iv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod

omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et longissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non potest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3; 13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be declared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6), with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the zeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the point at which his own principles would bear him out.

[545] M. Aurel. vi. 15: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν πρᾶξιν. Conf. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.

[546] Sen. Ep. 92, 6–10; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep. 92, 10.

[547] Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by ἡδονὴ an emotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert that the wise man feels delight (χαρὰ, gaudium), but not pleasure (ἡδονὴ, lætitia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2; Diog. 116; Alex. Aphr. Top. 96; the last-named giving definitions of χαρὰ, ἡδονὴ, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη.

[548] Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De Ira, ii. 6, 2.

[549] Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question utrum virtus summi boni causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of course, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5: The wise man takes pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex bono suo ortis. Ibid. 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem præstatura virtus est, ideo propter hanc petitur ... voluptas non est merces nec causa virtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et delectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and health, in ipso judicio et habitu optimæ mentis, in the sanitas et libertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui. Ibid. 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam lætitia et tranquillitas ... sunt enim ista bona, sed consequentia summum bonum, non consummantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stob. ii. 184, 188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74): πάντα τὸν ὁντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα ἴσην ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, for the reasons stated, p. 230, 1.

[550] Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10–12; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may be placed the inference in Clem. Strom. iv. 483, C, which bears great similarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 233, 2: If thirst be painful, and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause of this pleasure: ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

[551] Diog. 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβη.

[552] Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted sense, they reject ἡδονή, understanding thereby a particular emotion. See p. 236. 2.

[553] Sext. Math. xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’ (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.

[554] Accordingly, it is also defined to be τέχνη εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b.

[555] Diog. 89: τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τ’ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτ’ οὔσῃ [-ης] ψύχῃ [-ης] πεποιημένῃ [-ης] πρὸς ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Sen. De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. Id. Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19: Æquitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede conduci. Non esse justum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet præter ipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Benef. iv 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.; si quicquam præter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42: τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ πριήσας ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν σήν τι ἔπραξας, ἀλλὰ τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς; When man does good, πεποίηκε πρὸς ὃ κατεσκεύασται καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Id. vii. 73; viii. 2. See pp. 230, 1; 236, 4.

[556] Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic. Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance, in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est. Similarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This αὐτάρκεια of virtue was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed by Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (προηγμένα), nor, on the other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as only negative conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.

[557] Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged with at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time, and at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be worthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; Benef. v. 17, 6; M. Aurel. xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with Aristotle.

[558] This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found subsequently.

[559] Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42.

[560] Parad. 2.

[561] De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fæce in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis erroribus absoluta libertas. Quæris, quæ sit ista? Non homines timere, non Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam potestatem: inæstimabile bonum est, suum fieri.

[562] Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo ... philosophia præstabit? Scilicet ut malis tibi placere, quam populo, ... ut sine metu Deorum hominumque vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.

[563] See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475.

[564] See p. 148, 2.

[565] νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190, 204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by Marcian in Digest. i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel Συναγ. τεχν. 177, Krische, Forsch. 475) = λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων. It is therefore σπουδαῖόν τι or ἀστεῖον, something of moral value, imposing duties on man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λόγος κοινὸς, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to Diog. vii. 88 (who here, according to the passage quoted from Cic. N. D. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Διΐ. It is the ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Cic. N. D. i. 14, 30, respecting Zeus, on p. 150). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8 and 10, it is no human creation sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis (conf. Fin. iv. 5, II, in the fragment in Lact. Inst. v. 8). It is accordingly, as Chrysippus l.c. says in the words of Pindar (Plato, Gorg. 484, B), πάντων βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.

[566] Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.

[567] Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει.

[568] This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic definition of κατόρθωμα as εὐνόμημα, that of ἁμάρτημα as ἀνόμημα.

[569] The good alone, or virtue, is αἱρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. See p. 229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. αἱρετὸν is, however, Ibid. 126, 132, ὃ αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ, or, more accurately, τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς κινητικόν; and αἱρετὸν is accordingly distinguished from ληπτόν—αἱρετὸν being what is morally good, ληπτὸν being everything which has value, including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction (according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between αἱρετὸν and αἱρετέον, and similarly between ὀρεκτὸν and ὀρεκτέον, ὑπομενετὸν and ὑπομενετέον, using the first form to express the good in itself (for instance, φρόνησις), the latter to express the possession of the good (for instance, φρονεῖν).

[570] ὁρμὴ is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι· ἀφορμὴ, which is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2, 22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) φορὰ διανοίας ἀπό τινος. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction (connecting herewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stobæus respecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the impulses of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done (φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθηκόντος); that every impulse contains an affirmative judgment in itself (συγκατάθεσις), to which has been superadded a κινητικόν· συγκατάθεσις applying to particular propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110, 3; 83, 2), whereas ὁρμὴ applies to κατηγορήματα (i.e. activities expressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every desire aims at the possession of a good. Ὁρμὴ λογικὴ is defined to be φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and is also called ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ (only a rational being being capable of πρᾶξις). If the φορὰ διανοίας refers to something future, the ὁρμὴ becomes an ὄρεξις, for which the text twice reads ὄρουσις. Among the varieties of ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ, Stob. enumerates πρόθεσις, ἐπιβολὴ, παρασκευὴ, ἐγχείρησις, αἵρεσις, πρόθεσις, βούλησις, θέλησις, the definitions of which he gives, passing then to the doctrine of emotions, these being also a kind of ὁρμή. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and will are included in the conception of ὁρμή, as will be subsequently seen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which likewise includes both.

[571] Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ [l. τὸν] τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. Diog. 89, see p. 238, 3: The soul rests on the harmony of life with itself (virtue); extraneous influences corrupt it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.

[572] The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by nature good and wise.

[573] Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368 Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that Chrysippus’ definition of ὁρμὴ (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood (as in Baumhauer’s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 23 (‘as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so ὁρμὴ is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use’), that ὁρμὴ is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational by the direction given to it by man.

[574] The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient ideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed.

[575] Diog. vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are found in Stob. ii. 36, 166, with this difference, that ἀπειθὴς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place of ἄλογος, as in Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp. et Plat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4, vol. v. 368, 385, 432, 458 Kühn, and Id. in Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar definition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no longer to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost books (Heeren suggests in the treatise περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς Diog. v. 23), was that book genuine?

[576] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [πάθη] antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur [Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque judicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin. iii. 10, 35: Nec vero perturbationes animorum ... vi aliqua naturali moventur. Tusc. iv. 28, 60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium.

[577] See p. 215, 3; 242, 2.

[578] Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and above, p. 215, 3.

[579] Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has been already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ. See below, note 3.

[580] See p. 242, 2.

[581] Diog. vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. Stob. ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι [instead of which read πάντων ... παθῶν δόξας αἰτίας λέγ. εἶν.], παραλαμβάνεσθαι [add δὲ] τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione ... opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum? Fin. iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem nulla naturæ vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis. Acad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3.

[582] Diog. l.c.

[583] Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p. 416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας.

[584] See p. 242, 1.

[585] Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali) præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως.

[586] De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ’ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.

[587] Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p. 245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus, Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called λύπη a μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι; ἡδονὴ, an ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with deducing emotions from ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. That Chrysippus agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated (p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also (ii. 166) defines emotion as πτοία (violent mental motion), the words used being πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν· and, in Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ. Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows that both Zeno’s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and iv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobæus are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv. 4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was, that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as conditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words in Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. τῷ [l. τό] τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ’ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα τοιαῦτα φανερῶς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη κἂν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand, Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246, 1.

[588] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.

[589] Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv. 3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.

[590] This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.

[591] See p. 179, 3, 4.

[592] See p. 88, 1.

[593] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.

[594] Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione defectio sic aversa a præscriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones anima nec regi nec contineri queant.

[595] Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους ... ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ... πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτωοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠπατημένοι ... διδαχθέντες ... ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who à propos of Medea remarks: ἐξηπάτηται· δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς, ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται, καὶ οὐ ποιήσει.

[596] See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p. 229, 1, and 232, 3).

[597] Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii. 10, 35.

[598] According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the treatise περὶ παθῶν.

[599] In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως καὶ μάχης.

[600] The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. See p. 254, 4, 5. In like manner μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to Diog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονὴ (lætitia, voluptas gestiens) = opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear = opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with the προσδοκία κακοῦ of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido, ἐπιθυμία) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque adesse. It is, however, more common to hear λύπη (Diog. 111; Stob. 172; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as συστολὴ ψυχῆς ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, more briefly συστολὴ ἄλογος, fear as ἔκκλισις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, ἡδονὴ even according to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρέτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c. and Fin. ii. 4, 13, ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, or immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the additions made which are found in Stobæus.

[601] Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii 174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις; Stobæus πένθος, ἄχος, ἄση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds δέος and δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονὴ, Diogenes includes κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι, ἀσμενισμοὶ, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργὴ, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος, μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἵμεροι, φιληδονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from Stoic definitions.

[602] Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The Stoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire and will (βούλησις, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1), αἰσχύνη and αἰδὼς (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).

[603] On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati. If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind, hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly, Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen, l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest to us.

[604] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.

[605] Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.

[606] Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid. iv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere rationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice ægrotandum. Ep. 116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.

[607] Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10.

[608] Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88; Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of anger.

[609] In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum, ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.

[610] Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.

[611] Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85, 29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.

[612] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen. De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec injuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.

[613] See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.

[614] Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.

[615] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog. l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.

[616] Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ.

[617] See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.

[618] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others) non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.

[619] Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.

[620] The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6 and Diog. vii. 93: εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. Stob. Ecl ii. 108: ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων. It is not opposed to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other virtues besides those which are τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι; nor for Hecato (in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ θεωρητικαὶ (σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων) and ἀθεώρητοι; for by the latter must be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states resulting from them—health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 30.

[621] Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 144.

[622] See p. 260, 3.

[623] Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.

[624] See p. 56.

[625] See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῇν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. On the definition, see p. 82, 1.

[626] Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p. 128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way, Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced what is good in our conduct from εὐτονία and ἰσχύς; what is bad, from ἀτονία καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the soul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii. 104, as διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ; by Diog. 89, as διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη.

[627] Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.

[628] This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.

[629] See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.

[630] See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.

[631] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3, and Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p. 468): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος, οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί φησιν. vii. 2, p. 595. νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch. Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

[632] Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim, quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et horum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac. Proœm. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus; and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded him in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific virtue. In Zeno’s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut. Vir. Mat. 2), to φρόνησις was given the meaning of ἐπιστήμη.

[633] ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the subdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues, another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1, that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion of virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by Panætius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)—that into theoretical and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the Peripatetics.

[634] The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.

[635] ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. But this is superfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good and evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.

[636] ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ θαῤῥεῖν ἢ μὴ θαῤῥεῖν (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit, scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.

[637] ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p. 258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.

[638] ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104, further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues: intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to ὑπομοναὶ, justice to ἀπονεμήσεις. See also the distinctive peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.

[639] Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. See p. 255, 1.

[640] This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the basis in all. See p. 258, 1.

[641] Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρίαν. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2. On the other hand valour is here termed φρόνησις ἐν ἐνεργητέοις. He also says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη. Further particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, p. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε λαλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τἀγαθά τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ προειρημένα. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that, according to Cleanthes, strength of mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch’s account is accurate, ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by Sphærus. See p. 259, 3.

[642] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης, μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία, after the analogy of πρᾳότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic virtues, is found an ἐρωτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, &c., and a συμποτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτικὴ and συμποτικὴ ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by Philodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.), Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτικὴ at length; and since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.), none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright, these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.

[643] Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία, ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαῤῥαλεότης, μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια (on which Diog. 119), χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία. Diog. 126, is slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues, and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as ἐπιστῆμαι; by Diogenes, as ἕξεις or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the definitions are the same. A definition of εὐταξία is given by Cic. Off. i. 40, 142.

[644] Diog. 93; Stob. 104.

[645] Sto. Rep. 7.

[646] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. See p. 260, 3. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον.

[647] Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: ἀρετάς τ’ οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ [l. κατὰ] τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (scil. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην).

[648] See p. 260, 3.

[649] Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν, to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo maintained.

[650] Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος. Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.

[651] Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται (p. 108—the same is more fully set forth by Panætius, p. 112), τὸ αὐτὸ, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν. Diog. 125: τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, knowledge and action including all the four principal instincts.

[652] Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit; nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p. 267.

[653] Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice, which has τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἑκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

[654] Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1, conf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: τὰς ἀρετάς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτ’ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states, that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by experience, contrary to Stoic principles.

[655] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se esse præclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy accidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert, sed qua mente.

[656] Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.

[657] Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:

ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.

[658] On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not commands: οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. Stob. ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ’ οὐδέτερα (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνοήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα, κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.

[659] It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf. Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα ... τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.

[660] See p. 263, 2.

[661] In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a διάθεσις, and no mere ἕξις. οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἤτοι δυσκινήτους οὔσας ἢ μὴ (add οὐκ) εἶναι διαθέσεις. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, δ (Schol. 76, a, 12): τῶν Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν ταύτας οὔτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὔτε ἀνίεσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. Simpl. (73, α. Schol. 76, a, 24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in theoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false, and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of argument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the one being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος προκοπὴ, the other by a simple ἐπιτηδειότης (Simpl. Categ. 62, β; Schol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. für Philol. See Supplementb. xiv. 239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.

[662] Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra se gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis, quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa mutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ.

[663] The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101 and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen. Ep. 66, 5) is this: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was, according to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἄνεσιν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι; on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ., Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a hundred stadia away. Similarly, Stobæus: The Stoics declare all errors to be ἴσα, although not ὅμοια· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν· (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258, 3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every ἁμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equal to one another, if vices are equal; πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’ ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p. 230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul—the only primary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished; Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet. It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius. All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contigere ... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia minuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ... nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32: Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p. 266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri, nec quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.

[664] Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3). Stob. ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quæ dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66, 10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illæ contigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque fuerint sapientes pares erunt et æquales.

[665] Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.

[666] Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ’ αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον.

[667] Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125; Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef. iv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.

[668] Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.

[669] Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.

[670] Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.

[671] Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28; Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.

[672] Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.

[673] Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.

[674] Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An. 12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep. i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.

[675] Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf. Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.

[676] Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.

[677] Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.

[678] Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and above, p. 230, 1.

[679] Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4.

[680] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii. 198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid. 6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De Const. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15; Horat. Ep. i. l. 106.

[681] See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ... diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13: Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.

[682] πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii. 124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.

[683] The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp. Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατ’ ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.

[684] Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸν πλεῖστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.

[685] This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ’ αὐτοὺς τοῦ σοφοῦ. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν εἷς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ Φοίνικος ... οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. Philodem. De Mus. (Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it to be profane and impious.

[686] Benef. i. 10, 1–3.

[687] De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.

[688] De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.

[689] Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.

[690] See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur ingenti quidem nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est, &c.

[691] Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. The limitation likewise contained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15, mentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as θεῖοι.

[692] See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus sæculis.

[693] Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265, 2.

[694] Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum ac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in each one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.

[695] Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

[696] Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly, poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous, rich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno’s is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are advancing in virtue.

[697] See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p. 269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

[698] Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀχρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words, Ritter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (γίγνεσθαι δὲ καὶ διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους), and Philo, De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἄχρι σοφίας ἄκρας ἐληλακότας καὶ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῆς ἄρτι πρῶτον ἁψαμένους ἀμήχανον εἰδέναι, φασι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω συνίστασθαι τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the wise. Prantl’s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as διαλανθάνων, appears to be questionable.

[699] See p. 230, 3.

[700] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet [unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142: Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. πρῶτα μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη, οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἴσθησις, λεγὼ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν δὲ ... οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ’ ἀνάλογον. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where the enumeration of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is also in the Stoic sense, and above, p. 225.

[701] Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the Stoa against the theoretical ἀδιαφορία of the Sceptics (see above, p. 37, 1), with which the practical ἀδιαφορία of Aristo is most closely connected. It differs only in name from the ἀταραξία of the sceptics, Aristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.

[702] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις] hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔννοιαν illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris æstimavit quam omnia ilia quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.

[703] Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.

[704] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.

[705] Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μήδ’ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκεῖνον τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως· ἐκεῖνα δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὸν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. Cic. See p. 279, 3.

[706] Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.

[707] See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν ... καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.

[708] Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· (On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the ultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of ἀδιαφορία. It would appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true Stoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no followers after the time of Chrysippus.

[709] Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse. Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Præfract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext. Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.

[710] Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est in his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; quæ ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2: Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in that state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus’ attack on this ἀδιαφορία.

[711] Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. By ἀξία, the three meanings of which are discussed, they understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα.... δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί. δι’ ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account, only somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10, 36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60; Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52) explains the conception προηγμένον, and its distinction from ἀγαθόν: προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον ... οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τὸν προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.

[712] Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν—τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα. Similarly Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is, however, only a subdivision of the second.

[713] Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.

[714] Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.; Plut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether fame after death belongs to things to be desired. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the younger Stoics, pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen. Ep. 102, 3, even quotes it as a Stoic maxim that posthumous fame is a good. But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for προηγμένον.

[715] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and 283, 2.

[716] Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [δεῖσθαι], et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse [χρῆναι].

[717] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τἀναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστι, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς (with reference to the greatness of the difference between προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον) τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακὸν ... ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ δ’ ἄλλα στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. See p. 284, 1; Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230, 3. Diog. 103, says that Posidonius included bodily and external advantages among the ἀγαθά. In Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however, expressly proves that they are not goods.

[718] Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection of the highest good), sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says (De Vit. Be. 22, 5): Apud me divitiæ aliquem locum habent, only not summum et postremum. But what philosopher would have said they had this?

[719] De Vit. Bea. 21.

[720] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money, knowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such like. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panætius, thinks that not only will a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he believes that in a famine he will prefer letting his slaves starve, to maintaining them at too great a sacrifice.

[721] According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.

[722] Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.

[723] Ibid. 5.

[724] According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog. vii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three ways of earning an honest livelihood—by teaching, by courting the rich, by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more at variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 30): καὶ κυβιστήσειν τρὶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαβόντα τάλαντον. Chrysippus himself (in Diog.) enumerates the objections to the modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.

[725] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: λυσιτελεῖ ζῇν ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν; or, as it is expressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a wise man in the shape of a beast.

[726] καθῆκον, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog. 108.

[727] See p. 265.

[728] Diog. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ (the same in Cicero), ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. Stob. 158: ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. καθῆκον is, in general, what is according to nature, with which ἀκόλουθον coincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108: ἐνέργημα δ’ αὐτὸ [τὸ καθῆκον] εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.

[729] Diog. vii. 109: τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῇν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58: Eat autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis ... quoniam enim videmus, &c. (see p. 265, 2) ... quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis quæ media dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad. i. 10, 37. Corresponding to προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, Zeno placed officium and contra officium, as media quædam between recte factum and peccatum. Stob. ii. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι ... οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια, καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

[730] Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαῤῥιπτεῖν. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. This distinction, of course, only applies to μέσον καθῆκον. The unconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any circumstances.

[731] Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2, Diog. 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ (demands; see p. 244, 2, the αἱρῶν λόγος) ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾷν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, e.g. neglect of parents; οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, ὅσα οὔθ’ αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ’ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that καθῆκον includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those which aim at a simple προηγμένον; and, in view of the latter, καθῆκον is included among things intermediate, or ἀδιάφορα in its more extended meaning. Cic.; see p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that those καθήκοντα which are at the same time κατορθώματα, are οὐδὲ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ μέσα ... παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισὶ καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ’ εὐφυΐαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθούμεθα ἀπερισπάστως (if, without particular occasion, or as Diog. 109 observes, ἄνευ περιστάσεως—see previous note—we despise or reject them) μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

[732] In the latter sense καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα have been already discussed, p. 264.

[733] Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting, non ... tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet levem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Id. ii. 2; Ep. 57, 3; De Const. 10, 4; Stob. Floril. 7, 21; Plut. C. Not. 25, 5; Epictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, 5, 6.

[734] Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos (Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.

[735] Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2–4, particularly the quotation in Gell. from Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences, paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali percepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis atque rationis prævertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the foolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents (συγκατατίθεται, προσεπιδοξάζει) to such impressions (φαντασίαι).

[736] Diog. vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν· τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. Subdivisions of βούλησις are: εὔνοια, εὐμένεια, ἀσπασμὸς, ἀγάπησις; of εὐλάβεια: αἰδὼς, ἁγνεία; of χαρά: τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία. The same three εὐπάθειαι are mentioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, with the remark that they only belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14; 72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man’s cheerfulness.

[737] Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: καὶ μὴν οὔθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145; Quintil. Inst. xii. 1. 18.

[738] Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis quærimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phœnix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur, see p. 273, 1, just as everything great is rare. But compare p. 274, 3.

[739] Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2.

[740] Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further particulars in Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 33 and 70.

[741] Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius traced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably meant by the ‘younger Stoics’ (Sext. Math. ix. 28), who say that they introduced belief in the Gods.

[742] Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri ... ignorantia rerum innocentes erant ... virtus non contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, &c.

[743] Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ’ οὒ. (See p. 251, 2, for the difference between emotion and disease of the soul.) καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν, i.e., virtuous men are not all equally secure. These differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the other hand to folly), which admits of no increase, but only to such properties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not themselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.

[744] Stob. Serm. 7, 21: ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the author of the division of progressers into three classes, which is discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest stage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum liquet et ... scire se nesciunt.

[745] See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7.

[746] Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, affectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam eam excussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.

[747] Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ, ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the Cynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was weakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes, says that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against relapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, α, β (Schol. in Arist. 86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν καιροῖς (the reading κάροις is better) καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue, together with the whole rational life (λογικὴ ἕξις), is lost, and succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a ἕξις μέση. A similar question is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will act virtuously when in a frenzy.

[748] Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected, parænetice, or pars præceptiva. Sextus speaks of two τόποι—a παραινετικὸς and a ὑποθετικός. Both terms, however, appear to denote the same thing; for ὑποθετικὸς is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril. 117, 8, as παραινετικός. He who is himself insufficiently educated will do well ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργον εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερὰ τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις. ὑποθετικὸς τόπος is therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65). See p. 223, note 1.

[749] Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiæ et capita cognovit.

[750] See p. 223, 1.

[751] See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that he chiefly followed Panætius (περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων), not as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See p. 300, 2.

[752] Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari possit. He would devote his attention to officia, quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i. 29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait, conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Panætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.

[753] See p. 223, 1.

[754] Particularly in the portions treating περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων and περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν.

[755] See p. 260, 4.

[756] See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1.

[757] According to Cic. Off. i. 2; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Panætius, in the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i. 45, 159; iii. 12, 50; 13, 55; 23, 89, that these cases were frequently discussed, not only by the pupils of Panætius, Posidonius, and Hecato, but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.

[758] The Treatise of Panætius appears to have been used as a chief authority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and wealth (Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties, had added further casuistical investigations (Cic. iii. 28, 89). Brutus, too, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate Stoicism, and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down rules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, may have followed Panætius.

[759] Sen. Ep. 94, 1; 95, 1.

[760] Stob. ii. 128: ἐν ἕξει (not only ἐν σχέσει, see p. 230) δὲ οὐ μόνας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίγνεσθαι.

[761] The treatise of Panætius—we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9; iii. 2, 7; 7, 33—discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and then from that of interest. The third part, which Panætius proposed to himself—the collision between duty and interest—was never fully carried out. Cicero adds discussions on two questions, which of two conflicting duties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3, 10, c. 43; ii. 25). Otherwise he appears in his two first books to follow the order of Panætius.

[762] See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the fragment in Athen. xiii. 555, a, Chrysippus discussed the question of shaving; and Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the useless enquiries of the Stoics, ἐν τοῖς περὶ καθηκόντων, an enquiry whether it is proper to take the largest portion before one’s father at table, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a philosopher.

[763] εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία, talis ordo actionum ut in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia. i. 40, 142; 144.

[764] i. 43. We omit Cicero’s treatise, this section not being found in Panætius.

[765] Panætius still more diffusively, 5, 16.

[766] Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.

[767] Diog. 117 says: The σόφος or σπουδαῖος is free from vanity (ἄτυπος), is earnest (αὐστηρὸς), frank (ἀκίβδηλος), and with no inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life (ἀπράγμων), lest he should do anything contrary to duty. See p. 323, 1. Stob. ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (πρᾶος), quiet (ἡσύχιος), and considerate (κόσμιος), never exciting angry feelings against others, never putting off what he has to do.

[768] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανὴν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. Stob. ii. 230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσασθαι [l. -σεσθαι] νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος προόρασιν (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter iii. 662 does ‘for the sake of advantage’; it rather refers to such cases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii. 382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the community require deception) καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς. In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib. (Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷν ἔστι δικαίως κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε βιάζεσθαι οὔτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη τῶν πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξεως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The point here in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only for the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stobæus.

[769] Cic. Fin. iii. 20. 68: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been in a minority.

[770] Diog. 121: κυνιεῖν τ’ αὐτὸν [τὸν σοφόν]· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος [on whom, see p. 51, 1] ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ. Stob. 238: κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντ’ ἂν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

[771] See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii. 16, Athen. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno’s School must have presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is partially true of the earlier history of that School; still I would attach no great value to it as illustrating the system.

[772] Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.

[773] See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4; Benef. v. 4, 3; 6, 1; Ep. 90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom of sowing exhortations broadcast.

[774] As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.

[775] Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the temples by the contact with the dead or lying-in women or unclean foods); in other cases indeed, as Plutarch objects, he would not allow these considerations.

[776] Besides Diog. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see Chrysippus’s own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of extreme necessity. See Diog. 121. Chrysippus had probably been speaking, in the context, of the different modes of treating the dead among various nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that no uniformity of practice prevailed.

[777] Cic. Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui fuerunt Stoici pæne Cynici.

[778] Diog. vii. 33: καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι. The latter act is only conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics.

[779] Diog. 33; 131.

[780] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.

[781] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200; 245; Math. xi. 190; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

[782] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 205; 246; Math. xi. 191; Plut. Sto. Rep. 22; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

[783] Plut. l.c. 21, 1.

[784] Sextus, however (Pyrrh. iii. 206), attributes to him, as the representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus: τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ... ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει.

[785] His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con.