Part 28

4. So that however permission may be understood, it must properly relate to intellectual and rational creatures, and that only and especially in respect of those actions which we call moral, that is, in regard of sin, evil or _malum culpæ_; for whatsoever is _malum pœnæ_, God is the author, causer and inflicter of, according to the Text: _Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?_ To understand aright the nature of permission, we are to consider the affections, properties and adjuncts of it, both in regard of the person permitting, the creature permitted to act, and the thing permitted to be done, with all the circumstances about them, and these we shall take from their Ring-leader and great Champion _Arminius_ himself in these points.

[Sidenote: _Vid. Twisse Vindic. grat. de permiss._ _p._ 341.]

5. And first in respect of the person permitting (he saith) it is necessary that he know, what, to whom, and the ability of performance, that is to be granted, or used, by the person permitted, and that the person permitting have power to permit and to impede, and also that he have the right and authority of permitting. 2. In the person permitted, it is necessarily requisite, that he have sufficient power to effect and perform the thing permitted, if not hindered; for otherwise it would be nonsense to say, that a person is permitted to do an act that he hath no power to perform. 3. If the person permitted have sufficiency of power to perform the act permitted, yet there is also required a propension and disposition in the person permitted, to perform the thing permitted, otherwise the permission as to that act would be without a certain end, and so would be _in vagum_, inconstant and not to be performed, and therefore he concludeth thus: _Imò nec rectè dici potest quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illos præstandi affectu nullo tenetur_.

[Sidenote: _De permiss._ _p._ 342.]

[Sidenote: Eccles. 7. 29.]

6. We shall omit the exceptions that the learned and subtile Dr. _Twisse_ hath made against diverse particulars in these passages, and shall only fix upon one that is manifestly false (if he mean of permission in general which he confesseth.) For in the Angels and _Adam_ before their falling and committing of sin, there was not any propension or disposition to sin, and therefore to this we shall give the most acute answer of Dr. _Twisse_ in these words: _Nam licèt insit homini propensio ad peccandum (scilicet post lapsum) per modum dispositionis, quæ præcedanea sit permissioni actus peccaminosi; At in Adamo (ante lapsum) nulla inerat hujusmodi dispositio, aut ad peccandum propensio, ante peccatum ejus primum. Sed neq; in Angelis, qui à statu suo ceciderunt. Secundo, ut ut dispositio, sive habitus insit qui inclinet ad agendum, non est ex natura dispositionis sive habitus cujuscunq; ut faciat hominem propendere ad actum aliquem particularem, cujus vel solius ratione dicitur permissio._ And though it be granted that God did create the Angels, and _Adam in statu labili_, wherein they had a sufficiency of power or grace not to have sinned, or faln, and though that power or grace was not withdrawn from them, and that there was no coaction upon their wills to inforce them to sin; for if it had been so, their falls would have been no sin: so neither did God supply them with more assisting grace to have upholden them, for then their estate had not been labile, nor they in a possibility to sin. But it is manifest that they in their Creation were set in _æquilibrio_, and had equal power of freedom of will either to sin or not to sin, and so had no propension or disposition at all to commit that sin, to which they were left by a free permission: and so propension and disposition to the act permitted (if permission be understood generally) had no place in the Angels nor _Adam_ before their first sinning, according to the Text, _God made man upright_, that is like a straight or right line that falling perpendicularly upon another right line, doth incline to neither end of the line upon which it falls, so _Adam_ was made upright without any propension or inclination to sin at all. And if this propension and disposition be understood, and applied to Angels in their condition after their fall, then it is true they have not only an inclination but a most strong will and desire to commit more evil and mischief than God in his goodness permits them to perform, for _the Devil goeth about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour_, and it was Satan that not only had a disposition, but _desired to sift Peter as wheat_. And it is manifest that wicked Men have a strong will and desire to commit mischief; but that God hath an hook in their Nostrils, and a Bridle in their Jawes wherewith he curbs and restrains them, that they cannot act out all the mischief that they intend, as is manifest in the example of _Sennacherib_ and many others.

[Sidenote: Twisse _de Permiss. ut supra_.]

[Sidenote: _Fran. Jun. de peccat. prim. Adam._ _p._ 111, 114.]

[Sidenote: _August. Enchir._ 75, 76.]

7. Permission must be referred and reduced to the will of God, for nolition is an act of his will as well as volition: and to speak properly and truly, permission is but an act of the Divine Will not to impede such or such particular actions of the creatures; and therefore the same things will follow from his volition or his will _non impediendi_, as from his volition to the acts of a free agent, seeing neither do put coaction upon the will of the Creature that is to act. And that permission is an act of the Divine will, and to be reduced unto it _Arminius_ confesseth in these words: _Permissionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum, sive per se sive reductive, ut in Scholis loquuntur. Cessatio enim ab actu, ad actum quoq; est reducenda: causam autem proximam & immediatam habet voluntatem, non scientiam, non potentiam, non potestatem, licet & ista in permittente requirantur._ And when he defineth permission, he saith: _Permissio Dei, est actus voluntatis Divinæ_; than which nothing can be more clear. And not much different from this is the definition of permission, that is given by learned _Junius_ thus: _Est autem permissio actus voluntatis, quo is penes quem est alienas actiones inhibere, eas non inhibet, sed agentis voluntati permittit earum modum_. And again he saith: _Apud Deum verò Opt. Max. nulla est omnino permissio, nisi voluntaria: quandoquidem omnis divina permissio à principio interno est, id est, à voluntate ipsius, & movetur ad finem quem voluntas præfinivit ejus_. But we will conclude this with that of S. _Augustin_ thus Englished: “Not any thing cometh to pass, unless the Omnipotent will have it to be done, either that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to be.” By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will.

[Sidenote: _Twisse ut supra._ 346.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 4.]

8. It is a certain truth that all moral actions are performed by a physical power in respect of the sustentation of the will in its natural being while it acteth, and that the creature is conserved even in the act as it is natural, though there be obliquity in the will of the creature acting in reference to the law given, or made known unto it. And this _Arminius_ acknowledgeth in these words: _Necesse itaq; est, ut cum Deus potentiæ creaturæ actum aliquem permittit, creatura illa conservetur, ut sit, & vivat, potentia ejusdem permaneat, idonea ad actum producendum, nulla major vel æqualis potentia opponatur, objectum deniq; offeratur, & potentia permittatur_. From whence therefore to instance in the first sin of the Angels and _Adam_, besides the equal power and liberty of will that they had to sin or not to sin, it is manifest that God willed and determined not to withdraw his conservative power from them, but that they might be and live in the very act of their sinning. Neither did he withdraw that power they had, nor opposed a greater, or equal power to impede them, much less did he create or infuse any evil into their natures, nor put upon them any coaction of will, to inforce them to sin, but solely left them to the power and liberty of their own free wills. And though by his prescience he certainly knew that they would sin and fall, yet he determined in his purpose not to hinder them, but by his providential decree did set down how to guide and order that fall and defection the most advantagiously for his glory both in his Mercy and Justice. So that even in this there was no bare passive permission, separate and distinct from his will and decree in his providence, but only permission to the moral act of their wills, which by his wisdom, decree and providence, he ordered for his own glory, according to the Text: _The Lord hath made_ (or wrought) _all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_. The Hebrew word _hath wrought_, doth properly signifie, to work by polishing, trimming, or framing and fitting, so that the wicked (who have made themselves so by the acts of their own wills) God by his decree and providence doth polish, fit and order for the setting forth of his own glory in framing the wicked for the day of evil, the evil of punishment and judgment.

9. Further it is necessary that the creature acting a moral act (especially in this case of the Angels and _Adam_ before their fall) have the liberty and freedom of will, and that the will at the instant of the act, be not restrained nor under a coactive power, for otherwise _malum culpæ_ or sin would cease to be evil, and so there could be no sin at all. And thus far, and in this peculiar respect only, the Angels and _Adam_ before their acting of sin, and in the very instant of the act it self, were permitted, that is, God willed and determined not to impede them, but for the ordering of that sin and fall, the permission was conjoined with his will and providence, and not separate from it, or a nude permission.

[Sidenote: Rom. 7. 8, 11.]

10. That _malum culpæ_, or sin doth arise by the occasion of a law; for where no law is, there can be no sin, and therefore the Apostle saith: _But sin taking occasion by the Commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence_. So that sin considered as it is sin, is an Aberration or Deviation of the Will of the creature from the revealed law of the Creator, and hath simply and absolutely no other causality, but only the deficiency and ἀταξία of the Creature to produce it, especially in these cases of the Angels and _Adam_ in their first acts of sin.

[Sidenote: Psal. 73. 18.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 37. 10.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 75. 6, 7.]

11. Now we will come to the application of this unto wicked Men as they are under original and actual sins, and that in these few examples. 1. It is not by a bare permissive power, but by his will and order in his providence, for he _setteth up the wicked in slippery places_, and _yet a little while and the wicked shall not be: yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place, and it shall not be_. So _Cain_ was suffered to slay his Brother _Abel_, but by and by he was sent from the presence of the Lord into the land of _Nod_: So he set up _Saul_ to be _King_ over _Israel_, and soon after rejected him, and also destroyed him: these were by providence, not only bare permission. 2. _For promotion cometh neither from the East nor the West, nor from the South: But God is the judge, he pulleth down one, and setteth up another._ So wicked _Haman_ was set up to be the highest in the Kingdom next _Ahasuerus_, and got a decree to have all the Jewes put to death, and had set up a pair of Gallows to hang _Mordecai_ upon, and yet see the providence of God, who quickly brought him to be hanged upon them himself: and this will be further made out where we speak of providence.

[Sidenote: _Resp. Fludan. ad Lanov._ _p._ 18.]

12. Though those that ascribe so large a power unto Devils and Witches, do take it for granted that they are only under a bare passive permission, and that the faln Angels do act, what, when, where and how they list, yet is it a meer falsity, for they are under the rule of Gods Divine Will, decree and providence, and do act nothing, but as and so far as they are licensed, ordered and limited by his will and providence, and are under a punctual restraint, nay kept in the chains of everlasting darkness unto the judgment of the great day, as we shall prove at full in that Chapter where we handle the knowledge and power of faln Angels. And therefore here we shall only say this, that if Devils could do as much mischief as they would, and were under no restraint or chains, then none of the godly would be left alive. But it is manifest that Devils do act nothing (excepting the obliquity and evil of their own wills) but meerly as instruments of the Divine Will and Providence, for as the Christian Philosopher saith: _Illa est impietas; nimirum ea falso attribuere creaturis, quæ radicaliter Deo soli sunt propria, & inter cætera, actum aliquem peculiarem in diabolo esse existimare, qui non est originaliter à Deo, & consequenter immediatè, cum essentialis Dei actus sit per se sine divisione in omni re_.

[Sidenote: _Greg. in Dialog._]

[Sidenote: Isai. 42. 9.]

[Sidenote: Acts 15. 18.]

[Sidenote: _August. de. Trinit._ _l._ 15. _c._ 7.]

[Sidenote: Ephes. 1. 11.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 115. 3.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 33. 13, 14, 15.]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Rivet. de Provid. Disput._ 1.]

[Sidenote: _August. de lib. arbitr._ _l._ 3.]

Concerning Divine prescience, which is as S. _Gregory_ saith, _Præscientia est unamquamq; rem antequam veniat, videre, & id quod futurum est priusquam præsens sit prævidere_, we may only note this, That it is certain and infallible, as saith the Lord by the Prophet: _Behold the former things are come to paß, and new things do I declare, before they spring forth I tell you of them_: Also, _known unto God are all his works from the foundation of the World_. “So that his prescience is that infallible vision, by which he comprehendeth all what he knows by one eternal, immutable and ineffable vision.” But this prescience in God doth not flow from the things that are to come to pass, but from his decree, by which all future things are determined, who doth _all things according to the counsel of his own will_, for _God is in heaven, he hath done whatsoever he pleased_. But this prescience is not to be considered only by it self, as a bare vision, or inspection, but as it is coupled and joined with his providence, _For the Lord looketh from heaven, he beholdeth all the sons of men. From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth. Forming_ (or framing) likewise _their hearts, and considering all their works_. And this prescience considered solely by it self, is not the cause of the things that come to pass, for as the Father saith well: _Sicut tu memoria tuâ non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt, sic Deus præscientia suâ non cogit facienda quæ sunt futura_. So that we conclude that God by a naked prescience doth not only behold infallibly the things that are to come, and so is only a spectator of what Devils and wicked Men will do, but also that he doth order, rule and predesign all their works and actions.

[Sidenote: _Andr. Rivet. disputat. Thes._ 1. _p._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _De provid. Trac._ _p._ 9.]

[Sidenote: _Isagog. Christ._ _c._ 32. _p._ 52.]

1. As touching Gods Government and Administration of the World by his Divine providence, we shall in the first place lay down some of the definitions of it from the most sound and learned Divines of the Reformed Churches, and that in English, after this order. The acute and learned _Rivet_ describes it thus: “Providence is an ineffable force and virtue of the Divine Sapience and Potency, by which God doth conserve and govern to his own Glory all his Works according to his eternal, most wise, and most free decree, and directing every thing in time unto its end.” _Johannes de Spina_ defines it thus: “Providence is the prescience and counsel of God eternal, most free, immutable, most just, most wise; most good, whereby God worketh and determineth all good things in all, but doth only permit evil things, and doth dispose and direct all things to his own Glory and the Salvation of his elect.” And much to the same purpose doth _Lambertus Danæus_ speak in these words: “Providence is a most free and most powerful action of God, by which he not only stirreth up and governeth universals, but also singulars, in every one of their single actions. And (he saith) it is called a most free and most powerful act, because it can neither be hindered nor overcome by any law.” And to these for substance do agree _Calvin_, _Musculus_, _Beza_, _Zanchius_, and the rest of all Orthodox Divines.

[Sidenote: _Exeges. Loc._ 6. _p._ 143, 144. _&c._]

2. But we shall chiefly insist on that definition that is given by learned _Piscator_ in these words: “The providence of God is his eternal, most wise, most just and immutable counsel or decree, whereby he doth most freely govern all things by him created to the glory of himself, and the Salvation of his elect.” To which he giveth this explication: “That it doth consist of a Genus and three differences. The Genus is the word _Decretum_ which is illustrated by four adjuncts; Eternity, Sapience, Justice and Immutability. The first difference is taken from the objects; which are all created things. The second from the ends, which are two, the Glory of God, and the Salvation of the elect. The third from the effect, which is the government of things created, which Gubernation is illustrated by the adjunct which is liberty.”

[Sidenote: Acts 2. 23.]

[Sidenote: Acts 4. 27, 28.]

[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: Matth. 10. 29, 30, 31.]

[Sidenote: Deut. 19. 4, 5.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 45. 5.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 33.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 4.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 22, 23.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 8. 28, 30.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 115. 3.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 15, 18.]

[Sidenote: Job 34. 13.]

3. The parts of this definition are thus proved. 1. That the providence of God is his counsel and decree, appeareth most plainly from these Scriptures: _Peter_ in his Sermon to the Jews upon the day of Pentecost saith: _Him_ (that was Jesus) _being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God_ (τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει Θεοῦ) _ye have taken, and by wicked hand have crucified and slain_. And again the Church at _Jerusalem_ in their prayers say thus: _Of a truth against thy holy Child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined_ (ἡ χείρ σου καὶ ἡ βουλή σου προώρισε γενέσθα) _before to be done_. 2. That all things created (nay also those things which do seem to happen fortuitously, or to be by permission, as sinful actions) are governed and ordered by the providence of God, as these Scriptures will sufficiently demonstrate. _Christ Jesus the son of God, doth uphold_ (or sustain) _all things by the word of his power_. And doth not our Saviour tell us: _Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your father? But the very hairs of your heads are all numbred. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows._ That place concerning the Cities of refuge, and the fleeing of the ignorant man-slayer thither is most remarkable, and is this. _And this is the case of the slayer, which shall flee thither, that he may live: whoso killeth his neighbour ignorantly, whom he hated not in times past, as when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroak with the ax to cut down the tree, and the head slipeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die, he shall flee unto one of those Cities, and live._ And was not the action of _Josephs_ brethren, sin and sinful in selling of him to the Ismaelites, and yet he acknowledgeth, _that God sent him before them to preserve life_. So that God brought good forth of evil, and doth order even the sins of the wicked to just and good ends by his Divine Providence. Again: _The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord_. So when the Men in the Ship with _Jonah_ did cast lots, by the Lords disposing _the lot fell upon Jonah_ who was justly guilty, and so by providence pointed out. 3. That God doth govern all things to his own glory is manifest by these Texts: _The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil_. And, _what if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory?_ And that he governeth all things for the Salvation of his elect, is plain: _And we know that all things work together for good, to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose_. So that if God be for the Elect, who can be against them? 4. That God doth govern all things most freely is clear, because he is omnipotent and supream, and there is no power that can either impede, or constrain him, _For he hath done whatsoever he would, both in Heaven and Earth_. And the Apostle saith; _I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth._ For _who hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world?_

[Sidenote: Gen. 37. 18, 19, 20, 26, 27.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 45. 5. & 50. 20.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 21. 1.]

[Sidenote: Exod. 7. 3.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 9. 16, 17.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 17.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 105. 25.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 8. 14.]

[Sidenote: Matth. 4. 1.]

[Sidenote: Mark 1. 12.]

[Sidenote: Luke 4. 1.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 9. 27.]

[Sidenote: 2 Sam. 24. 1.]

[Sidenote: 1 Chron. 21. 1.]

[Sidenote: 1 Kings 22. 22.]

[Sidenote: Judges 9. 23, 56, 57.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 81. 11, 12.]

[Sidenote: Acts 14. 16.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 1. 24.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 20. 6.]