Part 30

1. We lay it down for a most certain and granted truth, that God simply and absolutely is only a most simple spirit, in whom there is no corporeity or composition at all, and what other things soever that are called or accounted spirits are but so in a relative and respective consideration, and not in a simple and absolute acceptation. And this is the unanimous Tenent of the Fathers, Schoolmen and all other Orthodox Divines, agreeing with the plain and clear words of the Scripture, as, _God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth_. And again: _Now the Lord is that spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty_. Therefore we shall lay down this following proposition.

2. That Angels being created substances, are not simply and absolutely incorporeal, but if they be by any called or accounted spirits, it can but be in a relative and respective sense, but that really and truly they are corporeal. And this we shall labour to make good not only by shewing the absurdities of that opinion of their being simply spiritual, but in laying open the unintelligibility of that opinion, and by answering the most material objections.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 1._]

1. And first to begin at the lowest step, Body is a thing that affecteth the senses most plainly and feelingly; for though many bodies are so pure, as the air, æther, steams of the Loadstone, and many other steams of bodies, that they escape the sight of our eyes, yet are they either manifest to our feeling, or otherwise made manifest by some sensible effect, operation, or the like; yet for all this, the intrinsick nature of body as such is utterly unknown unto us, for when we speak of the extension of body, as its Characteristical property, we do but conceive of its superficial dimensions, its internal nature _quatenus Corpus_, being utterly unknown unto us; it being a certain truth, that _Quidditates rerum, non sunt cognoscibiles_; and as D^r _Moore_ granteth, the naked essence or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties. From whence we argue, _à minori ad majus_, that if the substance of a body, whose affections and modifications do fully incur into, and work upon our senses, be utterly unconceiveable to any of our senses, much more of necessity must the substance of a Created spirit, conceived as immaterial and incorporeal, be utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, because it hath no effects, operations, or modifications that can or do operate upon our senses.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 2._]

2. And as we know not the intrinsick nature of body, so also we are ignorant of the highest degree of the purity and spiritualness of bodies, nor do we know where they end, and therefore cannot tell where to fix the beginning of a meer spiritual and immaterial being. For there are of Created bodies in the Universe, so great a diversity, and of so many sorts and degrees of purity and fineness, one exceeding another, that we cannot assign which of them cometh nearest to incorporeity, or the nature of spirit. And many of these being compared with other more gross and palpable bodies, may be and are called and accounted spirits, though notwithstanding they be all Corporeal, and but under a gradual difference. So the vital part in the bodies of men are by Physicians called Spirits in relation to the bones, ligaments, musculous flesh and the like; nay even in respect of the blood, lymphatick humor, lacteal juyce, or the _succus nutritius nervosus_, and yet still are contained within the limits of body, and are as really Corporeal as any of the rest, and so are the air and æther. And those visible species of other bodies that are carried in the air and represented unto our Eyes, by which we distinguish the shape, colour, site and similitude of one body from another, though by the Schools passed over with that sleight title of qualities, as though they were either simply nothing, or incorporeal things, are notwithstanding really Corporeal, else they could not incur into, nor affect the visive sensories: And these do in the air intersect and pass through one another (as may be optically demonstrated) without Confusion, Commixion, or discerpsion, and may comparatively be accounted spirital and incorporeal, though really they be not so. But what shall we say to that wonderful body, Image or _Idolum_ of our selves, and other things that we behold in a mirrour or looking-glass? must this be a meer nothing, or an absolute incorporeal thing? surely not. For it is as really a body as any in the Universe, though of the greatest purity and fineness of any that we know; and how near it approaches to the nature of spirit, is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine; for if it did exist when the body or subject from whence it floweth were removed, it might rationally be taken for a Spirit, and with far more probable ground than many things else that have been vainly supposed to be Spirits. And that these visible shapes of things, and this Image in the glass, are not meerly imaginary nothings, but Corporeal Figures and steams, is most manifest, because they vanish when the body or subject is removed, because that _nullius entis nulla est operatio, & Incorporeum non incurrit in sensus_, and because they would pass through the glass, but only for the foil or _Bractea_ laid on the otherside, by which the Image is reflected. So that if we have bodies of so great purity, and near approach unto the nature of spirit, we cannot tell where spirit must begin, because we know not where the purest bodies end.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 3._]

[Sidenote: The Immortal. of the Soul. _Axiom._ 2. _p._ 6.]

[Sidenote: _De natura substant. Energetic._ _c._ 27. _p._ 379.]

3. D^r _Moore_ maketh substance to be the genus, and spirit and body to be the two species, so that body and spirit are of one generical Identity, and so there must of necessity some certain specific difference betwixt them be assigned and proved, or else the division is vitious, and the property of spirit not proved, and so their opinion of spirit falls totally to the ground. For we affirm (and shall prove) that though a difference be imagined and supposed, yet it was never yet sufficiently proved, for _omnia supposita, non sunt vera_, otherwise all the impossible figments and vain _Chimæras_ of melancholy and doting persons might pass for true Oracles: but it is one thing truly to understand, and another thing to imagine and fancy what indeed is not, nor ever was. And though the supposition seem never so probable and like, yet it will but at the best infer the possibility of such an imagined difference, but not prove it really to be so, and therefore here we shall retort the Doctors Axiom against him, which is this: “Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as meerly possible, is not to move us or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own faculties.” Now that a spirit is penetrable and indiscerpible, may be imagined as possible to the fancies of some, but cannot be clearly intelligible to any sober mind; for to imagine, and to understand, are faculties that are very different, and however if such a difference be conceived as possible (which cannot enter the narrow gate of my Intellect) yet the difference of being penetrable and indiscerpible, is not to move us to determine that a spirit hath those distinct properties from bodies, because they are but known to us as meerly possible. And therefore that these two differences of penetrability and indiscerpibility assigned by D^r _Moore_, are not sufficiently proved to be so, we shall give these reasons. 1. If bodies in the ultimate act of nature can penetrate themselves and one another, as Helmont and D^r _Glisson_ do strongly labour to prove, then penetrability is not the proper difference of spirit from body, because then common to them both. 2. But if it be taken for a truth (and the one of necessity must be true) that bodies do not, or can possibly penetrate themselves or one another, as the common tenent holdeth, and seemeth most agreeable to verity, for it is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive, that two Cubes (suppose of Marble or Metal) should penetrate one another, and yet but to have the dimensions of one, and to possess no greater space than the one did formerly fill: And if this be impossible and unintelligible in respect of bodies, whose properties, aptitudes, affections and modifications are apparent to our senses, then must it be more impossible and unintelligible in substances supposed to be meerly incorporeal, because they must needs be more pure and perfect, and therefore less subject to such unconceiveable affections; and however, it can be no wayes known to our faculties or cognitive powers, that they have any such specifical property or affection. 3. As it is not any way manifest to any of our senses, nor can be proved by any sound deductions of reason, so it cannot be manifested to be any innate notion shining from the Intellect it self, and we ought not to take adventitious ones instead of those that are innate, nor fictitious ones for either, but to make a due distinction of each of them one from another. 4. Neither is indiscerpibility a proper difference of a spiritual substance from a corporeal one, because the visible species of things do in the air intersect one another, and suffer not discerpibility: and that these are bodies is manifest, because they affect the senses; and therefore that which is a property of some bodies cannot be the proper difference to distinguish a spirit from a body. 5. This is only an arbitrary and feigned supposition, and cannot be proved either by the testimony of any of the senses, by sound reason, or innate notions; and what is or cannot be proved by some of these (according to his own position) ought to be rejected. And therefore as indiscerpibility is no proper difference of a spirit from a body, no more is penetrability, which can no more be in a spiritual substance, than either in discreet quantity one can be two, or two one, or in continuate quantity one inch can be two, or two can become one. D^r _Glisson_ from his much admired _Suarius_ the great Weaver of fruitless Cobwebs, hath devised another difference of spirit from body which he thus layeth down, as we give it in this English. “I assign (he saith) a twofold difference betwixt the substance of matter and that of spirits. The first is taken from the substantial (_à substantiali materiæ mole_) heap or weight of the matter. For I (he saith) besides the actual and accidental extension, do attribute to the matter this substantial heap or weight which is denied to spirits. But the sign of this heap or weight is, that if the matter in the same space be duplicated, triplicated, or centuplicated, that it will be made more dense twofold, threefold, or an hundred fold. And concludeth thus: I answer (he saith) that matter and spirit in this do agree betwixt themselves, that they both are finite, and from thence that they have this common, that neither of them can reduce themselves into a littleness that is infinite, or into an infinite magnitude. Therefore the difference betwixt them doth not consist in this; but in this, that a spirit whether it be contracted or dilated, is not made more dense or rare; but on the contrary, matter, whether it be contracted or expanded, is made more dense, or more rare.” To which we return this responsion. 1. It is usual with men, when by their wills and fancies they would maintain an opinion that is weak and groundless, finding they cannot clearly perform it, to bring in some strange, obscure or equivocal word, thereby to make a flourish, though they prove nothing: So here this learned person to make a shew to prove the difference of spirit doth assign _moles substantialis_ as peculiar to body, but not to spirit; but what is to be understood by _moles_, he might know his own meaning, but I am sure there are few others that do or can understand it, and therefore is but a devised subterfuge to stumble and blind mens intellects, and not to prove the thing intended. 2. If by the word _moles_ he intend weight or gravity (and what else it can signifie is not intelligible) then it will not be a difference betwixt body and spirit, because gravity and levity are differences of bodies in respect of one another, and therefore can be none as he assignes it. 3. To assert that a spirit when contracted or dilated is not made more dense or more rare, but that matter whether it be contracted or expanded, is made more dense or more rare, is easily spoken, but not so easily proved: and rude assertions without sound proof, are of no validity, and may with as good reason be denied and rejected, as affirmed or received. 4. We have no density in bodies but in respect of the paucity and parvity of the pores, so that less of another body is contained in them, and that is accounted rare that hath many or greater, and so containeth more of another body in them, and are qualities or modifications that only belong unto bodies, and not at all unto spirits, and is but precariously taken up by the Doctor without any proof or demonstration at all. 5. If spirits cannot expand themselves into an infinite space, nor contract themselves into an infinite littleness, then where are bounds and limits of this contraction and expansion, or how is it proved that they can do either? seeing they are properties and affections of bodies and matter, and never were proved to be peculiar to spirits.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 4._]

4. Those that are much affected to and zealous for experimental Philosophie, do often run into that extream, as utterly to condemn and throw away all the ancient Scholastick Learning, as though there were nothing in it of verity or worth: But this is too severe and dissonant from truth, as might be made manifest in many of their Maximes; but we shall only instance in one as pertinent to our present purpose, which is this: _Imaginatio non transcendit Continuum_. And this if we perpend it seriously, is a most certain and transcendant truth; for when we come to cogitate and conceive of a thing, we cannot apprehend it otherwise than as continuate and corporeal; for what other notions soever we make of things, they are but adventitious, arbitrary, and fictitious, for even _non entia ad modum entium concipiuntur_. And therefore those that pretend that Angels are meerly incorporeal, must needs err, and put force upon their own faculties, which cannot conceive a thing that is not continuate and corporeal: But if they will trust their own Cogitations and faculties rightly disposed, and not vitiated, then they must believe that Angels are Corporeal, and not meerly and simply spirits, for absolutely nothing is so but God only.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 5._]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Rob. Fludd. utri. Cosm. Hist._ _Tract._ 1. _l._ 4. _c._ 2. _p._ 110.]

5. If the Angelical nature were simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they would be of the same essential Identity with God, which is simply impossible. For the Angels were not Created forth of any part of Gods Essence, for then he should be divisible, which he is not, nor can be, his Essence being simplicity, unity, and Identity it self, and therefore the Angels must of necessity be of an essence of Alterity, and different from the essence of God. Now God being a simple, pure, and absolute spirit in the Identity of his essence, if the Angels were simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they must be of the same essence with him, which is absurd and impossible; and therefore they have Alterity in them, and so of necessity must be Corporeal, and not simply and meerly spiritual. And that as much as we contend for here is granted by D^r _Moore_ in these words: “For (he saith) I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being consisting of soul and body, as that of men and brutes.” Whereby he plainly asserteth their Composition, and so their Alterity, and therefore that they must needs have an _Internum_ and _externum_, as the learned and Christian Philosopher D^r _Fludd_ doth affirm in these words: _Certum est igitur inesse ipsis (scilicet Angelis) aliud, quod agit, aliud autem, quod patitur; nec verò illud secundùm quod agunt, aliud quam actus esse poterit, qui forma dicitur; neq; etiam illud secundum quod patiuntur, est quicquam præter potentiam, hæc autem materia appellatur_.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 6._]

[Sidenote: _Serm._ 6 _sup. Cantic._ _p._ 505.]

[Sidenote: _Lib._ 5.]

6. Therefore to conclude, these arguments do sufficiently and evidently prove that Angels are either Corporeal, or have bodies united unto them, which is all one to our purpose whether way soever it be taken. To which only we shall add these authorities; and first S. _Bernard_ tells us thus much rendered into English. “Therefore (he saith) as we render unto God alone true immortality, so also incorporeity, because he alone doth so far transcend the universal Corporeal nature of spirits, that he doth not stand need of any body whatsoever, in any operation whatsoever, being content with only a spiritual nodd (or motion) when he will, to perform whatsoever he pleaseth. Therefore only that majesty of his, is that, which neither for himself, nor for another, hath need of the help of a Corporeal instrument, by which omnipotent will he is immediately present at every work.” And that of _Damascen_ is full to the purpose, which is this: “That Angels _quantum ad nos_, are said to be incorporeal and immaterial: but compared to God, are found to be Corporeal and material.” And of this opinion besides were _Tertullian_, S. _Augustin_, _Nazianzen_, _Beda_, and many others, as may be seen in the learned Writings of _Zanchy_ upon this subject: with whose words we shall shut up this particular: _Certum enim est, ex iis quæ scripturæ tradunt de Angelis, probabiliorem esse Patrum sententiam, quàm Scholasticorum: utram tamen sequaris, non multum peccaveris, nec proptereà inter Hæreticos haberi poteris_.

And on the otherside, if they be holden to be simply and absolutely incorporeal, then these absurdities must of necessity follow.

1. If Angels be simply incorporeal, then they can cause no Physical or local motion at all, because nothing can be moved but by contact, and that must either be by immediate or virtual contact, for the Maxime is certain, _Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi_, as when ones hand doth immediately touch a thing and so move it; _vel mediatione virtutis_, as when a man with a rod or a line, doth draw a thing forth of the water, both of these do require a Corporeal contact, that is, that the superficies of the body moving or drawing, must either mediately or immediately touch the superficies of the body to be moved or drawn. But that which is absolutely incorporeal hath no superficies at all, and therefore can make no contact either mediate or immediate; and therefore Angels if simply incorporeal, can cause no Physical or local motion at all.

[Sidenote: The Immortal. _l._ 1. _c._ 10. _p._ 72.]

[Sidenote: _Princip. Phil._ _Part._ 2. _p._ 40.]

2. If Angels be absolutely incorporeal, then they cannot be contained or circumscribed in place, and consequently can perform no operation in Physical things. To which if they answer with _Thomas Aquinas_: _Quod circumscribi terminis localibus est proprium Corporum, sed circumscribi terminis essentialibus, est commune cuilibet Creaturæ, tam corporali, quam spirituali_; This aiery distinction might have taken place, if _Aquinas_ had shewed us what essential terms and limitations are, but of this we have no proof at all, and what was never proved may justly be denied. For what a definitive place is, was never yet defined, neither can we possibly conceive an Idea or notion of any such thing, but only as we may make a _Chimæra_ or figment of that which never was nor is. For though we may apprehend that they are not circumscribed in place, as gross bodies are, yet it is not to be doubted, but that they move from place to place, and do so consist in some place, that they occupy a certain space of place, and this is most certain, if we believe (as we ought) those things which the Scriptures do declare concerning the mission and motion of Angels. And therefore notwithstanding this frivolous and feigned distinction, we may conclude with _Theodoret_, _Angelorum naturam esse finitam, & circumscriptam, eóq; opus habere loco_. Neither doth that avail to solve the business, and make this a good distinction, which is brought by D^r _Moore_, to wit, that there are two acceptions of place, the one being imaginary space, the other that place is the concave superficies of one body immediately environing another body, and that therefore there being these two acceptions of place (he concludeth) that the distinction of being there _Circumscriptive & definitive_, is an allowable distinction. But by the Doctors leave we must affirm, that what he saith is not allowable, and that for these reasons. 1. Because imaginary space hath no existence in nature, but only in the fancy of the Imaginant, _& entia rationalia, non sunt entia naturalia ex parte rerum existentia._ 2. Because it is a certain truth which _Des Cartes_ hath taught us, to wit: That the names of place or space, do not signifie any thing different from a body that is said to be in a place, but only do design the magnitude, figure and site of it amongst other bodies. And that this site may be determined, we ought to have respect unto some other bodies, which we may consider as immoveable. And as we respect divers bodies, we may say that the same thing at the same time doth change place and not change place. As when a Ship is carried in the Sea, he who sitteth in the Ship doth alwayes remain in one place, if respect be had to the parts of the Ship, betwixt which parts he keepeth the same site: And the same person doth continually change place, if respect be had to the shores, because he continually receedeth from some shores, and cometh more near unto other. 3. Neither is this distinction good, because as the same Author tells us: _Non etiam in re differunt spatium, sive locus internus, substantia corporea in eo contenta, sed tantum in modo, quo à nobis concipi soleat_. 4. D^r _Moore_ granteth that spirits are substances and have extension, and we affirm that nothing can be so but what is Corporeal, and consequently must be in place circumscriptively, and therefore the fancy of a definitive place, is meerly a fictitious foppery, without ground or reason.

[Sidenote: _Object. 1._]

[Sidenote: 1 Timoth. 6. 16.]

[Sidenote: Hebr. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: 1 Tim. 6. 13.]

[Sidenote: Job 34. 14, 15.]

[Sidenote: _De Lithias._ _l._ _c._ 8. _p._ 70.]