Part 1110

"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than 110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least 100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources at the disposal of the United States Government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. … It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned 'the trade of the soldier,'—should have acquired familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend largely superior numbers, better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E. Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard … and G. W. Smith, … entirely concurred. They saw that something must be done to break up this constantly increasing Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30, 1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an equal degree of efficiency,—'seasoned soldiers' as distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. … It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many important respects. It had the prestige of victory. … We may fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North, undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a successful result for the Confederate arms."

_J. C. Ropes, The Story of the Civil War, chapter 10._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia). The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.

"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief, as follows: One of General Stone's officers, Captain Philbrick, of the 15th Massachusetts, thought that he had discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the 20th, General Stone at 10.30 P. M. of the same day issued his orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of the 21st. Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, was entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment. Colonel Lee, of the 20th Massachusetts, was directed to replace Colonel Devens in Harrison's island with four companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover Colonel Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to 'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if practicable, before returning.' … Having accomplished this duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these orders Colonel Devens crossed about midnight with five companies (instead of four), numbering about 300 men, and halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Colonel Lee with 100 men of the 20th Massachusetts, who halted here to cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to report to General Stone that he thought he could remain where he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and, after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was withdrawn to the position held by Colonel Lee; but, after again scouting the woods, Colonel Devens returned to his advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned from General Stone with orders for Colonel Devens to remain where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken place. Colonel Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again returned with the information that Colonel Baker [Senator Edward D. Baker, of California] would soon arrive with his brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Colonel Devens was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Learned with the remainder of the 15th. bringing up his command to 28 officers and 625 men. About midday Colonel Devens learned that the enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great danger of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he found Colonel Baker, who directed him to take the right of the position he proposed to occupy. … At about three o'clock the enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and Colonel Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that Colonel Baker had been killed. Colonel Coggswell then assumed command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."

_G. B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, chapter 11._

In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff (called the battle of Leesburg by the Confederates) a great wrong seems to have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff to the Khedive of Egypt.

_J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, volume 1, chapter 17._

ALSO IN: _R. B. Irwin, Ball's Bluff and the arrest of General Stone (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 2, pages 123-134)._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War, 37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October-December: South Carolina-Georgia). The Port Royal Expedition. Capture of Hilton Head. Extensive occupation of the coast. Savannah threatened.

"On the 29th of October, another and far stronger naval and military expedition [than that against the Hatteras forts] set forth from Hampton Roads, and, clearing the capes of Virginia, moved majestically southward. Genera] T. W. Sherman [not to be confused with General William T. Shennan of the Western armies] commanded the land forces, consisting of 13 volunteer regiments, forming three brigades, and numbering not less than 10,000 men; while the fleet—commanded by Commodore Samuel F. Du Pont—embraced the steam-frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 22 first-class and 12 smaller steamers, with 26 sailing vessels. After a stormy passage, in which several transports were disabled and four absolutely lost, Commodore Du Pont, in his flag-ship, came to off Port Royal, South Carolina, during the night of November 3d and 4th; and, after proper soundings and reconnoissances, which developed the existence of a new fort on either side of the entrance, the commodore brought his most effective vessels into action at 9 A. M., on Thursday, November 7th, taking the lead in his flagship, the Wabash—the gunboats to follow at intervals in due order. Thus the fighting portion of the fleet steamed slowly up the bay by the forts, receiving and returning the fire of the batteries on Bay Point as they passed up, and exchanging like compliments with the stronger fort on Hilton Head as they came down. Thus no vessel remained stationary under fire; so that the enemy were at no time enabled to gain, by experiment and observation, a perfect aim. The day was lovely; the spectacle magnificent; the fight spirited, but most unequal. {3444} Despite the general presumption that batteries, well manned and served, are superior to ships when not ironclad, the terrible rain of shot and shell upon the gunners in the Rebel forts soon proved beyond human endurance. … The battle … raged nearly five hours, with fearful carnage and devastation on the part of the Rebels, and very little on ours, when the overmatched Confederates, finding themselves slaughtered to no purpose, suddenly and unanimously took to flight. … The Rebel forts were fully manned by 1,700 South Carolinians, with a field battery of 500 more stationed not far distant. The negroes, save those who had been driven off by their masters, or shot while attempting to evade them, had stubbornly remained on the isles."

_H. Greeley, The American Conflict, chapter 36._

"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into South Carolina. … Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. … The occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St. Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah. At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. … A few days after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south," occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by turning Fort Pulaski. … At the end of the year, Dupont's fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena, Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those bays."

_Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America, book 4, chapter 3 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN: _C. B. Boynton, History of the Navy during the Rebellion, volume 1, chapter 26._

_D. Ammen, The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast, chapter 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (November). The Trent affair. Arrest of Mason and Slidell.

"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the United States Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H. B. M. [His Britannic Majesty] mail packet boat Trent, having on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren, then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this transaction became known to the British government, immediate preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than others, that a breach of international law had been committed by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."

_G. E. Baker, Biographical Memoir of William H. Seward (volume 5 of Seward's Works, pages 10-11)._

In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War," Secretary Seward wrote:

"November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. …

January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister, Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. … By the adjustment of the present case upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two countries from each other."

_W. H. Seward, To Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861 (Works, volume 5, Diplomatic History of the War, pages 308-309)._

ALSO IN: _M. Bernard, Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain, chapter 9._

_D. M. Fairfax, Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell (Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 135-142)._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia). Protracted inaction of McClellan. His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by the rebel evacuation of Centreville.