CHAPTER VII

NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA

The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a parallel in the world’s history. The affairs of the Extreme Orient had in general advanced to such a stage that no single Power could again seek to enforce its will without due regard to the interests of some other Powers. The Russian problem in Manchuria was, as will be seen after a little reflection, of such a nature that it could hardly be literally propounded before the world. The absorption of a vast and rich territory in China by a Power whose policy was known to be aggressive would at once arouse a determined protest of the Powers which were, from interest and from conviction, committed to the principles of the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the open door therein as the best means of insuring a lasting peace in the Far East. The Manchurian question had to be developed under a disguise until it would be, if ever, safe to cast aside the veil. Hence began Russia’s long, laborious effort to explain to the critical world certain crude facts and deeds in Manchuria in the terms of some refined foreign phrases—phrases whose significance in this particular case her rivals well knew, but which they could not repudiate so long as they themselves upheld the principles indicated by those phrases. However, the moment a complex diplomatic machinery relies upon subterfuges for its success, its ingenuity will be taxed to the utmost, or its unity will be in danger. For it will not be easy to make the entire body of diplomatic agents speak the same untruths at all places and at all times. As soon as one pretext is uncovered, another must be invented, as it were, on the spur of the moment, in order to cover the retreat from the last one—a necessary change which might render a quick readjustment of the entire organism to the newly created situation almost impossible. It would indeed have been one of the most striking feats of the government of a nation, if the artful diplomacy of Russia had been able to combat successfully to the end, with the enemy’s weapon, the straightforward statecraft of the partisans of fair play. Let us now observe in the remaining chapters of this work how this process went on, and how it finally defeated itself,—how ingenuity gave place to threats, and how diplomacy ended in war.

As has been suggested, Russia avowed that a point in her policy in China at the outbreak of the Boxer trouble was to assist the friendly Government of that Empire in suppressing the insurrection and restoring the normal order.[288] When, however, in spite of Count Muravieff’s inclination to regard this matter lightly, all the Powers concerned deemed the situation grave enough to justify sending forces to the rescue of their Representatives and subjects in Peking, it became necessary for Russia to act in concert with the others, instead of alone assisting China. Russia promptly, on June 16,[289] declared her intention to coöperate with the other Powers, and claimed, about a month later, to have proposed to the Powers the following “fundamental principles as their rule of conduct in relation to events in China,” which principles were agreed to by the majority of the Powers:[290] (1) Harmony among the Powers; (2) the preservation of the _status quo_ in China prior to the trouble; (3) the elimination of everything which might conduce to a partition of China; and (4) the reëstablishment by common action of the legitimate central Government at Peking, which would be able of itself to guarantee order and tranquillity in that country.[291] Probably before these propositions were penned by Count Muravieff, orders had been issued by Russia to mobilize large forces into Manchuria. In this territory and in North China, events progressed rapidly in the next few weeks, and, by the middle of August, the Legations had been relieved, and the three Eastern Provinces had largely fallen into the hands of the Russians. It is essential to bear in mind this dual state of affairs, for henceforth it appeared that the best efforts of Russian diplomacy were made at once, in one sense, in reconciling to one another, and, in another sense, in insisting upon, the widely different situations of Manchuria and of North China. On the one hand, the principle of the integrity of China applied to both regions alike, but, on the other, Russia steadily declined to admit that Manchuria was within the sphere of the concerted action of the Powers. Thus, in her famous circular of August 25,[292] she declared, in regard to Manchuria, where “temporary measures” of military occupation “had been solely dictated by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government,” that, as soon as peace was restored and the security of the railway was assured, “Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from the Chinese territory, provided such action did not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other Powers.”[293] From these words it was evident that Russia would not allow the Manchurian question to be discussed by the Powers, for she would withdraw from it, as she had occupied it, on her own initiative, and with no interference from others. More important still was the fact that Russia, from this time on, pledged to evacuate Manchuria under the apparently reasonable conditions—of the question of the fulfillment of which, however, Russia would be the sole judge—that peace and security was restored in the territory, and that other Powers did not interfere with her intentions. As regards North China, the circular bespoke a striking action on the part of Russia. Of the two original intentions of Russia, namely, the rescue of the Russian subjects in Peking and the assistance to China to restore peace, the first had now been accomplished, but the second was hindered by the absence of the Imperial Court from the capital. In these circumstances, Russia, seeing no reason for maintaining the Legations and allied forces in Peking, would now withdraw M. de Giers and the Russian troops to Tientsin. It was explained later[294] that, while the action of Russia was not a technical proposition to the other Powers, their concurrence in these measures would conduce to the return of the Court to the capital and facilitate the settlement of the affair between the allies and China. It is interesting to see that at the same time the Chinese Representative at St. Petersburg urgently begged Li Hung-chang to memorialize the Throne to the effect that an edict should be issued to show China’s severity and ability to maintain order when the European troops were withdrawn, and the intention of the Court to return shortly. The adoption of this course, it was thought, would allay the apprehensions of the allies regarding the withdrawal of their troops from Peking.[295] The Russian declaration, so far as it regarded North China, in spite of her avowal that she would act strictly in concert with the other Powers, was as surprising to some of the latter as it must have been pleasing to China.[296] As might be expected, the Powers, except France, doubted the practicability of so early an evacuation of Peking.[297] A similar proposition by Russia, dated September 17, so far as the withdrawal of the Legations to Tientsin was concerned, came to the same result.[298] Russia, on her part, actually withdrew her troops to Tientsin, but when peace negotiations were opened at Peking in October, her Minister was obliged to be present there. In the mean time, the different status in which Russia held Manchuria from North China was made evident by the vigorous prosecution of the campaign in the former. Ninguta, Kirin, and Tsitsihar fell into the Russian hands about the same time as the evacuation of Peking was announced; Liao-yang was taken late in September, and Mukden and Tieh-ling early in October. Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung were captured even so late as December. On September 7, a solemn thanksgiving was held at the site of the burned town Sakhalien on the right bank of the Amur across Blagovestchensk, in which General Gribsky delivered a speech, and the high priest Konoploff was reported to have said: “Now is the cross raised on that bank of the Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Muravieff foretold that sooner or later this bank would be ours.”[299]

Footnote 288:

The circular note addressed to the Powers on June 3/16, _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 49; the letter to the Chinese Government on June 11/24, _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor, _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105, etc.

The Emperor had sent a specially worded personal message to each of the heads of the French, German, Russian, British, American, and Japanese nations, once about July 19 and again on October 14, that is, before and after the capture of Peking by the allied forces. In each case the Emperor made a special appeal to the person addressed, and begged him to take the initiative in coming to China’s assistance in solving the situation. The various replies are highly instructive. It seems that the Czar supposed that he had alone been singled out by the Chinese Empire for the first special plea, and answered accordingly.

See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 1, 51, 56, 61, 78, 79, 105, 113, 252; _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 24, 72, 108, 134, 174, 197; _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 293–296.

Footnote 289:

_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149.

Footnote 290:

These principles, says Lord Salisbury, on July 15, “have never been accepted by Her Majesty’s Government, nor have we as yet discussed with other powers the circumstances to which those principles might possibly apply.”—_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 44. Secretary Hay thought that the Russian _Chargé’s_ oral communication was “not explicit enough” to enable him to comment upon the so-called fundamental principles of Russia.—_Ibid._, No. 114. Later, about July 30, Mr. Hay replied to Russia by referring to his own circular note of July 3, and said that he deemed it “premature to forecast the means of bringing about those results [i. e., the restoration of order and responsible government in China].”—_Ibid._, No. 140. It is particularly remarkable that two of the Powers most interested in the principles proposed by Russia should be so conservative when the question was propounded by that Power.

Footnote 291:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 1 and 18.

It is interesting to compare these “fundamental principles” of Russia with the principles laid down in Secretary Hay’s circular telegraph addressed to the Powers on July 3, or probably some days before the Russian note: “... The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore,” it said, “to act concurrently with the other Powers, first, in opening up communication with Peking and securing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disorders. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety, and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”—The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 299. It will be observed that the American note is not only probably earlier in date, but also much wider in scope, than the Russian propositions, for the former contains the open door principle, among others, which receives no reference in the latter. It should be remembered, however, that the American note was not a proposition to the other Powers.

Footnote 292:

_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 256.

Footnote 293:

Statements of similar import occur in the _Official Messenger_ of August 13, in the instructions given on October 25 by Count Lamsdorff to the Russian Representatives abroad, and those on December 28 by General Kuropatkin to the governors-general of the Amur and Kwan-tung Provinces. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 259–260.

Footnote 294:

Cf. _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315.

Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000 inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be questioned.”

Footnote 295:

_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 306. Also see No. 313.

On August 19 and 21, Li Hung-chang wired to Wu Ting-fang to urge upon the United States Government that, inasmuch as the declared purpose of the allies to relieve the Legations had now been accomplished, they should suspend hostilities, withdraw their troops, and appoint envoys to negotiate with China. See _ibid._, No. 239, and the 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 197, 288–290. We may naturally infer either that Li sent similar telegrams to Russia, or that Russia had consulted Li before the circular was sent to the Powers, the general tenor of thought is so alike in the telegrams and in the circular.

Footnote 296:

Russia herself was conscious of the fact that others attributed to her the motive of ingratiating herself with China at a critical moment by taking, separately from the other Powers, an action favorable to China. See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 19–20.

Footnote 297:

See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 275 (Austria); 280, 322, 328, (France); 309 (Italy); 281, 293, 305, 317, 318, 321, 327, 335, 378, 383 (England); 307; _No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 110, 124, 127 (Japan); _No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 270, 315; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. ii. pp. 304–305, 378–379, 205 (the United States). As a matter of fact, the Boxers still roamed about Peking, and the Chinese Court, which had fled to Ta-yuen, was still under the control of Prince Tuan and his associates. A hasty withdrawal of troops from Peking would have been disastrous in its effect upon the foreigners and native Christians.

Footnote 298:

See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 356 (Russian proposition); 371, 395, 401 (England); 398 (Italy); _No. 5 (1901)_, No. 128, (Japan); _House Documents_, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382.

Footnote 299:

_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 375.