Part 29

4. The several ways that God useth in governing the creatures in the world whether good or bad, may be comprised in these four ways. 1. He ruleth and ordereth them, by bending, inclining and turning of their wills and intentions, to serve and fullfil his decree and pleasure. So when the Brethren of _Joseph_ were fully resolved to murther him, God by the means of _Reuben_ and _Judah_, so wrought upon their minds and wills, that they were contented to sell him to the Ismaelites, that so the determinate counsel of God might be fulfilled; for though they intended it for evil, that he might never return to his Father, nor to have his dream fulfilled that they might bow down before him, yet God intended it for good, and so brought it to pass. And this he did not by changing or taking away their natures, nor by putting a coactive power upon their wills; but by inclining and bending them to his own purpose, so that the act was the act of their own wills, but the moving of their wills to spare his life was from the Lord: for as he that made the eye must needs see, so he that made the will must needs have a power to move, incline and turn it. And therefore the Father said well, _Certum est, nos velle cum velimus, sed Deus facit, ut velimus bonum_. And it is apparent that the hearts of all men are in the hands of the Lord, and he turneth and inclineth them according to his will and purpose, as saith _Solomon_, _The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will_. Upon which the note of _Tremellius_ and _Junius_ is this: _Est quidem animus omnium hominum gubernaculum, quo velut naves in mediis aquis reguntur corpora & actiones nostræ: tamen ne ipsorum quidem regum animus ex seipso permovetur, impellitur, inhibeturque, sed Deus in singulorum animis, veluti clavum tenet_. And concerning the wicked God saith: _I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and multiply my signes and wonders in the land of Ægypt_. And again: And _indeed for this cause, have I raised_ (made thee stand, _feci ut existeres_, as _Beza_ notes) _thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. And as yet exaltest thou thy self against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?_ And further the Text saith: _He turned their hearts, to hate his people, to deal subtilly with his servants_. 2. God also ruleth and ordereth his creatures by leading, drawing, inciting and moving their wills to his own ends and purposes, as sometimes to good, as in his own people: _For as many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God_. And so was our Saviour _led_, or driven (ἐκβάλλει, ἤγετο, ἀνήχθη) _into the wilderness, to be tempted of the devil_. To this agreeth the blessing and prophecie of _Noah_: _God shall perswade_, or allure _Japhet_, _to dwell in the tents of Shem_. Sometimes God inciteth the creatures to evil by the ministery of Satan, as is manifest in these examples. For the Text saith, _And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah_. And another place saith: _And Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number the people_. Whereby it is plain that Satan was the instrument, as sent and ordered of God to move _David_ to number the people, that thereby the King and people might be punished, and the King thereby brought to a deeper sight of his sins, repentance, and a closer trusting and adhering to his God. So when the Lord intended to have _Ahab_ to go up to _Ramoth Gilead_ that he might be slain, he sent forth an evil Angel, to be a lying spirit in all _Ahabs_ Prophets, and said unto him, _Thou shalt perswade him, and prevail also: Go forth and do so_. So that what God orders, Satan doth but execute. So when God intended to punish and destroy _Abimelech_, and the Men of _Shechem_, he sent an evil spirit between them to divide them, and so accomplisht his will upon both parties, as saith the Text: _Thus God rendred the wickedness of Abimelech which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren. And all the evil of the men of Shechem, did God render upon their heads: and upon them came the curse of Jotham the son of Jerubbaal._ 3. God ruleth his creatures by permission, or his will of not impeding them to act according to their wills and power, as in these cases. For God speaking of his people of _Israel_ saith: _But my people would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up unto their own hearts lusts, and they walked in their own counsels._ Agreeable to which is that in the _Acts_: _Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways_: which is as _Beza_ notes: _Ex arbitrio suo vivere, nulla ipsis præscripta ratione religionis_. And in this sense, and to this purpose it is that _God gave_ (παρέδωκεν) _them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts_; because of that horrible Idolatry that formerly they were guilty of. 4. God ruleth his creatures by his providence, sometimes by repressing, prohibiting and impeding the execution of their wicked wills, as is clear in the case of _Abimelech_ King of _Gerar_, who took _Sarah_ _Abrahams_ Wife intending to have had carnal knowledge of her, but God plagued him and his Family, and said; _For I also withheld thee from sinning against me; therefore I suffered thee not to touch her_.

Now we shall come to consider how the faln Angels are under the rule and restraint of this Divine and all-governing providence, wherein we shall make it appear, that they act nothing in this elementary and sublunary World, after any corporeal manner, but as they are ordered, licensed and limited by the will and decree of the Almighty, and so do not wander and rove at their own pleasures to act in corporeal things, what, when and how they list, as the Witchmongers vainly suppose, and this we shall clear in these particulars.

1. It cannot rationally be supposed that God is less wise, in ruling and ordering the Prince of darkness, the Prince of Devils, and the head of all Rebellion and Rebels, than he is in ruling his Subjects and Servants, which are all wicked men; but all these he ruleth with a rod of Iron, and breaketh them in sunder like a Potters vessel: And therefore much more hath he a restraint upon, and a rule over the faln Angels who kept not their first estates, and therefore are reserved in chains in darkness until the judgment of the great day.

[Sidenote: Matth. 25. 41.]

[Sidenote: Luke 8. 31.]

2. As he is the Prince and Ring-leader of all Sin and Rebellion against God, though he yet have not his final punishment, unto which he is reserved for the judgment of the great day, and though he be not yet thrust into the abysse or great depth, nor into that everlasting fire that is prepared for him and his Angels; yet is he kept in chains and darkness, and can act nothing but as he is licensed, ordered and limited by the Almighty.

[Sidenote: _Thom. Aquin. Caten. aur. in Luc._ 8. _p._ 200.]

3. And though he compass the earth to and fro, and walk about _like a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour_, yet is that but according to the malice and purpose of his wicked will, for in punishing or afflicting of the godly he must have licence from God first, or else he can do nothing in this Elementary World, as is most manifest in the affliction of _Job_, neither could he enter into the herd of Swine, but by Christs leave and order, nor deceive _Ahabs_ Prophets but by order from the Lord. And therefore an ancient Father said well: _Quod si super porcos potestatem non habent, multò magis nullam habent Dæmones contra homines factos ad imaginem Dei; oportet ergo Deum solum timere, contemnere autem illos_.

Therefore we shall conclude this briefly here, having occasion to handle it more fully hereafter, to wit, that the Witchmongers can have no shelter for their opinion from the Doctrine of Gods permission (if rightly understood) because God doth neither order, nor permit faln Angels to act any thing (especially in corporeal things) but what is for just, good, and wise ends, which cannot be shewed in these actions attributed to Witches.

CHAP. X.

_Whether faln Angels be Corporeal or simply Incorporeal, and the absurdity of the assuming of Bodies, and the like consequents._

I am not insensible what great censure I may incurr for entring upon such a ticklish and nice point as the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, seeing it hath exercised and crucified the wits of the most learned in all ages, especially being but an obscure person, and not heightned with those lofty titles that usually elevate Mens fames, more by those attributes than by the weight and strength of their arguments. Yet it being no necessary Article of the Christian Faith, but that a Man may lawfully defend either, it cannot rationally be judged by understanding Readers either to be pride or just offence for me to handle this subject. For seeing that most of the Christian and Learned Fathers for the space of four hundred years after Christ, were of the opinion that they were corporeal, it can be no novelty in me to revive or assert that opinion, and therefore I shall labour to make it manifest in this ensuing order.

[Sidenote: The immort. of the Soul, p. 7, 8.]

[Sidenote: _Nov. Organ._ _lib._ 1. _p._ 49.]

[Sidenote: _Ibid._ _p._ 21.]

1. There is a late way of arguing taken up by Dr. _Moore_ and others, that they will undertake to prove a thing to be so or so, or else to make Man to deny his own faculties. And so the said Doctor doth undertake to prove the existence of immaterial and incorporeal beings, or else he thinketh he bringeth Men to deny their own faculties: And these faculties he maketh to be, common notions, external sense, and evident and undeniable deductions of reason. And concludeth that, what is not consonant to all or some of these is meer fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of truth or falshood, by either its vigour or perplexiveness. But this will not accomplish the business he intends, for these reasons. 1. Because there is not the common notion of a spiritual and immaterial being in all or any Man, neither is it (to use his own words) true at first sight to all men in their wits upon a clear perception of the terms, without any further discourse or reasoning, but is only a bare supposition without any proof or evidence at all. 2. The being of an immaterial and spiritual substance can no way incurr into the senses nor affect them, because it is manifest (as _Des Cartes_ hath sufficiently proved) that all sensation is procured by corporeal contact, and not otherwise. And though we deny not that there have been, are and may be apparitions, that cannot be rationally supposed to be the ordinary _Phænomena_ of corporeal matter, yet affecting the senses, there must be something in them that performeth that effect, that is corporeal, or else the senses could not be wrought upon, for _immateriale non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus_. 3. No right deductions can possibly be drawn from the highest power of ratiocination, where the understanding hath no cognoscibility of the things that reason would draw its conclusions from, for as the same Doctor frameth his Axiome which is this: Whatsoever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our faculties or cognitive powers. But we assert (which we shall make good anon) that our faculties or cognitive powers (how far soever some would vainly magnifie and extol them) have not the power of understanding beings that are simply and absolutely immaterial and incorporeal. 4. There is nothing that is more undoubtedly true than what the Lord _Verulam_ hath told us in these words: _Causa vero & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est: quod dum mentis humanæ vires falso miramur & extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus_. And again: _Subtilitas naturæ subtilitatem sensûs & intellectûs multis partibus superat_, the which may be proved from many undeniable instances, which need not here be mentioned, only we shall add what the aforesaid learned Lord speaks to the same purpose which is this: “The fault of sense is twofold: For it either forsaketh or deceiveth us. For first there are many things that escape the sense, though rightly disposed, and no way impeded either by the subtilty of the whole body or by the minuteness of the parts, or by the distance of place, or tardity and velocity of motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or by reason of other causes. Neither again, where the sense doth apprehend the thing, are those apprehensions sufficiently firm. For the testimony and information of sense is always from the Analogie of Man, not from the Analogie of the Universe.” And it is altogether asserted with great error, that sense is the measure of things. Neither can these notions the Doctor would make so clear, be had or gathered, without some intimation from some of the senses.

[Sidenote: _An Antidot. &c._ _p._ 12.]

[Sidenote: _Immortal._ _p._ 21.]

2. Further the Doctor tells us that the Idea of a Spirit is as easie a notion, as of any other substance whatsoever. And he also saith: “Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his Idea or notion (speaking of God) is as easy as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the World.” This later he speaketh concerning God. But that these assertions are unsound, these following reasons will sufficiently evince.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 1._]

1. He doth define a Spirit thus: A Spirit is a substance penetrable and indiscerpible. Now if it be true that he affirms before, that, “the subject, or naked essence, or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, and that if we take away aptitudes, operations, properties and modifications from a subject, that then the conception vanisheth into nothing, but into the Idea of a meer undiversificated substance, so that one substance is not then distinguishable from another, but only from accidents or modes, to which properly belongs no subsistence.” So then if we take away penetrability and indiscerpibility, which are but the modes and properties of a Spirit, whose genus he maketh substance to be, then it vanisheth into an indistinguishable notion, and so his definition comes to nothing.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 2._]

2. For if substances be known by their properties and modifications, as we grant they are, the modifications and properties must of necessity be some ways known unto us: but there are no ways either by common notions, evidence of the senses, or sound deductions of reason that can certainly inform us of these properties or modifications of penetrability and indiscerpibility, and the Doctor yet never proved either; but is only a bare supposition, and a melancholy figment.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 3._]

[Sidenote: The Immort. p. 68.]

[Sidenote: _De Inject._ _p._ 598.]

[Sidenote: _De Natur. Subst. Energ._ _p._ 406.]

3. He tells us that all substance has dimensions, that is, length, breadth and depth, but all has not impenetrability, and boldly saith: It is not the Characteristical of a body to have dimensions, but to be impenetrable; to which we answer. It is strongly asserted by learned _Helmont_, that by the ultimate strength of nature, bodies do sometimes penetrate themselves and one another, and to that purpose he giveth convincing examples, and concludeth thus from them. _Invenio equidem, naturæ contiguam dimensionum penetrationem, licet non ordinariam. And after saith thus: Quibus constat corpora solida, satis magna, penetrasse stomachum, intestina, uterum, omentum, abdomen, pleuram, vesicam, membranas inquam, tanti vulneris impatientes. Id est, absq; vulnere cultros per istas membranas transmissos. Quod æquivalet penetrationi dimensionum, factæ in natura, absq; ope Diaboli._ And to the same purpose that most acute person, Dr. _Glisson_, handling this very point saith: _Verum enimverò, si sola quantitas actualis sit causa impenetrabilitatis corporum (ut ex supra dictis liquet,) eaq; sit naturaliter mutabilis; quid impedit ne substantia materialis aliam substantiam, mutatâ quantitate, novâq; simul assumptâ utrisq; communi, penetret?_ And therefore we may as confidently deny his assumption, that Impenetrability is the Characteristical of body, as he affirm it without proof, and must with all the whole company of the learned, assign Extension to be the true and Genuine Character of Body. And further he granting that substance hath length, breadth, and depth, we must of necessity conclude, that whatsoever hath those properties must needs be material and corporeal, and so that which he would make to be Spirit is meerly Body.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 4._]

[Sidenote: _Nov. organ._ _p._ 18.]

4. Whereas he saith that the notion of Spirit is as easy a notion, as any other whatsoever, it is granted, but is not at all to the purpose: for our inquiry need not be of the facility of a notion, but of the verity of it, that is, of the congruity and adequation of the notion and the thing from whence it is taken; otherwise though the notion be easy, yet without an adequate congruity to the thing it is meerly false. As for instance, when a melancholy person doth verily imagine himself to be changed into a Wolf or Dog, it is not only an easy notion, but also it is truly a notion, and yet a false notion, because there is no true congruity betwixt it and the thing from whence it is taken, the Body of the person so conceiving, being not at all changed into Wolf or Dog, but still retaining its humane shape and figure. And therefore the Lord _Verulam_ doth to this point speak truly and clearly in these words: _Itaq; si notiones ipsæ mentis (quæ verborum quasi anima sunt, & totius hujusmodi structuræ ac fabricæ basis) malè ac temere à rebus abstractæ, & vagæ, nec satis definitæ & circumscriptæ, deniq; multis modis vitiosæ fuerint, omnia ruunt._ And therefore the Doctor might very well have considered, whether these his new notions had been fitly and rightly drawn from the things, to which he doth so confidently affix them, before he had so boldly asserted them, which though they be truly his notions, that is, that he did think, conceive, and frame them, yet they are not truly abstracted from the things: And so he may be rather judged to be led by speculative and Philosophick Enthusiasm, than by the clear light of a sound understanding.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 5._]

[Sidenote: Job 11. 12.]

[Sidenote: 1 Kings 8. 27.]

5. And concerning his Tenent that the Idea or Notion of God is as easy as the notion of any thing else whatsoever, that the notion may be easy we grant; but whether it be true and adequate, there lies the question. For those old Hereticks that held that God had Eyes, Ears, Head, Hands and Feet and the like, had an easie notion of it, conceiving him to have humane members, but I hope the Doctor will not say that this notion of theirs was a notion truly drawn from the nature and being of God, because there is no corporeity in him at all. And it is and hath been the Tenent of all Orthodox Divines, Ancient, Middle and Modern, that God in his own nature and being is infinite and incomprehensible, and therefore there can no true and adequate notion of him, as being so, be duly and rightly gathered in the understanding of creatures; and so the Doctors position or notion must needs be Phantastry and imaginary Enthusiasm. For as there are many things in nature that in themselves are finite and comprehensible, that as he grants of naked essence or substance are utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties; much more must the being of God that is infinite and incomprehensible, which are attributes that are incommunicable, be utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties. And it is but the vain pride of Mans Head and Heart, thereby to magnifie his own abilities, whereas the Text doth pronounce this of him, _For vain man would be wise; though he be born like a wild ass colt_; that lifts him up to conceit that he can fathom and comprehend the Infinite and Almighty, whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain, and therefore cannot frame a true notion of him, whom perfectly he doth not understand nor comprehend, and the attributes of God are matters of Faith and not the weak deductions of humane reason.

[Sidenote: _Origin. sacr._ _l._ 2. _c._ 8. _p._ 233, 234.]

3. Those that seem to idolize humane abilities and carnal reason, have not only applied those so much magnified Engines to the discovery of created things, wherein they have effected so little, that sufficiently proclaims the invalidity of the instruments or the inauspicious application of them, or both, all the several sorts of Natural Philosophy hitherto found out, or used, being examined, coming far short of solving the _Phænomena_ of nature, when even the least animal or vegetable affords matter enough to puzzle and _nonplus_ the greatest Philosopher, so that we may justly complain with _Seneca_, that the greatest part of those things we know are the least part of those things we know not; These engines (I say) though proving ineffectual to find out the true notions and knowledge of natural things, have also (like the fiction of the Gyants) notwithstanding invaded Heaven, and taken upon them to discover and determine of Celestials, wherein it is in a manner totally blind, or sees but with an Owl-like vision. For indeed the deciding of this point must be taken from the Divine authority of the Scriptures, and the clear deductions that may be drawn from thence; for this is that clear light, that we ought to follow, and not the Dark-lanthorn of Mans blind, frail and weak reason, for it is _a sure word of Prophecie whereunto_ it is good _to take heed_, and not to _vain Philosophy, old Wives Fables, or opposition of Sciences falsly so called_. And therefore we shall conclude this point here concerning the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels with that Christian and learned position of Dr. _Stillingfleet_ in these words: “But although Christianity be a Religion which comes in the highest way of credibility to the minds of Men, although we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is revealed by God, yet that any thing should be questioned whether it be of Divine revelation, meerly because our reason is to seek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence.”

[Sidenote: Gen. 2. 7.]

[Sidenote: Eccles. 3. 21.]

4. In handling this point of the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, we do here once for all exclude and except forth of our discourse and arguments the humane and rational Soul as not at all to be comprised in these limits, and that especially for these reasons. 1. Because the humane Soul had a peculiar kind of Creation differing from the Creation of other things, as appeareth in the words of the Text. _And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul._ Upon which the note of _Tremellius_ and _Junius_ is, _anima verò hominis spiritale quiddam est, & divinum_. 2. Because I find _Solomon_ the wisest of Men making this question: _who knoweth the spirit of man, that goeth upward: and the spirit of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth?_ 3. Because it is safer to believe the nature of the Soul to be according to the Analogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the learned, than to sift such a deep question by our weak understanding and reason. So having premised these things, and left this as a general exception and caution, we shall proceed to the matter intended in this order.

[Sidenote: John 4. 24.]

[Sidenote: 2 Cor. 3. 17.]