CHAPTER IV

PORT ARTHUR AND TALIEN-WAN

As has been said, it appears impossible at the present state of our knowledge to trace the exact connection of Russia with the German occupation of Kiao-chau.[198] What is of more direct interest to our study, and is more easily established by evidence, is the fact that, with the plea that she could not be denied what had been granted to Germany,[199] Russia closely followed the latter’s example,[200] and, under similar terms to hers,[201] demanded a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and also a railway concession between a point in the Manchurian line granted in 1896 and the ports. Recent years have seldom seen a situation so instructive of the character of the Far Eastern diplomacy in general, and of Russia’s method in particular, as the foreign relations in China which culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 27, 1898. These relations were also unusually complex, owing to the position which England held therein, whose vast interests in various parts of China were at once brought in many-sided contact, not only with Russia, but also with other Powers interested in China.

On December 20, 1897, a report reached the British Foreign Office that three Russian men-of-war had arrived at Port Arthur, and that three others were expected at Talien-wan and three more at Port Arthur.[202] Two days later it was officially explained by Count Muravieff “that the step taken was entirely a question of convenience for the ships, and had absolutely no connection with the occupation of the bay of Kiao-chau by Germany.” The Count added “that there had always been a difficulty about keeping more than a certain number of men-of-war at a time in Japanese ports, and that, consequently, the Imperial Government had been glad to accept the offer of the Chinese Government to allow the Russian squadron to winter at Port Arthur. This arrangement was all the more convenient as that port was within an easy distance of Vladivostok, and had an arsenal where their ships could undergo all necessary repairs. Moreover, it was an advantage that Port Arthur was quite free from ice in the winter, though this fact was not so important now, as Vladivostok was at present furnished with an exceptionally powerful ice-breaker, which it was hoped would make that port available for egress and ingress during the winter months. In fact, Vladivostok remained, as heretofore, their centre in the Far East, and the headquarters of their land and sea forces, so that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port Arthur made no change whatever in the situation.”[203] On the same day that this pacific declaration was made, it was reported, as it was later confirmed by Chinese authorities, that Russia was offering to China a 4 per cent. loan of 16,000,000 pounds at 93, an extremely favorable term, to pay off the balance of the Japanese indemnity. The suggested security was the income of the land tax and _likin_, besides which Russia was said to have demanded as _quid pro quo_ all future railway concessions in Manchuria and North China, as well as the succession of a Russian subject to Sir Robert Hart as Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs.[204] It was on this occasion that M. Pavloff, claiming that the Tsung-li Yamên had promised to employ Russian engineers and Russian capital in the construction of any railway between the Great Wall and the Russian frontier, undertook to record the alleged promise and express his gratification, and, seeing that the Yamên did not reply, took it for granted that the matter was settled, and notified the St. Petersburg Government to that effect.[205] Nor did the Russian Representatives at Peking fail thereafter to appeal to this agreement concluded by M. Pavloff in so striking a fashion, whenever China opened any discussion with another Power regarding any subject connected with railways north of Shan-hai-kwan. In the mean time, an Anglo-German syndicate had made an offer, last June, of a loan for the same purpose, and now Sir Claude MacDonald strongly supported a scheme of a new loan presented by the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank, a British concern, in competition with the Russian proposals.[206] One of the terms of the British loan as matured between the Bank, Sir Claude, and the Marquess of Salisbury, was the opening of Talien-wan to foreign trade.[207] The British Minister’s intention obviously was, among other things, to forestall the possible Russian occupation of this port as well as Port Arthur.[208] The significance was well understood by the Tsung-li Yamên, which was, however, afraid to embroil China with Russia, for the latter’s _Chargé d’Affaires_ “had protested, under instructions from his Government, against its [Talien-wan’s] opening in the strongest manner, and had warned the Yamên that it would incur the hostility of Russia by doing so.”[209] The reason for this strenuous opposition was, on January 19, 1898, explained by the Russian Ambassador at London, who “urged very strongly that if we [the British Government] insisted on making Talien-wan an open port, we should be encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence, and denying her in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.” These remarks were significant in showing how foreign was the idea of the open door to the Russian policy in Manchuria. When Lord Salisbury asked the Ambassador, in the same interview, what possible objection he could have to making Talien-wan a free port if Russia had no designs on that territory, the latter replied “that without any such designs it was generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial _débouché_ upon the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain with respect to the commercial régime which was to prevail there.” Here is a clear indication that Russia had little faith in the compatibility of other nations’ commercial welfare in China with her own, or, in other words, in the ability of her people and the efficiency of their economic organization to compete with other nations in an open market. Else, she would not object to the opening of a port to the world’s trade. Lord Salisbury reminded the Russian Representative that “the most-favored-nation clause forbade China to give Russia at Talien-wan more favorable terms with regard to customs duties than she gave to other treaty Powers.”[210] England’s position, which was repeatedly shown to Russia, was that it was natural that Russia should open a port for her commerce on the coasts of the North Pacific,[211] but that it would be a contravention of the treaty rights[212] of other nations to make of the port an exclusive market for Russian trade. Under these persistent representations, Count Muravieff at last declared, on January 28, through M. de Staal, Ambassador at London, that any (_tout_)[213] commercial outlet secured by Russia “would be open to the ships of all the great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland. It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose trade interests are so important in those regions, would share in the advantage.”[214] Then what was meant by “open”? M. de Staal stated on February 10: “I cannot in any way anticipate the decisions of my Government, which, in the event of acquiring an outlet in Chinese waters, naturally remains free either to establish a _porto franco_ [i. e., a port where goods imported are exempt from all import dues] there, or to assimilate the port in question to the treaty ports of the Chinese littoral.”[215] It will be seen later that, through the Imperial Order of July 30 (August 11), 1899,[216] Russia declared Dalny a “free port” in the sense of a _porto franco_, under certain conditions. In the face of these elastic conditions, one would be slow, in spite of the Order, to admit that the question stated by M. de Staal in the quoted passage has been definitively settled by his government one way or the other, or in a third alternative.[217]

Up to this point, namely, about February 10, 1898, one can follow the gradual withdrawal of Lord Salisbury’s position. He at first seemed to have accepted Sir Claude MacDonald’s suggestion to insist upon the opening of Talien-wan as a condition of the British-Chinese loan, but, evidently at the Russian opposition, presently contented himself with giving the following instruction to the British Minister at Peking: “You are not bound to insist on making Talien-wan a treaty port if you think it impracticable, though we give it up with regret. Would it be possible to obtain a promise of such a concession if ever a railway was made to that port? You should maintain demand for opening of other ports.”[218] Then, when the Chinese Government was so pressed by the opposition of Russia and France as to declare on January 30 that unless England pledged herself to offer protection to China against Russia, she could not consent to accept the loan,[219] Lord Salisbury’s policy receded further than before. He now made representations to Russia not to infringe the most-favored-nation treatment in Talien-wan, if she should lease the port. It is needless to say that such a direct request to Russia was tantamount, on the part of England, to abandoning the desire of securing the opening of the port from China, which, save for Russian threats, was willing to comply with the desire; and to acquiescing in and even recognizing Russia’s right to lease the port, instead of opening it as a treaty port. Under these circumstances, it was not strange that the British Government was met by Russia with the ambiguous phrase, “open port,” which, in spite of Lord Salisbury’s attempt[220] to interpret it in the sense of a _porto franco_, was found, in M. de Staal’s statement of February 10, already quoted, to be still more uncertain than it appeared when it was first declared. Russia seemed to have gained all that England lost, but it was a mere prelude to a far more serious situation which was still to develop.

It would have been plain to any one, had he been susceptible to certain unmistakable signs, that Russia’s desires in Manchuria were more extensive than the mere acquisition of a lease of a commercial outlet on the Yellow Sea. The same Count Muravieff, who had said three weeks before that the presence of Russian ships at Port Arthur late in 1897 was purely for the sake of wintering there, and that the fact that Port Arthur was ice-free was not very important, now declared, on January 12, 1898, that when the Russian fleet had left the port, after wintering there, the Chinese Government had given the Russians a prior right of anchorage—_le droit du premier mouillage_.[221] The question so gently broached was more clearly pronounced a week later, when M. de Staal strongly maintained that the opening of Talien-wan would result in an encroachment upon the Russian sphere of influence, and in “denying her in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.”[222] In the face of these official remarks, it would be impossible to deny that Russia wished to use, not only Talien-wan, but also Port Arthur, and the latter for purposes clearly other than commercial. Yet the British Government does not seem to have taken any action in the matter, but, on the contrary, its tacit recognition of Russia’s demand of the lease of Talien-wan was not of a nature to discourage her design upon Port Arthur. On February 14, China made concessions to Great Britain regarding internal navigation, the non-alienation of the Yang-tsze Provinces, and the appointment of an Englishman to the inspectorate-general of customs so long as the British trade was preponderant in China;[223] on the 19th, the preliminary agreement of the British loan was signed;[224] and March 6 saw the conclusion of the German agreement concerning the lease of Kiao-chau and privileges in the Province of Shan-tung. Russia immediately seized this opportunity in bringing forward her long cherished design, for, on March 7, it was simultaneously reported in the London _Times_ and by Sir Claude MacDonald, soon to be confirmed by the Tsungli-Yamên and admitted by Count Muravieff, that M. Pavloff was pressing the Peking Government to grant the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan and the railway concession from Petuna on the trans-Manchurian Railway to the ports.[225] The report appears to have made a profound impression upon the British Government, which, on the day it was received, was compelled to say that, if the Russian demands were granted, “her influence over the Government of Peking would be so increased, to the detriment of that of Her Majesty’s Government, that it seemed desirable for them to make some counter-move. The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of Wei-hai-Wei by the Japanese [who had been holding it, according to the treaty, pending the final payment of Chinese indemnity], to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to Germany.”[226] This view was sounded, it is true, to the British Minister at Peking, and not to the Russian Government, but the latter was not to encounter an effective protest from a government which had so soon made up its mind that the protest might fail and be compensated by itself reproducing the evil at China’s expense.[227] At any rate, Count Muravieff deemed it now safe to declare, beginning with March 8, that no alternative had been left to Russia, under the uncertainty attending the development of affairs in the Far East and other circumstances, but to demand a cession both of Talien-wan and Port Arthur, the former only to be opened to foreign trade; that one of these ports without the other would be of no use to Russia, while the use of both was of vital necessity to her; and that the lease would not interfere with the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire. To the last pledge was added, probably at the persistent representations of England, that the treaty rights acquired by the Powers in China would be respected.[228]

The distinction made by Count Muravieff between Port Arthur and Talien-wan at once brought home to the British Government the gravity of the situation. The first impulse on the part of Lord Salisbury was to fall back upon M. de Staal’s statement of February 10, that any (_tout_) port which Russia might acquire on the Chinese coast should be open to the foreign trade.[229] Count Muravieff, however, explained that the statement applied only to Talien-wan, but no promise had been made regarding Port Arthur.[230] On March 15, however, he was authorized by the Czar to give to Sir N. O’Conor “an assurance that both Port Arthur and Talien-wan would be open to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports, in the event of the Russian Government’s obtaining a lease of these places from the Chinese Government.” The Count intimated next morning that it would be desirable for the British Government not to repeat this assurance in the House of Commons, for “it might be considered as a want of courtesy toward the Chinese Government, who had not yet formally agreed to give the Russian Government a lease of the ports in question.”[231]

Presently, however, the British Government awoke to the conviction that Port Arthur was “not a commercial harbor,” and “it was doubtful whether it could be converted into one.” “But,” stated the Marquess of Salisbury, “though not a commercial harbor, Port Arthur supplies a naval base, limited indeed in extent, but possessing great natural and artificial strength. And this, taken in connection with its strategic position, gives it an importance in the Gulf of Pechili and therefore at Peking, upon which, in their representation to Japan at the close of the war with China, the Russian Government laid the greatest emphasis.... The possession, even if temporary, of this particular position, is likely to have political consequences at Peking of great international importance, and the acquisition of a Chinese harbor notoriously useless for commercial purposes by a foreign Power will be universally interpreted in the Far East as indicating that the partition of China has begun.... It may, perhaps, be proper to observe that a great military Power which is conterminous for over four thousand miles with the land frontier of China, including the portion lying nearest to its capital, is never likely to be without its due share of influence on the councils of that country. Her Majesty’s Government regard it as most unfortunate that it has been thought necessary, in addition, to obtain control of a port which, if the rest of the Gulf of Pechili remains in hands so helpless as that of the sovereign Power, will command the maritime approaches to its capital, and give to Russia the same strategic advantage by sea which she already possesses in so ample a measure by land.”[232] In this spirit, the British Government asked Count Muravieff through Sir N. O’Conor, on March 23, to reconsider the advisability of pressing demands upon China in regard to Port Arthur. England would not object to the Russian lease of an ice-free commercial harbor connected by rail with the trans-Siberian Railway, but questions of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in the neighborhood of Peking. England, on her part, was prepared to give assurances that beyond the maintenance of the existing treaty rights she had no interests in Manchuria, and to pledge herself not to occupy any port in the Gulf of Pechili as long as other Powers maintained the same policy.[233] To this protest, so plainly attended by a second wish of Great Britain to make a counter-move when the prime move of Russia could not be checked, Count Muravieff made, on March 23, a firm reply, refusing absolutely to admit that the integrity of the Chinese Empire was violated by the proposed lease of Port Arthur, and repeating his assertion that the possession of that harbor was a question of vital necessity to Russia. Sir N. O’Conor confessed the futility of his protest.[234] About the same day, M. Pavloff informed the Peking Government that Russia could not consider the question of Port Arthur and Talien-wan apart, and insisted upon their lease before the 27th, failing which, Russia would take hostile measures.[235] Now England definitely resolved, on March 25, to obtain speedily the lease of Wei-hai-Wei in terms similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur, and ordered the British fleet to proceed from Hong-kong to the Gulf of Pechili,[236] and, three days later, notified the Russian Government that she would retain her entire liberty of action to take steps to protect her interests, and to diminish the evil consequences which she anticipated.[237] On the preceding day, however, a Russo-Chinese Agreement had been signed, incorporating all the points upon which Russia had insisted and against which England had vainly protested. Count Muravieff at once briefly announced to the Powers the successful conclusion of the Agreement;[238] and, when the British Government called upon him to fulfill his promise to give a written assurance of Russia’s declared intention to respect the sovereign rights of China and the treaty privileges of the other Powers in the leased territory, he calmly replied that what was interpreted as promises was in fact “very confidentially” expressed views, and that “the time was not opportune” for making the assurances public. Russia would not, he added, so “abuse the lease granted by a friendly Power” as “to arbitrarily transform a closed and principally military port into a commercial port like any other.”[239] The triumph of Russia was tardily followed, on April 3, by the promise England secured from China to lease Wei-hai-Wei to her for the same period as Port Arthur,[240] thus again substituting for an effective prevention of evils the “balance”[241] and retaliation between the Powers at the expense of China.[242]

In this connection, it may be noted that the Russian Government considered, according to Count Muravieff, “that China owed them this [the lease of the ports] for the services they had rendered her in her war with Japan, and these services must be properly requited.”[243] It was no matter of surprise to Japan that Russia now secured for herself the most strategic portion of the territory, the retention of which by Japan was, three years ago, declared by the same Power to be imperiling the position of Peking, rendering Korean independence nominal, and interfering with the permanent peace of the Far East. When it was announced by Russia, in December last, that Port Arthur had been lent to her by China only temporarily as a winter anchorage, the Japanese Government merely “credited this assurance, and accordingly took note of it.”[244] When the negotiations for the lease were in progress, the Japanese Government made no protest, and when they were consummated, it manifested no appreciable sentiment. At the same time, it quietly approved of the British lease of Wei-hai-Wei,[245] which the Japanese troops had still held pending the final payment of the Chinese indemnity. Then they speedily evacuated the port in favor of England, leaving behind them every accommodation to the successor.[246]

The Agreement concluded, on March 15/27, 1898, between Li Hung-chang and the Russian _Chargé_, M. Pavloff, has never been published by the Russian Government, and the only sources to which we can turn are an English translation of a Chinese _précis_ forwarded by Sir Claude MacDonald more than a month after the conclusion of the Agreement,[247] and the Chinese text that appears in the _Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku Isan_.[248] Port Arthur and Talien-wan, with their adjacent waters, were leased to Russia for twenty-five years, subject to renewal by mutual agreement, the lease not affecting the sovereign rights of China (Articles 1 and 3); within the leased territory, Chinese citizens might continue to live, but no Chinese troops should be stationed, and the responsibility of military affairs should be vested in one Russian officer, who should not bear the Chinese title of governor-general or governor (Article 4); Port Arthur would be a naval port open only to the Russian and Chinese men-of-war, but closed against the commercial and naval ships of other nations, while Talien-wan, except the portion used exclusively for naval purposes, would be a trading port open freely to the merchant vessels of all nations (Article 6); the Russians would be allowed to build forts and barracks, and provide defenses (Article 7); there should be a neutral territory to the north of the leased ground, which would be administered by Chinese officials, but into which no Chinese troops should be sent without consulting the Russian authorities (Article 5); the railway contract of 1896 might be extended so as to cover a branch line to Talien-wan and, if necessary, another line between Niu-chwang and the Yalu, but the construction of the railways should not be made a ground for securing territory (Article 8). Sir Claude Macdonald presented also, on June 14, what he believed to be an authentic version of the Special Russo-Chinese Agreement concluded on April 25 (May 7), 1898, to supplement the Agreement of March 15.[249] It defined the extent of the leased territory, and of the neutral territory to the north of the former (Articles 1 and 2).[250] Within the latter, it was agreed, no ports should be open to the trade of other nations, and no economic concessions made to them, without Russian consent (Article 5). At Kin-chow, the administration and police were to be Chinese, but the military, Russian (Article 4). Regarding railways, it was provided that Port Arthur and Talien-wan should be the termini of the conceded line, along which no railway privileges should be given to other nations. Russia would, however, have nothing to say if China herself should undertake to construct a railway from Shan-hai-kwan to a point near the Russian line (Article 3).

These agreements were accompanied by some characteristically pacific and magnanimous utterances by the Czar, professing his firm friendship with China, extolling the wise decision of the Son of Heaven in granting the lease, and emphasizing that the direct communication by means of the great Siberian Railway with the hitherto closed-up country would largely contribute to the peaceful intercourse of the peoples of the East and West, to which task Russia was called by Divine Providence.[251]

The leased territory was named Kwan-tung[252] by the Russians, and the Provisional Regulations for its administration were published at St. Petersburg through the _Bulletin des Lois_ of August 20 (September 1), 1899.[253] By these regulations, the Kwan-tung region was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, with its chief seat of administration at Port Arthur (Articles 4 and 6). The Administration was headed by a Governor, appointed and removed at the immediate will of the Czar, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the army forces of the territory and entered into immediate communication with the commander of the cis-Amur region, and in addition commanded the navy at Port Arthur and Vladivostok; the latter port, however, retained its Commander of the port, who was subservient to the Governor (Articles 3, 7, 12, 13, and 14). In matters concerning frontier and foreign relations, the Governor directly communicated with the Russian Representatives at Peking, Tokio, and Seul, and with the Russian military and naval agents (Article 22). At the creation on August 13, 1903, of a Vice-regency in this region, which will receive attention later, it became necessary to make some changes in the administrative rules, which had not been completed at the outbreak of the present war.

Talien-wan being mainly open to foreign trade, its organization and administration were set on a separate basis from the rest of the Kwan-tung. At the instance of M. Witte, then the Minister of Finance, an Imperial Order was promulgated on July 30 (August 11), 1899, ordering that near Talien-wan a new town named Dalny should be built, which was simultaneously declared a free port under the following conditions, namely, that the importation and exportation of merchandise should be allowed free of customs dues in Dalny within the limits determined, and liable to modification, by the Minister of Finance; but that goods imported into Russia from Dalny should pay the regular import duties in force in the Russian Empire.[254] By the Provisional Regulations already referred to of August 20 (September 1) of the same year, the organization of Dalny was assigned to the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, under the chief direction of the Minister of Finance, and its administration was intrusted to a Prefect, to be appointed and dismissed by Imperial orders and subordinate to the Governor of the Kwan-tung (Articles 99 and 101).[255] It is already well known that Dalny, now covering about 100 square versts in area, was, according to M. Witte’s plan, intended to be the commercial terminus of the great Siberian Railway, and eventually the mercantile outlet on the Pacific of the vast Russian Empire. Before the war, the works at Dalny, including its large docks and piers, had cost already nearly 20,000,000 rubles. Part of this immense expenditure was to have been met by the income of the public sales at auction of land-lots, held three times since 1902, in spite of the fact that the twenty-five year lease of the territory to Russia would hardly justify her in alienating portions of it permanently.[256]

Footnote 198:

Cf. _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 1 and 15. China seems to have requested Russia to advise Germany to reconsider her action. Later, Russia is said to have reported that she had failed to change the mind of the Kaiser.

Footnote 199:

Count Muravieff’s remark to Sir N. O’Conor, the British _Chargé_ at St. Petersburg, on March 28, 1898.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 125.

Footnote 200:

Kiao-chau was occupied on November 17, three Russian war-vessels came to Port Arthur on December 18, 1897; the German-Chinese Agreement was concluded on March 5, the formal demand by Russia was presented about the 7th, and granted on the 27th of the same month, 1898.

Footnote 201:

_Ibid._, pp. 42–43, Nos. 95, 96, 98, 100. It is interesting to note that, on February 4, 1902, when negotiations were in progress between Russia and China, the former supporting large exclusive demands made by the Russo-Chinese Bank in Manchuria, M. Lessar, the Russian Minister, said that his Government was merely asking for privileges similar to those of Germany in Shan-tung.—U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 274.

Footnote 202:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 9, No. 231.

Footnote 203:

The statement made by Count Muravieff, on December 22, 1897, at his diplomatic reception, and reported by Mr. W. E. Goschen.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, pp. 12–13, No. 37.

Footnote 204:

See _Ibid._, Nos. 26, 43, 62. At the same time, M. Pavloff, the Russian _Chargé_ at Peking, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Kinder, British chief engineer of the Northern Railway.—_Ibid._, No. 38; cf. Nos. 111, 115, 117.

Footnote 205:

M. Pavloff’s own story to Sir Claude MacDonald, on March 17, 1898.—_China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 2.

Footnote 206:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 26.

Footnote 207:

_Ibid._, Nos. 30, 32, 43, 46. Some of the other terms were: (1) the maritime and native customs, salt tax, and _likin_, as security; (2) a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tsze valley; (3) a guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yang-tsze valley to any other Power; (4) the opening of some other ports; (5) the pledge that so long as the British trade with China was larger than the trade of any other nation, the inspector-general of customs should always be an Englishman; (6) a freer internal navigation; etc. These terms seem to have been framed so as to protect British interests in China strictly within the scope of the most-favored-nation principle. The demand for the opening of Talien-wan and Nanning strongly prejudiced England against Russia and France, while the Burma-Yang-tsze Railway was unpleasing to France, and the non-alienation of the river valley was sometimes regarded by Russia as a counterpart of her own claims beyond the Great Wall. The whole story of the loan negotiation, as well as that of the Northern Railway extension loan, is highly interesting and important in the recent history of China, but we are here concerned with the bearing of the first loan on the development of the Manchurian question.

Footnote 208:

It is highly interesting to note that during the latter part of 1903, when Russian aggression in Manchuria and on the northern frontier of Korea was feared, the American and Japanese Governments, with the moral support of the British, made successful efforts to open Mukden, Tatung-kao, and An-tung to foreign trade. This proposition had met a strong Russian opposition, which also delayed, till after the outbreak of the present war, the opening of Wiju on the Korean border.

Footnote 209:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 51, 57.

Footnote 210:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 59.

Footnote 211:

_Ibid._, Nos. 72, 76, 123, etc.

Footnote 212:

The most-favored-nation clause is referred to, which—sometimes in general and sometimes in specific terms, and sometimes reciprocal and conditional, but nearly always unilateral and unconditional—is inserted in the treaty of China with each Power. See Mayers, op. cit.

Footnote 213:

A dispute arose later between the Russian and British Governments on this word “any” (_tout_). The latter interpreted it to mean any port secured by Russia in China, while the former claimed that the Czar’s Government had never promised to open Port Arthur to foreign trade.—March 13, 1898; _China, No. 1 (1898)_, pp. 47–48, No. 114.

Footnote 214:

_Ibid._, No. 76.

Footnote 215:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 83.

Footnote 216:

See p. 133, below.

Footnote 217:

Compare the Russian reply to Secretary Hay’s note of September, 1899, pp. 135–138, below.

Footnote 218:

On January 17.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 56. Cf. No. 62.

Footnote 219:

_Ibid._, Nos. 65, 69, 75, 78, 79.

Footnote 220:

In his speech before the House of Lords on February 8. See _ibid._, Nos. 82, 83, 87; the _Parliamentary Debates_, 4th Series, vol. 53, pp. 40–41.

Footnote 221:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 54.

Footnote 222:

_Ibid._, No. 59.

Footnote 223:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 85.

Footnote 224:

_Ibid._, No. 88.

Footnote 225:

_Ibid._, Nos. 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103.

Footnote 226:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 95 (Salisbury to MacDonald).

Footnote 227:

The Russian Government soon had occasion to gauge the strength of the British protest, for, on March 8, Sir N. O’Conor made a striking statement to Count Muravieff, as will be seen in the following report (_ibid._, No. 108, O’Conor to Salisbury): “I alluded, as no doubt his Excellency was aware, to the junction of the Burmese and Chinese railway systems. This demand became at once still more necessary and reasonable if greater privileges of the same kind were accorded to Russia in the Liao-tung Peninsula, as they had apparently already been accorded in Manchuria. Count Muravieff did not, however, respond to these remarks beyond saying that he supposed the Burma-Chinese line would, in this case, descend to the valley of the Yang-tsze.” The Count’s remark may be considered a sufficient reply, when it is seen in connection with another remark he made a few moments earlier. When Sir N. O’Conor alluded to the objectionable features of leasing Port Arthur, the Foreign Minister reminded him that British interests were principally represented in the neighborhood of the Yang-tsze. Russia would evade the British protest by turning England’s attention to her own sphere, in which Russia had little interest, and would not object to a British repetition there of Russia’s conduct in Manchuria. Muravieff must have thought that O’Conor, by his reference to the Burmese Railway, now voluntarily threw himself into his net. Russia later succeeded in inducing England to conclude the Anglo-Russian railway declaration of April 28, 1899, delimiting in a negative manner the railway spheres of the two Powers in China, Russia pledging not to seek concessions and not to obstruct those of the British in the Yang-tsze valley, and England pledging similarly in regard to Russian concessions beyond the Great Wall. (See _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 138.) The Russian Government naturally considered the conclusion of this agreement as a diplomatic victory over the British, and seemed to have interpreted its terms as implying that all the territory beyond the Great Wall was the Russian sphere, not only of railway concessions, but also of general interests and influence. Already in May of the same year, M. Pavloff renewed his demand at Peking for the concession of a Russian railway to be built directly to the Chinese capital, thus even overreaching the limit set in the British agreement of less than a fortnight previous. See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 112, 116, 120, 129, 132–133, 214–215.

Footnote 228:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 101, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 149.

Footnote 229:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 104.

Footnote 230:

_Ibid._, No. 114.

Footnote 231:

_Ibid._, No. 120.

Footnote 232:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 138. The Marquess did not refer to a matter of enormous importance, that the proposed railways would _connect_ the immense land and sea forces of Russia, which he emphasized.

Footnote 233:

_China, No. 1 (1900)_, Nos. 123 and 133.

Footnote 234:

“I cannot say that my efforts were successful.... I was unable to induce his Excellency to modify his views.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 125 and 132.

Footnote 235:

_Ibid._, No. 126.

Footnote 236:

_China, No. 1 (1900)_, No. 129.

Footnote 237:

_Ibid._, No. 138.

Footnote 238:

_Ibid._, Nos. 134, 136, and 137.

Footnote 239:

Cf. _ibid._, Nos. 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, and 151.

Footnote 240:

_Ibid._, No. 144. The agreement was signed at Peking on July 1. See _Treaty Series_, No. 14, 1898.

Footnote 241:

“Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by the Yamên to Russia. It is therefore necessary to obtain,” etc.—Salisbury to MacDonald, March 25; _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 129. Cf. also _China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 2.

It should be said, in justice to Great Britain, that at first, when the Chinese Government intimated toward the end of February that they would lease Wei-hai-Wei to her if she would accept it, Lord Salisbury considered such an offer premature, for his Government “aimed at discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 90 and 91.

Footnote 242:

Two other instances may here be cited to further illustrate the policy of the British Government during this critical period of time. (1) Soon after the appearance of Russian war-vessels at Port Arthur, Admiral Buller, of the China station of the British navy, arrived at Chemulpo with seven ships, on December 29, and ordered the “Immortalité” and “Iphigenia” to proceed to Port Arthur. The former was, on January 10, ordered to leave for Chefu. The presence of the British boats created “a bad impression” on Russia, which requested England to avoid dangers of conflict in the Russian “sphere of influence.” The British Government explained that the ships had been sent by the Admiral without instruction from the Admiralty, and would soon leave, “in ordinary course of cruising.” It was added, at the same time, that British ships had a perfect right to proceed to Port Arthur. It was reported at one time that the two boats had been ordered away from Port Arthur under protest from Russia.—_Ibid._, Nos. 31, 48, 52, 63, 66, 68. (2) On March 8, Sir Claude MacDonald was informed by the Tsung-li Yamên that the only reason given by M. Pavloff for the demand of the lease of the two ports was to “assist in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.” Probably England and Japan were meant, and the Yamên was fully alive to the absurdity of this pretext, but was unable to resist the Russian demands. It therefore begged earnestly that the British Government would assist it by giving a formal assurance to the Russian Government that England had no designs on Manchuria. It does not seem to have been thought necessary by the British Government to give such an assurance. See _ibid._, Nos. 100 and 109.

Footnote 243:

_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 114 (O’Conor to Salisbury, March 13).

Footnote 244:

_Ibid._, No. 29.

Footnote 245:

“The Japanese Government,” said Baron Nishi, Foreign Minister of Japan, confidentially, to Sir Ernest Satow, about March 20, “had been anxious that China should be able to maintain her position at Wei-hai-Wei, but if she found it impossible to do so, Japan would have no objection to its being held by a Power disposed to assist in maintaining the independence of China.”—_China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 35. Cf. also Nos. 49, 79, 81, 107, etc.

Footnote 246:

_Ibid._, Nos. 85, 112, 118, 231, 238.

Russia had undertaken to request Japan to promise that China would secure Wei-hai-Wei after the Japanese evacuation, but Japan declined to make such a pledge.—_Ibid._, No. 30. In April, 1902, the control of Wei-hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty to the Colonial Office. The mouth of the harbor is so large that it would require an enormous expenditure and large forces to fortify and defend it adequately. At the time when England leased the port, she was hardly inclined to let financial considerations thwart her effort to restore her prestige so abruptly foreshadowed by that of Russia. In 1902, however, the lately concluded Anglo-Japanese agreement of alliance rendered the fortification of Wei-hai-Wei no longer necessary. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 172–173.

Footnote 247:

_China, No. 1 (1899)_, pp. 127–129, No. 187, dated Peking, April 29. Regarding this _précis_, Sir Claude says: “It bears every sign of foreign authorship, and the original cannot have been drafted by a Chinese. I have no doubt that the document correctly represents the sense of the original agreement, for it fully corresponds with what I have been able to learn of the contents of the latter.” M. Cordier also relies on this _précis_ in his _Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales_, vol. iii. pp. 362–364.

Footnote 248:

_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 244–245. This Chinese text naturally clears up some points which are obscure in the _précis_.

Footnote 249:

See _China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 188, No. 273. Also Cordier, _Histoire_, vol. iii. pp. 365–366. A Japanese version obtained from the Foreign Office at Tokio appears in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 246–247. The Special Agreement was supplemented by another Agreement concluded on April 25 (o. s.), 1899.

Footnote 250:

The boundary of the leased territory began with the northern side of A-tang Bay (Port Adams), on the west coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and passed through and included the A-tang Mountains, ending near Pi-tse-wo, and including the adjacent waters and isles. The northern limit of the neutral ground started at the mouth of the Kai-chow River, passed north of Yuyen-ch’êng and along the Ta-yang River, and ended at and included its mouth.

Footnote 251:

See the Czar’s telegraphic message to the Chinese Emperor, on March 15/27; and his Imperial orders of March 17/29 and July 30/August 11. _China, No. 1 (1899)_, pp. 20–21, 1–2, and 262–263.

Footnote 252:

Meaning, presumably, east of Shan-hai-kwan.

Footnote 253:

See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 292–293, 304–311, and 335. Also the _Tsūshō Isan_ (Japanese Consular Reports), April 28, 1904, pp. 33–46.

Footnote 254:

See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 262–263.

Footnote 255:

_China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 308–311.

Footnote 256:

Conditions at Dalny since its foundation are minutely described by M. Suzuki, agent of the Japanese Foreign Office in the _Tsūshō Isan_ for April 23 (pp. 39–49), 28 (pp. 32–46), May 3 (pp. 37–49), 8 (pp. 42–55), 12 (pp. 36–42), and 18 (pp. 33–37), 1904.