Part 27

1. If we consider natural Fascination was by the Philosophers and Poets only taken to be contagious steams flowing from the eyes, or breaths of malevolent and envious persons, that had some infectious diseases, as we see in the Plague, Small-pox, _Lues Venerea_, soreness of Eyes, Tinea’s, and the like, which are contagious to others that lie with them, or converse near them, the infected atomes or steams issuing in a certain Sphear of activity, are received by the pores, or mouths of the sound persons, by which they come to be infected also. And this the Poet witnessed: _Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos_. Now this being the common opinion, the Apostle taketh the metaphor from thence, as who should say, who with their virulent and poysonous opinions have infected you, that you should not obey the truth. And this is the genuine meaning of that metaphorical phrase, and no other sense can rationally and congruously be put upon the place, and this conduceth nothing to that opinion of Witchcraft that we oppose. For _Philosophica seu Physica fascinatio non nisi impropriè dici potest fascinatio, propriè verò est contagio, seu infectio_. And therefore did the learned _Vallesius_ to the same purpose speak this. _Sed neq; si quis pestilenti affectus febri, aut etiam sine febre deferens secum seminaria pestis alium intuens intuentem inficiat, dicetur fascinasse, sed peste affecisse._

[Sidenote: _Vid. Jo. Lazar. Guttier. de fascino._]

2. Some of the fathers (which may be offered for an objection) do seem to hold that S. _Paul_ here meant of diabolical fascination, and so _Tertullian_ in English thus: For there is also something amongst the Gentiles to be feared, which they call fascination, being a more unfortunate event of praise, and great glory: this we sometimes interpret of the Devil. And S. _Hierome_ saith upon this place: Fascination is when some things by Magical illusions are shewed to the eyes of Men, otherwise than they are. Also Fascination is vulgarly called that, which doth hurt Children, for the eyes of certain persons are said to burn with looking, and this act of theirs is called Fascination, and it may be that the Devils are subservient to this Sin. And _Thomas Aquinas_ saith: And this also may be done by Devils, who have power of moving false imaginations, and bringing them to the principles of the Senses, by changing the Senses themselves. From whence we may note these things. 1. That _Tertullian_ saith that they sometimes interpret this of the Devil, but how truly or upon what grounds he sheweth not, and it seemeth that sometimes they did interpret it of something else, for so his words must needs imply. 2. Secondly, S. _Hierome_ sometime calleth fascination Magical illusions, and sometime that which doth hurt Children, by the burning of some eyes; and then comes in with a may be that the Devils are subservient to this sin. So that he is not certain in his opinion, nor truly knows what fascination is, but according to vulgar opinion, or blind conjectures. 3. And all that the Angelical Doctor saith, doth but amount to the delusion of the Senses, by false imaginations, so that here is no proof either of the Devil, or his instruments, to cause any real fascination.

[Sidenote: _Vid. Guttier. passim._]

[Sidenote: _Galen. de Incantat._]

3. Those that hold that _Paul_ did allude unto natural, or diabolick fascination, do but mean magical illusions, whereby the senses are abused and deceived, to take things to be that which really they are not, and so are but cheating Incantations and delusory Juglings, for as _Galen_ (if that piece be truly his) saith: _Incantationes verba sunt decipientia rationales animas secundum spei inceptionem, aut secundum timoris incisionem_. So that though S. _Paul_ had taken the metaphor from that which was commonly accounted fascination, there is no necessity, that therefore the metaphor must in all points be true: it is sufficient that the common opinion was so, from whose usage of such terms the Apostle useth the word, to fascinate, or inchant. And of this opinion was S. _Hierome_ himself who saith thus much: _Dignè Paulum, qui etsi imperitus est sermone non tamen & scientia, debemus exponere non quod scierit esse fascinum, qui vulgò putatur nocere, sed usus sermone sit trivii, & ut in cætero, ita & in hoc quoq; loco verbum quotidianæ sermocinationis assumpserit_. So that from hence it is most evident, that the using of the word fascination by the Apostle, doth not inferr the being of the thing, but only the opinion of the vulgar, that believed things that were not. And of the same judgment is _Thomas Aquinas_ in these words: _Propriè dicit Apostolus, quis vos fascinavit? quasi dicat, vos estis sicut homo ludificatus qui res manifestas aliter accipit quàm sint in rei veritate_. Therefore we shall conclude this point with the sentiment of S. _Hierome_: _Nunc illud in causa est, quod ex opinione vulgi sumptum putamus exemplum, ut quomodo tenera ætas noceri dicitur fascino, sic etiam Galatæ in Christi fide nuper nati, & nutriti lacte, & solido cibo velut quodam fascinante sunt nociti_.

[Sidenote: _Vid. Valles. de sacr. Philosoph._]

[Sidenote: _Galen_ _l._ 8. _de compos. medic._]

4. But howsoever fascination might be understood, yet it is plain, that except the _Effluvia_ or steams of Bodies that had contagious diseases, entring into other sound Bodies, and thereby infecting them with their noysome vapours, or Atomes, there is nothing, but what was vain belief and credulous superstition, as the learned _Vallesius_ tells us in these words, thus rendered in English: “But if this be the way or reason of fascination, any one may easily understand, that fascination is a certain superstitious fear, arising from foolish credulity, of which sort are many other things in the life of Man, as for argument, that this opinion is more approved of by Women than by Men, and far more of the unlearned than of the learned. Although (he saith) I also see that there are those amongst the learned that are rather lovers of subtilty than verity, who take care to defend those things that the vulgar do admire. By which they would be accounted judicious magical Juglers, and Men skilful of secrets.” And therefore he thus concludeth: “Therefore the name of fascination is ancient, and according to the ancient signification, it doth not signifie any natural disease, but a vain superstition, arising from vulgar opinion, and therefore neither _Hippocrates_, nor _Galen_, nor any of the ancient Physicians, that I know of do mention fascination, neither amongst the differences nor causes of Diseases. From whence again is taken no small argument of its vanity.” Therefore we shall conclude this point with that remarkable saying of _Galen_. “_Falsæ etenim opiniones animas hominum præoccupantes, non solum surdos, sed & cæcos faciunt, ita ut videre nequeant, quæ aliis conspicua apparent._”

5. The Angelical Doctor with the consent of the most part of all the learned do affirm that the Devil by his own power cannot change corporeal matter, unless he apply proportionate actives to fit passives, to produce those effects he intendeth; As for instance, he can cause burning, because there is a combustive agent in nature; but if that were awanting, or if there were no combustible matter, how should he cause any ignition? But if he be supposed to work diabolical fascination, for which there is no agent in nature, it being but an imaginary thing in the heads of the deluded vulgar; then it will necessarily follow, that he can work no fascination at all, and so the whole opinion of the Witchmongers falls to the ground. For it is manifest that there is contagion, by the infected _Effluvia_ or steams issuing from a diseased Body to another by which it may be contaminated, but otherwise there is no natural fascination, nor any agent in nature to produce that effect, and therefore there can be no Diabolical fascination at all.

CHAP. IX.

_Of Divine permission, providence and prescience._

There is no one thing that hath more promoted this false and wicked Tenent of a kind of omnipotency in Devils, and the exorbitant power ascribed to Witches, than the misunderstanding of the true and right Doctrine of Divine Providence, and the admitting of a bare permission in God as different and distinct from his providence. From whence it cometh to pass that not only the vulgar, but such as tread in the steps of _Arminius_, do hold a meer bare permission, and that God sits as a quiet beholder by his Prescience from the event of things to see what will be effected by Devils and wicked Men, who in the mean time run and rove about, acting what, when and how they please, and that God hath neither hook in their nostrils, nor bridle in their mouths, neither keeps them in any restraint, order or government, and so we must needs have a mad rule in this World, during this permission and naked inspection.

But that we may proceed in such order, as may be clear and intelligible to the Readers, we shall here propose the state of the matter that we undertake to confute, which is this: That there is not in God a nude, passive permission, separate from the positive and active decree, order and will of his Divine Providence and Government, but that he doth rule all things according to the power and determination of his own positive and actual will. And this we shall prosecute in this following order and particulars.

Those that deny that there is in God a passive permission separate from his decretive and actual will in his providence are accused by others, thereby to infer the absurdity, that God is the author or efficient cause of sin; which pretended absurdity, in truth and reason cannot be any, because it is a simple and absolute impossibility, that God should be the author of sin as these arguments do sufficiently testifie.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 1._]

[Sidenote: James 1. 13.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 5. 4.]

[Sidenote: Deut. 32. 3.]

1. That of necessity must be false, which the Scriptures do declare to be so, in open and plain terms. But that God should be the author of sin or evil, the Scriptures do deny in open and plain terms, as where the Text saith: _God cannot be tempted with evil_: where both the act, and the possibility of it is absolutely denied. Again: _For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee_. Therefore it is false that God is, or can be the author of sin; and so by consequence the supposed absurdity is a meer impossibility; and an absurdity urged that is impossible, is most of all absurd.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 2._]

2. He is _ens summè perfectum, & quicquid est in Deo, est Deus_; but sin howsoever understood, or accepted, is an imperfection, defect and an aberration from a just and perfect rule, and therefore it is simply impossible that God can be the cause of any thing that is imperfect, sinful or evil, if sin be considered as _malum culpæ_.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 3._]

[Sidenote: Rom. 4. 15.]

3. God is not under any binding law given to him by some other, for then he should cease to be supream, independent and omnipotent: Now to whom there is no law given to observe, there can be no transgression, for the Apostle saith, _where there is no law, there is no transgression_; and therefore it is simply impossible that God should be the author, or causer of sin, or evil, because there is no law that he can transgress against.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 4._]

[Sidenote: _De Civitat. Dei_, _l._ 2. _c._ 7.]

4. God prohibiteth and hateth sin, as the Scriptures do every where testifie, but God is the cause of nothing but that which he loveth, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil of sin. And to speak properly sin hath no efficient cause, but a deficient, such as is the will of faln Angels, and wicked Men, whose irregularity of will, from the command of God, is all the cause that sin and evil hath or can have. An efficient cause is only of those things that are good, because every efficient cause doth by working put something in being: But privations (of which sort are sins) do put nothing in being, but do truly note the absence of beings. Therefore did S. _Augustine_ say well: _Mali causa efficiens nulla est, sed tantùm deficiens_.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 5._]

[Sidenote: Gen. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: John 8. 44.]

[Sidenote: 1 John 3. 8.]

5. That which properly hath an efficient cause, hath also an end properly so called: But sin hath not an end properly so called, because the end is being, and therefore good, and the perfection of the thing. But the Scripture doth declare that _all things that God created were exceeding good_; and that the cause of sin was Man, and the Devil; for the text saith, that _the Devil was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth_: And again, _He that committeth sin, is of the Devil, for the Devil sinneth from the beginning_. Therefore from hence it is clear, that God neither is nor can be the author or causer of sin.

[Sidenote: _Argum. 6._]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Schar. de miser. hom. stat. sub peccato_, _c._ 3.]

[Sidenote: _Fulgent._ _lib._ 1. _ad Monim_]

6. That which God is the author of, doth not make Man worse. but sin doth make Man worse, therefore God is not the author of it. And all sin is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth incline all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he turn them from himself, because he is _summum bonum_. And further as _Fulgentius_ saith: _Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor._ And therefore we conclude, that this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible that God should be the author or causer of sin.

[Sidenote: Job 13. 7.]

This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought to remember the argument of _Job_, which is this: _will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him?_ For as we ought not to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.

Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.

1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before the Creation.

[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: Job 34. 14, 15.]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Chrysost. in Loc._]

[Sidenote: Psal. 104. 19.]

[Sidenote: Verse 9.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 107. 25.]

[Sidenote: Job 38. 11.]

[Sidenote: Jerem. 5. 22.]

[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _l._ 1. _c._ 2. _p._ 165.]

[Sidenote: Isai. 38. 8.]

[Sidenote: Exod. 14. 21, 22, 23.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ _v._ 17.]

[Sidenote: Jonah 1. 4.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 2. 10.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 119. 91.]

[Sidenote: _Greg._ 16. _mor._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _Thom. de Christ. Religion._ 133.]

[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _p._ 171.]

2. It is as improper to attribute permission unto God in respect of the Physical agency of second causes, because he not only worketh all in all, and by his Divine concourse and conservative power _sustaineth all things by the word of his power_, and _Job_ tells us: _If he gather unto himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again into dust_. Upon which place of the _Hebrews_ S. _Chrysostome_ saith thus: _Feratq; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet omnia. Siquidem cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex nullis extantibus rerum essentiæ productæ sunt: in continendo verò, ea quæ facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Hæc ergo dum reguntur, & ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum & valdè mirabile, plurimæq; virtutis judicium declaratur_: But also because he hath set all natural things their bounds, and ordered, decreed and determined their ends in acting. Now what he hath appointed, ordered and decreed to be the agency of every creature, and determinated its end in acting, cannot properly be called permission, but his will, ordination and providence. As if one should say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and Moon to run their course, it is an improper expression and injurious to his wisdom and power in his providential government of the creatures, seeing that it is a certain truth, _Deus operatur in omni operante_: And _he hath appointed the Moon for seasons, and the sun knoweth his going down_. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow, when he hath _set it a bound that it cannot pass over. For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further: And here shall thy proud waves be staid._ And again, _Will ye not tremble at my presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they roar, yet can they not pass over it_. And therefore we may conclude that the whole Creation in respect of Physical agency is ruled according to those orders, and not by a fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1. For first all creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections and properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden, sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of his mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation, which if it should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would fall into that nothing, from whence his Eternal and Omnipotent _Fiat_ did raise and call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profound _Bradwardine_, _Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata_. 3. When he pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and agency of natural causes, as in making the Sun stand still in the victory of _Joshua_, and of the three Children in the fiery Furnace. Sometimes he causeth them to act contrary to their innate powers and qualities, as in _making the shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz sun-dial_: and in causing _the waters of the red sea_, contrary to their natures, which are to tend downwards, _to be divided, and to go backward, and to be as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, until Moses, and the children of Israel were passed through._ And by many other wayes and means doth he alter and change the course of natural agents, to serve his will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his justice, and yet here is no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these he ordereth all the particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient unto his will: So when _Jonah_ fled to _Tarshish_, _the Lord sent forth a great wind into the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake Jonah_; and when he was cast into the Sea, _the Lord prepared a great fish to swallow him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited up Jonah upon the dry land_. Now the wind was not carried nor the storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of the Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by chance or permission, but God in his merciful providence had prepared him for the preservation of _Jonah_, and caused him to be vomited on the dry land; so that all creatures do not only continue according to his ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational creatures do praise the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and providence. And lest we be either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or to be single in this opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S. _Gregory_ (as he is quoted by learned _Bradwardine_) tells us thus much: _Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic adest singulis, ut simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaq; exteriora circundat, ut interiora impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora circundet; sic summa regit, ut ima non deserat; sic imis præsens est, ut à superioribus non recedat_. And _Thomas Aquinas_ their great Schoolman (as the same author cites him) saith: _Quòd Deus immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione quodammodò immediatè se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causæ mediæ agunt in virtute causæ primæ, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, & omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti_. Therefore we will conclude this with that of S. _Augustine_: _Proculdubio nullus est locùs ab ejus præsentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè præsidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute, quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus, intra omnia, sed non conclusus._ And these places need no fiction of an Hebraism to expound them, nor no device of a verb of an active termination, and a permissive signification to evade the pressure of this truth. And therefore in respect of Physical agency we are bold with _Bradwardine_ to assert these three Corollaries.

1. _Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo._

2. _Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus per se & immediate facit illud idem._

3. _Quod nulla res potest facere aliquid, nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente._

[Sidenote: Amos 3. 6.]