Part 1
WARS AND TREATIES
1815 to 1914
DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMACY
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BY
ARTHUR PONSONBY
“It is the completest statement of the case for the democratic control of foreign affairs which has been published, and contains a mass of facts whose value cannot be exaggerated. We owe Mr. Ponsonby a great debt for this work.”--_Labour Leader._
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REBELS AND REFORMERS
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BY
ARTHUR & DOROTHEA PONSONBY
Savonarola--William the Silent--Tycho Brahe--Cervantes--Giordano Bruno--Grotius--Voltaire--Hans Andersen--Mazzini--W. Lloyd Garrison--Thoreau--Tolstoy
“Mr. and Mrs. Ponsonby’s book is intended for children or for those who are too busy to read books in many volumes. But the interest of it lies not in the necessarily short and simple narratives giving the story rather than the ideas, although these are done clearly and with spirit, but in the reflections which lie about those stories and lodge here and there in the reader’s mind. Like all books worth reading this one is the outcome of a mass of judgments and beliefs which may be very briefly expressed in the work itself, but lend it the gift which in the case of human beings we call personality.”--_The Times Literary Supplement._
“The story of these twelve lives is told in these pages--and told with a most enticing simplicity and the happiest taste--in the hope of redressing the balance between men of action and men of thought, and of showing that this type of character and achievement can be made just as interesting to the young as the more conventional hero of the history book.... This book is more especially for the young, but it will be a delight also to grown-up readers.”--_The Nation._
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WARS & TREATIES
1815 to 1914
BY ARTHUR PONSONBY
LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1 NEW YORK THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
_First published_ _April 1918_
_Reprinted_ _June 1918_
_Third Edition, revised and enlarged_ _January 1919_
(_All rights reserved_)
CONTENTS
PAGE INTRODUCTION 7 YEAR 1821–1828 GREEK WAR 14
1828–1829 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 16
1830–1839 WAR BETWEEN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM 18
1830–1839 WAR IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN 20
1831 RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND 22
1832–1841 TURKO-EGYPTIAN WAR 24
1838–1842 FIRST AFGHAN WAR 26
1840–1842 OPIUM WAR IN CHINA 28
1846–1848 AMERICAN WAR WITH MEXICO 30
1848–1849 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN WAR 32
1831 } } 1848–1849 } } ITALIAN WAR OF LIBERATION 34 1859 } } 1866–1867 }
1854–1856 CRIMEAN WAR 36
1857–1858 INDIAN MUTINY 38
1857–1860 CHINESE WAR 40
1861–1865 AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 42
1862–1867 FRENCH EXPEDITION IN MEXICO 44
1864–1870 BRAZILIAN WAR 46
1864 DANISH WAR 48
1866 AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR 50
1867–1868 BRITISH EXPEDITION IN ABYSSINIA 52
1870–1871 FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 54
1873–1874 THE ASHANTI WAR 56
1877–1878 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 58
1878–1881 SECOND AFGHAN WAR 60
1879 ZULU WAR 62
1879–1882 THE CHILE-PERUVIAN WAR 64
1881 FRENCH EXPEDITION IN TUNIS 66
1882 EGYPTIAN WAR 68
1884–1885 FRANCO-CHINESE WAR 70
1823–1826 } } 1851 } BURMESE WARS 72 } 1885 }
1885 SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR 74
1894–1895 CHINO-JAPANESE WAR 76
1895–1896 ITALO-ABYSSINIAN WAR 78
1896–1898 WAR IN THE SOUDAN 80
1897 TURKO-GREEK WAR 82
1897–1898 SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 84
1881 } } THE BOER WARS 86 1899–1902 }
1899–1900 BOXER RISING IN CHINA 88
1904–1905 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 90
1911–1912 TURKO-ITALIAN WAR 92
1912–1913 FIRST BALKAN WAR 94
1913 SECOND BALKAN WAR 96
IMPORTANT TREATIES 98
INDEX OF TREATIES 102
BIBLIOGRAPHY 104
WARS AND TREATIES
1815–1914
INTRODUCTION
A growing number of people are devoting their attention to a closer study of foreign affairs. Many of them may not have the opportunity to read the larger volumes of histories; and, indeed, even if they had, they would find their choice of books very much restricted when they came to the more recent period of European and world history, although in the last year or so the gap has to some extent been filled up by several interesting studies of international politics in the nineteenth century. Some knowledge of this period is essential if we are to understand the full significance of the events of to-day, and if we are to form any helpful opinion of the course to be pursued in future.
Historians often take for granted that their readers already have some general knowledge of the groundwork of events and they build up their structure of criticism, their delineation of policy and tendencies, and their survey of international problems on the assumption that the scaffolding has been erected. But often it has not, and then history, more especially the complex tangle of international history, becomes difficult to grasp. It may therefore serve some useful purpose if a few poles of scaffolding representing the dates and outline of conflicts and agreements between nations can be supplied in a very brief and easily intelligible form, a presentment of the bare record of facts which may be useful for reference.
During the last hundred years war has been a more common occurrence in international intercourse than most people realize. The forty-two records of wars tabled in these pages do not cover the whole ground. They are the chief conflicts, or the conflicts fraught with the most serious consequences, but they are by no means the only occasions on which there was fighting in the world. Revolutions, unless they led to international war, are not mentioned, neither are expeditions such as the advance on Llassa, the Chitral expedition, the Indian frontier wars, the Kaffir wars, the Somaliland expeditions, the revolt of the Herreroes in German West Africa or the French expeditions in Morocco: the wars between the states of South America, with two exceptions, have also been omitted. But the list as it stands, is striking enough and may suffice to make the student inquire further into the circumstances which produced this almost unceasing strife.
The causes are epitomized in the fewest possible words and the occasion is separated from the cause. Causes of wars are very seldom remembered and are not very easily discovered in the perusal of histories. The occasion is sometimes mistaken for the cause, whereas it may often be merely a pretext. The occasion of a war has not infrequently been a comparatively trivial incident, whereas the cause can be traced to the gradual development of friction for which divergence of policies or conflict of ambitions may have been responsible. The trivial incident, or even an incident of a more serious nature, may pass off without fatal consequences if no friction exists between the nations and there is a general atmosphere of amicable understanding. Where, on the contrary, relations are strained it requires but a very small spark to light up a conflagration. It is important therefore to detach the occasion from the cause.
Causes of war in the nineteenth century differ to some extent from those of previous centuries. The elemental combative passion of man expressing itself in fierce racial animosities is far less noticeable. Religious differences do not figure so positively as a reason for conflict. Dynastic ambitions linger on and still play a formidable part, even after 1815, but not with the same unashamed and aggressive arrogance as in bygone centuries. Nationalist aspirations begin to assert themselves, and the waves of revolutionary exasperation with outworn systems of despotic government have made those very governments combat that spirit by force of arms. As the century proceeds, and the wonderful inventions for rapid transit and communication develop, the most noticeable element in war-making is the commercial or colonial ambition of governments fostered largely by the pressure of financial interests and declaring itself under the name of Empire. This policy of competitive imperial expansion in the newly accessible regions of the globe will be found to constitute the most frequent cause of dispute, of jealousy, and of suspicion between nations. The pretext will vary, the excuse will be presented under plausible guises for popular consumption, but the ultimate cause, the fundamental origin will be the same. Imperialism economic in its origin is fostered largely by an exaggerated spirit of nationalism.
The remarkable extent of Empire expansion in the latter part of the nineteenth century is best illustrated by the following figures:--
_Acquisitions of Territory_
To the British Empire 1870–1900: 4,754,000 square miles; 88,000,000 population.
To France 1884–1900: 3,583,580 square miles; 36,553,000 population.
To Germany 1884–1900: 1,026,220 square miles; 16,687,100 population.
But perhaps the chief and most frequent cause of war is war itself. In the Balkan Peninsula--where, whenever the fighting has ceased, nothing approaching a satisfactory settlement has ever been concluded--this is specially true. Eight or nine of the wars recorded concern the Balkans. Or take the Crimean War. Sir Spencer Walpole says:
“From 1856 to 1878 the Continent of Europe was afflicted with five great wars--the Franco-Austrian War of 1859; the Danish of 1864; the Austro-Prussian of 1860; the Franco-German of 1870 and the Russo-Turkish of 1878: all of which can be lineally traced to the war of 1854,” and one at least of those wars, as we know, sowed the seeds of future war. The war that is concluded by a dictated peace, the war that leaves a sense of grievance and unsatisfied though legitimate claims, the war that inspires a lasting desire for revenge inevitably leads to future war. Wars are never aggressive but always defensive on the part of those who are responsible for waging them. Wars are never defensive but always aggressive on the part of those against whom they are waged. The Ministers and monarchs do the quarrelling, the people believe the version they are told and obey. The people do the fighting and make the sacrifice, the Ministers and monarchs do the treaty-making without consulting them. The people’s part is one of valiance, endurance, and suffering; the part of the Ministers and monarchs is one too often marred by failure and frequently disfigured by intrigue and deception.
Cast your eye through these forty-two very brief records of wars. Think of the valour, the determination, and the heroism of the people, be they soldiers or civilians. Consider the noble part played by those who without question obeyed what they were led to believe was their country’s call. And then look on the other side at the results--the ineptitude of the statesmen, the patched-up treaties, the worthless agreements, the wars that led to further wars, the failure to secure a settlement after the soldier had done his part, and the unnecessary prolongation of conflicts when agreement might have been reached by the exercise of a little wisdom and foresight. The contrast is remarkable between the actions on the battlefield and the intrigue in the council chamber. Blood has been spilt, lives lost, and victories won often without any positive advantage being gained in the final result.
The wars are arranged according to date. Some were long-drawn-out struggles, others sharp conflicts of a few months. The number of men engaged in any battle and the casualties if they could be tabulated would no doubt seem comparatively small to our modern eyes. The total loss of life in the Crimean War amounted to about 600,000 men.[1] An estimate of the loss in killed and wounded in some of the other great battles may be given as follows: Solferino (1859), 31,500; Chickamauga (1863), 35,100; Gettysburg (1863), 37,000; Königrätz (1866), 26,894; Vionville (1870), 32,800; Gravelotte (1870), 30,000; Plevna (1877), 19,000;[2] The Boer War (1899–1902): British losses, 28,603; Boers killed, 4,000, prisoners 40,000;[3] Mukden (1905), 131,000.
[1] _The Cambridge Modern History_, vol. xii
[2] An article in _Current History_, by General Duryee, of the U.S.A. Army.
[3] _Encyclopædia Britannica._
Wars to the generation that experiences them are unmixed evils engendering hatred and evil passions and bringing in their train loss, suffering, destruction, and impoverishment, all of which are acutely felt. The succeeding generation inherit their consequences in the shape of high taxation and the attempts to mend and reconstruct the dislocated national life. The horror has gone but the memory remains. To the succeeding generation they become episodes read of in the cold pages of history, and then at last they fade into mere names--a battle with a vaguely remembered date.
Each war is terminated by a treaty. The main provisions of a few additional treaties which were not concluded after wars are also given. In but few instances have war treaties been observed, and in several cases they were not worth the paper they were written on. Treaties are signed and ratified by statesmen without the sanction or approval, and sometimes without the knowledge, of their people. The statesmen enter the council chamber as individuals bent on securing advantages at other people’s expense, and ready by bargain and intrigue to attain their ends. These instruments therefore are expressions of temporary expediency sometimes exacted after defeat, sometimes the result of compromise and generally inconclusive. If treaties are to become sacred obligations founded on international justice and respected not merely by changing governments but by whole nations, the spirit in which they are drawn up and the method by which they are concluded must be radically altered. The existence of secret treaties and engagements has proved to be one of the gravest dangers to European peace.
There are a large number of conventions which have been concluded between nations, by which social intercourse with regard to such matters as post and telegraph is facilitated, and of late years arbitration treaties between one Power and another have multiplied very rapidly. This is the one advance in which the efforts of diplomacy have borne fruit. The important treaty of Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States is the only one of these treaties mentioned in the list. Agreements with regard to the conduct of war have been made, such as the Geneva Convention of 1864 and 1906, and the Hague Declarations of 1899 and 1907, but they have proved to a large extent futile.
Treaties are generally concluded for an undefined period, and lapse owing to deliberate breach or altered circumstances. But no people, and it may safely be said no government, was precisely aware which of the innumerable treaties were still in force, and what actually in given circumstances its obligations were.
There may be many instances in which a nation may look back with pride at the victory of its arms and the achievements of its generals. There are but few instances in which a nation can look back with pride at the advantages gained by treaties of peace and at the achievements of its diplomatists. From the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, to the Treaty of Bukarest, 1913, the record of so-called settlements is not one to inspire confidence in the efficacy of warfare or in the methods of diplomacy.
After the termination of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 there were great hopes of an era of peace. But two antagonistic elements existed in Europe which were bound sooner or later to come into open conflict. On the one hand the French Revolution had engendered in the peoples a spirit of unrest, of discontent, of impatience with the unfettered monarchical system, and at the same time confidence in their power and hope of success in the destruction of tyranny and arbitrary government. It was in fact the rise of democracy. On the other side the despotic governments were ready to co-operate, and, under the guidance of Metternich, endeavour to repress and exterminate the movement for the establishment of constitutional government, and for the expression of nationalist and democratic aspirations. Two waves of revolution passed over Europe in 1830 and 1848, and by the middle of the century the reactionaries could no longer hold their own, and many states had been freed from despotism and oppression.
In the latter part of the century, however, as has already been pointed out, fresh causes for war arose in the competitive ambition of governments for imperial expansion. Wars became more frequent and extended into remote regions of the world which had become accessible. There are forty-seven wars mentioned in these records; of these thirteen took place before the Crimean War, which is about the middle of the period, and thirty-three after. In twenty-one out of the forty-five wars Great Britain was either directly or indirectly concerned as a belligerent. There were only two wars in which Christian nations were not primarily involved.
It must be remembered that in no country had the peoples any voice in the determination of policy so far as international affairs were concerned. While for brevity’s sake the usual phraseology is adopted, and such expressions used as “France decided,” “Russia refused,” “Italy intended,” etc., etc., in no case does the name of the country mean the people or indeed anything more than a monarch and a few statesmen. Although constitutional monarchy became established during the period in many countries, and with it, parliamentary government, the idea of diplomacy, foreign policy, international engagements, and treaties being under parliamentary supervision and control, had not yet been suggested.
The solution of the vast problem of the avoidance of war in the future, if it rests alone on the wisdom of sovereigns and statesmen, is not likely, judging by the experience of the past, to be reached very rapidly. In the meanwhile a careful examination of the events of recent history is a necessary preparation for all who want to dispel the strange but prevalent delusion that force of arms settles international disputes, and this record may be useful as a manual for reference.
THE GREEK WAR
1821–1828
Belligerents:
Greece and later Russia, France and Great Britain. Turkey.
Cause:
Nationalist aspirations had been growing in Greece ever since the French Revolution. These were encouraged by an intellectual revival and commercial development. The tyranny and cruel oppression of Turkish misgovernment under Sultan Mahmud gradually inflamed public opinion.
Occasion:
The Hetæria Philike, a secret society, inaugurated the rebellion. The first move was made in Moldavia, where it completely failed. This was followed by a revolt in the Morea and the islands of the Ægean and subsequently in Central Greece.
Course of the War:
There were wholesale massacres on both sides, notably the destruction by the Turks of the inhabitants of Chios. The Turks were unable to suppress the revolt. The Greeks under Kolokotrones exhausted the Turkish army, and assistance was sought by the Sultan from Mehemet Ali, of Egypt, who in 1823 conquered Crete and defeated the Greeks at Psara. The Egyptians and Turks entered Morea. Missolonghi fell after a year’s siege, and the garrison in the Acropolis at Athens surrendered in June 1827. By a treaty signed at London in July 1827 Great Britain, France, and Russia decided to intervene as mediators. The Turks rejected mediation. The victory of the allied fleets at Navarino took place on October 20 1827.
Political Result:
By the _Treaty of Adrianople_, September 1829 (see also p. 17) Greece became autonomous under the supreme sovereignty of the Sultan. Shortly afterwards the Powers agreed that Greece should be established as an absolutely independent kingdom, but without Crete or Samos, and with a frontier line drawn from the mouth of the River Achelous to a spot near Thermopylæ. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg accepted the crown, but renounced it after a few months. Prince Otho of Bavaria accepted it in February 1833. After a revolution in 1862 he was succeeded by Prince George of Denmark in 1863, the father of King Constantine who was deposed in 1917.
Remarks:
Greece was confined within far too narrow limits, with which she could not rest contented. The enmity between Russia and Turkey was in no way mitigated, and Russian ambitions remained unsatisfied.
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR
1828–1829
Belligerents:
Russia. Turkey.
Cause:
By the Treaty of London, July 1827, Great Britain, Russia, and France undertook to put an end to the conflict in the East, which had arisen out of the Greek struggle for independence. After the victory of Navarino, Canning died and Great Britain was inactive. By the _Treaty of Akerman_, October 1826, the points of contention between Russia and Turkey had been settled in Russia’s favour. But the Russian Government ardently desired a contest with Turkey.
Occasion:
The Sultan Mahmud issued a proclamation which was a direct challenge to Russia, and followed it by a levy of troops and the expulsion of Christians from Constantinople. On April 26, 1828, Russia replied by declaring war.
Course of the War:
The Russians occupied the Roumanian principalities and crossed the Danube. At first the Turks had considerable successes in the Dobrudja, and the Russians, who suffered enormous losses, were only able to capture Varna. Reserves were brought up during the winter. After fierce resistance the Turks were routed near Shumla. In July 1829 the Russians crossed the Balkans, the fleet co-operated in the Black Sea, and the army began to march on Constantinople. In Asia, Kars and Erzeroum having fallen into the Russian hands, the Sultan yielded.
Political Result:
By the _Treaty of Adrianople_, September 14, 1829, Russian ascendancy in the principalities of the Danube was permanently assured, and the whole of the Caucasus was converted into Russian territory. The Straits were declared free and open to merchant ships of all Powers. The Turkish Government gave its adhesion to the Treaty of London regulating the Greek frontier.
Remarks: