ii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ

ἀνειμάρθαι. See above, p. 179, 3, 4.

[421] Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.

[422] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As diseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturæ gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt.

[423] Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole, οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστιν. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2: (Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu (Heraclitus’ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον) consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour are. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).

[424] Cleanthes, Hymn. 18:

ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖκαι καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν· ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.

[425] Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν ... ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ... [τὰ κακὰ] ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. Id. 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At the beginning of the same chapter, the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule. Conf. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277.

[426] Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says: πότερον ἀμελουμένων τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt,—hardly satisfactory explanations for any theory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca (Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by Chrysippus (in Plut.)—πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite harmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does Seneca’s—Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)—agree with his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For, according to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt expressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See p. 190, 1, 2.

[427] M. Aurel. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ.

[428] M. Aurel. viii. 35: ὃν τρόπον ἐκείνη [ἡ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὅλην ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐφ’ οἷον ἂν καὶ ὥρμησεν.

[429] Seneca’s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding this thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are: (1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune: he cannot receive at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to himself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in conflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2–4. Conf. Ep. 85, 39). (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external conditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a natural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in Epictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37; i. 24, 1; Stob. Ed. i. 132; M. Aurel. iv. 49: vii. 68 and 64; x. 33.

[430] Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53: ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων πιέζωνται, τότε καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν τὰ συναπτόμενα (what is suitable) μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δύναται.

[431] See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

[432] In Diog. 150, there is no difference made between Apollodorus and Chrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3, p. 1079; Sext. Math. x. 142. Similarly Aristotle.

[433] Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τὴν ὕλην. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu.