CHAPTER XVIII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, I

It was in view of these dangerously unstable circumstances in Manchuria and Korea that, on June 23, 1903, the four principal members of the Japanese Cabinet[580] and five Privy Councilors[581] met before the Throne, and decided on the principles upon which negotiations with Russia should be opened.[582] Having thus formulated the policy to be pursued, Baron Komura telegraphed to the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, Mr. Kurino, on July 28, as follows[583]:—

“The Imperial Government [of Japan] have observed with close attention the development of affairs in Manchuria, and its present situation causes them to view it with grave concern.

“So long as it was hoped that Russia would carry out, on the one hand, the engagement that she made with China, and, on the other, the assurances she had given to other Powers, regarding the subject of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Imperial Government maintained an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent conduct of Russia has been, at Peking, to propose new demands, and, in Manchuria, to tighten her hold upon it, until the Imperial Government is led to believe that Russia must have abandoned the intention of retiring from Manchuria. At the same time, her increased activity upon the Korean frontier is such as to raise doubts as to the limits of her ambition.

“The unconditioned and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese Government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant Power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defense, and Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and influence, Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.

“The Imperial Government, after the most serious consideration, have resolved to consult the Russian Government, in a spirit of conciliation and frankness, with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time the cause of their anxiety. In the estimation of the Imperial Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring about the desired adjustment, and it is believed that, failing this opportunity, there would be no room for another understanding.

“The Imperial Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and discretion, have decided to place the delicate negotiations in your hands.

“It being the wish of the Imperial Government to place their present invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official footing, you are accordingly instructed to open the question by presenting to Count Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, a _note verbale_ to the following effect:—

“‘The Japanese Government desire to remove from the relations of the two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believe that the Russian Government share the same desire. The Japanese Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Imperial Russian Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the regions of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view to defining their respective special interests in those regions.

“‘If this suggestion fortunately meets with the approval, in principle, of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding.’

“In presenting the foregoing note to the Russian Foreign Minister, you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the subject.

“You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under this instruction; and immediately upon the receipt of an affirmative reply from the Russian Government, the substance of our proposals will be telegraphed to you.”

To this request of Japan, Count Lamsdorff expressed a perfect agreement,[584] for, as he had very often said to Mr. Kurino, “an understanding between the two countries was not only desirable, but was the best policy.” “Should Russia and Japan enter into a full understanding,” said he, “no one would in future attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the two countries.”[585] The assent of the Foreign Minister was later sustained by the Czar.[586]

Thus the way was opened for an amicable interchange of the views of the two Powers. This auspicious beginning of the negotiations stands in striking contrast to their disastrous end. The discrepancy was perhaps in no small measure due to a political situation at St. Petersburg which was completely beyond the control of Count Lamsdorff, and probably also of the Czar. It should be remembered that Baron Komura, like Marquis Itō, was of the opinion that the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement with Russia was not only desirable, but also possible. The same belief was strongly shared by Mr. Kurino. It is also difficult to suppose that Count Lamsdorff entered upon the negotiations with a deliberate intention to introduce into them insurmountable difficulties, as he was presently obliged to do, so as to bring them to a complete deadlock. On the contrary, his remarks quoted in the preceding paragraph seem to indicate that he and Mr. Kurino had frequently talked of the wisdom of coming to a perfect adjustment of the interests of the two Powers in the East, and that he was gratified that the opportunity was offered by the Japanese Government to give effect to what he had long considered “the best policy.” About this time, however, it had begun to be surmised abroad that the peace party, with which the Count and M. Witte were said to be in sympathy, had been largely overshadowed by the less intelligent warlike faction. It was unknown what were the results of the observations of General Kuropatkin, the then Minister of War, who had made a tour of the East between the end of April and the end of July. Nor was it possible to discover what took place in the great conference held at Port Arthur early in July, in which the General, as well as Admiral Alexieff, MM. Lessar, Pavloff, Rosen, and Pokotiloff, took part. However that may be, it could hardly be denied that henceforth the Eastern affairs passed under the sway of a less thoughtful body of men at St. Petersburg, and of that executive officer of great talent, but strategist and diplomat of unknown value, Admiral Alexieff, at Port Arthur. M. Witte was relieved of his Ministry of Finance, and transferred to the presidency of the council of ministers, which was known to be of small real authority. On August 13, an Imperial _ukase_ was published in the Russian _Official Messenger_, stating that, “in view of the complex problems of administration of the eastern confines of the Empire, we [the Czar Nicolas] found it necessary to create a power capable of assuring the peaceful development of the country and satisfying urgent local needs.” For this purpose, a special vice-regency called the Far East was created out of the Amur and Kwan-tung territories, and Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy of the Far East. He was vested with supreme power in the civil administration of the territories, with the command of the naval forces in the Pacific and of all the troops quartered in the country under his jurisdiction, and with the management of the diplomatic relations of these regions with the neighboring States. The Viceroy was released from the jurisdiction of the Ministers at St. Petersburg, and the only control to be exercised over him by the central power was through a special committee of men[587] nominated by the Czar and presided over by himself.[588] Statutes concerning this special committee of the Far East—which has in itself no executive power—were promulgated on September 30.[589] When we consider the probable state of Russian politics at the time, the significance of thus elevating Alexieff and clothing him with enormous powers could hardly be concealed. Henceforth the control of the Eastern diplomacy of Russia seemed to have rested more with the Viceroy at Port Arthur than with the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg.[590]

Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy on August 13. On the preceding day,[591] the first Japanese note was handed to Count Lamsdorff by Mr. Kurino, who had held it for about a week pending the Czar’s assent to Japan’s proposition of July 28, already quoted. In this note, delivered on August 12, Baron Komura wrote as follows:—

“In reference to my telegram of the 28th July, the Imperial Government, after giving most serious consideration to the condition of affairs in those regions where the interests of the two Powers meet, have decided to propose the following articles as the basis of an understanding between Japan and Russia:—

“1. ‘A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires, and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

“2. ‘A reciprocal recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea and Russia’s special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.

“3. ‘A reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede the development of those industrial and commercial activities, respectively, of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this Agreement.

“‘An additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the Eastern Chinese and Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang lines.

“4. ‘A reciprocal engagement that, in case it should be found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder liable to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required, and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

“5. ‘The recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

“6. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.’

“In handing the foregoing project to Count Lamsdorff,” wrote Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino in the same dispatch which contained the proposed Articles, “you will say that it is presented for the consideration of the Russian Government in the firm belief that it may be found adequate to serve as a basis upon which to construct a satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments, and you will assure Count Lamsdorff that any amendment or suggestion he may find it necessary to offer will receive the immediate and friendly consideration of the Imperial Government. It will not be necessary for you to say much in elucidation of the separate items of the project, as they are largely self-explanatory; but you might point out that the project taken as a whole will be found to be little more than a logical extension and amplification of the principles already recognized by, or of conditions embodied in the previous engagements[592] concluded between, the two Governments.”[593]

These articles are memorable, as their more essential features were never altered in the later notes from Japan, as the persistent rejection by Russia of the principles embodied in these articles inevitably ended in hostilities, and, the most important of all, as much of the future of the East would seem to depend upon whether these principles should win or fail through the war. The principles were as obvious as the note was “largely self-explanatory.” At their basis was the desire for a general, lasting peace of the Far East, or, in other words, an effective elimination of unnatural, irritating circumstances, so that the East may develop its enormous material and moral resources, and thereby establish with the West an intimate and mutually beneficial relationship. Upon this fundamental desire were built two great principles, which had long been the mottoes of Eastern diplomacy; namely, the territorial integrity of, and the “open door” in, China and Korea. These principles, which Russia had frequently avowed on her own initiative, Japan now requested her to uphold mutually with herself. Side by side with these considerations, the vested interests and the peculiar position, respectively, of Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korea, were to be reciprocally recognized by the two Powers, in such a way, however, as not to infringe the two great principles already named. Observe that the Russian interests in Manchuria were not less respected than the Japanese interests in Korea, nor was the Russian occupation of Manchuria more guarded against than the Japanese annexation of Korea. The only ground in the note for a possible misinterpretation was the Article which provided for Japan’s sole right to advise and aid Korea for the cause of the good government and reform of the latter. Experience had shown that the independence and progress of Korea, upon which one half of Japan’s own future rested, would be possible only by the internal reform and development of the Peninsular Empire, and that, unfortunately, the task of reform could not safely be left either with the indolent Korea or with another Power, be it China or Russia, whose ultimate object would be best served were Korea to remain feeble. The reform of Korea may truly be called the penalty of Japan’s geographical position, and the latter’s success in the fulfillment of this most delicate mission must depend on her sense of just proportion and utmost self-control. And nothing seems to kindle the Japanese nation with a higher ambition than their profound determination to perform what they deem their historic mission in the fairest spirit of human progress. Only along these lines, moreover, by a peculiar coincidence of circumstances, the securest interests of Japan as a nation seem to lie. For it appears to be her singular fortune that her interests become every year more closely tied with the best tried principles of progress. Upon fairness her life depends, and upon it the natural growth of the millions of the East would seem to rest. It appeared, therefore, evident to the Japanese statesmen that in no other manner than along the course suggested by their propositions to Russia could the welfare of all the interested parties be assured, and the future repose and progress of the East guaranteed. On the other hand, however, nothing could be more distasteful to the party presumably in control of the Eastern policy of Russia at the time than the reciprocal understanding proposed by Mr. Kurino in his note of August 12.

Before replying to this note, Count Lamsdorff suddenly demanded, on August 23, that negotiations should be conducted at Tokio instead of at St. Petersburg, as had been desired by Japan[594]. This move of Russia was closely parallel to the policy she once pursued in China regarding the lease of Port Arthur, when she declined to negotiate at the Russian Capital[595]. A discussion at St. Petersburg might save it from many of the vexatious delays which would naturally attend its being held at an Eastern capital, away from the Foreign Office of the Power whose interest counseled procrastination. Of the several reasons presented by Russia for her proposition, one was that the local knowledge of Viceroy Alexieff had constantly to be consulted. Japan pointed out that the proposed Agreement concerned matters of principle, and not of local detail[596]. Her repeated request, however, to negotiate at St. Petersburg was firmly refused by Russia, as was also Japan’s suggestion that her note be made the basis of the discussion.[597] Negotiations were therefore transferred to Tokio, and the Japanese note and the Russian counter-note—the latter not then received—were together to serve as the base of the _pourparlers_[598]. This question, which marked the beginning of many long delays to follow, itself consumed two weeks before any real progress of the negotiations could be made.

After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia, on October 3, sent her counter-note, which, as will be seen from the following telegram of the 5th, from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, revealed the utter irreconcilability of the wishes of the two Powers:—

“Baron Rosen [Russian Minister at Tokio] came back from Port Arthur on the 3d instant. He called on me the same day, and handed me the following as the Russian counter-proposals, which, he said, had been sanctioned by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, upon the joint representations of Admiral Alexieff and himself:—

“1. ‘Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

“2. ‘Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire without infringing the stipulations of Article 1.

“3. ‘Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them, so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article 1.

“4. ‘Recognition of the right of Japan to send, for the same purpose, troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.

“5. ‘Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.

“6. ‘Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.

“7. ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.

“8. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous agreements between Russia and Japan regarding Korea.[599]’”

In comparing this counter-note with the original note of Japan, it will at once be seen that Russia seriously reduced Japan’s demands concerning Korea by excluding her right of rendering advice and assistance to Korea in the latter’s military affairs, and also by quietly suppressing the important clause providing for mutual recognition of the principle of the equal economic opportunity for all nations in Korea. Moreover, Russia imposed upon Japan the following new conditions regarding Korea: not to use any part of the territory for strategical purposes; not to fortify the southern coast; and to consider the territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel, covering nearly one third of the area of the Empire, as neutral[600] between the two Powers. As regards Manchuria, Russia silently discarded the two fundamental principles proposed by Japan and often avowed by Russia herself, namely, China’s sovereignty over it and the equal economic opportunity for all nations therein. On the contrary, Russia requested Japan to declare Manchuria and its littoral as outside of her sphere of interest. If the Power which exchanged necessaries of life with Manchuria in fast growing quantities, controlled more than ninety per cent. of the exports at Niu-chwang, and numbered tens of thousands of its subjects residing in the Three Provinces, should be required by Russia to declare itself uninterested in Manchuria, the exclusive designs of Russia upon the territory would seem to need no stronger proof. The general tenor of the note of October 3 was, thus, to exclude Manchuria from discussion, and, furthermore, to restrict Japan’s influence in Korea. Russia explained that the question of Manchuria rested between herself and China, and that she had no reason to make any arrangement about it with a third Power. To this, Japan replied that she had asked from Russia no concession of any kind in Manchuria, but merely requested her to recognize anew the principles which she had voluntarily and repeatedly professed. Such a recognition, Japan contended, was of vital interest to her, inasmuch as the Russian occupation of Manchuria would continually threaten the independence of Korea.[601] It was evident from Russia’s counter-note that there lay an impassable gulf between the propositions of the two Powers, not only in the actual terms under discussion, but also in the principles involved in them, for, to all appearance, nothing could prove more clearly that Russia was bent upon absorbing and closing up all Manchuria, as well as marking out Northern Korea as an eventual sphere of her influence, and that she was unwilling to recognize the profound and increasing common interest of Japan and Manchuria, and the vital importance to the former of the independence, strength, and development of Korea.

The date fixed in the Convention in April, 1902, for the final evacuation of Manchuria arrived on October 8, 1903—five days after the Russian counter-note was received by Japan, but the day came and passed with no sign of the evacuation. On the contrary, the Russian Minister at Peking was engaged, regardless of the negotiations at Tokio between his Government and the Japanese, in urging Prince Ching to change the terms of the Convention. Those who had been impressed by the manner and contents of the Russian reply to the Japanese note did not fail to observe in M. Lessar’s conduct at Peking another proof of the slight weight which the Russians attached to the overtures of Japan at least concerning Manchuria. For, if Russia succeeded in securing China’s consent to her new demands regarding Manchuria, which in every way transgressed the principles contained in the Japanese note, the Manchurian negotiations between Russia and Japan would become unnecessary. The Russian course of action at Tokio and Peking was thus consistent in ignoring Japan’s vital interests in Manchuria, and, therefore, was regarded as consistently insulting to Japan. The secret of the situation seemed to be, as has been already suggested, that the centre of gravity of Russian diplomacy in the East had largely shifted from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur—from Count Lamsdorff to the inflexible Admiral Alexieff. Ever since the latter had convened, at Port Arthur, early in July, a large council of the diplomatic, military and naval, and financial agents of Russia in the Eastern Asiatic countries, as well as General Kuropatkin, who was then traveling in the Orient, it had appeared that the Viceroy of the Far East,[602] and not the Foreign Office at the Russian Capital, was the guiding spirit of the Czar’s policy in Korea, China, and Japan. Hereafter, Count Lamsdorff could perhaps moderate the terms, and transmit to Japan the revised contents, of the Viceroy’s unconciliatory views, but had otherwise lost the control of the situation. The reason why Alexieff had risen to such a great influence may not be known until the relations he had with M. Bezobrazoff, the late von Plehve, and other influential politicians at St. Petersburg of that day, become more clearly understood than they are to-day. As to the probable views of the Viceroy regarding the situation in the East, it is not hard to infer them from the diplomatic history in China, Korea, and Japan, during the half year ending with February, 1904.

Let us make a brief review of the diplomatic manœuvres of the Russian Representative at Peking regarding Manchuria, which proceeded much as if his Government were not engaged in negotiations with Japan in respect to the same territory. The secret Manchurian agreement which was reported to have been concluded on July 20[603] was probably unfounded, and its detail may otherwise be safely left unnoticed. The nature of the Russian policy regarding Manchuria could, however, be inferred from the remarkable exchange of views which took place at London in July between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff. In this interview on July 11, the latter said, in effect: “Whatever may be the result of the negotiations which are pending between Russia and China, ... the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention of opposing the gradual opening of China, as _commercial relations develop_,[1] of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, _excluding, however, the right to establish ‘Settlements.’_ This declaration does not apply to Harbin. The town in question being within the limits of the concessions for the Eastern Chinese Railway, _is not unrestrictedly subject to the Chinese Government_;[604] the establishment there of foreign consulates must therefore depend upon the consent of the Russian Government.”[605] The three conditions here printed in italics would seem not only contradictory to the declaration made by Count Lamsdorff to Mr. MacCormick on April 28,[606] but also almost tantamount to opposing the opening of any new treaty port in Manchuria. For it was well understood that the desire on the part of some Powers for the speedy opening of some new ports in Manchuria was largely calculated to prevent the aggressive and exclusive proceedings of Russia in that territory. If, as Count Benckendorff suggested, the development of trade relations was the sole reason for “gradually” opening some towns, if foreign settlements should be excluded from the new ports, and if Harbin, and logically all the towns situated at the “depots” of the railway, could not be opened without Russian consent, Manchuria, excepting the regions touching the few towns which had already been opened, would remain open to the growing influence of Russia, but practically sealed to the rest of the world.[607] This inference was presently demonstrated by the new demands made at the Peking Foreign Office by M. Lessar on September 6. These demands, presented, as they were, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Tokio and on the eve of the close of the period of Manchurian evacuation, deserve a special notice. Briefly stated, M. Lessar requested: (1) that China should not alienate, in any manner, any port, of whatever size, of Manchuria to any other Power; (2) that Russia should be allowed to construct wharves on the Sungari River, to connect them by telegraph, and to station Russian troops to protect the telegraph lines and the ships plying the river; (3) that Russia should be allowed to establish post stations along the road from Tsitishar to Blagovestchensk; (4) that no greater duties should be imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by rail than those now imposed on goods transported by road or river; (5) that after the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the branches of the Russo-Chinese Bank should be protected by Chinese troops, but at the cost of the Bank; and (6) that a Russian doctor should be appointed member of the Sanitary Board at Niu-chwang. On these conditions, the Russian forces would evacuate Niu-chwang and the rest of the Sheng-king Province on October 8, the Kirin Province after four months, and the Hei-lung Province at the end of one year.[608] Of these, the first demand was interpreted to imply the prevention of the establishment of new foreign settlements and concessions in any part of Manchuria. As to the meaning of stationing troops along the Sungari and building a post road from Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk, it is instructive to observe that Prince Ching opined that, if China conceded these demands and Russia then nominally withdrew, the latter would still be in virtual possession of the territory.[609] The British and Japanese Ministers at Peking naturally warned China not to accept the Russian propositions.[610] The Foreign Office, after some hesitation,[611] finally refused all of the demands in a written note, on September 24.[612] This refusal, however, by no means terminated the Manchurian negotiations at Peking. As the Chinese Government showed inclinations, vacillating as they were, to sympathize with Japan in her efforts to maintain the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria, M. Lessar is said to have resorted to occasional threats that, if a war should occur between Russia and Japan and the latter be defeated, China would repent her sorry plight only too late, for then Manchuria would not be hers. Particularly vigorous was his obstruction of the effort of the United States Commissioners at Shanghai to secure the opening of new ports in Manchuria to foreign trade.[613] In spite of all this, however, on October 8—the very day once fixed for the final evacuation of Manchuria—the American-Chinese treaty was signed, opening Mukden and An-tung as treaty ports. The next day saw the conclusion of the Japanese-Chinese treaty, bearing the date of October 8, which also provided for the opening of Mukden and Tatung-kao. It was perhaps nothing more than a singular coincidence of circumstances that Mukden should be, as it was, occupied by Russian soldiers shortly after its opening had been secured by the United States and Japan. Early in the morning of October 28, 780 Russian soldiers with eight cannon suddenly, without warning, rushed through the city gate and took possession of the _Yamên_ of the Tartar General, Tsêng-chi, holding him in custody and reducing the military forces under his control.[1] A generally accepted ground for this precipitous act was naught more than that a subordinate Taotai under the jurisdiction of the Tartar General had undertaken to punish some recalcitrant bandits who had been under Russian employ. The _Journal de Saint Pétersbourg_ explained, however, that the seizure of Mukden was owing “to the apathy of the Chinese authorities, to the non-execution of the promises made on their part, and to the agitation which prevailed in the district.”[614] Mukden being the sepulchral city of the reigning dynasty of China, its sudden occupation by the Russians appeared to have aroused a bitter resentment among the educated classes throughout the Empire.

Turning to the Korean frontier, the conduct of the Russians at Yong-am-po[615] on the left side of the Yalu, near its mouth, had now assumed an unmistakably political character. Early in July a telegraphic connection had been made without permission with An-tung, a strategic centre in Eastern Manchuria. At the instance of the Japanese Minister, the Korean Government succeeded in enforcing the removal of the line.[616] Late in the same month, the Commissioner of Forestry of Korea and Baron Gunzburg visited Yong-am-po, and drafted an agreement leasing the port to the Timber Company, nominally represented by the Baron. The contract bore neither a definite period of time for the lease nor fixed area of the leased territory, in the Korean text of the agreement, but, according to the Russian document, the lease is said to have extended over twenty years and covered a space equivalent to 204 acres. The company also was granted, in the Korean text, judiciary rights over the residents within the leased area.[617] At the same time, extensive works had been started by the Russians at Yong-am-po, including the erection of large brick buildings and the laying out of roads, streets, and light railways, to be later increased by what was conceded to be a fort; while, beyond the river, the military forces at An-tung and other centres had been in the process of augmentation.[618] The situation had now become so grave that Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Minister at Seul, was obliged to enter sharp protests at the Korean Foreign Office against the conclusion of the lease agreement,[619] and to urge again the opening of Wiju, and now also of Yong-am-po, to foreign trade. Both the British and American Representatives also pressed the Seul Government to open these ports.[620] The Russian Minister, M. Pavloff, however, was as strenuously opposed to the opening of these ports as Mr. Hayashi was to the conclusion of the lease agreement. The conditions were almost identical with those in 1898 under which Great Britain urged the opening of Talien-wan, so as to counteract the Russian aggression upon it and Port Arthur, and also with those in Manchuria, in this same year, where the American and Japanese Governments demanded the opening of new ports in order to prevent the exclusion of foreign trade and industry from Manchuria under Russian rule. The struggle between the open and the exclusive policy, however, continued much longer in Korea than in China, owing largely to the extremely unstable political conditions at Seul, which enabled the Russian diplomats oftener and longer to influence the Korean court.[621] As regards the lease of Yong-am-po, the Korean Government was now so alive to the serious nature of the agreement that it proposed to modify its terms late in August.[622] M. Pavloff, however, persistently urged the Korean Government to ratify the original agreement. On August 27, for instance, he and Baron Gunzburg remained at the Foreign Office from one to six o’clock in the afternoon, requesting the immediate conclusion of the contract, until the Foreign Minister escaped out of the door and tendered his resignation.[623] At the same time, the conduct of the Russians on the frontier grew even more menacing than before. The cutting of timber was started at different points, where many Koreans were forced into unpaid service, and the bandits in Russian employ created disorder among peaceful citizens.[624] Moreover, according to the reports of Korean officials, the Russians had occupied at Yong-am-po—now named Nicolas—a ground far more extensive than the lease-area stipulated in the yet unratified agreement.[625] All this while, the Russians at the Capital exercised a powerful influence over both Yi Keun-thaik and Yi Yong-ik, two of the most noted politicians at Seul, and over the strong party upholding the interests of Lady Öm.[626] It was through these pro-Russian people that the unique idea of declaring the neutrality of Korea before the outbreak of any war—an idea which had more than once been unsuccessfully proposed[627]—was again brought forward, and finally, early in 1904, carried into effect in an awkward manner.[628]

Russian activity in Korea and Manchuria, which has been briefly described, may be said to constitute the reverse side of the diplomacy of the Czar’s Government at Tokio. The actual control of the Eastern situation having probably passed from the central power to Port Arthur, it was now founded, perhaps not upon greater practical wisdom than before, but apparently upon a uniform basis. For the conclusion is forced upon the student that Viceroy Alexieff’s policy must have been, on the one hand, to deal with Japan’s overtures lightly and leisurely, but, on the other, to hasten the establishment of Russian control in Manchuria and upon the Korean frontier, so that Japan might in time be compelled to bow to the situation and accept terms dictated by Russia. The proof of this policy had already seemed abundantly sufficient by the time when the Russian counter-note reached Baron Komura on October 3. It is impossible to tell whether, in framing such a policy, the Viceroy had taken into consideration the fact that the entire nation of Japan felt as one man that they had come to the greatest crisis known in their long history.

Footnote 580:

Viscount Katsura, Premier; Baron Komura, Foreign Minister; and Messrs. Terauchi and Yamamoto, Ministers, respectively, of the Army and Navy.

Footnote 581:

Marquises Itō and Yamagata, and Counts Matsukata, Inoüé and Ōyama.

Footnote 582:

The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 583:

The _Nichi-Ro Kōshō ni kwan su ru Ōfuku_ (diplomatic correspondence respecting the negotiations between Japan and Russia), dispatch No. 1. This correspondence (hereafter abbreviated as _N.-R._) was presented by the Japanese Government to the Houses of the Imperial Diet, respectively, on March 23 and 26, and published in the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette) of March 24 and 27, 1904. It contains fifty-one dispatches, all telegraphic, covering the period of more than six months between the opening of the negotiations and the severance of all diplomatic relations between the two Powers, namely, between July 28, 1903, and February 6, 1904.

An authoritative English translation of this correspondence has been issued from Washington, probably by members of the Japanese Legation there. In the quotations from the correspondence that appear in these pages, the language of the translation—accurate as it is—has been largely changed, in order to make it coincide as closely as possible with the literal meaning of the original.

Footnote 584:

_N.-R._, No. 2.

Footnote 585:

It is singular that even Count Lamsdorff should thus participate in the characteristic plaint of the Russians that they are an object of unjust machinations of other nations.

Footnote 586:

_N.-R._, No. 3, received at Tokio on August 6.

Footnote 587:

These men were, according to Article 2 of the Statutes of September 30, “the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs, and of War, the head of the Ministry of Marine, and such persons as His Majesty the Emperor may find it expedient to summon, either to sit permanently on the committee, or to take part temporarily at its meetings. The Viceroy of the Far East, being, by his duties, a member of the committee, shall be present at the meetings when he is in St. Petersburg.”

Footnote 588:

The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 144.

Footnote 589:

_Ibid._, No. 155.

Footnote 590:

After the opening of hostilities in February of the present year, the Russian Foreign Office made a statement of Russia’s case, in which it was said that, when the Japanese Government proposed in August, 1903, to open the negotiations, “Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio....” See p. 327, note 9, below.

Footnote 591:

_N.-R._, No. 6.

Footnote 592:

Evidently the reference is to the three Russo-Japanese agreements concerning Korea concluded in 1896 and 1898.

Footnote 593:

_N.-R._, No. 3, originally dated Tokio, August 6.

Footnote 594:

_N.-R._, No. 7.

Footnote 595:

The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 100 and 109.

Footnote 596:

_N.-R._, Nos. 8, 11.

Footnote 597:

_N.-R._, Nos. 10, 11.

Footnote 598:

_Ibid._, No. 14, September 7.

Footnote 599:

_N.-R._, No. 17.

Footnote 600:

The Russian Government explained later, in the note delivered on January 6, 1904, that the creation of a neutral zone was “for the very purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government had likewise in view, namely, ‘to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings in the future;’ a similar zone, for example, existed between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia.”—_N.-R._, No. 38.

It is easy to see, however, that _neutralization_ is merely _common appropriation_ in a negative form, and might, like cases of the latter, as in Primorsk and Sakhalien, result in _absorption_ by one of the two Powers between which the territory was neutralized.

Footnote 601:

_N.-R._, No. 20.

Footnote 602:

Before August 13, when he was appointed Viceroy of the Far East, Alexieff was as yet Governor-General of the Kwan-tung region.

Footnote 603:

The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 604:

The italics in the quotation are the author’s.

Footnote 605:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 133 (Lansdowne to Scott).

Footnote 606:

See pp. 246–248, above.

Footnote 607:

It is highly interesting that at this moment, when the Russian Government was, on the one hand, negotiating with Japan, and, on the other, proposing new demands upon China, the Russian Ambassador at London intimated the desire of his Government to come to an agreement with Great Britain regarding their interest in China. It appears that Russia wished Great Britain to declare Manchuria as outside of her sphere of interest, in return for a similar declaration by Russia regarding the Yang-tsze valley. Lord Lansdowne’s reply was characteristic. “I repeated,” he wrote to Sir C. Scott, “that we should be glad to arrive at one [i. e., an agreement with Russia], but that it must, of course, include the Manchurian question. We could, however, of course not come to terms unless we were fully informed as to the intentions of the Russian Government [in Manchuria]. Count Benckendorff again asked me whether, if we were satisfied upon this point, we should be likely to _assist_ in bringing about an arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. I said that we should certainly make no secret of our concurrence, if we were thoroughly satisfied. Meanwhile, however, I was afraid that our attitude must remain observant and critical.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 142 (August 12). Cf. No. 139.

The Russian Government could not have forgotten that Great Britain had agreed with Japan, on January 30, 1902, that neither of the two Powers should come to a separate understanding with another Power regarding China or Korea without a full and frank discussion between themselves.

Footnote 608:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 147, 148, 149, 156.

Footnote 609:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 150.

Footnote 610:

_Ibid._, Nos. 149, 151, 153, 160.

Footnote 611:

_Ibid._, Nos. 147 and 156.

Footnote 612:

_Ibid._, Nos. 150 and 160.

Footnote 613:

See pp. 252 ff., above.

Footnote 614:

_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 159.

Footnote 615:

See pp. 289 ff., above.

Footnote 616:

The _Kokumin_, Seul telegrams, July 6, 10, 17 (1903).

Footnote 617:

_Ibid._, July 23, 27; August 2, 8, 18.

Footnote 618:

_Ibid._, July 27, etc.

Footnote 619:

_Ibid._, August 12, 14, 23 (cf. July 17, etc.).

Footnote 620:

The _Kokumin_, August 10, September 2, etc.

Footnote 621:

The opening of Wiju was once granted by the Foreign Office, but the Emperor refused to sanction it.—_Ibid._, November 21. This is another illustration of the peculiar circumstances at Seul, that there exist two political centres, the Government and the Court. (The opening of neither Wiju nor Yong-am-po had been effected before the outbreak of the present war.)

Footnote 622:

The _Kokumin_, August 29.

Footnote 623:

_Ibid._, August 27, 29.

Footnote 624:

_Ibid._, September 29.

Footnote 625:

About 2¾ by 5¾ miles.—_Ibid._, November 1. Late in December, a report reached the Korean Government from the frontier that the Russians had forbidden all but their countrymen to enter into the Russian territory at Yong-am-po.—_Ibid._, December 23.

Footnote 626:

Many stories have been told of M. Pavloff’s influence over the venal politicians of Seul. Of these, two are given below, which are not verifiable, but certainly interesting.

Yi Keun-thaik is said to have told the Emperor, late in December, 1903, that the following assurance had been given by the Russian Representative: if the Korean refusal to open Wiju and Yong-am-po to foreign trade should result in the mobilization of Japanese forces, Russia would also dispatch troops against them; in 1894, Korea erred when she relied on China, but Russia was not a China, and might implicitly be relied upon.—The _Kokumin_, telegram, December 25.

One day, it is said, M. Pavloff remarked in the presence of the Korean Emperor and his attendants: “The Koreans often rely upon Japan, or else are afraid of her, but where in the world is Japan?” Then he scanned a map through a pocket magnifier, and said: “Oh, I find a tiny country called Japan in a corner of the Pacific Ocean. My Russian Empire is the greatest country on the globe, spreading over two continents. If Korea relies upon our Empire, she will be as safe as in navigating a sea in a colossal vessel. Should Japan object to it, our Russia would only have to do thus.” Here, placing a few matches on his palm, he blew them off.—The _Kyōiku Jiron_.

Footnote 627:

In the latter half of 1900, for example.

Footnote 628:

Korean neutrality is said to have been telegraphed to the Korean Representatives abroad through the French channel. It was not until some time after the other Powers had received the declaration that it reached Japan. Russia, it will be remembered, told the world that Japan infringed the neutrality of Korea when the former’s warships had an encounter with the “Variag” and “Korietz” at Chemulpo. See pp. 355 ff., below.