iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον

παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄῤῥεσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε· πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ’ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno’s object is not to justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt are morally on a par with the deed.

[786] See the following note.

[787] Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to Diog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is only directed to beauty of soul. By Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top. 75, and Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is defined to be ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον; and, according to Plut. C. Not. 28, ἔμφασις κάλλους is an incentive to love; but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of Plat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated τοὺς ἐρασθέντας αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι καλῶν γενομένων. Love is excited by a sensation of εὐφυία πρὸς ἀρετὴν, its object is to develop this capacity into real virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving, in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.

[788] Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend on the intention alone, and declared external actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν. καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν ... παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένου, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ... τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.

[789] How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved by the fragment, preserved by Clem. Pædag. iii. 253, C, respecting the dress and conduct of maidens.

[790] Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem censent regi numine Deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostræ anteponamus.

[791] M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a unit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas ... nos homines hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.

[792] Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando (see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur ... prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communio, et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει.

[793] Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.

[794] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2; Benef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi. 18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext. Math. ix. 131.

[795] Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only ὠφελήματα and βλάμματα (moral good and evil), but εὐχρηστήματα and δυσχρηστήματα (other advantages and disadvantages) are common to all men.

[796] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double meaning of ἀδικεῖν, which sometimes means ‘to wrong,’ sometimes simply ‘to harm.’ Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only exist towards another. See Cic. on p. 315, 2.

[797] Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a justice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a part.

[798] Sen. Benef. iv. 18.

[799] M. Aurel. vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not a member, of human society, οὔπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· οὔπω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι ὡς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν ποιεῖς· οὔπω ὡς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.

[800] See p. 298, 3.

[801] Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus, the three others besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitæ quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes duæ sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

[802] Off. i. 7–13; ii. 14–17.

[803] See p. 254, 2, 3.

[804] We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It may here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De Clementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i. 3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit nulla humanior.

[805] Conf. Panætius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.

[806] De Clem. ii. 5–8.

[807] Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the censure deserves notice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) passes on gladiatorial shows and the Roman thirst for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The attitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies will be considered hereafter.

[808] Stob. ii. 184: τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, διὸ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55. Conf. p. 309, 3.

[809] Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought is expressed in the statement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the universe) as deity is to him.

[810] Sen. Benef. vii. 12, 2; Ep. 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118; see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates, was blamed for asserting that only the good (σπουδαῖοι) among themselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the bad are enemies and strangers.

[811] He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum artifex.

[812] Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.

[813] We have already encountered friendship in the Stoic list of goods. See p. 230, 3. Stob. 186 says, more accurately, that friendship, for the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual goods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as κοινωνία βίου (Stob. 130); κοινωνία τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς (Diog. 124). Similar definitions are given by Stob. of varieties of friendship: γνωριμότης, συνήθεια, κ.τ.λ. On the absolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Ep. 47, 2; 3, 2; Benef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.

[814] Ep. 109, 3 and 11.

[815] Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens, ad beate vivendum, non ad vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum animo sano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.

[816] Ep. 9, 5.

[817] Sen. Ep. 109, 5.

[818] Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; 18.

[819] See p. 318, 2.

[820] Stob. ii. 208: τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοῦτον· πόλις μὲν εἰ (wrongly struck out by Meineke) ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστιν; Floril. 44, 12. See pp. 223; 241, 3.

[821] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life, placing βίος σχολαστικὸς on the same footing with βίος ἡδονικός. Diog.