Part 1141

"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August, consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department] into one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His operations during that month and the fore part of September were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that officer expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened the communications of the other, and either could bring on a battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It is due to state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and 3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M., made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified heights: the Confederates … broke in confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine battle-flags. … After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack, while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the right. {3539} Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. … Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad, returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The desolution of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. … The army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column, "favored by a heavy fog … attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps … and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery (18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. … At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact line, and prepare either to resist further attack, or himself resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very inspiriting effect. General Wright had already brought order out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. … A counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. … A large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The refluent wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. … The retreat soon became a rout. … In the pursuit all the captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition, The captures included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. … With this defeat of Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to the main field of operations, at Petersburg.

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 12, part 8._

ALSO IN: _P. H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 1-4._

_G. E. Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, chapters 7-13._

_M. M. Granger, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

_W. Merritt, Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley._

_J. A. Early, Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek (Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_R. B. Irwin, History of the 19th Army Corps, chapters 33-34._

_H. C. King, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Personal Recollections of the War: New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia) Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants. Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea. Hood's Raid to the rear.

"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. … The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. … Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government.' … This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city, he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses. … My military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. … War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. … You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was arranged, during which "446 families were moved south, comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family."

_S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman and his Campaigns, chapter 18._

{3540}

"General Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia; and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Governor Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. … To allow their principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however the intention of the rebel authorities. … Something must be done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be irretrievably lost. … The whole army of General Hood, it was decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee river at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated from Nashville, and General Sherman, cut off from his primary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. … A week sufficed to complete General Hood's arrangements, and by the 2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth, effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two places. He also sent a division under General French to capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to replenish his commissariat. … General Sherman, … immediately upon hearing that General Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, … despatched General Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week he had sent General Thomas with troops to Nashville to look after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th corps, General Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity of holding the latter place, General Sherman at once communicated by signals instruction to General Corse at Rome to reënforce the small garrison and hold the defences until the main body of the Federal army could come to his assistance. Upon receiving the message General Corse placed 900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men, with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, General French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort, until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the enemy. … During the heat of the contest General Sherman reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly signalled to General Corse to hold out to the last. The announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's (4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000. The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced to a mere wreck by the [severe fire of the enemy, and all the Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Allatoona, which General Sherman immediately commenced to repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona, General Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome, and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. … General Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held by Colonel Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery. … No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be of no particular advantage to them. … Meanwhile the rebel army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on the 14th. … The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. … {3541} The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. … From Lafayette the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens, on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused for several days, receiving a few reënforcements brought up by General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the Confederate military division of the West. … General Hood still retained his special command, subject to the supervision or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville, which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the enemy's movements. … Whatever … might be the final result of Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. … In the light of subsequent events it would now appear that General Sherman, making only a show of following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The ill-advised plan of General Hood had given him the very opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail himself of it."

_W. J. Tenney, Military and Naval History in the United States, chapter 45. _

ALSO IN: _J. D. Cox, Atlanta (Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 9), chapter 17._

_W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, chapter 19 (volume 2)._

_T. B. Van Horne, Life of Major-General George H. Thomas, volume 2, chapter 12._

_J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, chapter 15._

_Official Records, 1st Series, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Admission of Nevada into the Union.

See NEVADA: A. D. 1848-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October). Report on secret disloyal associations in the North. Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.