Part 1108

At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more that 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. {3436} Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost."

_Brigadier General I. McDowell, Report (Official Records, series 1, volume 2, page 320)._

"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace, to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides prove that it was bravely disputed. … The rout—or, in other words, the panic— … was one of those accidents to which even victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses sustained by the two contending parties. … Its immediate effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates. Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was threatened anew. … But it was chiefly through its moral effect that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day, but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal to the Union in the Southern States. … This disaster, which might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a salutary lesson."

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, volume 1, book 3, chapter 2._

"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign and the battle with which it closed. The crowds of curious and impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the morning of the battle—a delay occasioned by a few baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear—the many ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting, in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to fill up the picture. … I believe the plan of this battle to have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these facts, successes would have been achieved but for the impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves—of the prodigies of valor performed by them—of their bayonet charges—of their heroic assaults—of the fearful destruction inflicted by them upon the enemy—and, finally, when the order to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,' as they were called, to cease fighting and commence retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was from that day never again known as a military organization. This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us that the rough element of our cities—the prize-fighter, the veteran of a score of street-fights—does not necessarily make the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom equalled by the rough element of our cities."

_General H. W. Slocum, Military Lessons taught by the War (Historical Magazine, February 1871)_.

"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances. … The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy. But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large proportion of these were not in call. {3437} Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and were in little better condition than the infantry. All who were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. … The fact that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active pursuit out of the question is established by the official reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' … The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes; for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was the lack of necessary transportation. … Even if the Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing. They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side, even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner. They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."

_R. M. Hughes, General Johnston, chapter 6._

ALSO IN: _W. T. Sherman, Memoirs, volume 1, chapter 8._

_J. G. Nicolay, Outbreak of the Rebellion, chapters 13-16._

_J. B. Fry and others, Campaign of the First Bull Run (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1)._

_J. E. Cook, Stonewall Jackson, part 1, chapter 12._

_A. Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, volume 1, chapter 9._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (JULY). Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.

The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of Congress passed July 22 and 25.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-September: Missouri). Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage. Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek. Siege of Lexington. Fremont in command.

The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from Booneville was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by General Sterling Price.

See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

"Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day, halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by a Union force 1,500 strong, under Colonel Franz Sigel, who had been dispatched from St. Louis by the 'Southwestern Pacific road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent a junction between Jackson and some forces which his Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to have started that morning with intent to find and fight the other; and such mutual intentions are seldom frustrated. Sigel found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This compelled Sigel to fall back. … The retreat was made in perfect order … to Carthage, and through that town to Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed, that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and Texas troops, under Generals Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31 wounded—not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150 wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to Springfield; where General Lyon, who had been delayed by lack of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th."

_H. Greeley, The American Conflict, volume 1, chapter 35._

"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at Springfield, hoping to receive reenforcements; but the battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to the command of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed 5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish occurred at Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had the advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's Creek]. But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on. It was executed without difficulty. {3438} In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721 wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be inferred from the determined character of the assault, the loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the 19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan. Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th, when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price, but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his Confederate troops."

_J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapter 47 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN: _T. L. Snead, The Fight for Missouri, chapters 11-14._

_J. Peckham, General Lyon and Missouri in 1861, book 4._

_J. C. Fremont, F. Sigel and others, Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War', volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-November). McClellan's rise to the chief command. Creation of the Army of the Potomac. Reorganization of the western armies.

"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' … General McClellan at once commenced the organization of the great army authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and appropriate military conduct were, for the most part, accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength of … 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list. … His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the President. This change in his position at once produced a change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West. He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. … In preparation for this, the Department of the West was reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter; (3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was magnificent, the roads excellent. … Winter at last came, and nothing had been done. … Considering the military condition of the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition was far from being too long. … From the resources furnished without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not use it on the battlefield. … There probably never was an army in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with what we waste.'"

_J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, chapters 44 and 49 (volume 2)._

"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than myself that, with the means at my command, that would have been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time. What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that orders could be reasonably well carried out. … In spite of all the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of it was wasted. {3439} The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly, saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and enabled the army to manœuvre freely and independently. … No other army we possessed could have met and defeated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac, it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in the camps around Washington."

_G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, chapter 6._

ALSO IN: _G. B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac._

_Prince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War, 37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part. 1._

_W. Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August). Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed in the service of the Rebellion.