Part 52

The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good general. The most indispensible one, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nugatory. The next is a sound understanding with some genius; for he must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients; the third is health and a robust constitution.

“His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have an aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without betraying the slightest trace of his own intentions. He must be _seemingly_ communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; he must, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make a proper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line of military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and unhappy, by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment of the service, on account of mere rules and regulations. Great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession.

“In his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to peevishness, or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem to know, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be from among the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. For it is better, in instances of correction, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by orders of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence,) than that an idea should go forth in the army, of public justice being sacrificed to private sentiments.

“A modern general should always have before him the example of Manlius; he must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced himself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. With these qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure the affections of his followers, instil into their minds all the impulses of deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed.

“The resources of a general’s mind are as various as the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and chequered; he must be perfectly master of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and situations, how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy and confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as not to be forced to give, or receive battle in opposition to settled plans. When once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the relative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorable moments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready possession of which its ultimate success depends. These requisites are unquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations, and the chance medley of events that produce their necessity.

“A general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of battle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every feeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he must reconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye collects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality; and feels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of his troops, he must discover a perfect knowlege of his profession, and make all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. His orders of battle must be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, _the first line will attack! the second will support it! or such a battalion will advance and support the line_.

“The general officers that act under such a general, must be ignorant of their business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should be deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out directions according to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied, that every division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on the contrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become a drill serjeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case of the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel and foolishly imagined, that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its situation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eye rivetted to the immediate scene of action. He will by these means be enabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. The instant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any regard to personal safety, to advance against his enemy’s line. [By a ready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, general Desaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo.] It is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify, with accuracy, all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. Every thing depends upon variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermediate occurrences which no human foresight can positively ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a ready conception, and a prompt execution.

“Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, particularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes the essence of a military character.

“Many commanders in chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignement, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of columns. They have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their aids-de-camp, to send orders in various directions and to gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. They endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. They appear like men, whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten track, or are reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon exertions; and from whence continues the same sensible writer, do these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of these high qualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeat themselves. Many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments through a regular set of manœuvres; and having done so, they vainly imagine, that all the science of a real military man consists in that acquirement. When, in process of time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, and from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remain satisfied with doing what they have partially learned.

“Military knowlege, as far as it regards a general or commander in chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of rules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conception, that method may assist, but cannot give.

“If a man be not born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the situation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity.

“It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. Perfection in either art grows out of innate talents, but it never can be acquired without them. Study and perseverance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; those are the works of nature.

“It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see several very excellent colonels become indifferent generals. I have known others, who have distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their profession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. Should a man of this cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to mere dispositions and manœuvres; to them he will look for safety; and if once thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is not capable of other resources.

“In order to obviate in the best possible manner, the innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, but for the instruction of those who have the command of them. The principles to be observed, are: that when the line or the columns advance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenever a body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are made in the first line it becomes the duty of the second instantly to fill up the chasms.

“These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not require the least elucidation in writing. They constitute the A, B, C, of soldiers. Nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minutiæ. His functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy, to observe his movements, and to see with an eagle’s, or a king of Prussia’s eye, all the relative directions that his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy’s line in one quarter, whilst his real intention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans; to take advantage of the manifold openings, which his feints have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of plunging with effect, upon the weakest part, and of carrying the sword of death where its blows is certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these important and indispensible points, his judgment must be clear, his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day.

“I am not, however, an advocate for pitched battles, especially at the commencement of a war. _A skilful general might, I am persuaded, carry on a contest between two rival nations during the whole of his life, without being once obliged to come to a decisive action._ Nothing harrasses and eventually distresses an enemy so much as this species of warfare. He must, in fact, be frequently attacked, and by degrees, be broken and unnerved; so that in a short time he will not be able to shew himself.

“It must not generally be inferred from this opinion, that when an opportunity presents itself, whereby an enemy may be crushed at once, the attack should not be made, or that advantage should not be taken of the errors he may commit; all I mean to prove is, that war can be carried on without leaving any thing to chance; and in this consists the perfection and highest point of ability belonging to a general. But when a battle is risked, the triumphant party ought well to know all the advantages which may be derived from his victory. A wise general, indeed, will not remain satisfied in having made himself master of the mere field of battle. This, I am sorry to observe, is too often the custom; and, strange to say, that custom is not without its advocates.

“It is too much the practice of some governments, and as often the custom of generals, to follow the old proverb, which says, _that in order to gain your ends, you must make some sacrifices, and even facilitate the retreat of your enemy_. Nothing can be more impolitic or more absurd. An able surgeon might as well tamper with a mortification, and by endeavoring to save an useless limb, run the hazard of destroying all the vital parts.

“An enemy, on the contrary, ought to be vigorously pushed, harrassed night and day, and pursued through every winding he can make. By a conduct of this sort, the advancing army will drive him from all his holds and fastnesses, and the conclusion of his brilliant retreat, will ultimately turn out a complete and total overthrow. Ten thousand well trained and disciplined troops, that are sent forward from the main army, to hang upon the rear of a retiring enemy, will be able to destroy an army of an hundred thousand men, when that army has once been forced to make retrograde movements. A want of confidence in their generals, added to many other disheartening circumstances, will naturally possess the minds of the latter, while implicit faith and warm affection must influence the former. A first defeat well followed up, almost always terminates in a total rout, and finishes the contest. But some generals do not wish to bring war to a speedy issue. Public misfortunes too frequently produce private emoluments, and the accumulation of the latter is too endearing to suffer itself to be superseded by the former.”

In order to substantiate what he thus advances with much good sense, the Marshal cites the following particular instance, from among an infinity of others.

“When the French army, at the battle of Ramillies, was retiring in good order over an eminence that was rather confined, and on both sides of which there were deep ravines, the cavalry belonging to the allies followed its track leisurely, without even appearing to wish to harrass or attack its rear. The French continued their march with the same composure; retreating upon more than twenty lines, on account of the narrowness of the ground.

“On this occasion, a squadron of English horse got close to two French battalions, and began to fire upon them. The two battalions, naturally presuming that they were going to be attacked, came to the right about, and fired a volley at the squadron. What was the consequence? the whole of the French army took to its heels; the cavalry went off full gallop, and all the infantry, instead of patiently retiring over the heights, threw itself into the ravines in such dreadful disorder, that the ground above was almost instantly abandoned, and not a French soldier was seen upon it.

“Let any military man consider this notorious event, and then praise the regularity of a retreat and the prudent foresight of those who, after an enemy has been vanquished in the field, relax in their exertions, and give him time to breathe. I do not, however, pretend to maintain, that all the forces of a victorious army should be employed to follow up the pursuit; but I am decidedly of opinion, that large bodies should be detached for that purpose, and that the flying enemy should be annoyed as long as the day lasts. This must be done in good order. And let it be remembered, that when an enemy has once taken to his heels in real earnest, you may drive him before you by the mere noise of empty bladders.

“If the officer who is detached in pursuit of an enemy, begins to manœuvre after prescribed rules and regulations, and operate with slowness and precaution, he had better be recalled; for the sole purpose of his employment is to push on vigorously, to harrass and distress the foe. Every species of evolution will do on this occasion; if any can be defective, the regular system might prove so.

“I shall conclude these observations by saying, that all retreats depend wholly upon the talents and abilities of generals, who must themselves be governed by circumstances and situations; but I will venture to assert, that no retreat can eventually succeed, unless it be made before an enemy who acts with extreme caution; for if the latter follow up his first blow, the vanquished army must soon be thrown into utter confusion.”

These are the sentiments of Marshal Saxe, as far as they relate to the qualifications which the general of an army should indispensibly possess. And no man we are persuaded was better enabled to form an opinion on so important a subject; for as baron Espagnac has justly observed in his _Supplément aux Rêveries de ce Mar_, p. 166, he possessed uncommon courage, was fertile in expedients and resources; he knew how to distinguish and to make use of the abilities of individuals, was unshaken in his determinations; and when the good of the service required chastisement or severity, was not influenced by private feelings, or hurried away by a sanguinary temper; he was uncommonly attentive to his men, watchful of their health, and provident to supply their wants; sparing of their blood in the day of battle, and always inspiring them, by the liveliness of his mind, tempered by experience, with confidence and attachment to his measures. He knew the cast of each man’s character, particularly so of his officers; and whilst he directed the former with consummate knowlege and consequent success, he never lost sight of the merits of the latter, when they co-operated with his designs. If the natural vivacity of his mind sometimes led him into temporary neglect, good sense and a marked anxiety to be just, soon made amends for apparent slights, by rendering the most important services; he was ingenious and subtle in all his manœuvres before an enemy, skilful in his choice of camps, and equally intelligent in that of posts; he was plain in his instructions previous to an engagement, simple in his disposition of the order of battle; and he was never known to lose an opportunity, through the want of prompt decision, whereby a contest might be ended by a bold and daring evolution. When it appeared necessary to give weight to his orders, and to turn the balance of fortune by personal exposure, no man became less fearful of his own destiny, than Marshal Saxe. On these occasions he was daring to an extreme, heedless of danger, but full of judgment, and a calm presence of mind. Such, in our humble opinion, are the outlines of a _real_ general, how well they were exemplified and filled up by the subject of this article, time and the concurring testimony of events have proved.

GENERAL’S _Guard_. It was customary among the French, for the oldest regiment to give one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, two serjeants, and fifty privates, as a general’s guard. Whenever the marshals of France were on service under the immediate orders of the king, or of the princes belonging to the royal household, they always retained the rank of general.

GENERAL _d’armée_, _Fr._ the commander in chief of any army.

_Battre la_ GENERAL, _Fr._ to beat the general. See DRUM.

GENERAL _court-martial_. See COURTS MARTIAL.

GENERAL _formations_ of the battalion, are from line into column, and from column into line by echellon; to either flank, to the front, or on a line oblique to any given point front or rear.

GENERAL, is also used for a particular beat of the drum. See DRUM.

GENETTE, _Fr._ a particular sort of snaffle, which is used among the Turks; it resembles a large ring, and serves to confine the horse’s tongue.

GENIE, _Fr._ The art of engineering. It consists in a knowlege of lines so as to be able to trace out all that is requisite for the attack or defence of places, according to established rules in fortification. Marshal Vauban and the marquis of Louvois, have particularly distinguished themselves in this art.

GENIUS, in a military sense, a natural talent or disposition to every kind of warlike employment, more than any other; or the aptitude a man has received from nature to perform well, and easily, that which others can do but indifferently, and with a great deal of pains.

From the diversity of genius, the difference of inclination arises in men whom nature has had the precaution of leading to the employment for which she designs them, with more or less impetuosity, in proportion to the greater or lesser number of obstacles they have to surmount, in order to render themselves capable of answering this occasion. Thus the inclinations of men are so very different, because they follow the same mover, that is the impulse of their genius. This is what renders one officer more pleasing, even though he trespasses against the rules of war; while others are disagreeable notwithstanding their strict regularity.

GENOUILLIERE, _Fr._ the lower part of the embrasure of a battery. The genouilliere is about 2¹⁄₂ or 3 French feet high from the platform to the opening of the embrasure. It lies immediately under the arch of the fortification. Its thickness, which usually consists of fascines well put together, is of the same dimensions that merlons bear; namely from 18 to 22 feet. The term _genouilliere_ is derived from _genou_, signifying the knee, to the height of which it is generally raised.

GENS, _Fr._ a word in much desultory use among the French, signifying in a general acceptation of it, folks, people, servants, soldiers, &c.

GENS _d’armes_. See GENDARMES.

GENS _de guerre_, _Fr._ men attached to a military profession.

_Mes_ GENS, _Fr._ an affected phrase, which was formerly used among the French, to signify their servants or attendants. It seems to have been an arrogant and foolish imitation of _mon peuple_, my _people_. During the monarchy of France, this term was in much vogue at Paris, and was afterwards adopted by almost all the _petits maitres_, or coxcombs belonging to the church, state, and army.

GENS _de sac et de corde_, _Fr._ an opprobrious term which the French apply to men that deserve chastisement. In former times, the cord or rope, and the sack, were the common instruments and means of punishment. The ropes served to hang up malefactors: and the sack was used to contain their bodies when it was ordained that they should be thrown into a river.

GENS _de mer_, _Fr._ sea-faring men.

GENS _de l’équipage_, _Fr._ men belonging to the train of artillery.

GENT. _Fr._ Nation. It is only used in poetry, viz. _La gent, qui porte le Turban_. The Turkish Nation. In the plural number it is only accepted according to the following significations.

_Le droit des_ GENS, _Fr._ the rights of nations.

_Violer le droit des_ GENS, _Fr._ to infringe or violate the rights of nations.

_Respecter le droit des_ GENS, _Fr._ to respect the rights of nations.

_Un traité du troit des_ GENS, _Fr._ a treatise on the rights of nations.

The following phrases are in familiar use among the French, viz.

GENS _de marque_, _Fr._ men of distinction.

GENS _de condition_, _Fr._ men of condition.

GENS _d’honneur_, _Fr._ men of honor.

GENS _de qualité_, _Fr._ men of fashion, or quality.

GENS _de coeur_, _Fr._ men of spirit.

GENS _d’epée_, _Fr._ this term is used among the French, to distinguish officers, gentlemen, &c. who wear swords, from those who do not, particularly so in opposition to _gens de la robe_, or lawyers.

GENS _de main_, _Fr._ executive characters.

GENS _de service_, _Fr._ useful men, persons of exertions.

GENS _de pied_, _Fr._ The same as _fantassins_, foot soldiers, or men who serve on foot.

GENS _de cheval_, _Fr._ cavalry, or men who serve on horseback.