iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre aqua, ignis

ex aëre, ex igne aër ... ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra? ... omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Similarly Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2; 198, 3. This is borrowed not only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.

[434] They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by κίνησις every form of change.

[435] Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of κίνησις, of φορά, and of μονή, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110, β (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds of μεταβολή see the extracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between μένειν, ἠρεμεῖν, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀκινητεῖν, but this is rather a matter of language. Simpl. Cat. 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and discusses their assertion that κινεῖσθαι is a wider, κινεῖν a narrower, idea.

[436] Simpl. Phys. 310, b: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμένην.

[437] Simpl. Categ. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.

[438] Simpl. l.c. 77, β; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by Aristotle.

[439] Simpl. l.c. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according to p. 84, ε, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories, made the following διαφοραὶ γενῶν: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἔχει κατασκευῆς—τὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν ποίησιν ὑπεργάζονται; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant—τὸ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, or ἀπὸ ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, one species of which is τὸ ἀπὸ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς—τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν. It is, in short, the application to a particular case of the distinction which will be subsequently met with of ἕξις, φύσις, ψυχὴ, and ψυχὴ λογική. The celebrated grammatical distinction of ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια mentioned p. 95, 3 is connected with the distinction between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. Conf. Simpl. p. 79, α, ζ; Schol. 78, b, 17 and 30.

[440] See page 135.

[441] Stob. Ecl. i. 382: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c. 20, beginning οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος). διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν τόπον χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον (Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob. i. 390: Chrysippus defined τόπος = τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἷον κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι’ ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπὸ τινὸς εἴτε ὑπὸ τινῶν. If, however, only one portion of the οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος is really filled, the whole is neither κενὸν nor τόπος, but ἕτερόν τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, which may possibly be called χώρα. Hence τόπος corresponds to a full, κενὸν to an empty, χώρα to a half-empty, vessel. Sext. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect. Cleomed. Meteor. p. 2, 4; Simpl. Categ. 91, δ. According to the Stoics, παρυφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθόσον συμπληροῦνται [-οῦται] ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων.

[442] The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b; Simpl. Phys. 133, a.

[443] See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of ἀσώματον δὲ, we should read κενὸν δὲ) definitions of κενόν.

[444] Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus.

[445] See p. 131, 2.

[446] Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε (conf. Plut. Plat. Quæst. viii. 4, 3) Χρύσιππος δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Conf. Ibid. 89, α, β; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full is Stob. Ecl. i. 260: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα καθ’ ὅ ποτε λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει. The passages quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (Plut. Plac. i. 22, 2), 254, 256, 258, and Diog. 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur several other observations on Time, which are, however, of no importance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the future, are unlimited, the present is limited; the present cannot be accurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the future (Archedemus in Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in the one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, ibid. 38, 8).

[447] Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260.

[448] For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle (Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ἀρχὴ, see Diog. 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed. Chrysippus (in Stob. Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of στοιχεῖον. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in the third, any material out of which something is made.

[449] Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84.

[450] See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into water δι’ ἀέρος (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing through air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86, inaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements. In this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation of the upper elements (as Lassalle, p. 88, does).

[451] Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δεύτερα δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called (Ibid. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and therefore only partially intelligible) ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀΐδιος δύναμις ... εἰς αὐτήν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ τὸ [ἐξ] αὑτῆς πάλιν ἀποκαθιστᾶσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῷ. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60: Not only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θεῖα, καὶ νὴ Δί’ αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει· καὶ γῆ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. On the flux of things, see also M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N. D. ii. 33, 84: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata (= συνεχής; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2, continuatio est partium inter se non intermissa conjunctio) natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre æther: deinde retrorsum vicissim ex æthere aër, ex aëre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum, ultro citroque commeantibus, mundi partium conjunctio continetur. See p. 194, 3.

[452] Diog. 137: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p. 1053. The air is, according to Chrysippus, φύσει ζοφερὸς and πρώτως ψυχρός. Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Galen, Simpl. Medic. ii. 20, vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4: Aër ... frigidus per se et obscurus ... natura enim aëris gelida est. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which elements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to each element as its distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air.

[453] Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the region of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest, the driest, and the rarest; but yet, owing to the evaporation of the earth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which in point of dryness and density is between the two, but exceeds both in cold. See p. 146, 4.

[454] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E, who is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire: ἄνθραξ, φλὸξ, αὐγή. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial fire, which, after all, forms only one small portion of fire.

[455] Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2.

[456] This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move altogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence the meaning can only be this: that the difference of natural motions can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together, and so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all bodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between heaviness and lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p. 1054: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together, not to go asunder. οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανὸν, πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics maintain that the world continues in empty space, ἐπεὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον νένευκε. The same reason is assigned by Cleomedes, Meteor. p. 5.

[457] Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ... φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ’ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. Plut. Sto. Rep. 42, p. 1053: In the treatise περὶ κινήσεως, Chrysippus calls fire ἀβαρὲς and ἀνωφερὲς καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου, τοῦ δ’ ἀέρος, τῷ πυρί. (So too in Ach. Tat. Isag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his Φυσικαὶ τέχναι, he inclines to the view that air in itself is neither heavy nor light, which however can only mean that it is neither absolutely, being heavy compared with fire, and light compared with water and earth.

[458] Diog. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων. μεθ’ ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν. Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To these main masses, all other smaller masses of the same element in different parts of the world are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place. Conf. M. Aurel. ix. 9.

[459] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc cœlum, quod igneus æther, mundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is called πῦρ by Stobæus, æther by Cicero. See p. 146, 4. The same thing is meant by Zeno, where he says (Stob. Ecl. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes says the same in Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, C) that the stars are made of fire; not, however, of πῦρ ἄτεχνον, but of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which appears in plants as φύσις, in animals as ψυχή. See p. 201, 5.

[460] In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. Similarly Diog. 138; Cleomed. Met. p. 7. Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense.

[461] See p. 146, 4.

[462] Stob. i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ’ αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that Zeno can (Stob. Ecl. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line. Cleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on the strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 2; Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, B.

[463] They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with four elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quæ quæque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.

[464] The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3. Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives an elaborate proof of it, for the most part taken from Posidonius.

[465] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by Stob. i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in Cleomed. Met. p. 47.

[466] Stob. Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ ... κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὶ δ’ ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. The earth is the natural framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water has been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as islands. For what is called continent is also an island: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἐξῆφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα σφαιρικῶς καὶ περικεχύσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιότατόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον. It moves in circular form round the world. Then follows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the earth. Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun amongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. That Archedemus also refused to allow the earth a place in the centre has been already stated, p. 147, 2. The language of Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is ambiguous: As the circumference originates from the centre, so according to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth; when compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.

[467] Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed. Met. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the perfection of this form and its adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil. Tat. Isag. 130, C, Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11), with the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes believed in a spherical form of the earth. According to Ach. Tat. Isag. 152, A, who probably has the Stoics in view, the axis of the world consists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the division of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the earth into five zones, conf. Diog. 155; Strabo, ii. 2, 3, p. 95.

[468] Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.

[469] Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii. 214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of ἀντιπερίστασις, without supposing the existence of empty space. A number of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.

[470] See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5.

[471] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To the same effect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see Diog. 140 and 143; Stob. i. 260 and 382; Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 1, p. 1054; C. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073; Plac. i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; Theodoret, l.c. and p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has been already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world occupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself, as Plut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Rep. 44, 2, observes.

[472] Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408. According to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac. ii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D, the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was included or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is called τὸ πᾶν; without it, ὅλον (τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα, frequently occurs with the Stoics). The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor immaterial, since it consists of both. Plut. C. Not. l.c.

[473] Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516; 540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p. 201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he considered the moon πιλοειδὴς (ball-like—the MSS. have πηλοειδῆ) does not agree.

[474] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314; 519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac. ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Achil. Tat. Isag. 124, D; 133, C, and above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the stars generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, or Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since (as Plin. Hist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes) owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in vapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive its light from the sun (Diog. 145), which, according to Posidonius in Plut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only illuminates its surface, but penetrates some depth. Cleomed. 100, believes that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a light of its own.

[475] Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is. 41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2; 20, 3; 23, 5; Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11; Cic. N. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16. 2; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, p. 74 and 56, p. 117; most of whom affirm that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars are also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 3, adds to the passage quoted p. 161, 2: οἱ δ’ ἀστέρες ἐκ θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐνάπτονται. Plut. Ibid. 2: ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ μεταβαλούσης. Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084: γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον λέγουσι τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν.

[476] Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes and Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the stars without anything very peculiar in Stob. i. 448; 538; Plut. Pl. ii. 15, 2; 16, 1; Diog. 144; Cleomed. Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also discussed by Diog. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560; Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p. 932; Plac. ii. 29, 5; Cleomed. pp. 106 and 115, nor is there anything remarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of Posidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518; Achil Tat. Isag. 132, B; 165, C. The information—quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor. 51; Procl. in Tim. 277, E; Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119—respecting observations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry.

[477] Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however, appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by Diog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but also because of the spherical form of the earth’s shadow in eclipses of the moon. Diog. l.c.; Macrob. Somn. i. 20; Heracl. Alleg. Hom. c. 46; Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an orbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of the earth, with a diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103, only calls the moon half that size; and Cleomed. p. 97, probably following Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The other stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are some of them as large as, and others larger than, the sun. Posidonius, according to Plin. Hist. N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon’s distance from the earth at two million, and the sun’s distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He estimated the earth’s circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed.; at 180,000 according to Strabo, ii. 2, 2, p. 95.

[478] Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. Sto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145; Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 3; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36 and 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr. l.c.; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 134, A. Hence, in several of these passages, the sun is called after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a νοερὸν ἄναμμα (or ἔξαμμα) ἐκ θαλάσσης.

[479] Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the quotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from Diog. 147.

[480] Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called μετεωρολογικὴ or μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις; also, vii. 135, a treatise περὶ μετεώρων, in several books. Alexander, in Simpl. Phys. 64, 6, speaks of an ἐξήγησις μετεωρολογικῶν, which, judging by the title, may be a commentary on Aristotle’s meteorology. Geminus had made an extract from this book, a long portion of which on the relation of astronomy and natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really belong to these different treatises is not clear. Posidonius is probably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca’s Naturales Quæstiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10; 13; ii. 26, 4; 54, 1; iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii. 20, 2; 4), particularly in his meteorological treatises.

[481] On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle, looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut. Plac. iii. 1, 10; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are explained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580 (Plac. iii. 2, 8.—Whether the Diogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real stars is Diogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of Apollonia, is not clear. The former is more probable, Boëthus having been just before mentioned); Arrian, in Stob. i. 584; Diog. vii. 152; and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii. We learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19–21; 30, 2), with Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars uniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics—and, amongst their number, Panætius and Posidonius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v. 1091)—considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called πωγωνίαι, δοκοὶ, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1, 14; 15, 4. On σέλας, consult Diog. 153; Sen. i. 15; on halo (ἅλως), Sen. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116; on the rainbow, Diog. 152; Sen. i. 3–8; on virgæ and parhelia, Sen. i. 9–13; Schol. in Arat. v. 880 (Posidonius); on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning, cyclones, and siroccos, Stob. i. 596; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian, Ibid. 602; Sen. ii. 12–31; 51–58 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius); ii. 1, 3; Diog. 153; on rain, sleet, hail, snow, Diog. 153; Sen. iv. 3–12; on earthquakes, Diog. 154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi. 4–31 (particularly c. 16; 21, 2); also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102; on winds, Plac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1–17; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29; iii. 2, 5, p. 144; on waterspouts, Sen. iii. 1–26; the Nile floods, Ibid. iv. 1; Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, p. 790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo, i. 3, 12, p. 55; iii. 3, 3, p. 153; 5, 8, p. 73; on seasons, p. 111, 2.

[482] Thus colours are explained as πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης (Stob. i. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the air by Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5; Diog. 158.

[483] Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; Müller, Fragm. Hist. Græc. iii. 245.

[484] Sext. Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων (on ἕνωσις see p. 103, 1) σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ, καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. 451: καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν. Themist. De An. 72, b; M. Aurel. vi. 14; Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D; De Mundo, 1154, E; Leg. Alleg. 1091, D; Incorrupt. M. 947, A; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p. 146, 1). Respecting the difference of φύσις and ψυχὴ, φύσις is said to consist of a moister, colder, and denser πνεῦμα than ψυχή; but, on this point, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1; Com. Not. 46, 2; Galen, Hipp. et Plat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In Diog. 139, ἕξις and νοῦς, as the highest and lowest links in the series, are contrasted. Ibid. 156, there is a definition of φύσις = πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν; and (148) another = ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ’ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time appears as ἕξις, at another as φύσις. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. l.c.; Sext. Math. ix. 84.

[485] The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the Peripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1; also the explanations of sleep, death, and age in Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4; 30, 5; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on this point see Plut. Solert. An. 2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963, 967), but also (according to Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3; v. 1, 6. Vol. v., 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says in θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία), even in man the emotions being connected with the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement (Galen, p. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a ἡγεμονικόν. (Chalcid. in Tim. p. 148, b.) He even discovered in the scent of dogs traces of an unconscious inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p. 225, 2.

[486] Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν. σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Chrysippus in Nemes. p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same is said by Tertullian.

[487] Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 30.

[488] Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36.

[489] Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in Tim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus in Chalcid. l.c.

[490] Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσώματον· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same in Tertullian, l.c.

[491] Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον. Zeno. Macrob. Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum ... Boëthos (probably the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century, is meant) ex aëre et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p. 282: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42: Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panætius believes that it is burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater, Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. Stob. Ecl. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8: καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, conf. § 2 and Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. c. 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν). Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De An. 127. b: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every πνεῦμα is not a soul, a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πὼς ἔχον (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458, E); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater warmth and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2, p. 1052: Chrysippus considers the ψυχὴ to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783: The Stoics say that both φύσις and ψυχὴ is πνεῦμα, but that the πνεῦμα is thick and cold in φύσις, dry and warm in ψυχή.

[492] Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further explained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f. 68, a. Plotin. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, as being κρᾶσις, i.e. an intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for the body, and not vice versâ, was a point vindicated by the Stoics against the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E; Sext. Math. ix. 72.

[493] Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3; M. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.

[494] Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα ... μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (Plut. Coh. Ir. 15). Similarly Chrysip., in Diog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by separation from all parts of the body and can consequently produce all, as Democritus had already said. Panætius (in Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 79) proves, from the mental similarity, between parents and children, that the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother’s share in producing the soul, see Ar. Did. l.c. See above p. 127, 5.

[495] Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γενέσθαι ψυχήν. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c. Conf. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21, p. 40; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed of it there by cooling and condensation.

[496] On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, l.c. iii. 8, p. 349. It appears, however, from Galen, l.c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5, iii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De An. c. 15, that the most distinguished Stoics—Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Apollodorus—decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still did not shrink from using it. Galen, l.c. p. 254, 261. At the same time, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268; iii. 1, 290, c. 5, 321, c. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362) that, by universal assent, supported by numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the feelings proceed from the heart.

[497] Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.

[498] Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the ἡγεμονικὸν to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, and ὁρμαὶ, and is by them called λογισμός; from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοὺ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, μυκτήρων, γλώττης, ἐπιφανείας, παραστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων). Galen, l.c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2; Diog. 110 and 157; Porphyr. and Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836, 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307; Nicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De An. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Panætius only held six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among the Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the Peripatetic Aristo.

[499] See p. 73, 2.

[500] Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4:

ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν.

[501] See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p. 211, 5: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων] μορίῳ, τὸ διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν’ ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικὸν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ’ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται [= ταται] διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr. (De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχικὴ δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the action of the πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. Conversely Tertullian, De An. 14, speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem non tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciæ et operæ ... non enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambl. in Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics, the same relation to the soul that qualities bear to the substance; their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary, for ἡγεμονικὸν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμὴ, and λόγος.

[502] Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Plac. Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l.c. iv. 1, p. 364: Chrysippus sometimes speaks as if he admitted a distinct δύναμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ or θυμοειδής; at other times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v. 6, 476: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ’ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. See p. 209, 1. Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in Galen, l.c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view, by a passage in which he contrasts θυμὸς with λόγος—but this is making a rhetorical flourish do duty for a philosophic statement.

[503] Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι.

[504] Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχαὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11. M. Aurel. ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόρροια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ; and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus incertum est, habitat Deus. Id. Ep. 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently, reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as in the soul of the universe, as Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 886, states as a Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a well-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul’s capacity for studying nature, and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in God. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: εἰς μὲν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα μία ψυχὴ διῄρηται· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται. xii. 30: ἓν φῶς ἡλίου, κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις· μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ, κἂν φύσεσι διείργηται μυρίαις καὶ ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς. This oneness, however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of ethereal substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also Marc. Aurel. viii. 54.

[505] In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.

[506] Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189.

[507] See p. 179.

[508] See p. 88, 1.

[509] Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2; Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26, 7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2; Ep. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42; Resurr. Carn. 3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order to dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of Tiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) to suppose that they, in many passages (Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M. Aur. ii. 17; v. 4, 13), supposed the immediate dissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear, from M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death, and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration. But even this is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics. According to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam) the souls of the good, as in the doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are admitted to the ranks of the blessed; and here this purification is no doubt required on physical grounds. When the soul is purified, both in substance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, according to M. Aurelius, united to the σπερματικὸς λόγος τῶν ὅλων, it lives, according to the common view, until the end of the world. The ether is also allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Cic. Tusc. i. 18, 42; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. The souls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to heaven, until they reach an atmosphere (the juncti ex anima tenui et ardore solis temperato ignes) congenial with their own nature. Here they naturally stop, and are fed by the same elements as the stars. According to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Il. xxiii. 65), they there assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An. 54, conf. Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in speaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.; Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, p. 73); and meantime, as it is distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius, they are punished in the nether world. Tertullian in placing a portion of the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there allowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to the purification mentioned by Seneca. For the supposed transmigration of souls see p. 166, 2.

[510] The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging to the Stoics—animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber—was not required by their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School.

[511] Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld’s Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221.

[512] Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam ... per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique proluditur. As a child in its mother’s womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.

[513] Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit ... ipse quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna requies manet. Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ. Ibid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or compassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur ... fruitur nunc aperto et libero cœlo ... et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum naturæ bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris ... totum diem admiserit, et cœlo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28: Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lax undique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands.

[514] In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the addition: excepit illum cœtus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss) and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.

[515] Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies ... quo, remotis strophis ac fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.

[516] Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere.

[517] Ep. 36, 10: Mors ... intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire, mutari. Æquo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return, according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration, presuming that the same persons will be found in the future world as in the present. See p. 166, 2. As long as the world lasts, the better souls will continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to the return of personality after the conflagration of the world.

[518] Besides the definitions of αἴσθησις in Diog. 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeling is in the ἡγεμονικόν (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following statements may be mentioned: In the process of seeing, the ὁρατικὸν πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the ἡγεμονικόν, gives a spherical form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονικὴ κίνησις (on τόνος, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim. 149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear. Diog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also φωνᾶεν, see Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; Diog. 55, and above p. 214, 2; 74, 6. Disease is caused by changes in the πνεῦμα, Diog. 158; sleep ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, Diog. 158; Tertull. De An. 43; and in a similar way, death ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου Iambl. (in Stob. Ecl. i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by name. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is only a liberation of rational souls.

[519] Page 77.

[520] The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιττιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would therefore fall into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus, Diss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in his introduction to virtue three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these divisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with his first; but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise with the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of ὀρέξεις and ἐκκλίσεις. Stobæus again differs from either. In his survey of the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the καθῆκον, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on friendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on ἐνεργήματα (κατορθώματα, ἁμαρτήματα, οὐδέτερα), the greater portion of which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and, moreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but ætiologia) and ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14, the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the first determining the value of things, the second treating de actionibus, the third de impetu, περὶ ὁρμῆς. Two of these parts coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (περὶ τῶν πράξεων); and even Seneca’s first part more nearly agrees with one of these (περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division is a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently met with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus). None of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by Cic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir. c. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises Seneca’s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such contending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were themselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen’s attempt, l.c. p. 258, appears to me a failure.

[521] Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα.

[522] Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly from their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their adopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably the treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, since it is distinctly referred to by Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: ὡς οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν. The difference mentioned by Alex. Aphr. De An. 154—that at one time self-love, at another the preservation of one’s own nature, is the impulse—is unimportant.

[523] Diog. vii 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὑτῶ [αὑτῷ] τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ [Cobet incorrectly αὐτὸ] τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιῆσαι ἂν [l. ποιήσασαν sc. τὴν φύσιν] αὐτὸ μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ’ οὐκ [must evidently be struck out] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκείως πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. Similarly, Cic. l.c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced the conception of the good to that of οἰκεῖον, without the fuller explanation. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature, which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno’s teacher, is combined therewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question whether all living creatures possess a consciousness (συνείδησις, sensus) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural self-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that this question (according to Sen. Ep. 121, 5, conf. Cic. l.c.) could be answered in the affirmative without hesitation, and appealed for evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue what is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which children and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they only know their own constitution, but not its true conception (constitutionis finitio, Sen. p. 11). Constitutio, or σύστασις, was defined by the Stoics, Sen., p. 10. as principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus.

[524] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.

[525] The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the hair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136) three meanings of τέλος, between τέλος and σκοπός.

[526] Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9; Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 171; Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal definitions are given of ἀγαθὸν, τέλος, and εὐδαιμονία. The latter is generally paraphrased by εὔροια βίου, as Zeno had defined it. Various formulæ for the conception of a life according to nature are given by Cleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panætius, Posidonius, and others in Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 416; Stob. 134; and Diog., all apparently taken from the same source.

[527] Diog. vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ ... εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

[528] Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῷοις. Diog. 86: Plants are moved by nature without impulse, animals by means of impulse. In the case of animals, therefore, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν is the same as τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν. In rational creatures, reason controls impulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In Galen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, p. 460, Chrysippus says: ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν. M. Aurel. vii. 11: τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον. Hence the definition of a virtuous life, or a life according to nature: ζῇν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων (Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog. 87; Clem. l.c.; also Diogenes, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (Diog. 94).

[529] Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Id. Ep. 92, 1: The body is subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the rational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam. ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly. Ep. 76, 8. M. Aurel. vi. 44: συμφέρει δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.

[530] According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobæus to have defined τέλος = ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν; Cleanthes first added the words τῇ φύσει, and Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several additions. Diog. 87 attributes the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno, adding, however, 89, that Chrysippus understood by φύσις, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, whereas Cleanthes understood τὴν κοίνην μόνην οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. These differences are, however, not important. The simple expression ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν means, without doubt, ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, the ζῇν καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον (Stob. ii. 132 and 158), the ὁμολογία παντὸς τοῦ βίου (Diog. vii. 89), the vita sibi concors, the concordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the unum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found in a wise man—in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency. Nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions accord with the requirements of the character of the agent. Accordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει by the side of ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cleanthes, therefore, in adding to the expression ὁμολογουμένως the words τῇ φύσει, which, however, according to Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next condition of ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν. We can, however, hardly believe with Diogenes that Cleanthes understood by φύσις only nature in general, but not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to κοινὴ φύσις or κοινὸς νόμος only, with the praise of which his well-known hymn ends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature, which is only a particular form of nature in general. Chrysippus therefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his master.

[531] Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 10; Parad. 1; Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17; 120, 3; 118, 10, where the relation of the conceptions honestum bonum, secundum naturam is specially considered. To prove their position, the Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally fond. Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 11): τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν· τὸ δ’ αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ’ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ’ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν. (The same in Cic. Fin. iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50, where I would suggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.). Again: τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν (The same somewhat expanded in Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii. 126: πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἶναι, ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν φευκτὸν. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.

[532] Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes reconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the perfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus aut status natura absoluti.

[533] Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν. Ibid. ii. 202; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20, 1; Cic. Off. ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.

[534] M. Aurel. ix. 16.

[535] See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here defined to be either ὠφέλεια or οὐκ ἕτερον ὠφελείας (inseparably connected with ὠφέλεια, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is connected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sextus l.c. and above p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς. (Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is drawn between three kinds of good: τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ἢ ἀφ’ οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν. Under the first head comes virtue, under the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two others, virtuous subjects—men, Gods, and demons. A second division of goods (Diog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.) is into goods of the soul, external goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous country, and such as are neither (τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ εὐδαίμονα, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the individual to himself, as his own possessions). Goods of the soul are then divided into διαθέσεις (virtues), ἕξεις (or ἐπιτηδεύματα, as instances of which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes μαντικὴ and φιλογεωμετρία, &c.; these are not so unchangeable as peculiarities of character, and are therefore only ἕξεις, p. 103, 1), and those which are neither ἕξεις nor διαθέσεις—actions themselves. A third division of goods (Diog., Cic. l.c., Stob. 80, 100, 114) distinguishes τελικὰ or δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετὰ (moral actions), ποιητικὰ (friends and the services they render), τελικὰ and ποιητικὰ (virtues themselves); fourthly and fifthly, μικτὰ (as εὐτεκνία and εὐγηρία), and ἁπλᾶ or ἄμικτα (such as science), and the ἀεὶ παρόντα (virtues), and οὐκ ἀεὶ παρόντα (οἷον χαρὰ, περιπάτησις). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by Diogenes and Stobæus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in addition, the ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει (χαρὰ, &c.) and ἐν σχέσει (εὔτακτος ἡσυχία, &c.), the latter being partially ἐν ἕξει; the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ (virtues) and πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα (honour, benevolence, friendship); the goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are not necessary (χαρὰ, ἐπιτηδεύματα). Seneca’s list is far more limited, although it professes to be more general. He mentions, prima bona, tanquam gaudium, pax, salus patriæ; secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia; tertia, tanquam modestus incessus.

[536] Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id quod esset natura absolutum [αὐτοτελὲς] ... hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando sed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi æstimandum, sed ea æstimatio genere valet non magnitudine, &c.

[537] Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum nisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: ἡ μὲν ἀρετή τε καὶ ἡ κακία μόναι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δὲ κακόν. See p. 229; 233, 1.

[538] Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον. To this category belong external goods, health, &c. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἀδιάφορον· διὰ παντὸς δ’ ἀρετῇ μὲν κακῶς, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς, ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι χρῆσθαι. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102, who defines οὐδέτερα as ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει. Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορον = τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 1: ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς τοῦτό φασι μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μήτε κακόν.

[539] Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum malum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious death): ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are prominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject: that what is according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death are not despised. See Sen. Ep. 30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad. Marc. 19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3; viii. 58. And other passages quoted in Baumhauer’s Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.

[540] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away with, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2): ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ’ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων. Similarly, Sto. Rep. 17, 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3: The only good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba rerum, nec detrahens quicquam beatæ vitæ nec adjiciens. Id. Ep. 66, 14: There is no difference between the wise man’s joy and the firmness with which he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa, in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur ... virtutem materia non mutat. Ep. 71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39: Tu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 3; Plut. C. Not. 4, 1; Sto. Rep. 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 12, 2; Diog. 102; Stob. ii. 90; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex. Aphr. Top. 43 and 107.

[541] Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ’ ὑγίεια. Again: ᾧ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. In Sen. Ep. 87, 11, instead of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes nostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38): (1) Quod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt bona. (Similarly in M. Aurel. ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et lanistæ contingunt: ergo, &c. (So, too, Marc. Aurelius, v. 10.) (3) Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiæ fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo, &c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοβοσκίας κακοῦ ὄντος γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.) (4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non est: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c. (5) Quæ neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a fortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been included in this class) in hæc impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 49); that poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in Sen. Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view. Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad; consequently, what both enjoy equally—life and death, honour and dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty—can neither be good nor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19.

[542] This view is compared with the Academician in Cic. Tusc. v. 13, 39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as 4, 24: Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt?... et quid stultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus nectere?... non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, quæ ex virtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potent, id imperfectum est.

[543] Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic. Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si sequi potest. Primæ partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo loco stare: tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5; 14, 1.

[544] Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1, quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef.