CHAPTER XX. Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity 363

Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, 363, 364; Secretary Hay’s note, 364–365; China’s own declaration, 365; Japan’s pledge to China, 366; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366–368; its nature analyzed, 368–372.

INDEX 373

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

MAP SHOWING “THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO POWERS MEET” _Frontispiece_

COUNT CASSINI, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT WASHINGTON, AND FORMERLY AT PEKING 90

COUNT LAMSDORFF, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER 146

LI HUNG-CHANG 193

COUNT KATSURA, PREMIER OF JAPAN 202

M. LESSAR, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT PEKING 255

M. PAVLOFF, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SEUL 276 Copyright, 1902, by George Grantham Bain

BARON KOMURA, JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER 296

ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF, VICEROY OF THE FAR EAST 303

MR. KURINO, LATE JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG 331

BARON DE ROSEN, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT TOKIO 347

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

INTRODUCTORY

SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT

The deeper significance of the present dramatic struggle between Russia and Japan over territories belonging to neither of the contestants cannot perhaps be understood, until we examine some of the issues at stake between them. The more fundamental of these issues, however, as in many another international crisis, seem to be oftener understood than expressed, and hence understood only vaguely, although it may fairly be said that they constitute the very forces which have with irresistible certainty brought the belligerents into collision. For Japan, the issues appear to be only partly political, but mainly economical; and perhaps no better clue to the understanding, not only of the present situation, but also, in general, of the activities at home and abroad of the Japanese people, could be found than in the study of these profound material interests.

Among the most remarkable tendencies of Japan’s economic life of recent years has been the enormous increase of her population, along with an immense growth of her trade and industries. The number of her inhabitants increased from 27,200,000, as estimated in 1828, to only 34,000,000 in 1875, but since that year it has risen so fast that it is to-day 46,305,000[1]—exclusive of the 3,082,404[1] in Formosa and the Pescadores—and is increasing now at the annual rate of nearly 600,000. At the same time, the foreign trade of Japan has grown from 49,742,831 _yen_ in 1873 to 606,637,959 _yen_ in 1903. Up to the end of May, 1904, the total amount showed 274,012,437 _yen_, as compared with the 248,506,103 _yen_ of the same period of 1903.[2] The significance of these figures must be seen in the light of the important fact that the bulk of the increase in population and trade has been due to the decisive change of the economic life of the nation from an agricultural to an industrial stage. The new population seems to increase far more rapidly in the urban than in the rural districts, for if we consider as urban the inhabitants of communities containing each more than three thousand people, the ratio of the urban population to the rural may be estimated as 1 to 3. If only towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants each are included in the urban class, it is seen that their population increases annually 5 or 6 per cent., while the corresponding rate with the rural communities never rises above 3 per cent. and is usually much lower.[3] This comparatively rapid growth of the cities also indicates that the new population must be mainly supported by commerce and manufacture.

In 1903, 84.6 per cent. of the total export trade of Japan consisted of either wholly or partly manufactured articles.[4] On the other hand, agriculture has progressed only slowly,[5] and is no longer able either to support the increased population or to produce enough raw articles for the manufactures. The average annual crop of rice may be put at 210 million bushels, and that of barley, rye, and wheat, collectively called _mugi_, at 94.3 million bushels, while the average annual consumption of these cereals may safely be estimated, respectively, at 228.3 and 106.7 million bushels. In years of poor crops, the importation of rice, wheat, and flour amounts to large figures; as, for instance, in 1903, they together were imported to the value of about 67 million _yen_.[6] Raw material and food-stuffs, consisting of cotton, wool, rice, flour and starch, beans and oil-cakes, the importation of all of which was next to nothing twenty years ago, were in 1903 supplied from abroad to the value of 169,600,000 _yen_, or 53.5 per cent. of the total imports of Japan.[7] Japan will not only always have to rely upon foreign countries for the supply of these articles, but also have to import them in ever increasing quantities. Nor does agriculture occupy in the national finances the position it once did, for in 1875 the land tax, the incidence of which fell, as it still falls, very largely on the farmer, supplied 78 per cent. of the total revenue of the state, while the percentage fell, in the estimated budget for the fiscal year 1902–3, to 16, the actual amount also decreasing during the interval from 67.7 to 37 million _yen_, and the expenditures of the government, on the other hand, increasing from 73.4 million in 1874, to the enormous figure of 223.18 million _yen_ in 1904–5.[8]

No one can say a cheerful word about agriculture in Japan or the life of her farmer. Exclusive of Formosa, the development of which seems to lie in the direction of industry and trade rather than agriculture, less than 13,000,000 acres are under cultivation,[9] or, about 13 per cent. of the extent of the country, while the arable area of the land cannot possibly be increased by more than 10,500,000 acres,[10] so that the _per capita_ share of arable land is less than one half of an acre,[11] which is even below the corresponding rate in England and less than one half of that in China. Japan’s agricultural life can, however, be no more intensively improved than extensively enlarged. The sedimentary soil so well adapted to the rice cultivation and so abundantly blessed with moisture[12] is too minutely and carefully tilled, the climate conditions are too cleverly made use of,[13] and, above all, the lots of land are too diminutive,[14] to make the importation of new machinery and methods always profitable or desirable.[15] The day-laborers on the farm receive wages ranging between nine and fifteen cents, though the latter have risen more than 100 per cent. during the last fifteen years.[16] With this meagre income, some of the laborers have to support their aged parents, wives, and children. The tenants, whose number bears the ratio of about two to one[17] to that of the proprietors, live literally from hand to mouth, and cannot always afford even the necessary manure, and the proprietor’s profit hardly rises above 5 per cent., while the capital he employs pays an interest of 15 to 30 per cent.[18] and his local and central taxes further reduce his income. The farmer would in many cases be unable to subsist, were it not possible for him, as it fortunately is, to try his hand at silk-culture or some other subsidiary occupation.

Japan’s agriculture, then, can neither be much extended nor be greatly improved, can neither satisfy the old population nor support the new, and, above all, can only produce smaller and smaller portion of the necessary raw material for her growing industries. Under these circumstances, it is becoming more evident every year that the time is forever past when the nation could rely solely upon agriculture for subsistence. It is hardly necessary to repeat the well-known law of population—which is at the root of our subject—that every advance in the economic life of a nation creates a situation which is capable of supporting a larger population than in the preceding stage. What agriculture cannot support, industry and trade may. Japan’s growing population may only be supported, as it has already begun to be, by an increased importation of raw material and food-stuffs and an increased exportation of manufactures. Trade statistics unmistakably show that such markets for her manufactures and such supply regions of her raw and food articles are found primarily in East Asia, with which the commercial relations of Japan have grown 543 per cent. since 1890, as compared with the 161 per cent.[19] increase of the American and the 190 per cent. increase of the European trade,[20] until the East Asiatic trade amounted in 1903 to 295,940,000 _yen_ in value, or 48.7 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of Japan.[21] The following table gives a comparison of the importation in the years 1882, 1902, and 1903, of what may be considered as primarily East Asiatic products:[22]—

1882 1902 1903 Cotton 467,249 _yen_ 79,784,772 _yen_ 69,517,894 _yen_ Wool 3,397,564 4,811,811 Rice 134,838 17,750,817 51,960,033 Wheat 240,050 4,767,832 Flour 3,278,324 10,324,415 Beans 4,956,000 7,993,411 Oil-cakes 44,468 10,121,712 10,739,359

From these eloquent facts, the conclusion would seem tenable that, should the markets of East Asia be closed, Japan’s national life would be paralyzed, as her growing population would be largely deprived of its food and occupation. These markets, then, must be left as open as the circumstances permit, if Japan would exist as a growing nation. Observe here the tremendous significance for Japan of the principle of the “open door” as applied to East Asia—the principle, in a more accurate language, of the equal opportunity in East Asia for the economic enterprise of all foreign nations.[23]

In this great problem Manchuria and Korea occupy, perhaps, the most important position, for they together receive a large portion of the cotton yarn and cotton textiles exported from Japan, besides several other manufactured goods and coal, and in return supply Japan with much of the wheat and rice, and practically all of the millet, beans, and oil-cakes, imported into the country. Let us briefly demonstrate these statements by figures. First, consider the exportation of cotton yarns and textiles from Japan to Manchuria and Korea. It is rather difficult from the material on hand to estimate the exact ratio which the import of these articles from Japan into Korea and Manchuria bears to the total import of the same articles from all nations. In the case of Korea, we can make an approximate estimate, as we possess both the export values in Japan and import values in Korea, but with regard to Manchuria, we know only the quantities, but not the values, of the cotton goods imported. By assuming, however, that 40 per cent. of these goods imported by the Chinese Empire from Japan go to North China (of which Manchuria is here considered by far the most important part), it may be said, roughly, that in 1903 about 6 per cent. of the cotton yarn exported from Japan went to Korea and perhaps 40 per cent. to North China. The average import of this article during the past two years was probably 1,200,000 _yen_ in Korea and 8,000,000 _yen_ in North China, making the total about 36 per cent. of the export value in Japan. On the same basis of calculation, the average importation of cotton textiles from Japan during the past three years was 3,190,000 _yen_ in Korea and 765,000 _yen_ in North China, or about 69.5 per cent. of the entire export of these articles from Japan. These figures are only tentative, but may serve to show that Manchuria receives comparatively much yarn and Korea much textiles, and that they together receive at least a large percentage of those articles exported by Japan, where their manufacture occupies an increasingly important place in her economic life.[24] As to the exportation of agricultural products from Manchuria and Korea, it is seen that wheat is only beginning to be cultivated in Manchuria, while the rice cultivation is there practically unknown except in a few places near the Korean border, where during the campaign of 1894–5 the Japanese troops introduced it. The position which Korea occupies in the importation of wheat into Japan will be seen from the following table:—

Wheat imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[25] _kin_ = 1.325 lbs. av. _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

From │ 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 Australia │ 4,339,845 5,554,513 18,423 │ 143,260 185,274 721 ────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Korea │ 2,770,755 1,668,207 5,182,533 1,644,577 8,556,813 │ 72,698 71,764 132,734 43,875 237,217 ────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Great │ 457,450 Britain │ │ 15,502 ────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The United │ 2,039,371 395,009 12,370,022 1,388,372 864 States. │ │ 71,173 14,697 400,829 43,720 43 ────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Other │ 1,560 990 547 77,343 countries.│ │ 41 27 14 2,069 ════════════╪══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ Total │ 4,811,686 2,064,206 22,350,397 8,587,462 8,653,443 │ 143,913 86,489 692,341 272,869 240,050

A glance at these figures will show that the import trade of wheat, like that of rice, is dependent on many fluctuating conditions at home and abroad. The poor crop in Japan caused an enormous importation of wheat in 1903 to the value of 4,767,000 _yen_. From the above table, it is seen that Korea supplied during the five years, respectively, 57.5, 80.7, 23.1, 19.1, and 98.8 per cent., in weight, of the wheat imported into Japan. As regards rice, the following table will show that in the five years between 1898 and 1902 Korea supplied, respectively, 5.5, 26.5, 49.4, 46.8, and 19.8 per cent. in weight of the cereal imported into Japan:—

Rice imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[26] _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av. _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

From │ 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 British │ 2,663,087 53,827 249,344 220,650 1,793,362 India │ │ 11,642,416 174,507 973,747 876,057 7,530,356 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── China │ 967,216 60,323 83,998 227,234 90,401 │ 3,989,422 231,625 327,673 867,272 341,689 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Korea │ 649,570 436,716 1,131,787 1,456,661 891,186 │ 2,704,887 1,689,909 4,694,166 6,009,641 3,961,312 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Dutch │ 403 Indies │ │ 1,816 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── French │ 6,445,390 956,142 726,859 919,774 1,324,789 India │ │ 25,762,726 3,354,095 2,739,752 3,199,420 4,651,395 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Siam │ 969,413 143,575 94,530 287,594 409,307 │ 4,114,065 510,007 284,178 926,486 1,265,970 ───────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Other │ 1,576 9 58 25 27 countries│ │ 6,290 21 200 82 94 ═══════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ Total │ 11,696,252 1,650,592 2,286,979 3,111,938 4,509,072 │ 48,219,810 5,960,166 9,021,536 11,878,958 17,750,817

As will be seen in this table, much rice comes also from Saigon and Bangkok, to which, however, Japan hardly exports anything. In Korea, on the contrary, the greater her exportation of rice, the larger her purchasing power of the goods from the country to which the rice goes. In the case of beans and oil-cakes, Manchuria and Korea occupy in the list of the importation of these articles into Japan an even more important place than is the case with wheat or rice, as will be seen in the following table:—

Beans and oil-cakes imported into Japan in _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av. 1902,[27] _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

From │Beans, pease, and pulse Oil-cakes China │ 1,306,103 4,064,198 │ 3,524,138 8,656,775 ───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────── Korea │ 777,151 5,671 │ 2,254,899 12,331 ───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────── Russian Asia │ 545 345,022 │ 1,505 1,448,868 ───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────── French India │ 742 │ 2,178 ───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────── The United States │ 281 │ 2,405 ───────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────── Other countries │ 545 846 │ 1,582 3,738 ═══════════════════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════ Total │ 2,086,367 4,415,737 │ 5,786,707 10,121,712

An explanation is necessary that, to all probability, much of the oil-cakes from Russian Asia was reëxported from Manchuria. In 1903, beans and oil-cakes were imported to the value of, respectively, 7,993,000 and 10,739,000 _yen_. In considering all these facts as a whole, attention is called to a point of immense importance, that Manchuria and Korea supply Japan with necessaries of life, and receive in return, in the main, useful goods, instead of wares of luxury. We shall have occasion further to develop this point.

Let us now take a general survey of the position Japan holds in the trade relations of Korea and Manchuria. In Korea, whence the Chinese merchants withdrew during the China-Japan war of 1894–5 and were replaced by the Japanese traders,[28] it is Japan alone of all trading nations which enjoys a large share both in the import and export trade, as is suggested in the following table:—

Japan’s export Total import of Japan’s import Total export of to Korea Korea from Korea Korea 1902 10,554,000 _yen_ (13,823,000 _yen_) 7,958,000 _yen_ (8,460,000 _yen_) 1903 11,764,000 (18,207,000) 8,912,000 (9,472,000)

while the grains exported from Korea go almost entirely to Japan, different ports of Korea present of course different characteristics in their trade with Japan: as, for instance, at Chemulpo the Chinese merchants still enjoy a considerable share in the import trade; at Seul nearly all the export consists of gold bullion, which is almost exclusively bought by the branch of the First Bank of Japan; while at Fusan and Mokpo the Japanese monopoly of trade is almost complete. With these variations, however, the Japanese merchants control the major part of the trade of each port, and consequently of the entire trade of Korea. They also carry a large amount of foreign goods to Korea, as seen in the following table:—

Japanese goods Foreign goods 1902 9,344,859 _yen_ 1,209,332 _yen_ 1901 10,410,563 961,897 1900 9,423,821 529,450[29]

The shipping also is largely in the hands of the Japanese. In 1903, their share in the Korean shipping was as follows:[30]—

Vessels Tonnage Korean 25 per cent. 9+ per cent. Japanese 61+ 78+ Russian 2+ 9+ Others 11+ 4–

Turning to Manchuria, it is found that Japan controlled in 1902 more than 44 per cent. of the shipping tonnage,[31] besides 40 per cent. of the direct import trade and over 90 per cent. of the export trade, as is shown below:[32]—

Exports (Japan) Imports (Japan) 1901 1,080,345_l._ ( 970,663_l._) 635,085_l._ (247,624_l._) 1902 1,130,429_l._ (1,041,395_l._) 695,020_l._ (280,843_l._) Average five years, 1896–99 and 1891 965,553_l._ ( 880,917_l._) 433,811_l._ (131,143_l._)

at Niu-chwang, which was then the only important port in Manchuria open to foreign trade under the ordinary customs rules.[33]

In this connection, it should be remembered that both the Korean and Manchurian trade are of recent origin. Niu-chwang was opened as a treaty port in 1858, but its commercial importance may be said to date from 1899. Korea’s foreign trade did not begin till 1884, and it exceeded 10,000,000 _yen_ for the first time in 1895. The rapid growth of the trade of these places has been largely due to the increasing trade activity of Japan. In the case of Niu-chwang, it is true the development of its import trade has been as much owing to the energy of the Americans as to that of the Japanese, but its export business would be meagre, and would consequently reduce the imports also, but for Japanese activity. The recent increase in the production of millet in Manchuria, for instance, may be said to be entirely due to Japanese trade at Niu-chwang. Of the three staple products of Western Manchuria, tall millet is consumed by the natives, and beans are partly consumed and partly exported, while millet is cultivated purely for the purpose of exportation. It began to be exported to Korea in August, 1901, and to Japan in 1902. Since the latter year, Japan’s demand for millet has steadily increased, and has caused a considerable rise in its price at Niu-chwang. The cultivation of millet, therefore, is a pure gain that has been created by the trade relations of Manchuria with Japan.[34] Far more important than millet as articles for exportation are beans and bean-cakes. The entire trade conditions at Niu-chwang may be said to depend upon the amount of the sale of these articles. The more they are sold, the greater is the importing capacity of the people of Manchuria. The nation which buys beans and bean-cakes in the largest quantities naturally commands the greatest facility in pushing their imports into Niu-chwang. The exportation of these goods doubled during the ten years between 1889 and 1898, while the amount of the bean production in Manchuria for 1900 was estimated at between 1,930,000 and 2,450,000 _koku_. Both the production and the exportation must now be much greater. The increase was due in the main to the growing demand in Japan for beans and bean-cakes, as witness the following ratios of exports to China and Japan from Niu-chwang:—

Beans Bean-cakes To China To Japan To China To Japan 1889 98.0% 2.0% 95.8% 4.2% 1893 67.5% 32.5% 68.3% 31.7% 1897 60.7% 39.3% 50.2% 49.8%

In 1903, the ratios must have been much greater for Japan than for China. The increasing demand for these products has induced many Chinese to migrate from Shan-tung to Southern and Western Manchuria and cultivate beans.[35] As regards the Korean trade, the following table will speak for itself:—

Korean trade in Korean export Total Japan-Korea merchandise of gold trade 1897 19,041,000 _yen_ 2,034,000 _yen_ 21,075,000 _yen_ 14,061,000 _yen_ 1898 17,527,000 2,375,000 19,902,000 10,641,000 1899 15,225,000 2,933,000 18,158,000 11,972,000 1900 20,380,000 3,633,000 24,013,000 18,759,000 1901 23,158,000 4,993,000 28,151,000 21,425,000 1902 (22,280,000) 5,064,000 (27,344,000) 18,512,000 1903 27,679,000 5,456,000 33,135,000 20,676,000

If we examine the causes of the growth of individual open ports in Korea, nothing can be plainer than that it has almost entirely resulted from the increasing trade relations between Korea and Japan. It is needless to mention Fusan, for its trade is nearly synonymous with its Japanese trade. Kunsan was opened on May 1, 1899, and its population was only 300 till two years ago, but the great demand by Japan for the rice coming through this port has already tended to enlarge the number of its inhabitants up to 2000 or more.[36] Similar remarks may be made of Mokpo, Chinnampo, and other ports.[37] Most conspicuous, however, is the case of Chemulpo. In 1883, when it was opened as a treaty port, it contained only a few fishers’ houses, but now it holds a population of 15,000, and occupies a position in Korea similar to that of Shanghai in China. Of the inhabitants of the ports, 8000, or more than a half, are Japanese. Streams of Koreans also have flowed hither from inland towns, for there the officials oppress people, while here they are so constantly viewed by the foreigners that undue exactions are impossible.[38] We have already noted the important fact that Korea and Manchuria on the one hand and Japan on the other exchange, not wares of luxury, but useful and necessary articles. We have now come to another equally important fact, that the growth of the Manchurian and Korean trade depends largely upon the commercial activity of Japan. From these considerations, it would seem safe to say that the trade interests of the three countries are largely _common_, for the more Korea and Manchuria export to Japan, the greater will be their purchasing power of Japanese goods, and, also, the larger the exportation from Japan to Manchuria and Korea, the more readily they will dispose of their products to her. On the one hand, Korea and Manchuria encourage the growth of Japan’s manufacture, and supply her with food and manure; on the other hand, the economic development and prosperity of Korea and Manchuria must be largely determined by the increasing demand for their products by Japan, and the easy supply of their wants from Japan. The future growth of the three nations, then, must in a large measure depend upon the intimate progress, of their trade interests, which, therefore, not only are common, but should be increasingly common. If the history of the past suggests the probable development in the future, there is every reason to believe that, with reformed systems of currency and improved and extended cultivation of land and means of transportation, the trade of Manchuria and Korea will show a tremendous increase, and then the community of interest between them and Japan will be most profound.

This theme of the community of interest may further be elaborated. Korea and Manchuria may with profit remain open, not only for the trade, but also for the emigration and industrial enterprise, of the Japanese people. Since 1902 no passports have been required for travelers from Japan to Korea, whither, in spite of the occasional obstacles placed in their way by Korean officials, the emigrants have proceeded, now for years, in increasing numbers, until there resided in 1903 nearly thirty thousand Japanese in the Peninsula.[39] It takes only thirteen hours on sea from Bakan in Japan to Fusan in Korea, and the cost is even less than that of sailing to the Japanese colony of Formosa, the former being fifteen _yen_ and the latter twenty. It seems easier to go from Bakan to Fusan than it is from Osaka to the Hokkaidō within Japan proper.[40] The expense of living in Korea is also as low as one third the corresponding figure in Japan, a monthly income of ten or thirteen _yen_ being considered sufficient to support a family of three persons in a rented house.[41] It is not strange, under these conditions, that the Japanese migrate to Korea, not always singly, like the Chinese, but often in families,[42] so that their settlements assume there a normal and permanent character unseen even in Japan’s own island of Formosa. Nor are all these colonists mere laborers like their brethren in Manchuria and the Hawaiian Islands, but many are independent men of business. They also naturally manifest a stronger sense of kinship and coöperation in Korea than the merchants and capitalists do in Japan. In several Korean towns these Japanese settlers have established their own municipalities, with modern improvements, chambers of commerce, police, and public schools, all of which compare favorably with those of the larger cities in Japan, and the advantages of which are enjoyed by native Koreans and resident Chinese. It is said that in some places the influx of the Japanese and their investments have caused a rise in the price of land and house rent.[43] In Fusan, the port nearest to Japan, the 10,000 Japanese who live there own large tracts of land and occupy the main sections of the city. Here and everywhere else the Japanese colonists seem to hold a position similar to that of the foreigners living in the so-called settlements in the larger treaty ports of China. Tourists are wont to contrast the clean and well-ordered streets and the general energetic appearance of the Japanese quarters in Korean cities with the comparatively filthy and slothful Korean quarters. The branches of the First Bank of Japan have been issuing recently one-, five-, and ten-_yen_ bank-notes,[44] which have been of immense value to the foreign trade in Korea, the native currency of which is in a deplorable condition.[45] The coasting and river navigation, so far as it concerns foreign trade, is largely controlled by the Japanese, who, besides, own the only railway line in operation in Korea, twenty-six miles long, running between the capital, Seul, and its port Chemulpo.[46] They are also building,[47] under the management of substantially the same company, another and longer line—two hundred and eighty-seven miles—between Seul and the port of Fusan, which passes through the richer and economically by far the more important half of the Peninsula.[48] It is not impossible to suppose that the Japanese people will succeed in their efforts to secure the right of extending this line beyond Seul up to Wiju on the northern border,[49] and thence ultimately connecting it with the Eastern Chinese and the Peking-Shanghaikwan-Sinminting Railways, so as to render the connection by rail between Fusan and China and Europe complete.[50] The Mitsui Produce Company, another Japanese concern, monopolized the export of Korean ginseng, and, in 1903, despite the competition of the Russian Baron Gunzburg,[51] succeeded in extending the term of the monopoly for five years. Twenty to forty thousand Japanese fishermen along the Korean coast report an annual catch amounting sometimes to large figures.

No part of Korea’s economic life, however, would seem to be of greater importance to her own future, or to depend more closely upon the enterprise of the Japanese settlers, than her agriculture. If it is remembered that nearly all her exports consist of agricultural products, and also that they largely supply the needs of Japan, we can readily comprehend the great community of interest felt by both countries in the agriculture of the Peninsula. It is remarkable to note, to take a single instance, that the production of cereals and beans (respectively about eight and four million _koku_) in Korea has grown to its present dimensions largely owing to the stimulus given to it by the increased demand for these articles in Japan.[52] We shall presently note also that, owing to the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Korea, her purchasing power and general commercial activity are so completely ruled by the conditions of her weather and crops as is seldom the case with other agricultural nations. The Koreans are comparatively happy in good years, while in bad years they are reduced to great miseries and bandits infest all parts of the country. Upon the state of her agriculture, then, must depend the trade conditions of Korea, as well as most of her material strength and much of that of Japan. From this it is plain that the profound community of interest of the two nations calls for both the extension and the improvement of the agriculture of Korea. It is estimated that the extent of her land under cultivation is hardly more than 3,185,000 acres, or about 6.3 per cent. of the 82,000 square miles known as the total area of the country,[53] and that there exist at least 3,500,000 more acres of arable land, which would be fully capable of sustaining five or six millions of new population, and of increasing the annual crops of the land by not less than 150,000,000 _yen_.[54] Unfortunately, however, the Koreans lack energy to cultivate those three and a half million acres of waste land. For it is well known that the irregular but exhaustive exactions of the Korean officials have bred a conviction in the mind of the peasant that it is unwise to bestir himself and earn surplus wealth only to be fleeced by the officials. His idleness has now for centuries been forced, until it has become an agreeable habit. It is in this state of things that is has often been suggested that the cultivation of the waste lands may most naturally be begun by the superior energy of the Japanese settlers.[55] Not less important than the cultivation of new land is the improvement of old land in Korea, where the art of husbandry is far less advanced than in either China or Japan. Lots are marked out carelessly, improvements are crude, and the manure most universally used is dried grass. The great rivers with all their numerous ramifications are hardly utilized for the purpose of irrigation, and the forests have been mercilessly denuded for fuel and in order to forestall the requisition of the government,—which formerly used to order without compensation the cutting and transporting of trees by their owners,—so that a slight drought or excess of rain works frightful disasters upon agriculture. Another serious effect of the absence of a good system of irrigation is the comparative want of rice land, which always requires a most careful use of water.[56] These conditions are all the more to be regretted, when it is seen that the soil is generally fair and the climate favorable. The cultivation of rice is said to have been first taught by the Japanese invaders toward the end of the sixteenth century, and yet, with all their primitive method, the Koreans are already exporting rice to the value of four million _yen_ or more. Sericulture is still in its infancy, while tea, cotton, hemp, sugar, and various fruits are all declared to be tolerably well suited to the soil. The Japanese farmer finds here, particularly in the south, a climate and general surroundings very similar to his own, and otherwise eminently agreeable to his habits, and, along with the application of his superior methods of cultivation, irrigation, and forestry, the common interests of his country and Korea are bound to develop with great rapidity. The progress of agriculture would also gradually lead the Koreans into the beginnings of an industrial life, while the expanding systems of railways and banking would be at once cause and effect of the industrial growth of the nation. Another inevitable result would be the development of the economic sense and the saving capacity of the Korean, the latter of which has had little opportunity to grow, not so much because of his small wage and high rent and interest, as because of the onerous, irregular local dues and the systematic exactions in various forms by the official.[57] An advanced economic life, itself necessitating a reform of the official organization, would at least make it possible for the peasant to work, earn, and save. Simultaneously and in increasing degree would his wants, as well as his purchasing power, increase. Around the progress of Korea’s agriculture, then, must be built all other measures of her growth and power, as, for instance, transportation, industries, trade and commerce, finance, political reform, and military strength. In no other way can we conceive of the possibility of her effective independence, the cause of which has cost Japan, and is now costing her, so dearly. In no other light can we interpret the Korean sovereignty under the assistance of Japan.

In regard to Manchuria, where the chances for development are far vaster, the Japanese people do not possess there as large vested interests, but entertain as great expectations for its future settlement and industry as in Korea. It was estimated before the present war that there resided more than ten thousand Japanese in Manchuria, who were either under the employment of Russian authorities in public works along the railway, or engaged in such small occupations as laundry work, carpentry, restaurant-keeping, photographing, and hair-dressing,[58] while many of the Japanese women, whose numbers in many a town preponderated over those of men, had been allured by unscrupulous parties, who consigned them to disreputable occupations. Merchants and business men of greater capital and resources would be, as they often have been, attracted to Manchuria, were it not for the exclusive, and in the hands of some of their officials, arbitrary, measures of the Russians.[59] Under normal conditions of peace and “open door,” the immensely greater resources of Manchuria and the much greater productiveness of its people[60] would seem to promise even a more important economic future than in Korea.

In summing up our preceding discussion, it may be stated that the natural growth or unnatural decay of the Japanese nation will greatly depend—ever more greatly than it now does—upon whether Manchuria and Korea remain open or are closed to its trade, colonization, and economic enterprise; and that, in her imperative desire for the open door, Japan’s wish largely coincides with that of the European and American countries, except Russia, whose over-production calls for an open market in the East.

Thus far we have discussed only Japan’s side of the economic problem in Manchuria and Korea. Passing to Russia’s side, it is seen that her vested interests in Manchuria are as enormous as her commercial success there has been small. The building of the Eastern Chinese Railway has cost the incredible sum of 270,000,000 rubles, making the average cost per verst more than 113,000 rubles,[61] or over $87,000 per mile, besides 70,000,000 rubles lost and expended during the Boxer outrages and Manchuria campaign of 1900,[62] to say nothing of the normal annual cost of guarding the railway by soldiers, estimated at 24,000,000 rubles.[63] The investments in permanent properties alone, besides the railway, are moderately valued at 500,000,000 rubles.[64] In return for these heavy outlays, the trade relations between Russia and Manchuria have been most disappointing. Though it is not possible to obtain the exact figures of the actual trade between Manchuria and European Russia, we can establish approximate estimates in the following manner. According to official returns, exports from Russia to her Far Eastern Possessions were as follows:—

1900 56,000,000 rubles 1901 51,000,000 1902 38,000,000

The decline must be largely due to the decreased demand for military and railway supplies, for it is seen that the falling-off has been most conspicuous in iron and steel wares and machinery.[65] At the same time there was little or no import trade from the Russian possessions in the East into Russia, for the native products sent out from the former never passed beyond Eastern Siberia. It would be interesting if we could find out how much of these Russian exports went to Manchuria. The figures for the Pacific ports are given as follows:[66]—

1900 51,157,000 rubles 1901 49,827,000 1902 37,704,000

If these figures are reliable, the difference between them and those given above, namely:—

1900 less than 5,000,000 rubles 1901 more than 1,000,000 1902 less than 300,000

might be considered an approximate amount of the export trade from Russia to Manchuria (and Mongolia, which imports very little from Russia), for, of the Pacific ports, no other port but Vladivostok reëxports Russian goods into Manchuria, which reëxportation seems to be slight enough to be ignored. The approximate correctness of the figures is further seen from the fact that of the total 8,193,000 rubles of the Manchurian trade at Blagovestchensk, Habarofsk, and the South Ussuri region—the three main points of transit trade with Manchuria—only one half showed exports to Manchuria, and again, of this one half, only a portion consisted of reëxported Russian goods. The South Ussuri district, for instance, sent only 130,800 and 206,000 rubles’ worth of Russian and foreign goods to Manchuria, out of the total export trade of 799,500 and 2,221,300 rubles, respectively, in 1898 and 1899.[67] On the other hand, before the opening of the Manchurian Railway (which took place in February, 1903), the _direct_ trade between Russia and the interior of Manchuria must have been so slight as not to materially affect the sum-total of the Russian-Manchurian trade.

This remarkably unfavorable trade between Manchuria and Russia was probably due to a decreased demand for military supplies since 1900 (for Russia has little to export from Manchuria, and Chinese teas have largely gone through Kiakhta or by the Amur, rather than by the Manchurian Railway), and also to the difficulty of further reducing the freight rates on the railway,[68] and of competing successfully with the American and Japanese traders in certain articles for importation.[69] In spite of all the effort made by the late Finance Minister, M. Witte, Russia is not yet primarily a manufacturing country, her exportation of manufactured goods forming in fact only 2.5 per cent. of her entire export trade, and at best remaining stationary during the three years 1900–2, as will be seen below:—

1900 1901 1902 Rubles Rubles Rubles Total exports from Russia 688,435,000 729,815,000 825,277,000 Exports of manufacturers 19,553,000 21,039,000 19,263,000[70]

Russia’s commercial failure in Manchuria in the past would, however, in no way justify the inference that the future will be as disappointing. All competent observers seem to agree that the undeveloped resources of the 364,000 square miles of Manchuria are enormous.[71] Its unknown mineral wealth, its thousands of square miles of land now under the bean and millet cultivation, but beginning to yield to the wheat culture and producing wheat at a market price of not more than forty cents per bushel, and its extensive lumber districts, as well as its millions of cheap and most reliable Chinese laborers,[72] would before long enable the Russians successfully to convert Manchuria into one of the richest parts of China and one of the richest countries in the world. A success of such magnitude must, however, largely depend upon a systematically protective and exclusive policy on the part of Russia, or, in other words, upon the completeness with which Russia transfers the bulk of the Manchurian trade from the treaty port of Niu-chwang, and, so far as the Russian import from China is concerned, even from the once important Russian port of Vladivostok, to the commercial terminus of the Manchurian Railway—Dalny. Particularly in order to capture the import trade into Manchuria of cotton goods and kerosene oil, in the face of the great advantages enjoyed by American and Japanese competitors, Russia must at all costs make Dalny overshadow Niu-chwang, so as to bring the trade under her complete control. Nothing but a highly artificial system could accomplish such wonders, for, under normal conditions, teas for Russia would go by the less costly routes through Kiakhta, or up the Amur, or by sea to Odessa; the native products of Manchuria for exportation to Japan would be sent to Niu-chwang by the nearest, cheapest, and most natural channel, the Liao River, and, when the latter freezes between the end of November and March, by the Shan-hai-kwan Railway; and, finally, the smaller cost of production and lower rates of freight of the American and Japanese cotton fabrics would completely outdistance the Russian. Let us observe with what artificial measures the Russians have been meeting this situation. With a view to diverting the tea trade from Vladivostok to Dalny, Russia imposed an import duty of 3 rubles per pood from August, 1902, and increased it in May, 1903, to 25.50 rubles,[73] which with other measures dealt a crushing blow to the prosperity of Vladivostok.[74] This must at least have stifled the transportation of tea up the Amur, without, perhaps, affecting the inroad of teas through the old Kiakhta and by sea.[75] As regards the export trade at Niu-chwang, the Russians took advantage of the important fact that the Shan-hai-kwan Railway did not penetrate sufficiently north to reach some producing centres of Western Manchuria, while the waters of the Liao were navigable only 200 miles from the mouth, and were, together with the harbor itself, ice-bound from November till March. Dalny was nearly ice-free, and the Manchurian Railway was available through all seasons. The only competitors of the railroad would seem to be the small bean-carrying junks plying down the Liao, which were both owned and loaded by the same Chinese merchants. This competition the Russians met by greatly reduced freight rates of the railway, which made it possible for every 100 poods of Manchurian grain and beans to be carried 600 miles between Harbin and Dalny for about fifty-seven cents gold, or $10 per ton.[76] From Dalny, heavily subsidized Russian boats transported Manchurian exports to Japan at a freight rate which, in conjunction with railway rates, amounted to the saving by the shipper of 4.50 _yen_ per ton, as compared with the railway-rates _plus_ the freight-rates of non-Russian vessels.[77] When the flour industry of the Russian towns in Manchuria is developed, Russian steamers may be seen carrying flour from Dalny, not only to Japan, but to Chinese and Eastern Siberian ports. As for the import trade of Manchuria, the Russians, who have ousted American importers of kerosene oil at Vladivostok, seem to be now by energetic methods slowly driving away the same rivals from Chemulpo and from Dalny.[78] Vastly more important as articles for importation than kerosene oil are cotton yarn and textiles, which are annually supplied from abroad to the value of over 12,000,000 _taels_. By far the greater part of sheetings, drills, and jeans comes from America. The Russians were not unable to produce cotton fabrics almost as good as the American goods, but the trans-Siberian freight was twice as expensive as the Pacific transportation, and could not be expected to be further reduced without great difficulty.[79] It was not impossible to suppose that the Russian Government might ultimately apply to Manchuria the system of granting a premium and an additional drawback on textiles made from imported cotton, which had been in successful operation in Persia. There was no question but that, together with the development of Manchuria under Russian control, foreigners would lose most of their import trade in lumber, butter, and flour, and here again the Russian success must depend on the exclusiveness of their policy.[80] Mr. H. B. Miller, the United States Consul at Niu-chwang, seems to have made a delicate reference to this point when he said, in his report dated December 5, 1903: “The United States trade in Manchuria with the Chinese amounted to several millions of dollars per year, and was almost entirely imports. It had grown very fast, and would have had an extended and most substantial increase without the Russian development, for the country was being improved and extensively developed with a continual immigration from other provinces in China, before the railway construction began.”[81] Much has been said regarding the oft-reiterated wish of Russia to keep Dalny as a free port, but it is well known that it has recently been placed under a protective tariff.[82] We are not in possession of the details of this tariff, but its general significance can hardly be mistaken when we see how the Russians have been reducing freight rates to the utmost, subsidizing their own steamers, and pooling together their great banking and railway facilities, all for the purpose, on the one hand, of developing Russian industries in Manchuria, and on the other, of monopolizing the bulk of its trade.

Not only in trade, but in colonization also, the Russians have been building up new cities and developing old ones under their exclusive policy with an unheard-of rapidity. Dalny is a good example of the former class. Still more conspicuous is the city of Harbin, the so-called Moscow of Asia, the geographical and commercial centre and headquarters of the railway work in Manchuria, which is said to have consisted of a single Chinese house in 1898,[83] but now contains 50,000 people.[84] Well might Count Cassini, as he did, refer, not only to the colonization, but to the general civilizing influence of the Russians in Manchuria in the following language:[85] “Through the pacific channels of diplomacy my government acquired privileges which, accepted in good faith, have been exercised in a spirit of true modern progressiveness, until now the flower of enlightened civilization blooms throughout a land that a few years ago was a wild, and in many parts a desolate, seemingly unproductive waste. Before the signing of the treaty which I had the honor to negotiate in behalf of my Sovereign, giving to Russia railroad and other concessions in Manchuria, no white man could have ventured into that province without danger to his life.... Upon the basis of the rights to commercial exploitation thus peaceably obtained, Russia built a railway into and through Manchuria. She built bridges, roads, and canals. She has built cities whose rapid construction and wonderful strides in population and industry have no parallel, certainly in Europe and Asia, perhaps even in America. Harbin and Dalny are monuments to Russian progressiveness and civilization. These great undertakings, wonderful even in a day of marvelous human accomplishment, have cost Russia more than 300,000,000 dollars.” Without stopping either to dispute the historical accuracy of Count Cassini’s statement or to deny the wonderful work the Russians have accomplished in Manchurian cities, it seems pertinent to call our attention to the exclusive side of the Russian enterprise in this vast territory. Harbin is one of the so-called “depots,” over eighty in number, which are found along the whole length of the Manchurian Railway, each one of which extends over several square miles, within which none but the Russians and Chinese have the right of permanent settlement.[86] Russia would not consent to the opening of Harbin (and, presumably, all other cities within the “depots” of the Manchurian Railway) to foreign trade. Even outside of these cities, the Russian Government appeared to be opposed to the opening of new ports, and when it was no longer politic to continue the opposition, Russia informed other Powers in 1903 that she had no intention of objecting to the opening of new treaty ports “without foreign settlements” in Manchuria.[87]

The meaning of all these protective and exclusive measures becomes plain, when it is seen that the complete control of the economic resources of Manchuria would give Russia, not only sufficient means to support Eastern Siberia, but also a great command over the trade of China and Japan. The latter country Russia might be able to reduce to dire distress, when necessary, by closing the supplies coming from Manchuria, upon which Japan will have to depend every year more closely than before.[88] The success of these great designs on the part of Russia would depend upon how completely protective and exclusive her Manchurian policy can be made.

Coming from Manchuria to Korea, we find the economic position of the Russians in a totally different situation, for either their vested or even their potential interests in the Peninsula were slight, excepting, perhaps, their already acquired timber concessions[89] on the northern frontier and the Kaiserling whale fishery on the northeastern coast.[90] It has been pointed out, however, that the fact that Dalny was not altogether ice-free made Russia covet Chemulpo or some other trade port on the western coast of Korea.[91] However that may be, it is safe to say that Russia’s interests in Korea are slightly economic, but almost wholly strategic and political.

Let us sum up our discussion at this point, and compare the economic interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. In Manchuria, both Powers seek trade and colonization, with the important difference that Japan’s interests are actually great and potentially greater, while those of Russia are both actually and potentially preponderant. A difference of greater moment lies, however, in the fact that, so far as her trade and industry are concerned, Japan’s interests call for an equal opportunity there for all industrial nations, while Russia’s interests may be maintained and developed only by a highly exclusive policy. In Korea, its opening for the trade, settlement, and enterprise of the Japanese is not only the most natural method of strengthening Korea herself, but also a primary condition for the life and growth of Japan. Russia’s economic interests there, on the other hand, may be measured by the number of her resident subjects and the extent of their enterprise, which are, outside of Yong-am-po, next to nothing. Her interests, being, as we shall soon see, mainly strategic and political, demand here also a policy directly opposed to the open door. If we now consider Manchuria and Korea together, it may be said that Russia’s economic interests are, even in Manchuria, rather for her glory as a great, expanding empire than for any imperative need of trade and emigration in that particular part of her Asiatic dominion, while similar interests of Japan, primarily in Korea and secondarily in Manchuria, are vital, as they are essential for her own life and development as a nation. The case for Russia can, perhaps, never be understood until her _political_ issues are examined.

Politically, also, the interests of the two Powers are found to be directly opposed to one another. It has been rightly said that Manchuria is the keynote of the Eastern policy of Russia. Besides its immense wealth still unexploited, Manchuria possesses the great Port Arthur, which is the only nearly ice-free naval outlet for Russia in her vast dominion in Asia, while the 1500 miles of the Manchurian Railway, together with the Great Siberian Railway, connect this important naval station with the army bases in Siberia and European Russia, so that Manchuria alone would seem to be politically more valuable for Russia than the rest of her Asiatic territories. Without Manchuria, Russia would be left inclosed in the ice-bound Siberia, with no naval or commercial outlet during nearly five months of each year. With Manchuria, Russia’s traditional policy, which has repeatedly failed since Peter the Great on the Baltic Sea and other European waters, as also on the Persian Gulf,—the policy of becoming the dominant naval power of the world,—would at last begin to be realized. The very importance of Manchuria for Russia, however, constitutes a serious menace to Japan and to the general peace of the Far East. In the first place, the Russian control of Port Arthur gives her a large measure of control over the water approaches to Peking, while the Mongolian Railway now reported to be in contemplation would bring Russian land forces directly upon the capital of the Chinese Empire. The very integrity of China is threatened, and a more serious disturbance of the peace of the world could hardly be imagined than the general partition and internal outbreaks in China which would follow the fall of Peking under the pressure of Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia. Not less grave is the fact that Manchuria is geographically and historically connected with the Peninsula of Korea,[92] which makes Russia’s occupation of Korea a necessary adjunct of her possession of Manchuria. Geographically considered, there exists no abrupt change from the eastern part of Manchuria to the northern half of Korea,[93] which fact goes far to explain the Russian solicitude to obtain railway and other concessions between the frontier and Seul. Even more serious conditions exist on the southern coast of Korea, which contains the magnificent harbor of Masampo, which constitutes the Gibraltar between the Russian fleets at the ice-bound and remote Vladivostok and the incommodious and not altogether ice-free Port Arthur, with no effective means of connecting them. By controlling this coast, Russia would not merely possess a truly ice-free, and the best naval port to be found in East Asia,[94] but also at last feel secure in Manchuria and complete her Far Eastern design of absorbing Korea and China and pressing down toward India. If, on the contrary, another Power should control Masampo, it would be able to watch the movement of the Russian fleets in their attempts to unite with one another, and also seriously impede the greatest hopes of Russia’s Eastern expansion. From Japan’s standpoint, the Russian occupation of this section of Korea would not only possibly close Korea against her trade and enterprise, but also threaten her own integrity. Only fifty miles away lie the Japanese islands of Tsushima, which Russia has always coveted, and which would have been hers had it not been for the shrewd diplomacy of the late Count Katsu.[95] From Tsushima the mainland of Japan is visible on the eastern horizon, so that the presence of Russia at Masampo would arouse in the heart of Japan the most profound feeling of unrest. Russia must have Masampo, and Japan must not let her have it.

In concluding our discussion of the vital issues, both economical and political, which are at stake, it would seem that Manchuria is for Japan a great market as well as an increasingly important supply region of raw and food products and a field for emigration, while for Russia it is the keynote of her Eastern policy, and economically the most promising of all her Asiatic possessions. On the other hand, Korea is essential for Russia for the completion of her Manchurian policy,[96] and for strengthening enormously her general position in the East. For Japan, Korea is nothing short of one half of her vitality. By the opening or closing, strength or weakness, independence or fall, of Korea, would Japan’s fate as a nation be decided. On the contrary, Russia, with Manchuria and ultimately Korea in her hands, would be able, on the one hand, to build up under her exclusive policy a naval and commercial influence strong enough to enable her to dominate the East, and, on the other, to cripple forever Japan’s ambition as a nation, slowly drive her to starvation and decay, and even politically annex her. From Japan’s point of view, Korea and China must be left open freely to the economic enterprise of herself and others alike, and, in order to effect that end, they must remain independent and become stronger by their internal development and reform.[97] Russia’s interests are intelligible, as are Japan’s, but unfortunately their desires are antagonistic to each other, so that a conflict between an open and an exclusive policy is rendered inevitable. The series of events during the past decades, particularly since 1895, which we shall narrate in this volume, has only served to bring this conflict into a sharp clash in arms.

* * * * *

In closing, it may not be entirely out of place to attempt a speculation upon the significance of the conflict, not to the belligerents, but to the world at large. From the latter’s point of view, the contest may fairly be regarded as a dramatic struggle between two civilizations, old and new, Russia representing the old civilization and Japan the new. Two dominant features, among others, seem to characterize the opposition of the contending nations: namely, first, that Russia’s economics are essentially agricultural, while those of Japan are largely and increasingly industrial; and, secondly, that Japan’s strength lies more on sea than on land, while Russia represents an enormous contiguous expansion on land. It is evident that the wealth of a nation and its earning capacity cannot grow fast under a trade system under which it imports many and exports few manufactures.[98] The commercial prosperity of Russia depended formerly upon its nearness, first to the trade route with the Levant, and then to the free cities of Germany, but with the fall of Constantinople and the decline of the Hansa towns the business activity of Southern and Baltic Russia has in turn passed away. Then, from the time of Ivan the Terrible, she unified her European territory, and expanded eastward on land, until she had embraced within her dominion much of Central and all of Northern Asia. For such an expansion Russia seems to have been particularly fitted, for her primitive economic organization suffers little from external disturbances, while the autocratic form of her government enables her to maintain and execute her traditional policy of expansion. But the real importance of her expansion appears to be more territorial than commercial, for the days of the land trade with the Orient are numbered. Even the great Siberian Railway would not successfully divert the Eastern trade landward.[99] If Russia would be prosperous she must control the Eastern sea by occupying northeast China and Korea. Here she comes in conflict with Japan, the champion in the East of the rising civilization. The economic centre of the world has been fast passing to America, where cotton, wheat, coal, and iron abound, the people excel in energy and intelligence, and the government is servant to the welfare and progress of the people. Japan has joined the circle of this civilization, ever since the influence of the youthful nation of America was extended to her through Commodore Perry[100] and Townsend Harris, and the spirit of national progress through industry and education was eagerly adopted by her. To-day, Japan stands within the range of the interests of the British and American sea-power over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans, while Russia, on the other hand, represents a vast expansion on land.

The historical bearing of the effects of the old civilization to the world may, perhaps, be best characterized by the one word—_unnatural_. Observe, first, the effect of the policy of land aggression on the internal affairs of Russia. The policy is costly. Hence the great incongruity between the economics of the people, which are agricultural, and the finance of her government, which would be too expensive even for the most highly advanced industrial nation. Hence, also, it is, perhaps, that the richer and more powerful her government becomes, the poorer and more discontented her people seem to grow. Her administration must naturally be maintained by the suspicion of her people and the suppression of their freedom,[101] and the suspicion and suppression must become more exhaustive as the disparity widens between rulers and ruled.[102] Under these circumstances, a constitutional régime would not be possible, for a free expression of the popular will would be hardly compatible with a form of government which seeks to strengthen the state at the expense of the nation. Again, consider the unnatural situation of an agricultural nation competing in the world’s market with industrial, trading nations which command a higher and more effective economic organization. If Russia would sell her goods, her markets abroad must be created and maintained by artificial means:[103] protective and exclusive measures must be pushed to such an extent as to distance all foreign competition, the interests of the consumer must be disregarded,[104] and those of the growing industrial nations must be sacrificed,[105] all for the sake of artificially promoting the belated manufactures in Russia.[106] From this unnatural state of things would seem to follow the Russian policy of territorial occupation and commercial exclusion in the East, and also her free use of the old-time intrigue in diplomacy; for it is Russia’s fortune that she would not be able to compete freely with the new, growing civilization, whose open arts she cannot employ to her advantage, but to whose advanced standard of international morals she must appear to conform. Her position forbids her to have recourse to an open policy and fair play, and yet she cannot afford to overtly uphold the opposite principles.[107] On the other hand, the new civilization, represented in the present contest by Japan, relies more largely upon the energy and resources of the individual person, whose rights it respects, and upon an upright treatment by the nations of one another.

What is the goal of the warfare of these two civilizations? It is, it may be said, the immensely rich and yet undeveloped North China, of which Manchuria is a part, and to which Korea is an appendix. Over this territory, the interests of Russia and Japan have come to a clear and sharp clash, those of the former demanding the subjection and closure of this great portion of the earth’s surface, and those of the latter imperatively calling for its independence and progress.

Whoever wins, the issues are momentous. If Russia should win, not only Korea and Manchuria, but also Mongolia would be either annexed by Russia or placed under her protection, and Japan’s progress would be checked and her life would begin to fail. Russia would assume a commanding position over all the Powers in the East, while the trading nations of the world would be either largely or completely excluded from an important economic section of Asia. The Siberian railway system might at last be made to pay, and Russia’s exclusive policy would enable her and her ally France to divide the profit of the Eastern trade with the more active industrial nations. The old civilization would enjoy an artificial revival, under the influence of which China and Korea would be exploited by the victors and, for the most part,[108] closed against reformatory influences from abroad. All these momentous results would be in the interest of an exclusive policy incorporating principles which are generally regarded as inimical to freedom and progress. If, on the contrary, Japan should win, the doubtful importance of the Siberian Railroad as a carrier of the Eastern trade would in the mean time be further overshadowed by the Panama Canal, and it would be compelled to perform its perhaps proper function of developing the vast resources of Siberia and Manchuria. The Oriental commerce would be equally free and open to all; the Empires of China and Korea would not only remain independent, but, under the influence of the new civilization, their enormous resources would be developed and their national institutions reformed, the immense advantages of which would be enjoyed by all the nations which are interested in the East. There would naturally result a lasting peace in the East and the general uplifting of one third of the human race. Japan’s growth and progress after the war would be even more remarkable than in the past. In short, East Asia would be forcibly brought under the influence of the new civilization, the effect of which would not be without a profound reaction upon Russia herself. Humanity at large, including the Russians, would thereby be the gainer. The difference in the effects of the outcome of the war, according to who is the victor, would be tremendous. Which will win, the old civilization or the new? The world at this moment stands at the parting of the ways.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]

According to an estimate made by a Russian expert of the carrying capacity of the great Siberian railway system,[110] the Siberian section alone will carry at least 190 million poods, and the Manchurian section from 100 to 150 million poods, making a total of 300 to 350 million poods, approximately. It is contended, however, that, while the present conditions of the inhabitants of Siberia and Manchuria make it possible for the railway to carry only raw and crudely manufactured goods, these are the very articles whose cost would easily be raised by the long distance over which they have to be carried by rail. In Europe, it never pays to carry these articles for a longer distance than 2000 miles. Nor would it in Siberia, unless abnormal reductions are made in freight rates, or unless commerce and manufacture are artificially fostered in Siberia and Manchuria. It is supposed, therefore, that it would always be unprofitable to carry bulky, cheap goods between Europe and the East on the Siberian Railway. China’s exports to Russia consist of such costly goods as teas and silks, which may be profitably transported by rail, but thus far even teas have only begun to be so transported under more or less artificial measures in favor of the railway traffic at the expense of the routes through Kiakhta, up the Amur, and by sea to Odessa. As to Russian imports into China, cotton and woolen goods and metals would never be carried by rail under normal circumstances.[111] The benefit of the eight thousand versts of the railway from Moscow to Dalny may be safely said to be as slight to the carrying trade as it is great to the travelers and postal service between Europe and the East.

The statistics for 1899 and 1900 show that the bulk of the Russian trade with China was carried on land, but that the land trade was decreasing and sea trade increasing. See the following table (unit 1000 rubles):[112]—

│ Export Import Total Ratio 1899│Land 7,522 30,007 37,520 74% │Sea 4 13,508 13,512 26% ────┼──────────────────────────────── 1900│Land 6,678 29,779 36,457 69% │Sea 24 16,166 16,190 31%

It should be noted, however, that the period covered by the table is not only too short, but also precedes the opening of the Manchurian Railroad to trade, which took place only in 1903. Nor should it be overlooked that the figures indicate the China trade of _Russia_ alone.

Regarding the _European_ trade with China in general, M. Sorokin, Assistant Director of Customs at Niu-chwang, is reported to have remarked that the freight per pood from Europe to the East was five rubles on land and 1.50 on sea.[113] Certain articles, such as glassware, tobacco, and the like, seem to be carried from Russia to China at two rubles by rail and one ruble by ships.[114] The sea route consumes nearly two months, but, for bulky merchandise, it would be impossible for the railway to compete with it.

It is interesting, in this connection, to remember that, from _America_, the freight between San Francisco and the Eastern ports has been reduced repeatedly during the last year, owing to the competition among the shipping companies, so that the charge for flour does not seem to be more than one mill per ton-mile, or forty cents a hundred pounds for 8000 miles.

During 1901, according to the latest statistics available, the deficit of the Ussuri branch of the Siberian Railway is said to have amounted to $435,162, and that of the entire railway to $11,330,000.[115]

* * * * *

In this connection, it is interesting to note that this view is further confirmed by no less authority than Count Cassini, the present Russian Minister at Washington, who, in his statement given on April 9, and published in the _North American Review_ for May, 1904, said:

“... Consider Russia’s position commercially toward Manchuria with that of the United States. In this country [the United States] are made not only the very materials that would find a sale among the people of the province, but with American goods shipped by an all-water route, the cost of transportation would be much lower than the cost of carrying on the all-land routes to which Russia would be confined. Should Russia ship by water to Manchuria from Odessa, the distance would still be too great to make competition with the United States successful. From Moscow to Port Arthur the distance by rail is 5000 miles. It is therefore easy to realize the privileged position of the United States in competing over an all-water route from the Pacific coast, with Russia over an all-rail route.”[116]

Footnote 1:

Official figures for December 31, 1903. The _Fourth Financial and Economical Annual of Japan_, 1904 (hereafter abbreviated as the _Fourth Annual_), published by the Department of Finance, Imperial Government of Tokio, p. 5. The actual numbers may be even higher.

Footnote 2:

_The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan_ for May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91–95.

Footnote 3:

_Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century_ (hereafter abbreviated as the _20th Century_), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53–58.

Footnote 4:

Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 _yen_. As the term manufacture is expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper, cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries. Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well as reëxported articles, are excluded. See the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7.

Footnote 5:

The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about 42,000,000 _koku_; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to 19 million _koku_. But the increase has been due more to an improved cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat, barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43 million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These figures have been converted from those in the _20th Century_, pp. 119 ff. One _koku_ dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.)

Footnote 6:

These figures have been worked out from the _Kokumin Shimbun_ (National News, hereafter abbreviated as the _Kokumin_) of February 5, 10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment in the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17–19.

Footnote 7:

If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190 million _yen_, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade.

Footnote 8:

289.2 million _yen_ in 1902–3. The _Fourth Annual_, pp. 4 and 9, and plate 3. Also see the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for December 5, 1902, pp. 19–21 and chart.

Footnote 9:

Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides fields for _mugi_, beans, and vegetables. Based on the _20th Century_, pp. 95 ff.

Footnote 10:

This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less than 15°, so that, from the practical point of view, it may be considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely undeveloped island of Hokkaidō. See _ibid._, pp. 95–96, 104.

Footnote 11:

Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at 7,400,000,000 _yen_, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000 _yen_. See the _20th Century_, pp. 105–106.

Footnote 12:

The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country and the short and rapid current of the rivers.

Footnote 13:

Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30 per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places _mugi_, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of land.

Footnote 14:

More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa and Hokkaidō is put down as .1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for upland fields.

Footnote 15:

Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24, 1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000 horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the _20th Century_, chapters on agriculture; the _Annual_, No. III, tables x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s _Industries of Japan_, English translation, New York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s _Le Japon politique, économique et social_, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–121.

Footnote 16:

The _20th Century_, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112–113.

Footnote 17:

This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3) entirely lessees, was 147:200:95. Since that time the ratio must have grown in favor of the tenants. See the _20th Century_, p. 90.

Footnote 18:

See the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December 26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan were estimated at 400 million _yen_. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for July 15, 1902, p. 14.

Footnote 19:

In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890.

Footnote 20:

The actual figures were:—

European American Japanese 1890 57,200,000 _yen_ 36,700,000 _yen_ 45,700,000 _yen_ 1903 166,900,000 _yen_ 95,900,000 _yen_ 295,900,000 _yen_

Footnote 21:

In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India, French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam, the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of Japan amounts to 264,476,239 _yen_, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of Japan. See the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4.

Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia, including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the peculiarities of both Europe and East Asia: it exports to Japan cotton and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller manufactured articles.

Footnote 22:

Oil-cakes are used as manure. As to rice, wheat, and flour, it is unnecessary to say that their importation depends largely upon the conditions of the crop at home.

Footnote 23:

The present author has often met persons who misinterpreted the “open door” to mean the complete throwing open of a country to the ruthless exploitation of the foreigner. The “open door,” it is needless to say, merely negatives a differential treatment in favor of one or more foreign nations at the expense of all the others. It does not necessarily imply a wide opening, but an impartial, even if narrow, opening for all nations.

Footnote 24:

Consult the British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series, Nos. 2995 and 2999; the U. S. _Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance_, January, 1904, pp. 2410–1; the _Kokumin_, September 19–21, 1901; Minister Kiyoura’s address before the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, February, 1904.

Footnote 25:

The figures were taken from the _Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States_ for February, 1904, p. 3006.

Footnote 26:

From _ibid._, p. 3006. In 1903, rice imported amounted to 51,960,000 _yen_ in value. The _Fourth Annual_, p. 77.

Footnote 27:

See the U. S. _Monthly Summary_, February, 1904, pp. 3006 and 3013.

Footnote 28:

At present, Chinese merchants in Korea compete with the Japanese only at the ports on the western coast, principally in the import trade of silk. The number of the Chinese residents in Korea is one tenth that of the Japanese, or about 4000.

Footnote 29:

The _Kokumin_, January 30, 1904.

Footnote 30:

Based on the figures in the _British Diplomatic and Consular Report: Trade of Corea for the Year 1903_, pp. 11–13.

Footnote 31:

Of the 1430 vessels, aggregating 1,104,000 tons, entered at and cleared from Niu-chwang in 1902, the Japanese had 710 vessels and 491,000 tons, the British, 374 vessels and 350,000 tons, the Germans, 88 vessels and 73,000 tons, and so forth.—The _Kokumin_, April 29, 1904, from the _Tai Shin-Kan Bōyeki Chōsa Hōkoku_ (report on the trade with China and Korea), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokio, 1904. The Russians could show only 3 vessels and 1,223 tons, which was below their record for 1901 and less than one half of the average of the five years 1886, 1897, 1898, 1899, and 1901.—The British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series, No. 2999 (on Niu-chwang), p. 9.

Footnote 32:

_Ibid._, p. 8.

Footnote 33:

The direct import trade of any trading nation at Niu-chwang does not represent the actual amount of the articles imported from the country of that nation, for most of the foreign goods come to Niu-chwang through some other distributing centres in China, such as Hong-kong or Shanghai. The Japanese goods, however, are nearly all carried by Japanese vessels. On the contrary, the American imports, besides jeans, drills, sheetings, kerosenes, and flour, are not specified in the customs returns of Niu-chwang, and consequently their nominal figures are insignificant (7396 _l._ in 1901 and 4089 _l._ in 1902), while Hong-kong, through which most of the American goods are imported into Niu-chwang, showed, in 1902, 385,302 _l._, or 55 per cent. of the entire direct trade. On the other hand, the estimate made by the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington, showing 18,000,000 haikwan taels for the _real_ import of American goods into Niu-chwang, seems to be pretty liberal. See British _D. and C. Reports_, annual series, No. 2999, p. 8, and the U. S. _Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance_, January, 1904, p. 2328.

Footnote 34:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for January 22, 1903, pp. 10–11.

Footnote 35:

See the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 165 (July 15, 1900), and No. 244 (September 25, 1902).

Footnote 36:

The _Kokumin_, November 26, 1903.

Footnote 37:

The _Annai_, pp. 58–61.

Footnote 38:

Mr. Shiga’s letter, in the _Kokumin_, July 5, 1904.

Footnote 39:

In July, 1903, there were, besides soldiers, 26,705 Japanese in the eight treaty ports and Seul and Ping-yang. To these must be added about 4000 who lived on some islands and places outside of the treaty ports. See the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_ (Report of the Dōbun Association), No. 41, pp. 95–96, and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for October 18, 1903, pp. 29–47; April 8, 1904, pp. 28–52. Mr. Yamamoto places the number of the Japanese residents in Korea at 40,000. See his _Saishin Chōsen Ijū Annai_ (latest guide for emigration to Korea; hereafter abbreviated as the _Annai_), Tokio, 1904, p. 14.

Footnote 40:

The _Annai_, pp. 8–9, 19–20.

Footnote 41:

_Ibid._, p. 81.

Footnote 42:

In July, 1903, of the 26,645 Japanese in Korea, 15,442 were men and 11,263 women. It may be noted, in passing, that, in the case of Manchuria, a great majority of the Japanese women residing there are not the wives of the male settlers, and hence the comparative numbers of men and women there should not lead us to a similar conclusion as to Korea. This part of the problem of Japanese emigration opens up an interesting social question, which it is hardly necessary for us to discuss here.

Footnote 43:

From the legal standpoint, the Japanese had no right, outside of the treaty settlements, to live or buy land.

Footnote 44:

On March 31, 1904, there were about 1,234,000 _yen_ of these notes in circulation against a reserve of 944,000 _yen_. From the British _C. and D. Reports_; _Trade of Korea for the Year 1903_, pp. 7–8.

The Russians and their sympathizers at Seul have more than once tried, though unsuccessfully, to induce the Korean Government to suppress the issue of the notes. See pp. 281–284, below.

Footnote 45:

The nickel coins of Korea have been so debased and so much counterfeited that they are at a discount of much more than 100 per cent.

Footnote 46:

The right of building this line was originally granted by the Korean Government to Mr. Morse, an American citizen, in March, 1896, who, however, sold it to a Japanese syndicate in November, 1898, and handed the line over to the latter before it was completed. The whole line was in working order in July, 1899. See p. 286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 47:

Actual work was begun in August, 1901, but Japan’s want of capital was such that by the first of December, 1903, only thirty-one miles from both ends had been built. In view of the immense economic and strategic importance of the line, the Japanese Government, which had for a certain period of time guaranteed 6 per cent. annual interest on 25,000,000 _yen_, which was fixed as the minimum capital of the company, now further promoted its work by liberal measures, so as to make it possible for the company to complete the line before the end of the present year. Both the Korean and Japanese Imperial Houses own shares of the company.

Footnote 48:

The line passes through the richest and most populous four provinces of Korea, which comprise nearly seven tenths of all the houses in the Empire, and cover more than five sevenths of the cultivated area of the country, with considerable capacity for future cultivation and improvement. The road also connects places to which the Koreans flock from neighboring regions for the periodical fairs held there. These fairs occur six times each month, held alternately in different places, besides great annual fairs in large cities. Among the thirty-nine stations of this railroad, six will be daily seen holding fairs, for which the traffic of passengers and merchandise through the road will be considerable. It is safe to say that five sevenths of the entire Korean foreign trade belong to the sphere controlled by this line, and also that nearly all of this trade is in reality the fast growing Japan-Korea trade. The effect of the completion of the line upon this trade will be tremendous. See Mr. J. Shinobu’s _Kan Hantō_ (“The Korean Peninsula”), Tokio, 1901.

Footnote 49:

The French have an agreement with the Korean Government regarding a Seul-Fusan railway. The Seul Government is to build it with its own money, and the French to furnish engineers and material. Not a mile of rail has been laid by the impecunious Government, and the present war is rapidly changing the entire situation. A Japanese railway for strategic purposes has already been started from Seul northward. Another line, between Seul and Wonsan (Gensan), will also be built by the Japanese in the near future.

Footnote 50:

It was one of the first propositions from Japan to Russia during the long negotiations between them which have ended in the present war, that Russia should not impede Japan’s possible attempt in the future to extend the Fusan-Seul Railway in the manner above described. See p. 286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 51:

A promoter of Russian interests in Korea, and to all intents and purposes a semi-official diplomat for Russia, living at Seul and observing the political barometer of the Court at close range. Another person, perhaps less known to the outside world, but far more influential at Court, is a woman, Fräulein Sonntag, a relative of the wife of the ex-Russian Minister Waeber at Seul. See p. 280, below.

Footnote 52:

The _Kokumin_, January 15, 1904.

Footnote 53:

From an address by Mr. Suerō Katō, of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, who had studied the agriculture of Korea on the ground three times in succession.—_Ibid._, May 27, 1904.

Footnote 54:

Calculated from the data given in the _Kokumin_ for January 8, 1904. The official census of Korea for 1902 gives a population of 5,782,806, but assuming that there live 145 people per square mile, which is one half the density of the population in China, the Korean population cannot be much below 12,000,000. The official record of the land under cultivation is also untrustworthy for institutional reasons not necessary to mention here.

Footnote 55:

The question of cultivating the waste land in Korea by Japanese enterprise, however, has called forth a very delicate situation which still awaits the most careful solution. The progress of this situation will be a matter of great interest, but it is still too early to discuss it. Cf. the _Korea Review_ for July and August, 1904, and follow its subsequent numbers.

Footnote 56:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, and the _Kokumin_ for January 7, 15, and 16, 1904.

Footnote 57:

The rent is of two kinds: either to be decided anew each year after the harvest, or to deliver to the proprietor 50 per cent. of the crop. It should always be remembered that a large majority of actual cultivators are tenants, the proprietors being limited to a small class of rich men, officers, and nobles. The daily wage of the laborer on the farm averages 20 _sen_, but it is usually paid in kind, as are debts and repayments in many cases. The standard of life of the Korean farmer is perhaps lower than that of the Japanese, but apparently not less comfortable. The national land tax is said to be mild and largely discarded, but the house tax, special tax, local tax, and the like, bring up the dues of the farmer sometimes to an unendurable extent. The tenant, after paying his rent and other charges, is obliged to sell what little rice is left to him at the earliest opportunity, so that he henceforth becomes a buyer of rice, and consequently has little to buy other articles with, and still less to save, until his spring harvest of wheat comes in. Woe betide him when both the rice and the wheat crops fail! See the _Kokumin_, January 13 and 14, 1904, and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, p. 21.

Footnote 58:

An address by Mr. G. Hirose, a competent eye-witness, in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, November, 1903, pp. 15 ff. Official census, however, gives only 2806 Japanese in Manchuria (December 30, 1903). See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for April 13, 1904, pp. 33–38.

Footnote 59:

Mr. Hirose, already mentioned, refers to a Japanese capitalist who started a lumber business in Kirin Province and another who discovered coal deposits near Harbin and began to mine them, both of whom, in spite of the permits they had received from the Chinese authorities by regular process, were driven away arbitrarily under threats of the Russian military. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 48, pp. 21–22.

Footnote 60:

The so-called Manchus, the original inhabitants of Manchuria, have migrated to China proper, which they conquered during the seventeenth century. The present inhabitants of Manchuria are immigrant Chinese, whose greater economic capacity has been rapidly developing this immensely rich territory.

Footnote 61:

An official report of the Province of Amur, dated June 22, 1903, denies that the actual cost of construction per verst was, as had been alleged, 150,000 rubles, but 113,183 rubles. The _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 8, 1903, p. 46. A ruble is equivalent to about 51.5 cents.

In this connection, it is interesting to note in M. Witte’s report to the Czar after the former’s tour in the Far East in 1902, that the Siberian Railway had cost 758,955,907 rubles, but, with the Circum-Baikal section, would cost not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles, excluding the salaries of officers, expenses for soldiers, the Pacific fleet, harbor work, and the like. The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 42, p. 30.

Footnote 62:

According to the “Past and Present of the Siberian Railway,” compiled in 1903 by the government committee in charge of the railway, as quoted in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 51, pp. 58–60.

Footnote 63:

M. Witte’s report of September, 1901, quoted in the _Kokumin_ for October 1, 1904.

Footnote 64:

Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), p. 8.

Footnote 65:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, November 25, 1903, pp. 16–18.

Footnote 66:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, July 30, 1903.

Footnote 67:

See the _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_ (“Siberia and Manchuria”) Tokio, 1904, compiled by T. Kawakami, special agent of the Foreign Office of Japan, who was sent to Siberia and Northern Manchuria to investigate economic and military conditions there, pp. 94, 119–121, 124, 138.

Footnote 68:

For the relative advantages of the Manchurian Railway and the Amur River, see the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, August 5 and October 5, 1903, and January 19, 1904.

Footnote 69:

The Russia-China trade began more than 250 years ago. Before 1860, it was carried wholly on land, and its balance was nearly even. Since 1860, when sea trade from Odessa was opened, the progress of this trade has been slower than the general foreign trade of China, and its balance has been heavily against Russia (6,702,000 against 45,945,000 rubles in 1900). More than half of the Russian imports into China consists of cotton fabrics, and over 80 per cent. of the exports from China to Russia are teas. Russia’s share in the entire foreign trade of China has also fallen from 4.6 per cent. in 1899 to 4.4 per cent. in 1900, 2.6 per cent. in 1901, and 2.3 per cent. in 1902, as compared with the growing share of the trade by Japan amounting to 14.2 per cent., 15.9 per cent., 15.7 per cent., and 18.4 per cent., in those respective years. Of the Russian share of 2.6 per cent. in 1901, Russian Manchuria occupied only 0.6 per cent. See the _Tsūshō Isan_, July 8, 1903, pp. 1–4; T. Yoshida’s _Shina Bōyeki Jijō_ (Trade Conditions in China), Tokio, 1902, pp. 128–129, etc. For the gold values of the figures up to 1903, see the British _D. and C. Reports_, annual series, No. 3280.

Footnote 70:

From Russian official figures quoted in the _Tsūshō Isan_, November 25, 1903.

Footnote 71:

The reader is recommended to the reports of the United States Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, particularly those which appeared in the daily _Consular Reports_ for January 21 and 24, and February 5, 1904 (Nos. 1856, 1858, and 1869). Reference should also be made to the ex-British Consul at Niu-chwang, Alexander Hosie’s _Manchuria_, London, 1901 (new edition, New York, 1904).

The resources of Eastern Manchuria are well described in the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 13, 1903, and those of Northern Manchuria in the _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, Tokio, 1904, compiled by the Foreign Office of Japan, pp. 427–485.

Footnote 72:

The present population of Manchuria is differently estimated between the limits of 6.5 and 15 millions. Probably there are more than 10 millions. Immigration was said to have been progressing rapidly under the Chinese rule.

It is noteworthy that Siberia, with a larger area than Manchuria, contains only about 8,000,000 inhabitants. The productive capacity of the Manchurian population must be measured, however, not only by their larger numbers, but also by their far superior economic training.

Footnote 73:

The _Tsūshō Isan_ for June 23, 1903, pp. 34–35. Pood = 36.112 lbs.; ruble = 51.5 cents.

Footnote 74:

Under this and other differential measures the commercial importance of Vladivostok is said to be fast passing away. Local merchants made a strong plea of their case before M. Witte when he traveled in the East in 1902, but on his return he reported to the Czar that the interests of the Empire demanded a large sacrifice at Vladivostok for the sake of Dalny.

Footnote 75:

The effect of the new duties levied on tea at other places than Dalny is seen in the following comparative table. The figures for 1902 are taken from the U. S. _Monthly Summary_ for January, 1904, p. 2420, and those for 1903 have been converted from data given in the British _D. and C. Reports_, Annual Series No. 3280.

In 1902, the Russian Empire took 882,893 out of the 1,519,211 _piculs_ of tea exported from China, while in 1903 the corresponding amounts were 1,010,580 out of 1,677,530. The distribution of the imported teas to the Russian Empire, according to the routes, was as follows:—

1902 1903 _Via_ Odessa and Batum 206,699 _piculs_ 200,391 _piculs_ _Via_ Kiakhta 403,648 244,668 To Russian Manchuria 272,546 191,679 To Port Arthur and Dalny 373,842

We presume that most of the teas exported to Russian Manchuria went through Niu-chwang. The table plainly shows an increased importation at Dalny at the expense of all other points. It is not known how much of the 373,842 _piculs_ imported at Dalny and Port Arthur was reshipped to other ports not mentioned here. (_Picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.)

Footnote 76:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_, April 18 and August 3, 1903, and the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 21, 1904 (No. 1856). Reduction apparently had not reached its minimum point. It was unknown whether Dalny handled much of the Manchurian export trade.

Footnote 77:

The _Kokumin_, March 7, 1903. The ex-Japanese Consul at Niu-chwang, Mr. K. Tanabe, doubts that Dalny will completely displace Niu-chwang as an exporting centre. The latter is geographically the nature outlet for the grain from the Liao Valley, and, in winter, the handling of this product is apt to be done more at Mukden than at Dalny, the latter becoming in that case a mere port of transit. Moreover, mercantile customs differ so much at Niu-chwang and Dalny that it is not possible that the conservative Chinese merchants should readily transfer their business from the one place to the other. See Tanabe’s conversation in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 244 (September 25, 1902), p. 16.

Footnote 78:

The central distributing station at Vladivostok has a capacity of 600,000 poods, and the one to be built at Dalny will hold 1,500,000 poods, to which a special tank steamer will bring oil from Batum.—The _Tsūshō Isan_, May 3, 1903. Americans tried to build warehouses at Dalny, but were opposed by Russians. The importation of American kerosenes at Niu-chwang decreased from 3,172,000 gallons ($410,500) in 1901 to 603,000 gallons ($77,000) in 1902, and the decrease was in no small measure due to the Russian competition at Dalny.

Footnote 79:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February 23, 1904.

Footnote 80:

See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859, and 1870).

Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions, and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr. Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would have to be developed. See the American _Review of Reviews_ for February, 1904.

Footnote 81:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p. 11.

Footnote 82:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also see _ibid._, April 4, 1903.

Footnote 83:

British Consul Hosie’s report, the _British Parliamentary Papers_ (“Blue Books”), _China, No. 1 (1900)_, p. 154.

Footnote 84:

See U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43.

Footnote 85:

The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 683–684.

Footnote 86:

For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the _Tsūshō Isan_, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40), 1903.

At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coöperation of all nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15, 1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at the same time unable to develop it without either the coöperation of other people or some unnatural devices.

Footnote 87:

See pp. 313 ff., below.

Footnote 88:

On March 27, 1904, Russia declared that Niu-chwang was under her martial law. This eventuality had been fully expected by Japan. The gravity of the situation, however, may be understood, when we remember that the Russian law of neutrality considers food as among contraband goods, so that the supply of millet, beans, and bean-cakes from Manchuria to Japan was henceforth completely closed, until the Russians evacuated Niu-chwang in July.

Footnote 89:

These concessions were acquired by the Russians in 1896 when the Korean King was still living in the Russian Legation in Seul. About May, 1903, after more than seven years’ inactivity, the Russians began to cut timber on a large scale along the Yalu River, and subsequently made extensive improvements at Yongampu at the mouth of the river. The political features of this event do not concern us here. See pp. 263, 289 ff., 318 ff., below.

Footnote 90:

Kaiserling is a successor to the two other Russians who, one after the other, had been engaged in the whale fishery on the Japan Sea for a long period of time. It was Kaiserling, however, who extended the work, made an agreement with the Korean Government, and was turning the business into an apparently successful enterprise. In 1901, his two vessels caught about eighty whales, which number was in 1902 increased to 300.—The _Tsūshō Isan_, September 28, 1903, p. 34.

Footnote 91:

Mr. J. Sloat Fassett’s article in the American _Review of Reviews_, for February, 1904, p. 174.

In the winter of 1902–3, ice at Dalny was six inches thick.—Mr. F. Nakasawa in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15, 1903), p. 13.

Footnote 92:

It is well known that at several times in history kingdoms have been built which extended over both sides of the present boundaries between Korea and Manchuria.

Footnote 93:

It is noticeable that the Russian diplomatic historian already referred to gives as a reason for the desirability of placing Korea under Russian protection the need of safe-guarding the frontiers of Russian territories adjacent to Korea.—The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 49, p. 8.

Footnote 94:

The Bay of Masampo, generally so-called, which lies between the Island of Koji and the Korean coast, is said to be deep and broad enough to hold the largest fleet, sheltered from winds from all directions. Several islands with sufficiently wide passages between them form a splendid gate to the bay, while the western extremity of the latter may be walked across, when the tide is low, from the Koji to the coast.

As to the Masampo reach or inlet, specifically, which is the head of the gulf, “its entrance, five cables wide, named the Gate, is perfectly free from dangers, and is available for all classes of vessels. On either side are treeless hills, bare in winter, but in summer covered with grass; these hills, near the entrance, slope steeply to the water’s edge. The general depth over the reach is seven fathoms, but it shallows gradually as the town of Masampo is neared, until at one mile from the town the depth is four fathoms.... Anchorage may be had anywhere in Masampo reach, according to draught; a depth of three fathoms being found at half a mile from the town, and six to seven fathoms at two miles below it.”—The _Sailing Directions for Japan, Korea, and Adjacent Seas_, published by the British Admiralty, London, 1904, pp. 114–115. Masampo is the best but not the only good naval harbor on the southern coast of Korea.

Footnote 95:

In 1861, when some Russian marines landed here and took virtual possession of the islands, Awa Katsu, who was then one of the officers appointed by the Yedo government to study the possibility of organizing military forces after the Western model, succeeded in setting the British Minister against the Russian Minister about the Tsushima affair. Russia was obliged to abandon the islands. See the _Katsu Kaishū_ (a life of Katsu), Tokio, 1899, iii. pp. 57–59.

Footnote 96:

It is interesting to hear that Russian school text-books enumerate Korea and Manchuria among the Russian spheres of influence.—A letter from Tōsuisei, dated St. Petersburg, February 13, 1900, in the _Kokumin_, April 1, 1900.

Footnote 97:

It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which the writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among the people here. A vast majority of people, not excluding recognized writers and speakers on the East, seem to ascribe to Japan certain territorial designs, particularly in Korea. It is not remembered that Japan was the first country to recognize the independence of Korea, the cause of which also cost Japan a war with China. The present war with Russia is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s vital interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly follows that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow her to fall into the hands of another Power. If Korea is really unable to stand on her feet, the solution of the difficulty does not, in Japan’s view, consist in possessing her, but in making her independence real by developing her resources and reorganizing and strengthening her national institutions. It is in this work that Japan’s assistance was offered and accepted. It would be as difficult for any impartial student not to see the need of such assistance as to confuse it with annexation. It would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the task as extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse. Further, see pp. 366 ff., below.

Footnote 98:

Russian exports for 1900–2 are classified as follows (1000 rubles as unit):—

Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total 1900 381,174 269,806 17,902 19,553 688,435 1901 430,955 256,697 20,224 21,939 729,815 1902 526,189 258,267 21,558 19,263 825,277

It is seen that the exportation of food-stuffs was the largest in value and increasing, while that of manufactured articles was the smallest (2.5 per cent.) and, to say the least, stationary. Imports were as follows:—

Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total 1900 79,844 307,402 1,136 183,682 572,064 1901 84,349 288,107 1,495 158,993 532,944 1902 81,409 295,483 1,403 148,800 527,095

The importation of manufactures decreased, but also that of raw material did not increase, while, as shown above, the exportation of manufactures was slight and stationary. Figures have been taken from the _Tsūshō Isan_ for November 25, 1903, which drew them from Russian official sources.

It is interesting to note the unfavorable conditions of the foreign trade of Russia’s ally, France, in U. S. Consul Atwell’s report in the daily _Consular Reports_ for February 24, 1904 (No. 1884), who quotes from Georges Blondel.

Footnote 99:

See the Supplementary Note to this chapter on pages 61–64.

Footnote 100:

Documents of that time clearly indicate that the discovery of gold in California and the westward expansion of the American nation, as well as the growing prospects of the China trade and the increasing application of steam in navigation, were the motives which prompted the United States Government to open negotiations with Japan in 1853.

Footnote 101:

To-day there seem to be about 84,500 public schools in Russia, of which 40,000 are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education [compared with 30,157 public and private schools in Japan in 1902]. Toward the maintenance of the 40,000 schools, the ministry appropriates only about $2,000,000, or a little over one eighth of the annual cost. The teachers number 172,000 [in Japan, 126,703, in 1902], and pupils and students, 4,568,763 [in Japan in 1902, 5,469,419]. 7,250,000 children of school age are without any education [while in Japan, in 1902, the ratio of attendance to the number of children of school age was 95.80 per cent. for boys and 87.00 per cent. for girls, or, on the average, 91.57 per cent.]. See the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for February 8 and March 4, 1902 (Nos. 1871 and 1892), [and the _Kwampō_, April 8, 1904].

Footnote 102:

As an evidence for this striking state of things the reader is referred to Dr. E. J. Dillon’s article in the American _Review of Reviews_ for October, 1904, pp. 449–454. The whole subject should be more carefully studied than it seems to have been thus far.

Footnote 103:

“The whole northern part of _Asia Minor_, according to the treaty between Russia and Turkey, is now placed under such conditions that Russian capitalists have the area open to them, to the exclusion of foreign enterprise. A situation analogous is found in _Persia_, where the entire northern portion is acknowledged to be under the exclusive economic influence of Russia.”—Consul Greener at Vladivostok, in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 104:

For example, the normal freight per ton from Russia to Eastern Siberia would be about twenty-one rubles, while that from Japan or Shanghai is three or four rubles. If Russian goods were sold to the artificial exclusion of articles exported from nearer countries, the consumer’s burden would be greatly increased.

Footnote 105:

Count Cassini, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, wrote, in the _North American Review_ for May, 1904: “... But let us suppose for argument’s sake that Russia, triumphant in this war, finds herself dominant in Manchuria. Japan, her enemy, could look for no favors; she could not expect to find encouragement for the importation of her manufactures” (p. 688).

Footnote 106:

Continuing, the Count stated: “But Manchuria would require many things that Russia could not supply, or supply at figures reasonable enough to create a market. In Russia, agriculture is, comparatively speaking, more important than manufacturing, and those goods which are made in my country are not such as Manchuria would need. Russia, too, would be obliged to use the railway with its high freight tariffs....”—_Ibid._

Footnote 107:

One can seldom find a more outspoken confession of a diplomacy consisting of a series of deliberate falsehoods than the chapters on the Russian relations with China, Korea, and Japan, in a diplomatic history by a Russian writer, as translated in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, Nos. 45, 46, 48, 49, and 50 (August, September, November, and December, 1903, and January, 1904).

Footnote 108:

The Russian diplomatic historian to whom frequent reference has been made frankly says that the feebleness and internal disorder of China are welcome conditions for the expansion of Russian influence in the Far East, and that it would be the height of folly to displace the weak China with a colonial possession of a European power.—The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, p. 36.

Footnote 109:

See p. 55, note 1, above.

Footnote 110:

The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 221–223.

Footnote 111:

The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 223–225, 490–495.

Footnote 112:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, July 8, 1903, p. 4.

Footnote 113:

The New York _Evening Post_, January 20, 1903.

Footnote 114:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 115:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 24, 1904 (No. 1884).

Footnote 116:

The _North American Review_, May, 1904, p. 688.