Part 1138

Sherman now held command of the three armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, having McPherson, Thomas and Schofield for their subordinate commanders, respectively. The main army of the rebellion in the West, Joe Johnston commanding, was at Dalton, northern Georgia, confronting Thomas at Chattanooga. "Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert. While the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond, his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta. And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to Mobile and thence move towards and join hands with the Western armies. Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example. Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to be carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past; comforts to be forgotten. War's stern reality was to be each one's lot. Probably no officer in such high command ever lived so entirely from hand to mouth as did Sherman and his military family during the succeeding campaigns. The entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861. Spring was to open with a general advance. It was agreed to put and keep the Confederates on the defensive by a policy of constant hammering. Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr. Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander of the Department, had personally undertaken to hold head against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither the President's good will nor that of his new adviser, militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign. Sherman's forces occupied a front sixteen miles in advance of Ringgold, just south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee was on his right with 25,000 men and 100 guns. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland held the centre with 60,000 men and 130 guns. Schofield and the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was 15,000 men and 30 guns. This grand total of 100,000 men and 260 guns formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in their leader was unbounded. Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine character, as well as his judgment as to what the existing conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited. Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army, Johnston had some 75,000 men. … He intrenched every step he took; he fought only when attacked; he invited battle only when the conditions were largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise beyond his critics he could be. Sherman took the measure of the intrenchments at Dalton with care, and, though he outnumbered his antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such odds when he might force one on better ground. This conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the latter first met his opponent at this same moment in Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions to capture the town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a general advance was made upon the Confederate lines, and after tactical manœuvring of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston concluded to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had strangely failed to seize Resaca, though an excellent chance had offered, and at this place the Confederate army took up its new stand. … Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the Oostanaula. From this position he operated by unintermitted tapping upon Johnston's defences at constantly varying points, without, however, bringing on a general engagement [though the losses were 2,747 Union and 2,800 Confederate]. … Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied indefinitely in details, consisted, as will be seen, in forcing the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, while with the right and left he operated upon either flank as chance or ground best offered. Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at Adairsville, twenty miles south of Resaca, but shortly withdrew to Kingston and Cassville. Each captain manœuvred for a chance to fight the other at a disadvantage. … From Cassville, Johnston retired across the Etowah. So far this campaign had been one of manœuvres. Neither combatant had suffered material loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold. … The Union army was growing skillful. Local difficulties multiplied many fold by bad maps and hostile population were overcome in considerable measure by an able corps of topographical engineers. … Bridges were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the retreating Confederates. To save delays in rebuilding, so far as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always followed hard upon the heels of the army."

_T. A. Dodge, Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War, chapters 42-43._

ALSO IN: _W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 15 (volume 2)._

_T. B. Van Horn, History of the Army of the Cumberland, chapters 25-28 (volume 2)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 38, part 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia). Grant's Movement upon Richmond: The Battle of Cold Harbor.

"The passage of [the Pamunkey] had been completed on May 28, and then, after three days of marching, interspersed with the usual amount of fighting, the army found itself again confronted by Lee's main line on the Totopotomoy. The operations which followed were known as the battle of Cold Harbor. On the afternoon of May 31st, Sheridan, who was on the left flank of the army, carried, with his cavalry, a position near the old well and cross roads known as Old Cold Harbor, and, with his men dismounted behind rough breast-works, held it against Fitzhugh Lee until night. To this point, during the night, marched the van·guard of the Army of the Potomac. … About 9 the next day (June 1st) the head of the column reached Sheridan's position, and the cavalry was withdrawn. {3529} The enemy, who had been seriously threatening Sheridan, withdrew from our immediate front within their lines and awaited us, occupying a strong outer line of intrenchments in front of our center, somewhat in advance of their main position, which included that on which the battle of Gaines' Mill had been fought two years before. It covered the approaches to the Chickahominy, which was the last formidable obstacle we had to meet before standing in front of the permanent works of Richmond. A large detachment, composed of the Eighteenth Corps and other troops from the Army of the James, under General W. F. Smith, had disembarked at White House on the Pamunkey, and was expected to connect that morning with the Sixth Corps at Cold Harbor. A mistake in orders caused an unnecessary march and long delay. In the afternoon, however, Smith was in position on the right of the Sixth Corps. Late in the afternoon both corps assaulted. The attack was made vigorously and with no reserves. The outer line in front of the right of the Sixth and the left of the Eighteenth was carried brilliantly, and the enemy was forced back, leaving several hundred prisoners in our hands. … This left the well and the old tavern at Cold Harbor in our rear, and brought us in front of the most formidable position yet held by the enemy. In front of him was a wooded country, interspersed with clearings here and there, sparsely populated, and full of swamps. Before daylight the Army of the Potomac stood together once more almost within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on the very ground where, under McClellan, they had defended the passage of the river they were now endeavoring to force. On the 2d of June our confronting line, on which the burden of the day must necessarily fall, consisted of Hancock on the left, Wright in the center, and Smith on the right. Warren and Burnside were still farther to the right, their lines refused, or drawn back, in the neighborhood of Bethesda Church, but not confronting the enemy. … No reconnoissance had been made other than the bloody one of the evening before. Everyone felt that this was to be the final struggle. No further flanking marches were possible. Richmond was dead in front. No further wheeling of corps from right to left by the rear; no further dusty marches possible on that line, even 'if it took all summer.' The general attack was fixed for the afternoon of the 2d, and all preparations had been made, when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until half-past four the following morning. Promptly at the hour named on the 3d of June the men moved from the slight cover of the rifle-pits, thrown up during the night, with steady, determined advance, and there rang out suddenly on the summer air such a crash of artillery and musketry as is seldom heard in war. No great portion of the advance could be seen from any particular point, but those of the three corps that passed through the clearings were feeling the fire terribly. Not much return was made at first from our infantry, although the fire of our batteries was incessant. The time of actual advance was not over eight minutes. In that little period more men fell bleeding as they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the war. A strange and terrible feature of this battle was that as the three gallant corps moved on [necessarily diverging, the enemy's line forming an arc of a circle, with its concave side toward them] each was enfiladed while receiving the full force of the enemy's direct fire in front. … At some points the slashings and obstructions in the enemy's front were reached. Barlow, of Hancock's corps, drove the enemy from an advanced position, but was himself driven out by the fire of their second line. R. O. Tyler's brigade (the Corcoran Legion) of the same corps swept over an advance work, capturing several hundred prisoners. One officer alone; the colonel of the 164th New York [James P. McMahon], seizing the colors of his regiment from the dying color-bearer as he fell, succeeded in reaching the parapet of the enemy's main works, where he planted his colors and fell dead near the ditch, bleeding from many wounds. Seven other colonels of Hancock's command died within those few minutes. No troops could stand against such a fire, and the order to lie down was given all along the line. At points where no shelter was afforded, the men were withdrawn to such cover as could be found, and the battle of Cold Harbor, as to its result at least, was over. … Shortly after midday came the order to suspend for the present all further operations, and directing corps commanders to intrench, 'including their advanced positions,' and directing also that reconnoissances be made, 'with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular approaches'. … When night came on the groans and moaning of the wounded, all our own, who were lying between the lines, were heart-rending. Some were brought in by volunteers from our intrenchments, but remained for three days uncared for beneath the hot summer suns and the unrefreshing dews of the sultry summer nights. … An impression prevails in the popular mind, and with some reason perhaps, that a commander who sends a flag of truce asking permission to bury his dead and bring in his wounded, has lost the field of battle. Hence the reluctance upon our part to ask a flag of truce. In effect it was done at last on the evening of the third day after the battle, when, for the most part, the wounded needed no further care and our dead had to be buried almost where they fell."

_M. T. McMahon, Cold Harbor (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

"According to the report of the Medical Director, Surgeon McParlin, the wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 3d of June numbered 4,517. The killed were at least 1,100. The wounded brought to the hospitals from the battle of the 1st of June were 2,125; the killed were not less than 500. The wounded on the 1st and 3d of June were, therefore, 6,642, and the killed not less than 1,600; but, adopting the number of killed and missing furnished General Badeau from the Adjutant General's office, 1,769 killed, 1,537 missing (many—most, indeed—of them, no doubt, killed), we have 8,411 for the killed and wounded, and for the total casualties, 9,948."

_A. A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865 (Campaigns of the Civil War), page 191._

"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. … At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. … This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared."

_U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapter. 55 (volume 2)._

_Official Records, Series 1, volume 36._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia). The Campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.

"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. … In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook, should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton."

_G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864 (Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 11), chapter 2._

"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond, as above], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley at that time was occupied only by a small force under General Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and behaved with distinguished gallantry. … After the battle of Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to reinforce Lee … in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General Sam Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W. E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in Southwestern Virginia. … Although greatly outnumbered, he [Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was defeated and killed. … After the fall of Jones, McCauslin opposed Hunter with gallantry and vigor, but his small force was no match for the greatly superior force against which he contended. The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force, with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond, and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who, with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station. After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated, and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat. [In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned back to rejoin Grant south of Richmond]. … This was one of the most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war. Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, was unable to comply with that part of his instructions which directed him to Charlottesville. He therefore continued his march up the Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's arrival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps (formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell), from Richmond on the 13th of June, had reached that city and was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid night-retreat."

_A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, chapter 18._

ALSO IN: _P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 1. chapter 21._

[Image: Map of the Atlanta Campaign. Page 331.]

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-September: Georgia). Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church. Kenesaw. Peach Tree Creek. The siege and capture of the city.