Part 1140

[Early then] united to his own corps General John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. … By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused some concern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing among the different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this place he found that he was being followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without shelter or food. … This second irruption of Early and his ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. … Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander. … On the evening of August 1, I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day received instructions from General Halleck, to report to General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."

_P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 23._

ALSO IN: _G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 4-6._

_F. Sigel, Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

{3536}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia). The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.

"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion. … The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brigadier-General Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. … Several minutes passed—precious, fatal minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. … A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000."

_H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, pages 590-591._

ALSO IN: _W. H. Powell and others, The Battle of the Petersburg Crater (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_A. Woodbury, Burnside and the 9th Army Corps, part 4, chapter 5._

_A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865, chapter 9._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d Session: volume 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia). The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road. Battle of Reams's Station. The Dutch Gap Canal.

"Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and heavily fell upon his flank. … Warren held the ground he had gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners." The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made, was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of 1,200 men. "In his entire movement for the possession of the road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men. He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory [August 21], Hancock, who … had been called from the north bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station, and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's," and was attacked there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was forced back to a rear line, "where the troops had been rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon road. … For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing armies. … A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's Island. {3537} By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the National war vessels, by which they might flank several important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth of water never being secured during the war, though the canal has been brought into use since.

_B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the Civil War, volume 3, chapter 13._

ALSO IN: _P. S. Michie, Dutch Gap Canal (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 575)._

_O. B. Willcox, Actions on the Weldon Railroad (Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 568)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama). The Battle of Mobile Bay. Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.

"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile was now the principal port in the possession of the Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on; winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. … This force consisted of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only paddle-wheel gun-boats … while the fourth was the iron-clad ram Tennessee … the most formidable vessel that the Confederates had ever built. … The City of Mobile lies at the head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies between a long sandspit … and a shoal. … The ship-channel between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. … In addition to the land and naval defences, additional protection had been given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his fleet. The ships were gradually assembled toward the latter part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. … At six o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging, after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. … Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. … Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor] fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee, passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. … From the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others. At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest height. … 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!' came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's place in the rigging. {3538} In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dashing with the Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier. Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead, followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. … No sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly entered the bay, the Confederate ram … came charging down the whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter, with the Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame, she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay served every purpose of the Federal Government."

_J. R. Soley, The Sailor Boys of '61, chapter 13._

"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. … The losses in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in the forts is unknown."

_Loyal Farragut, Life of David Glasgow Farragut, chapter 27._

ALSO IN: _J. O. Kinney and J. D. Johnston; Farragut at Mobile Bay, and The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay, (Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (The Navy in the Civil War, volume 3), chapter 8._

_A. T. Mahan, Admiral Farragut, chapter 10._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August-October: Virginia). Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley. Winchester. Fisher's Hill. Cedar Creek. The famous Ride.