CHAPTER IX

A _MODUS VIVENDI_: THE ALEXIEFF-TSÊNG AGREEMENT

In the mean time, the Chinese Court[318] having largely emancipated itself from the sway of the reactionary Prince Tuan and his associates, the Representatives at Peking of the eleven interested Powers had agreed in September to open discussions among themselves of the terms of peace to be presented to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang.[319] The German Government, however, proposed, as a prerequisite of peace negotiations with China, a drastic measure demanding the surrender to the Powers of the chief culprits of the recent trouble. The proposition meeting little encouragement from other Ministers, Germany presented a new condition on October 3. The latter was, however, supplanted by the basis for negotiations formulated on September 30 and presented five days later to the Powers by the French Minister.[320] His proposals, to which Russia immediately assented,[321] and which with important amendments[322] and additions became the basis of the Protocol signed on September 7, 1901, comprised the following six points: (1) the punishment of the chief offenders designated by the Representatives of the Powers at Peking; (2) maintenance of the prohibition of the importation of arms into China; (3) indemnities for the foreign governments, societies, and individuals; (4) establishment of a permanent legation guard at Peking; (5) dismantlement of the Taku forts; and (6) military occupation of two or three points on the road from Tientsin to Taku, so as to keep open the passage between Peking and the sea. It is needless for us to follow the negotiations which proceeded at Peking after these proposals were made by France, but it is important to observe that the French propositions were limited, in the first place, to North China, and, in the second place, to those questions in North China which concerned all the Powers alike. The significance of all this, or at least of the prompt assent of Russia,[323] may well be inferred from the opposition as readily offered by the latter when Germany[324] and Japan,[325] respectively, urged that a proper mention should be made in the peace protocol of China’s consent to repair the murder of Baron von Ketteler and the Chancellor Sugiyama. Russia maintained that “proposals of this nature, serving principally as a satisfaction to be given to private views of one State, ought not to enter into the common programme of the collective demands, which had as their object the interests of all the Powers collectively and the reëstablishment of a normal state of affairs in the Celestial Empire.”[326] “In the Chinese question it is advisable,” said the _Official Messenger_ of St. Petersburg, “not to lose sight of the necessity of distinguishing clearly the questions which interest each of the Powers in particular and those which affect the interests of all the Powers in general.”[327] This distinction had been fundamental in the Russian diplomacy in China since 1900, for, if one question of the former class was allowed to be dealt with in the common deliberation of the Representatives of all the Powers, why should not another question of the same class be similarly treated? Or, in other words, if the Sugiyama affair was referred to the collective council, the argument that the Manchurian problem should be solved solely by Russia, without intervention of the other Powers, would lose much of its force.[328] The ultimate failure of Russian diplomacy—for diplomacy has failed when it ends in a war, and, if Russia does succeed, her success will be that of force, not of diplomacy—may be said to be largely due to the evident contradiction of this fundamental distinction between North China and Manchuria, upon which she sought to build her entire diplomatic structure in this crisis. As a matter of fact, it was as impossible to deny the profound interest felt by Great Britain and the United States, and, above all, by Japan, in the economic development of Manchuria, as it would have been to exclude Russia from the community of the Powers in North China. It should be remembered that Russia herself persistently maintained that the principle of the integrity of China applied also to Manchuria, and she would have hardly antagonized other Powers had she expressed an equally clear adhesion to the principle of the open door, and made efforts to carry out pledges regarding both principles.

Events soon took place, however, which made other Powers skeptical of Russia’s sincerity in her profession of even the principle of the integrity of the Chinese Empire. The new question thus thrust upon the attention of the Powers was of an extremely grave nature, for if the sovereignty of Manchuria should eventually pass into the hands of Russia, the treaty rights that other nations had acquired therein from China might rightfully be terminated by Russia. Whatever her ultimate objects, it was hardly politic for her to approach the difficult Manchurian question at the time and in the manner selected by her. Dr. George Morrison reported to the _Times_ on December 31, 1900, and Sir Ernest Satow, the British Minister at Peking, confirmed it as authentic,[329] that the delegates of Admiral Alexieff and the Tartar General Tsêng-chi, of Mukden, had signed, in November last, an agreement whereby Russia consented to return to the Chinese the civil government of the Southern Province of Fêng-tien (Sheng-king) in Manchuria, on the following conditions:—

1. “The Tartar General Tsêng undertakes to protect the province and pacify it, and to assist in the construction of the railroad.

2. “He must treat kindly the Russians in military occupation, protecting the railway and pacifying the province, and provide them with lodging and provisions.

3. “He must disarm and disband the Chinese soldiery, delivering in their entirety to the Russian military officials all munitions of war in the arsenals not already occupied by the Russians.

4. “All forts and defenses in Fêng-tien not occupied by the Russians, and all powder magazines not required by the Russians, must be dismantled in the presence of Russian officials.

5. “Niu-chwang and other places now occupied by the Russians shall be restored to the Chinese civil administration when the Russian Government is satisfied that the pacification of the provinces is complete.

6. “The Chinese shall maintain law and order by local police under the Tartar General.

7. “A Russian Political Resident, with general powers of control, shall be stationed at Mukden, to whom the Tartar General must give all information respecting any important measure.

8. “Should the local police be insufficient in any emergency, the Tartar General will communicate with the Russian Resident at Mukden, and invite Russia to dispatch reinforcements.

9. “The Russian text shall be the standard.”[330]

In brief, the province was to be disarmed, its military government to be in the Russian hands, its civil government to be placed under the supervision of a Russian Resident, with additional duties on the part of the Chinese to provide for the Russian military and to protect Russian properties. The last provisions were coupled with the right of the Russians to supply reinforcements, if the Chinese local police should prove insufficient. The probable significance of this measure will be fully discussed in connection with the Russo-Chinese Convention of April 8, 1902. As regards the Agreement now under discussion, Dr. Morrison opined that it would necessarily be followed by similar agreements with reference to the other two of the three Eastern Provinces,[331] and then all Manchuria would be “a _de facto_ Russian protectorate, Russia by a preëxisting agreement having already the right to maintain all necessary troops for the protection of the railway.” It is needless to say that the report of this Agreement caused universal amazement in the diplomatic world. It soon became known[332] that the Chinese delegate who signed it at Port Arthur had received no authorization to do so from the Peking Government.[333] But the Japanese Government, hearing from a reliable source that so late as the beginning of February, Russia was pressing China to ratify the Agreement, undertook to express its opinion to the Chinese Minister at Tokio, that the conclusion of any such agreement would be a “source of danger” to the Chinese Government, and that no arrangement affecting territorial rights of the Empire ought to be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the Powers.[334] At the instance of Japan, Great Britain also made precisely the same representation to China,[335] Germany following the example in slightly different language,[336] and the United States also reminding China of “the impropriety, inexpediency, and even extreme danger to the interests of China, of considering any private territorial and financial engagements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the Powers now engaged in negotiation.”[337]

It has often been reported in the press that the Agreement was never ratified by either China or Russia. Before, however, any of the protests of the Powers reached the Peking Government, Count Lamsdorff had, on February 6, “very readily” explained the situation to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He said it was quite untrue that any agreement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate in Southern Manchuria had been concluded or was under discussion with China, but “the Russian military authorities who had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of that province had been directed, when reinstating the Chinese authorities in their former posts, to arrange with the local civil authorities a _modus vivendi_ for the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier, and to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur.” “Some of the details of the proposed _modus vivendi_ had been sent for consideration to St. Petersburg, but no convention or arrangement with the central Government of China or of a permanent character had been concluded with regard to Manchuria, nor had the Emperor any intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it.”[338] A careful reading of this statement, as typical of the many declarations made by Russia in regard to Manchuria, will show how untenable is the popular view that she persistently falsifies. There is here a fair admission that a _modus vivendi_ was under way between the Russian military officers in Southern Manchuria and the local Chinese authorities, and that it was not of a permanent nature, nor was it concluded with the central Government at Peking, and both of these points accord with the reported facts. Nor can one deny the cogency of the argument that Russia would evacuate Manchuria “as soon as circumstances admitted of it.” What constituted the objectionable feature of the affair, from the standpoint of the interested Powers, must have been that, inasmuch as Count Lamsdorff would not publish the terms of the _modus vivendi_, it was not possible for them to satisfy themselves that it contained nothing which would render impossible the consummation of “circumstances” favorable for evacuation, and eventually tend toward a “permanent” possession of the territory by Russia. As matters stood, it would be as natural for the Powers to entertain such a doubt, as it was for Russia to deem it necessary to declare, in her circular of August 25, 1900, that she would withdraw from Manchuria if, for one thing, no obstacle was placed in her way by the action of other Powers. The doubt of the Powers was rather intensified, if at all, by the further explanation by Count Lamsdorff on February 6, that “when it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the central Government of China an effective guarantee against the recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance in the future by China of the terms of the agreement [agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, September 28, 1896?], which she had been unable to fulfill during the disturbances. The terms of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister, or be left for discussion at Peking.”[339] A month before this official statement of Russia reached the London Government, the latter heard from the Japanese Minister, Baron Hayashi, that Russia and China had already made at St. Petersburg some arrangement regarding Manchuria,[340] evidently referred to by Count Lamsdorff in the quoted passage as “an effective guarantee.”

Footnote 318:

The Court had fled toward Ta-yuen-Fu before the allied troops reached Peking, and thence started toward Si-ngan-Fu, the capital of many a historic dynasty, on October 1.

Footnote 319:

Russia had early advocated accepting Li as plenipotentiary, while other Powers were still skeptical of the nature of his credentials. See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 254, 356, 368, 371, 398, 401; _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 31, 111, 112, 128, 216; U. S. 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. It was not till September 20 that Li entered Peking. Prince Ching had arrived there September 3. The appointment of the Prince as a plenipotentiary is said to have been partly due to Japanese influence.

Footnote 320:

_Documents diplomatiques: Chine, 1899–1900_, No. 327 (p. 174). Also see _China, No. 5 (1901)_, pp. 5, 46, 53–54.

Footnote 321:

_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 17.

Footnote 322:

For the Japanese amendments, see _ibid._, Nos. 60, 151, 178.

Footnote 323:

Russia openly declared in her _Messager Officiel_ of March 24 (April 6), 1901, that the Russian views regarding the settlement of the trouble in North China, as distinguished from Manchuria, had “served the French Government as a basis for the elaboration” of the latter’s propositions.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 20–21.

Footnote 324:

November 5.—_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 117.

Footnote 325:

November 28.—_Ibid._, Nos. 178 and 198.

Footnote 326:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 21.

Footnote 327:

_Ibid._, p. 20.

Footnote 328:

Russia allowed the question of the indemnity in Manchuria to be dealt with at the general conferences at Peking together with the indemnity respecting North China. In the matter of the punishment of guilty local officials, from the discussion of which Russia abruptly withdrew herself, the representatives of the other Powers included Manchuria in their consideration.

Footnote 329:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4, 1901). Sir Charles Scott, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported on January 5, that it appeared to be generally believed there that “some provisional agreement, such as that indicated, had been concluded by Russia with the local authorities in Manchuria, and that she might eventually acquire by treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian Government.”—_Ibid._, No. 4.

Footnote 330:

The London _Times_, January 3, 1901, p. 3. In this and other reports Dr. Morrison seems to have translated from Chinese texts.

Footnote 331:

The Russian _Official Messenger_ of April 6, 1901, stated that “temporary agreements in writing (_modus vivendi_) respecting the reëstablishment of the local civil administration in the _three Provinces_ of Manchuria were, before all else, concluded between the Russian military authorities and the Chinese tsian-tsiouns [Generals] of the three Provinces.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 22.

Footnote 332:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4).

Footnote 333:

The Tartar General Tsêng-chi was degraded for this offense, but Russia succeeded in reinstating him.—_The Times_, February 20, 1901, p. 5.

Footnote 334:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 8.

Footnote 335:

_Ibid._, No. 13 (February 13).

Footnote 336:

The opinion of the German Government was that China “should not conclude with any Power individual treaties of a territorial or financial character _before_ they can estimate their obligations toward all the Powers as a whole, and _before_ the compliance with such obligations is accepted.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 12, 13.

Footnote 337:

_Ibid._, No. 19 (February 19).

What action the remaining Powers took is not shown in the Blue Books. Austria-Hungary and Italy are said to have also protested.

Footnote 338:

_China, No. 2 (1901)._

Footnote 339:

_China, No. 2 (1901)._

Footnote 340:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 6.