The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues

Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, 363, 364; Secretary Hay’s note, 364–365; China’s own declaration, 365; Japan’s pledge to China, 366; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366–368...

The Russian counter-note having been received on October 3, Baron Komura began to confer with Baron Rosen upon the basis of both the Japanese note and the Russian reply.[629] Me...

It was in view of these dangerously unstable circumstances in Manchuria and Korea that, on June 23, 1903, the four principal members of the Japanese Cabinet[580] and five Privy...

As has been said, it appears impossible at the present state of our knowledge to trace the exact connection of Russia with the German occupation of Kiao-chau.[198] What is of mo...

From 1899, both Japan and Russia were represented at Seul by new Ministers, Mr. G. Hayashi and M. Paul Pavloff. The latter had been the _Chargé_ at Peking, where he had recently...

It will be remembered that we left the Russo-Chinese negotiation regarding Manchuria at the point where Prince Ching, either late in February or early in March, presented a coun...

The way in which the momentous _issues_ already discussed in the introductory chapter have been at work and have steadily culminated in the present conflict is with unusual clea...

See the virulent opposition of certain reactionaries of Korea against the railroad, shipping, and other economic enterprises of the Japanese in the peninsula, as expressed in a...

Regarded, however, from a broader point of view, no one could predict a happy consequence of so ominous a beginning, as has been described, of the new Eastern situation. By her...

The details of the negotiations preliminary to the consummation of this remarkable stroke of diplomacy have not been made public, but we are in possession of some salient facts...

The most important section of Manchuria, strategically, namely, that part of the Province of Sheng-king which lies east of the Liao River and the entire Province of Kirin, was t...

Manchuria, however, constituted only one half—perhaps the less important half—of the great Eastern problem which perplexed the world and imperiled the future life of Japan. In t...

It was as early as January 12 that the Japanese Government had made inquiries directly at the Russian Government regarding the contents of the Agreement reported to have been ma...

In the mean time, the Chinese Court[318] having largely emancipated itself from the sway of the reactionary Prince Tuan and his associates, the Representatives at Peking of the...

The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a parallel in the world’s history....

No sooner had the war broken out than the Japanese Government notified other Powers, on February 9, that it had advised the Chinese Government to observe a strict neutrality dur...

Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the Russian squadron. Its value as a commer...

We have given only an incomplete account of the manner in which certain Powers seemed, during the years 1897 and 1898, to vie with one another in transgressing, in effect, the p...

Russia did not wait long before reaching another “starting-point.” No sooner did the effort of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the late Viceroy Liu Kun-yi to create among the Repres...

Unsatisfactory as the Manchurian Agreement of April 8, 1902, appeared to Great Britain and Japan, they refrained from entering any protest against its conclusion. They probably...

When we recall that even before 1900 Russia desired to control the railway enterprises, not only in Manchuria, but also on the right side of the Liao River, it is not altogether...

It is unnecessary for us to describe how, between 1897 and 1899, other so-called spheres of influence and of economic concessions than those already mentioned were marked out in...

Japan’s second proposals, October 30, 324–328; Russia’s second counter-proposals, December 11, 328–329; Japan’s third proposals, December 23, 329–331; pacific declarations of Ru...

Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, 296–299; Russia’s assent, 299; political changes in Russia, and the Viceroy of the Far East, 299–302; Japan’s first proposals, Au...

Russian warships at Port Arthur, 111–112; British demand for the opening of Talien-wan, 113–118; Port Arthur and Talien-wan, the British and Russian Governments, 118–125; Wei-ha...

Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of the Queen, 257–261; the flight of the King, 262–263; the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura-Waeber Me...

Pavloff and Hayashi, 273; the Masampo affair, 274–278; abortive loans, 278–280; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at Seul, 280; the bank-note trouble, 281–282; the Keyserling wha...

A growing sympathy between Great Britain and Japan prior to the conclusion of the agreement, 197, 198; diplomatic steps toward the conclusion, 199–202; the Agreement of January...

The Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention, 173–176; China’s appeal, and the Powers’ protests, 176–178; Russia detached herself from the allies, 178–181; the amendments of March, 1901, 18...

The second evacuation, 239–241; new Russian demands, April 5, 1903, 241–244; the opposition of three Powers to the demands, 244–246; Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer, 246–248; Count...

The Russo-French loan and the Russo-Chinese Bank, 83–85; the agreement of alliance, 85–87; the “Cassini Convention,” 87–95; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of...

Peace negotiations at Peking, and Russia’s Manchurian policy, 162–165; the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement of November, 1900, 165–168; the protests of the Powers, 168–169; Count Lamsdo...