Part 1139

From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman, "to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far from our base, and that when the right moment should come he would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident, and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array, repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June 27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the 4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. … We had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food, ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000 animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had to go. … We feigned to the right, but crossed the Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek, prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known to us to be a 'fighter' … and I confess I was pleased at this change. … I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country, but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the 20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps (Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,499 to ours of 8,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts, but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard), from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when, on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d, sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our 700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor, General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive. Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies, because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro') on the railroad 20 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864. The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings of the best masters of the 'science of war' of which I had knowledge. … But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war, and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies, independent of the railroads."

_W. T. Sherman and others, Atlanta (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

ALSO IN: _W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapters 15-18 (volume 2)._

_J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9), chapters 7-16._

_C. C. Chesney, The Atlanta Campaign (Fort. Rev., Nov. 1895)._

_J. E. Johnston, Narrative, chapters 9-11._

_Official Records, series 1, volume 38._

_J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapters 12-13._

{3533}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-November). The Twentieth Presidential Election. Renomination and Re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

"Preparations for the nomination of candidates had begun to be made, as usual, early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the political party by which he had been nominated and elected four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his inability to recognize their claims to office. The most violent opposition came from those who had been most persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort. At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and strength by bringing forward the Honorable S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National Committee of the Union Republican party had called their convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June." Those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's nomination issued a call for a convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May. The Cleveland Convention, attended by about 150 persons, put in nomination General John C. Fremont, for President, and General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice President. "General Fremont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th. Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. … He intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate anyone but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a union of all upon the nominee. … The Convention, the nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the popular feeling [and Fremont withdrew his candidacy in September]. … The next form which the effort to prevent Mr. Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively checked by General Grant, himself. The Convention at Baltimore, when it assembled on the 8th of June, showed no hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reelection, and it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its candidate for Vice President. The National Convention of the Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29th, The second resolution which it adopted in its platform declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war … justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." On this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for President, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for Vice President, the opponents of the war went to the country in the election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."

_H. J. Raymond, Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 18._

The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan, 1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was 116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.

_E. Stanwood, History of Presidential Elections, chapter 21._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.

At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the 6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27 to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a law.

_H. Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, volume 3, chapter 29._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). Revenue Measures. The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June). The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia). Grant's movement to the south of James River. The Siege of Petersburg.

"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness was becoming general among the people, which the government in vain pretended not to notice. … Public opinion, shaken in its confidence, already began to listen to the sinister interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last half of June, it learned that the lieutenant: general had boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. … This passage of the James was … a very fine movement, as ably executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new phase in the campaign. … Henceforth, the battering not having produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the resources of military science, and give precedence to strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that the latter did not recognize the character of the movement until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.) reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose. {3534} At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad. The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W. F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness, he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock, in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon, the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown, after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning, a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance. In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side, amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on the right, bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where the new base of supplies of the army was naturally established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves across a part of the enemy's communications with the South, and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these, the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources. If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point towards which all the operations of the siege were directed for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded, Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."

_R. de Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, chapter 28._

ALSO IN: _F. A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, chapters 19-23._

_U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter 56 (volume 2)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 40._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July). The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.

"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work [Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders (the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise confidentially assured that the two former had full powers from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they should be accepted or rejected. … The 'Plan of Adjustment,' which he suggested that the President might advantageously offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition of slavery, with $400,000,000 paid in compensation to the slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses. "The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question. He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment … it was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was, in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of adjustment und peace. … The whole matter thus terminated in failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the opposition. … Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaques, 73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies for the purpose. {3535} Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar, earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief presented his ultimatum in these terms: … The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will have'. … Thus it was not only incontestably settled but proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens, that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be recognized as an independent power, or till it should be utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was worth more than a victory to the National cause."

_H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 2, chapter 30._

ALSO IN: _E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, pages 301-307._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland.) Early in the Shenandoah Valley. His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.

"… [General Jubal Anderson] Early had forced Hunter into the Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could not again be threatened from that direction;

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).