vii. 121: πολιτεύεσθαί φασιν τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι

Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ἐφορμήσειν. Sen. De Ot. 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam, nisi si quid impedierit. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for the sake of other men, consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184: τό τε δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ... καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, κ.τ.λ.

[822] Cic. Legg. ii. 5, 11.

[823] Diog. Ibid.: καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. Ibid. 120: The Stoics consider love of children, parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Hieron. Ad. Jovin. i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus Γαμήλιος and Γενέθλιος. Antipater (whether the well-known pupil of Diogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater of Tyre mentioned by Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob. Floril. 67, 25: Wife and child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic life; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the purest. Musonius (Ibid. 67, 20, Conf. 75, 15): A philosopher ought to be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and discharge his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife and children is the deepest love.

[824] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις, αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι, πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει, πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν. Conf. the titles in Diog. vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes’s list contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to be incomplete; for Diog. vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus’s treatise περὶ πολιτείας, a treatise also quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5). According to Cic. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Panætius were the only Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting legislation, though others might have written much on politics.

[825] Conf. the fragment of Sen. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad. Jovin. i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also preserved of Chrysippus’s treatise on the education of children. See Quintil. Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; Baguet, De Chrys. (Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of education, particularly those previous to birth.

[826] Diog. vii. 131.

[827] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3–5; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.

[828] Diog. vii. 4.

[829] Diog. vii. 131.

[830] Diog. 33: κοινάς τε γὰρ γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους, μήθ’ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ... νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας. Ibid. 131.

[831] Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.

[832] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 1: οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τε αὐτοπραγίας καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων ... τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.

[833] Stob. Ecl. ii. 186: πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας.

[834] Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew from public life, he replied: διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύεται [-σεται], τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ, τοῖς πολίταις.

[835] Sen. Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? Malis artibus popularis favor quæritur. Similem te illis facias oportet ... conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest.

[836] Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 3: It needs a special cause for devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si respublica corruptior est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est malis ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec illum admissura erit respublica, si valetudo illum impediet. Ibid. 8, 1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid autem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicæ, si omnibus defutura respublica est? (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose quærentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam, quæ sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.

[837] Athenodor. l.c. 3, 3.

[838] Diss. iii. 22, 67.

[839] Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostræ cum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it not seem like reading Augustin’s De Civitate Dei? Some serve the great, others the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublicæ et in otio deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius. Ep. 68, 2: Cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in majora atque ampliora transit, &c. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83: Do you ask whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could be greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not consulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery? τηλικαύτην πολίτειαν πολιτευσαμένου ἀνθρώπου, σύ μοι πυνθάνῃ, εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου καὶ, εἰ ἄρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρὲ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα ἧς ἄρχει;

[840] Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4.

[841] Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44: πόλις καὶ πατρὶς ὡς μὲν Ἀντωνίῳ μοι ἡ Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ κόσμος. τὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖν ταύταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα ἐστί μοι ἀγαθά. ii. 5: πάσης ὥρας φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην.

[842] Ibid. ix. 29: ὅρμησον ἐὰν διδῶται καὶ μὴ περιβλέπου εἴ τις εἴσεται μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολίτειαν ἔλπιζε, ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον πρόεισι.

[843] Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.

[844] De Otio, 6, 5; Tranq. An. 1, 10.

[845] See Socrates and Socratic Schools, p. 324.

[846] This connection is already indicated by Plutarch’s grouping the Stoics and Alexander together.

[847] Sen. Ep. 95, 52; M. Aurel. See p. 312, 2; 313.

[848] Diss. i. 13, 3. See p. 331, 2.

[849] Sen. Ep. 95, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2: Ex illius [naturæ] constitutione miserius est nocere quam lædi. Ex illius imperio paratæ sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos datæ quid refert? Ubicumque homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. De Clem. i. 1, 3: Nemo non, cui alia desint, hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.

[850] Sen. De Otio, i. 4: see p. 256, 4: Stoici nostri dicunt ... non desinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca’s treatise, De Ira, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially i. 5, 2: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa discedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere, illa etiam carissimos perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1: It is not so praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic vinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est ... ultio et talio. Magni animi est injurias despicere. Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88: Violent anger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Even when severity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in anger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all. See p. 254, 1.

[851] Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. 328, 3. Cic. Off. i. 13, 41.

[852] Cic. l.c.: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here, too, belongs the question, discussed in full by Sen. Benef. iii. 18–28, Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he can, says Seneca (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus animi sit, qui præstat, non cujus status: nulli præclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos, servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man. Only the body belongs to his lord; his heart belongs to himself, c. 20. The duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand certain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement. i. 18, 2). He enumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves, and concludes by saying: Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium ... unus omnium parens mundus est ... neminem despexeris ... sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines: erigite audacter animos, et quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep. 44: Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p. 270, 3.

[853] Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.

[854] Diog. 122, at least, calls δεσποτεία, the possession and government of slaves, something bad.

[855] According to Sen. Benef. iii. 22, 1, Cic. l.c., Chrysippus had defined a slave, perpetuus mercenarius; and hence inferred that he ought to be treated as such: operam exigendam, justa præbenda. Sen. Ep. 47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves, contrasting a man with a slave: servi sunt; immo homines. He regards a slave as a friend of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power, speaks of himself as conservus.

[856] M. Aurel. iv. 4: εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὃν λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός. εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.

[857] See pp. 312, 1, 3; 325, 3, and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes the Stoics assert: τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. M. Aurel. x. 15: ζῆσον ... ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ. iv. 3: ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις.

[858] M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus asserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore, in the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. See p. 331, 2 and p. 312, 2. Sen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patriæ: ergo civi quoque ... ergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 40, 9): νομίζει [ὁ ἐπιεικὴς] εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ Διὸς πόλεως ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν. Epict. Diss. iii. 5, 26; Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.

[859] M. Aurel. iii. 11: ἄνθρωπον πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν.

[860] Sen. De Ot. 4; Ep. 68, 2. See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and 5: Unum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis ... patriam meam esse mundum sciam et præsides Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4: Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis mœnibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dare. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. Ibid. i. 9: If the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply κόσμιος and υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Muson. l.c.: Banishment is no evil, since κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν. It is, says Cic. Parad. 2, no evil for those qui omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.

[861] Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p. 329: καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοίνῳ τρεφομένης.

[862] In Epictet. Man. c. 53: more fully, Ibid. Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4, 34; and translated by Sen. Ep. 107, 11. See p. 182, 1. The verses are:

ἄγου δέ μ’ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύγ’ ἡ Πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος· ὡς ἑψομαί γ’ ἄκονος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

[863] Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and 8: Boni viri laborant, impendunt, impenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.... Quid est boni viri? Præbere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5: Deum sequere.... Quæ autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?... Quicquid ex universi constitutione patiendum est, magno excipiatur animo. Ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia.... In regno nati sumus: Deo parere libertas est. Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. Epictet. Diss. ii. 16, 42: τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι. οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. iv. 7. 20: κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἢ [ὃ] ἐγώ. iv. 1, 131, in reference to the verses of Cleanthes: αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας. Man. 8: θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὡς γίνεται καὶ εὐροήσεις. Similarly Fragm. 134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. M. Aurel. x. 28: μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαι τοῖς γινομένοις· τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. Ibid. viii. 45; x. 14.

[864] Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind arrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam: Nunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortunæ maledixit. Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem credens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam malum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum sibi.... Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis ingemuit, nunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter æquus, &c.

[865] Conf. Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. præcipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor. Volunt.: Ut. 1842, p. 220.

[866] Diog. vii. 130: εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν (ἐξαγωγὴ is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide. Full references for this and other expressions are given by Baumhauer, p. 243). καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις. Stob. Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the comœdian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to sell his slave to Zeno ἐπ’ ἐξαγωγῇ.

[867] Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad libertatem viæ multæ, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5, 6, makes the deity say: Contemnite mortem quæ vos aut finit aut transfert.... Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet exitus.... Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui. Trahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right of committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius æterna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus multos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8 and 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.

[868] De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.

[869] In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1; 50, 2.

[870] See Epictetus’s discussion of suicide committed simply in contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the rule (in Plato, Phæd. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the will of God. ii. 15, 4. Conf. M. Aurel. v. 10.

[871] Muson. in Stob. Floril. 7, 24, says: ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῇ; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.

[872] M. Aurel. v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free from the body: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῇν ἔξιθι· οὕτως μέντοι, ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων.

[873] Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3. Clem. Strom. iv. 485, A, likewise calls the restriction of rational action sufficiently decisive reason: αὐτίκα εὔλογον ἐξαγωγὴν τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγχωροῦσι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (i.e. the Stoics), εἴ τις τοῦ πράσσειν αὐτὸν οὕτως τηρήσειεν [l. οὕτω στερήσειεν], ὡς μηκέτι ἀπολελεῖφθαι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐλπίδα τῆς πράξεως.

[874] Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; De Ira, iii. 15, 3.

[875] See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.

[876] See p. 335, 2.

[877] Olympiod. in Phædr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a banquet.

[878] Plut. C. Not. 11, 1: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπον ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηθὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι μηδ’ ἔσται τὰ δὲ δεινὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ πάρεσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. Ibid. 22, 7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.

[879] Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 5: ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως, φασὶν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ’ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίνεται ποτὲ καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῇν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi cœpit suspecta esse fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit. Nihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an citius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex stillicidio potest perdere. Conf. 77, 6.

[880] Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt, quæ secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est in vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.... Et quoniam excedens e vita et manens æque miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita manendum. Stob. 226: The good may have reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though they never should become wise: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῇν, οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.

[881] Ep. 70, 11.

[882] Teles. in Stob. Floril. 5, 67, p. 127 Mein.

[883] The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 30, and the verses quoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without importance. He asserted, at least according to Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 28: ἀμείνονά γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μουσικὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας. τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μάλιστα προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θεωρίας.

[884] Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 28, 71: Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur; and more particularly Epict. Man. 31, 1: τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ... καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ εἴκειν ἐν πᾶσι γινομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Id. Diss. ii. 18, 19. Further particulars on p. 345, 2.

[885] M. Aurel. ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: διδόναι αὐτοὺς τὸ μήτε φοβεῖσθαί τι τούτων μήτε ἐπιθυμεῖν τινος τούτων. Diog. vii. 124: We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.

[886] See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math. ix. 28, says that Rome of the younger Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have been already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to the golden age.

[887] In this spirit, Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw doubts on the popular Gods, not considering that by so doing they deprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum ab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism.

[888] Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta, in Cic. N. D. i. 22, 61; iii. 2.

[889] Plut. Sto. Rep. 6, 1; Diog. vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.

[890] Ep. 41, 1: Non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus nec exorandus ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35, 1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are only ægræ mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.

[891] Benef. iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere salutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira, ii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in which fear holds such a prominent place.

[892] Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet præcipi: accendere aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et ne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis officiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles ferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non quærit ministros Deus. Quidni? Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus præsto est.... Primus est Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3): Vultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum ... non immolationibus et sanguine multo colendum—quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est?—sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique consecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy temple of God is the universe.

[893] In Fr. 120 (in Lact. ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of in their own profession. On this point he expressed his opinion with great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which Augustin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary appearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are honoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and mutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take part in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who otherwise was so much admired by the Stoics.

[894] Fr. 119 (in Lact. i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas salacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius factus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium liberorum? An ... timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno? Similarly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. l.c.); Brevit. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26, 6, the ineptiæ poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter’s many adulteries, give free rein to sins.

[895] Augustin. l.c. Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T. Tatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem, teterrimos hominum adfectus.... Hæc numina potius credes et cœlo recipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.

[896] N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c. 28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones pæne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic legends.

[897] Phædrus (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to Petersen’s restoration. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii. 147; both of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human in form; and Lactant. De Ir. D. c. 18: Stoici negant habere ullam formam Deum.

[898] The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.

[899] Cic. l.c. 37. Conf. Krische, Forschung. i. 406 and 415.

[900] Clem., indeed, says (Strom. vii. 720, D): οὐδὲ αἰσθησέων αὐτῷ [τῷ θεῷ] δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσε τοῖς Στωῑκοῖς, μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. But, according to all accounts, this must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers have conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with their real opinion. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 139.

[901] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology, evidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented as being like men: διότι τῶν μὲν ἁπάντων τὸ θεῖον κυριώτατον, τῶν δὲ ζῴων ἄνθρωπος κάλλιστον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἀρετῇ διαφόρως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ σύστασιν, (τὸ κράτιστον—probably these words should be struck out), τοῖς οὖν ἀριστεύουσι τὸ κράτιστον ὁμοίως καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν διενοήθησαν.

[902] Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19, p. 420.

[903] The numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent on the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. Sen. Fr. 26, 16 (in Lact. Inst. i. 5, 26).

[904] Diog. vii. 147.

[905] See p. 206, 1.

[906] Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.

[907] Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.

[908] See p. 131.

[909] Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39; ii. 26; Diog. vii. 147.

[910] Plut. De Is. c. 66; Cic. l.c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, where this view is attributed, in particular, to Zeno’s pupil Persæus. Krische (Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of Prodicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.

[911] Phædr. (Philodemus), Nat. De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38, attribute this assertion specially to Persæus and Chrysippus. Id. ii. 24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus, Romulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni. Diog. vii. 151. See p. 351, 1.

[912] This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is there said, is held in three forms—the physical, the mythical, and the form established by law (theologia civilis). All the gods belong to seven classes, εἴδη: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ μετεώρων: the observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) τὸ βλάπτον καὶ ὠφελοῦν: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἐλπὶς, Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as Ἔρως, Ἀφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον (τὸ μυθικὸν), such as the Gods invented by Hesiod for the purpose of his genealogies—Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are honoured for their services to mankind—Hercules, the Dioscuri, Dionysus. This list includes not only things which deserve divine honours, but all things to which they have been actually given: hence it includes, besides the purely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions, on which see p. 345, 1; 346, 2. On the other hand, they could raise no objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list the elementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that followed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno—see p. 44, 1—or some later Stoic, is unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad Nat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods into three classes: the visible—the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of nature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they make themselves felt in the elements and in planets); and those facti, or deified men.

[913] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ’ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διὸς, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους.

[914] Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und Dämonen (Berl. 1860), pp. 29–39.

[915] Tim. 90, A.

[916] Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6, p. 469: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. Sen. Ep. 41, 2, according to the quotation, p. 344, 4: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc [animus rectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Just as Kant calls the moral idea, a primary notion which mankind has embraced, the moral tone a good spirit governing us. Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12: ἐπίτροπον [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἑκάστῳ παρέστησε τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. He who retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστί. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance, as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνταῦθα δ’ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων; so that the demon is lost in the αὐτὸς within. M. Aurel. v. 27: ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. See ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12, 16; v. 10; viii. 45.

[917] See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3. (Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, as source), which receives its explanation (if it needs one) from the above words of Posidonius.

[918] In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood: Sepone in præsentia quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pædagogum dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ ... ita tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et Genium et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the old Romans, not the Stoics.

[919] Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, quoted p. 146, 1, it is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea, there must be νοερὰ ζῷα in the air, which is so much purer; and these are the demons.

[920] Diog. vii. 151: φασὶ δ’ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας τὰς ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360: Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians (amongst whom Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly thinks of the Orphics), that the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of them by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: The Stoics believe demons to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. A special treatise περὶ ἡρώων καὶ δαιμόνων proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, probably, as was his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an extract from which is given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, containing the etymology of δαίμων.

[921] Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277: καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται καλασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. Id. Def. Orac. 17, p. 419: φαύλους ... δαίμονας οὐκ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μόνον ... ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος—a statement which, particularly as it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of mythology (p. 350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which purify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and whom Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, reminds of), are not borrowed from Stoicism, but from Plato (Rep. x. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.

[922] Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See p. 191, 2.

[923] Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui Chrysippi sectator illudit ea.

[924] The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical explanations of myths. Just as, before philosophy had broken away from mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of legend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry; so, now that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to conceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the real meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the original framers had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of treating the myths resulted—that by natural explanation, and that by allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific. Both methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning besides the literal one. This method of treating myths had been already met with among the older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other followers of Anaxagoras (according to Hesych. even Agamemnon was explained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite one in the time of the Sophists (Plato, Theæt. 153, C; Rep. ii. 378, D; Phædr. 229, C; Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg. 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as appears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth in popular notions without attributing to it any higher value. The founder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the Cynics the Stoics appear to have taken it. They carried it much further than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater influence on posterity than the Cynics.

[925] Cic. N. D. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3.

[926] The definition of allegory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα δὲ ὧν λέγει σημαίνων, ἐπωνύμως ἀλληγορία καλεῖται (Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 5, p. 6). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical expression. In earlier times, according to Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, it was termed ὑπόνοια, which term is found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D, conf. Io. 530, D; Xen. Symp. 3, 6.

[927] In this way Zeno treated all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 275; Diog. vii. 4; Krische, Forsch. 393), and so did Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 175; Phædr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3; Plut. Aud. Po. 11, p. 31; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003; Krische, 433) and Persæus. Chrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Musæus (Phæd. col. 3; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, vol. v. 349, Krische, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (Phæd. col. 5; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also Plut. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and respecting the theological literature of the Stoics Villoisin on Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by Varro (Preller, Röm. Myth. 29), and from his writings Heraclitus (living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories (edited by Mehler), and Cornutus for his work on the nature of the Gods edited by Osann from Villoisin’s papers.

[928] Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.

[929] Corn. c. 17, p. 80: δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους, μήδ’ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταφέρειν, μηδ’ εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς κατ’ αὐτοὺς παραδιδομέναις γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνέντων ἃ αἰνίττονται κεχρημένων δ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι.

[930] Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus. Conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that Jupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos Jovem intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, &c.

[931] Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 276, R. speaking of Zeno’s commentaries on Homer, says: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου λέγει, ἀλλὰ διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν.... ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένειός ἐστι πρότερον ... ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.

[932] Special references are hardly necessary after those already quoted, p. 148, 1; 153, 2; 164, 2: 165, 5. Conf. the hymn of Cleanthes; Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48; Arat. Phæn. Begin.; Plut. Aud. Poët. c. 11, p. 31; Varro, in August. Civ. D. vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in Georg. i. 5; Heraclit. c. 15, p. 31; c. 23, 49; c. 24, 50; Corn. pp. 7; 26; 35; 38, where Ζεὺς is derived from ζῇν or ζέειν and Διὸς from διὰ, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα; conf. Villoisin and Osann on the passage of Cornutus, who give further authorities in their notes on the respective passages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of θεὸς from θέειν or τιθέναι; of αἰθὴρ from αἴθειν or ἀεὶ θέειν. A portion of these etymologies is well known to be Platonic.

[933] Πολυώνυμος, as he is called by Cleanthes, v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147; Corn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in the Neoplatonic doctrine.

[934] See Diog. l.c.; Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66; Phæd. (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 2–5; Heracl. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl. c. 15 and 41, p. 85; Corn. c. 3; on Hephæstus, Heracl. c. 26, 55; 43, 91; Corn. c. 19, p. 98; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377 (Diog. l.c. perhaps confounds as Krische, p. 399, supposes, common fire with πῦρ τεχνικὸν, but it is also possible that the artificial God of mythology may have been explained now one way now another in the Stoic School, which is not always uniform in its interpretations); on Poseidon, Heracl. c. 7, 15; c. 18, 77; c. 46, 117; Corn. c. 12; Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367; on Hades, whom Cicero l.c. makes the representative of terrena vis; Heracl. c. 23, p. 50; c. 41, 87; Corn. 5; on Demeter and Hestia, Corn. c. 28, p. 156; Plut. l.c.; on Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39; c. 28, 59; c. 61, 123; Corn. c. 20, 103. It is only by a forced interpretation of a passage in Homer, that (Heraclit. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth. That even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one general divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Krische, Forsch. 399, by a comparison of Phædr. col. 5, with the passages quoted from Cicero and Diogenes.

[935] Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit.... Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus (Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.

[936] Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf. Il. i. 395.

[937] Heracl. c. 40, 83; Il. xv. 18.

[938] Ibid. c. 37, 73; Il. viii. 18.

[939] Heracl. c. 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation to the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96), Corn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness of Hephæstus, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 3, p. 922.

[940] According to Eustath. in Il. p. 93, 46, probably following a Stoic interpretation, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is surrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two elements are opposed to each other.

[941] Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. p. 19), where this explanation is given very fully. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to represent the passage of winter into spring. Here’s tresses are the foliage of trees, &c.

[942] See Diog. vii. 187; Proœm. 5; Orig. con. Cels. iv. 48; Theophil. ad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

[943] c. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed matter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements

[944] See the description. Alleg. Hom. 43–51, p. 90, of which the above is a meagre abstract.

[945] According to Heraclit. 53, 112.

[946] We learn from Ps. Plut. De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleanthes wrote a θεομαχία, a small fragment of which, containing a portion or the Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded form, is there preserved. The theomachy described by Cleanthes (the Stoic Cleanthes seems to be meant) is, however, not the Homeric theomachy, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans, described in the book περὶ γιγάντων (Diog. vii. 175). Perhaps on this occasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate the moral interpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer’s θεομαχία is quite in the style of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, and was probably borrowed from Cleanthes.

[947] Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.

[948] Alleg. Hom. c. 54.

[949] Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11; Corn. 32, p. 191; 34, 206; Cic. N. D. ii. 27, 68; Phædr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Phædrus, too, col. 2 (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλω), if ἥλιον seems too wild, perhaps φῶς should be substituted for τούς, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the earth.

[950] Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p. 922. The Stoics address the moon as Artemis and Athene.

[951] See p. 147, 1.

[952] The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17, ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιουμένου; by Chrysippus, as derived from α privative and πολὺς, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων αὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ὄντα. The latter explanation is quoted by Plotin. v. 5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have taken it from Pythagoras, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in imitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of Apollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the ἕλικες λοξαὶ of the sun’s course, or the ἀκτῖνες λοξαὶ of the sun; and by Œnopides, to the λοξὸς κύκλος (the ecliptic). The epithet Λύκιος is explained by Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis; Antipater, ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου. In the same author Macrobius found the derivation of πύθιος from πύθειν (because the sun’s heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as well as of other epithets of Apollo, of the name of Artemis and her epithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found in abundance in Cornutus, c. 32, 34, and in Macrobius, l.c., who probably got most of them from Stoic sources.

[953] The first of these stories is explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17, down to the most minute details, in the sense of the cosmical views already given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the marshy earth, which were overcome by the sun’s heat (the arrows of Apollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by Macrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same source. Another likewise quoted by him, according to which the dragon represents the sun’s course, is perhaps also Stoical.

[954] Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as Ληθὼ, and referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at night.

[955] c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang of Apollo’s arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.

[956] c. 15, p. 31.

[957] Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141.

[958] See Corn. c. 20, 105, and Villoisin’s notes on the passage. The most varied derivations of Athene are given: from ἀθρεῖν by Heracl. c. 19, 40; Tzetz. in Hesiod. Ἐρ. καὶ Ἡμε. 70; Etymol. Mag. Ἀθηνᾶ—from θῆλυς or θηλάζειν (Ἀθήνη = ἀθήλη or ἀθηλᾶ = ἡ μὴ θηλάζουσα), by Phædr. Nat. D. col. 6; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17, p. 78—from θείνω, because virtue never allows itself to be beaten—from αἰθὴρ + ναίω, so that Ἀθηναία = Αἰθεροναῖα.

[959] This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to Phædr. col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the derivation from τρεῖν.

[960] c. 33, p. 69.

[961] It is to be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349–353, but, according to Phædr. (Philodem.) l.c., conf. Cic. N. D. I. 15, 41, was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest place in the universe. Cornut. c. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between this explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head as the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter, Eustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.

[962] p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.

[963] See p. 359, 1, Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367: Demeter and Core are τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν κάρπων διῆκον πνεῦμα. Phædr. col. 2: τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ γόνευμα [γόνιμον πνεῦμα]. On Demeter as γῆ μήτηρ or Δηὼ μήτηρ, see Corn. c. 28, p. 156, and Villoisin on the passage.

[964] Plut. l.c.: Dionysus is τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον.

[965] Macrob. Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from διανύσαι, because the sun daily completes his course round the world. It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of Apollo with Dionysus was common, and it is elaborately proved by Macrobius. Servius, too, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed the sun, Apollo, and Bacchus—and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno, and Proserpine—to be identical. Other etymologies of Διόνυσος are given by Corn. c. 30, 173.

[966] Corn. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heracl. c. 35, p. 71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.

[967] Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who also refers the legend and worship of Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of Persephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66. According to Plut. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called Περσεφόνη, τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα. A somewhat different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in a passage of Mai’s Mythograph, vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann. on Cornutus, p. 343.

[968] The legend of Triptolemus is explained by Cornutus, l.c. p. 161, as referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.

[969] Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 5; Corn. c. 13, p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.

[970] According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole book, probably of a treatise not otherwise mentioned on kind deeds, with these ineptiæ—ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique beneficii pauca admodum dicat, nee his fabulas, sed hæc fabulis inserit. A portion of these was made use of by Hecato in his work on this subject.

[971] Chrysippus, in Phædr. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars in Sen. l.c., and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of Λιταί (Corn. 12, 37; Heracl. 37, 75), which at best are only casual personifications.

[972] Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and number; Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; Erato indicates the importance of music for ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή. Ibid. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes; 29, 171, on the Horoi.

[973] Heracl. 31, 63; Plut. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.

[974] Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62, and above, p. 360.

[975] Ibid. 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with Zeus, which was really done by Phædr. Nat. De. col. 1: ἀνάλογον εὐν ... θαι [Petersen suggests εὐνομεῖσθαι, but probably it should be ὀνομάζεσθαι] τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἀνάγκην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν.

[976] The story of Ares, νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, means, according to Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes, ἐπὶ τὰ κενὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντεπάλων τάξεως παρεισελθὼν, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (ἀφροσύνη, ibid. 30, 62), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced troops of barbarians.

[977] In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, the connection of Ares and Aphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets. Heracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to the union of φιλία and νεῖκος, which produces harmony, or to the fact that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephæstus) into objects of beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by Corn. 19, 102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the union of strength and beauty.

[978] Corn. 27, 148; Plut. Krat. 408, C.

[979] His lewdness was said to indicate the fulness of the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the world.

[980] Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann ad locum, who points out similar interpretations, probably of Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the theogony, and also in Etymol. M.

[981] Besides the etymologies of οὐρανὸς in Corn. c. 1, and the observation of Plut. Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because she brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63, on which Krische, Forsch. 397, comments, deserve notice. It is there said, probably after Zeno: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things. Cronos is Time (the same is said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in Rhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his children, just as Time does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course of time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second explanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain attempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Rhea. Cronos (from κραίνειν) stands for the order of nature, putting an end to the all too-violent atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the vapour-masses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2), and he is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited. Macrob. Sat. i. 8 (who betrays that he is following a Stoic example by quoting Chrysippus’s definition of time: certa dimensio quæ ex cœli conversione colligitur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation: Before the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity, and the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and the different sexes were left to propagate animal life.

[982] See p. 292, 4, and Sen. Benef. i. 13, 3.

[983] C. 31, 187.

[984] Plut. De Is. 44, Schl. p. 367: He is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν πνεῦμα. Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2, and what Villoisin quotes on Cornutus, p. 366. from Schol. Apollon. Among the natural philosophers, i.e. the Stoics, Hercules symbolises strength and intelligence.

[985] Pers. Sat. v. 63.

[986] Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who, in the introduction, expressly refers to δοκιμώτατοι Στωϊκῶν.

[987] C. 70–75.

[988] C. 70–73, p. 137.

[989] Conf. the way in which Heraclitus, 74, 146, expresses himself as to Plato’s and Epicurus’s attacks upon Homer.

[990] Conf. Wachsmuth’s treatise mentioned above, p. 351, 2.

[991] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on divination, which are also referred to (as Wachsmuth, p. 12, shows) by Diog. vii. 149; Varro (in Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9); Phot. Amphiloch. Quæst. (Montfaucon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and perhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also wrote a book, περὶ χρησμῶν (Cic. Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; Suid. νεοττός); and one περὶ ὀνείρων (Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27, 66: Suid. τιμωροῦντος). In the former, he collected oracular responses; in the latter, prophetic dreams.

[992] Diog. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphærus περὶ μαντικῆς. Cic. (Divin. i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101) mentions a treatise having the same title as that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and two books of Antipater περὶ μαντικῆς, in which many interpretations of dreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54, 123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101) mentions a treatise of Posidonius περὶ μαντικῆς in five books, Diog. vii. 149; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6; 30, 64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; De Fato, 3; Boëth. De Diis et Præsens (in Orelli’s Cicero, v. 1) p. 395.

[993] Boëthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and explain the indications of a storm. Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47. On Panætius’s objections to μαντικὴ a word will be presently said.

[994] Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118: Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum fissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec Diis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. Ibid. 58, 132: Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui quæstus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem ... agnoscere. Similarly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and the ordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics, auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt significent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter should hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an opinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.

[995] Conf. Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5: τὸ χρειῶδες αὐτῆς (divination) καὶ βιωφελὲς, δι’ ὃ καὶ μάλιστα Χρύσιππος δοκεῖ ὑμνεῖν τὴν μαντικήν; and M. Aurel. ix. 27; God shows his care for the wicked by means of prophecies and by dreams.

[996] Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where among the four reasons from which Cleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is præsensio rerum futurarum, extraordinary natural phenomena—pestilence, earthquakes, monsters, meteors, &c., being the third. Ibid. 65, 105: The Stoic says of divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132: If there were no Gods, all the varieties of divination would be unmeaning; these are nevertheless universally admitted. Cic. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175, 3, 4.

[997] Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, inquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suæ majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶ μὲν θεοὶ οὐ προσημαίνουσι δὲ—the well-known expression of Chrysippus for εἰ θεοί εἰσιν, οὐ προσημαίνουσι, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the same proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab iis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ᾗ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from providence to divination, but from divination to providence.

[998] Cic. Div. i. 55, 125: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a Deo ... deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda.

[999] Cic. l.c. 55, 126.

[1000] Ibid. 57, 129.

[1001] See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.

[1002] Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. τιμωροῦντος), ii. 65, 135 (Suid. νεοττός), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, quoting from Antipater; i. 30, 64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posidonius—gives instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst their opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the prophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to be accidental (Cic. Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De Fato, 3, 5).

[1003] Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the marvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the existence of presentiments within certain limits.

[1004] Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after the passage quoted: Sed a Stoicis vel princeps ejus disciplinæ Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri degeneravit Panætius, nec tamen ausus est negate vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107; Diog. vii. 149; Epiphan. Adv. Hær. Cicero appears to have borrowed from Panætius, as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology (Divin. ii. 42–46), and he allows, c. 42, 88; 47, 97, that Panætius was the only Stoic who rejected it.

[1005] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3: Nimis illum [Deum] otiosum et pusillæ rei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista nihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennæ avium reguntur nec pecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series explicatur ... quicquid fit alicujus rei futuræ signum est ... cujus rei ordo est etiam prædictio est, &c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after the passage quoted, p. 371, 3: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, &c. Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see p. 373, 2). Nor was the meaning otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15, 33; 69, 142) were based on a συμπάθεια τῆς φύσεως (on which see p. 183, 2), an opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for instance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous business, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.

[1006] As in the passage quoted from Boëthus on p. 371, 2.

[1007] Conf. p. 374, 2; 379, 1, and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90, according to whom Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he would not allow, because twins often differ widely in their course of life and destiny.

[1008] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.

[1009] Cic. l.c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius assert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quæ tota confusa mundo sit, as was explained i. 52, 118.

[1010] Cic. ii. 15, 35: Illud vero multum etiam melius, quod ... dicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52, 118): cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum enim numini parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.

[1011] Cic. i. 53, 120, defends auguries somewhat similarly by arguing: If an animal can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater power over His? (his body according to them being the whole world).

[1012] See p. 181.

[1013] Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5; Alex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.

[1014] Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its reality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p. 372, 1.

[1015] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit prædictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c. This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above-quoted and more general form it is found in Alexander and Eusebius, probably also taken from Chrysippus, see p. 181.

[1016] According to the definition in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an ἐπιστήμη (Cic. more accurately: a vis = δύναμις, since besides scientific there is also natural divination), θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων. Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238; Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5.

[1017] Plut. Vit. Hom. 212, p. 1238: [τῆς μαντικῆς] τὸ μὲν τεχνικόν φασιν εἶναι οἱ Στωϊκοί. οἷον ἱεροσκοπίαν καὶ οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὸ περὶ φήμας καὶ κληδόνας καὶ σύμβολα, ἅπερ συλλήβδην τεχνικὰ προσηγόρευσαν· τὸ δὲ ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον, τουτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς. To the same effect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34; ii. 11, 26.

[1018] Conf. the fragment quoted in ‘Aristotle and the Peripatetics,’ p. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of the Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, without, however, defending them.

[1019] Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64; ii. 10, 26: The naturale genus divinandi is, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Plut. Plac. v. 1; where, however, the words κατὰ θειότητα τῆς ψυχῆς are only a gloss on the preceding words κατὰ τὸ ἔνθεον, κ.τ.λ. Galen. Hist. Phil. p. 320.

[1020] Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and Plut. Compare the many Stoic stories of dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56; 30, 64; ii. 65, 134; 70, 144.

[1021] See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110; 50, 113; 51, 115; and in particular i. 57, 129. Hence the prophecies of the dying (ibid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius; conf. Arist. l.c.), and the statement (ibid. 53, 121; see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come of innocent sleep.

[1022] Conf. the quotations on p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26; 15, 35; and his remarks on the instinct us afflatusque divinus. Cic. i. 18, 34.

[1023] According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the second, corresponds with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 122, 238, μαντικὴ is defined = ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Posidonius can only have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which is referred to in the first mode.

[1024] Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50, 114; 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural scenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapours arising from the earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he can have attached value to oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or justified them otherwise than in the way mentioned on p. 375, 4.

[1025] Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.

[1026] Ibid. i. 56, 127.

[1027] Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously (i. 33) treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 212. See above, p. 377, 2, Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions tentatively, as varieties of μαντικὴ τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν, καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no Gods, there would be neither μαντικὴ nor θεοληπτικὴ, ἀστρομαντικὴ nor λογικὴ πρόῤῥησις δι’ ὀνείρων. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory of dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is impossible to say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.

[1028] Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128.

[1029] Ibid. i. 56, 127.

[1030] Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quieti præparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment; conf.