Part 1109

In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been employed in the military or naval service against the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act."

_J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, page 342._

ALSO IN: _H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 1, pages 568-570._

_E. McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Rebellion, page 195._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August: North Carolina). The Hatteras expedition.

"General Wool relieved General Butler August 16th, 1861, of the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took its departure. … Not until the vessels were at sea were any but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great rendezvous for traders running the blockade. … Fort Hatteras was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous and narrow neck of land. … The secrecy and rapidity of preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat unprepared for the attack. … The bombardment opened Wednesday morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. … A heavy surf rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor, and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. … The bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor, but with little avail. … On the morning of the 29th, the cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a transport heavily laden with troops reenforced the fort, running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a white flag was slowly run to the peak. … Articles of capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota. Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615, who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they were in New York harbor. … The first design, it would appear, was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks, and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."

_O. J. Victor, History of the Southern Rebellion, volume 2, division 5, chapter 11._

ALSO IN: _D. Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast, chapter 8._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August-October: Missouri). Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of rebels and Lincoln's modification of it. The change of command.

"On the 31st of August, General Fremont [commanding in the West] issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal property of all persons in the state [Missouri] who should take up arms against the United States was declared confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold to their allegiance the border slave states which had not seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation, and so, man for man, indefinitely.' {3440} He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having his (the President's) approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves as were engaged in the rebel service. … General Fremont received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he labored, with communication with the government so difficult, and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the department under his command. As to the part of his proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong, and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and that such act be published at length with this order.' Before this order had been received, or on the day following its date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis, in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr. Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely out of respect to that act. … If he had believed that the time had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time, and he used it for his immediate purpose. … Complications in the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P. Blair, under whose personal and family influence General Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day. Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless, exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. … It was a very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom and justice. … Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their own differences. … General Fremont at length took the field in person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated, until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved of his command by the President not because of his proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved him simply because he believed that the interests of the country, all things considered, would be subserved by relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country: but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."

_J. G. Holland, Life of Abraham Lincoln, chapter 20._

ALSO IN: _J. C. Fremont, In Command in Missouri (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1), pages 278-288._

_W. Dorsheimer, Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri (Atlantic Monthly, volume 9, 1862)._

_Official Record, series 1, volume 3, pages 466-564._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August-December: West Virginia). Rosecrans against Lee. Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.

"When General McClellan was called [July 22] to take General McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000 men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General John B. Floyd … took up a position on the Gauley River for the purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee, marched southward with about 10,000 men and [September 10] attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about 2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily, Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd, finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed, but finally fell back again to the Gauley. When Rosecrans marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on Cheat Mountain."

_J. D. Champlin, Young Folks' History of the War for the Union, chapter 10._

{3441}

"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible, over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal commander [his main force at Elk Water] held the center summit of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined summits. … It was necessary first to carry this well-selected position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths, had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly see the Federal position, and reported his observations to General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance, accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and the strength of the position for himself. They reported to General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. … The movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered back to their former position. There had been only a small conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington, General Lee's aid-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H. F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade. … Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding failure of the whole movement. … This movement having failed, and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was the strongest and offered the best means for successful defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. … Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with te troops of Wise, Floyd, and Loring—about 8,000 men—occupied a position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days, Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation, were such that Lee decided not to pursue. … The rapid approach of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this section. … At the termination of this campaign of General Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined to support the Federal side. … It must be admitted that General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished military reputation. Great results had been expected from his presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged, and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."

_F. Lee, General Lee, chapter 6._

After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds' position, the former established himself in a fortified camp on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime, Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time, were at an end.

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 1, book 4, chapter 2._

ALSO IN: _V. A. Lewis, History of West Virginia, chapter 28._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (September-November: On the Mississippi). General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.

In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for a few weeks in Missouri, first as Colonel of the 21st Illinois Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by General Fremont to "the command of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On the 4th of September he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois, and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, he placed a couple of regiments of troops and a light battery on board of steamers: and occupied the place on the 6th,—telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only, and secured a command of the Tennessee, the importance of which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. {3442} I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men. … About the 1st of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders, General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some 3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans," says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. … The moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result was a rallying of the defeated rebels and a reinforcement from Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. … If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been culpable indeed."

_U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, chapters 19-20 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN: _A. Badeau, Military History of U. S. Grant, chapter 1._

_W. P. Johnston, Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, chapter 24._

_Official Records, series 1, volume 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia). Confederate project for the invasion of the North vetoed by Jefferson Davis.