CHAPTER IV.

NAPOLEON, by his precautionary measures of strengthening his Advanced Posts, and of displaying along the whole line of the Belgian frontier an equal degree of vigilance and activity, had effectually concealed from his adversaries the combined movements of his several _Corps d'Armée_, and their concentration on the right bank of the Sambre.

During the night of the 13th, however, the light reflected upon the sky by the fires of the French bivouacs, did not escape the vigilant observation of ZIETEN's Outposts, whence it was communicated to the Rear that these fires appeared to be in the direction of Walcourt and of Beaumont, and also in the vicinity of Solre sur Sambre; further, that all reports received through spies and deserters concurred in representing that NAPOLEON was expected to join the French Army on that evening; that the Imperial Guard and the Second Corps had arrived at Avesnes and Maubeuge; also that, at one o'clock in the afternoon of that day, four French Battalions had crossed the river at Solre sur Sambre, and occupied Merbes le Château; that late in the night the Enemy had pushed forward a strong Detachment as far as Sart la Bussière; and lastly, that an attack by the French would certainly take place on the 14th or 15th.

On the 14th of June, the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN, who was stationed at St Symphorien, near Mons, and who commanded the Outposts between the latter place and Binche which formed the extreme Right of the Prussians, ascertained that the French troops had moved from Maubeuge and its vicinity by Beaumont towards Philippeville, that there was no longer any hostile force in his front, except a Picquet at Bettignies, and some National Guards in other villages. He forwarded this important information to the Prussian General STEINMETZ, on his left, with whom he was in constant communication, and by whom it was despatched to General ZIETEN at Charleroi.

The Prussian General PIRCH II., who was posted on the left of STEINMETZ, also sent word to ZIETEN that he had received information through his Outposts that the French Army had concentrated in the vicinity of Beaumont and Merbes le Château; that their Army consisted of 150,000 men, and was commanded by General VANDAMME, JEROME BUONAPARTE, and some other distinguished Officers; that since the previous day all crossing of the frontier had been forbidden by the French under pain of death; and that a Patrol of the Enemy had been observed that day near Biercée, not far from Thuin.

During the day, frequent accounts were brought to the troops of ZIETEN's Corps, generally corroborative of the above, by the country people who were bringing away, and seeking some place of safety for, their cattle. Intelligence was also obtained of the arrival of NAPOLEON, and of his brother, Prince JEROME.

ZIETEN immediately transmitted the substance of this information to Prince BLÜCHER and to the Duke of WELLINGTON; and it was perfectly consistent with that which the latter had received from Major General DÖRNBERG, who had been posted in observation at Mons, and from General VAN MERLEN (through the Prince of ORANGE) who, as already mentioned, commanded the Outposts between that place and Binche. Nothing, however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of concentration, the probable strength of the Enemy, or his intended offensive movements, and the Allied Commanders therefore refrained from making any alteration in their dispositions, and calmly awaited the arrival of reports of a more definite character concerning the Enemy's designs.

* * * * *

ZIETEN's troops were kept under arms during the night, and were collected by Battalions at their respective points of assembly.

Later in the day ZIETEN ascertained, through his Outposts, that strong French Columns, composed of all Arms, were assembling in his front, and that every thing portended an attack on the following morning.

ZIETEN's communication of this intelligence reached BLÜCHER between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 14th.

Simultaneous Orders were consequently despatched by eleven o'clock for the march of PIRCH's Corps from Namur upon Sombref, and of THIELEMANN's Corps from Ciney to Namur. An Order had already, in the course of the day, been forwarded to BÜLOW at Liege, desiring him to make such a disposition of his _Corps d'Armée_ as should admit of its concentration at Hannut in one march; and at midnight a further Order was despatched, requiring him to concentrate his troops in cantonment about Hannut.

ZIETEN was directed to await the advance of the Enemy in his position upon the Sambre; and, in the event of his being attacked by superior numbers, and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three Corps in rear of the latter point.

The vigilance which was thus exercised along both the Anglo-Allied and Prussian line of Outposts, obtained for WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER the fullest extent of information which they could reasonably have calculated on receiving respecting the dispositions of the Enemy immediately previous to an attack. They had been put in possession of the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the frontier beyond Tournai, Mons, and Binche, of the troops which had previously occupied that line, and their concentration in front of Charleroi, might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi, upon which a feigned attack would be made, while the real attack was intended to be by Mons. Hence no alteration was made by the Duke in the disposition of his forces; but the Prussian Field Marshal immediately ordered the concentration of his own troops at a point where they would be at hand in case Charleroi should be the real line of attack, and whence they could far more readily move to the support of WELLINGTON, should that attack be made by the Mons road.

* * * * *

ZIETEN's position, and his line of Advanced Posts, have already been described. His Right Brigade (the First), having its Head Quarters at Fontaine l'Evêque, held the ground between Binche and the Sambre; his Centre Brigade (the Second) lay along the Sambre, occupying Marchienne au Pont, Dampremy, La Roux, Charleroi, Châtelet, and Gilly; a portion of his Third Brigade occupied Farciennes and Tamines on the Sambre, while the remainder was posted in reserve between Fleurus and the Sambre; and his Left Brigade (the Fourth) was extended along this river nearly as far as Namur. The Reserve Cavalry of the First Corps had been brought more in advance, and was now cantoned in the vicinity of the Piéton, having Gosselies for its point of concentration.

In this position, ZIETEN, without making the slightest alteration, remained fully prepared for the expected attack on the morrow.

* * * * *

While NAPOLEON was occupied in prescribing his intended order of attack, he received a despatch from Count GÉRARD announcing that Lieutenant General DE BOURMONT, and Colonels CLOUET and VILLOUTREYS, attached to the Fourth Corps, had deserted to the Enemy--a circumstance which induced the Emperor to make some alteration in his dispositions.

The morning of the 15th had scarcely broken, when the French Army commenced its march towards the Sambre, in three Columns, from the three bivouacs already mentioned as having been taken up during the previous night. The Left Column advanced from Solre sur Sambre, by Thuin, upon Marchienne au Pont; the Centre from Beaumont, by Ham sur Heure, upon Charleroi; and the Right Column from Philippeville, by Gerpinnes, upon Châtelet.

As early as half past three o'clock in the morning, the head of the Left Column came in contact with the Prussian troops in front of Lobbes, firing upon, and driving in, the Picquets of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, commanded by Captain GILLHAUSEN. This Officer who was well aware that the French troops that had assembled, the night before, in great force in his front, intended to attack him in the morning, had posted his Battalion so as to afford it every advantage to be derived from the hilly and intersected ground it occupied. The French, however, inclined more to their right, and joined other troops advancing along the road to Thuin, which lay on his left. Shortly after, they drove back an advanced Cavalry Picquet; and, at half past four, commenced a fire from four guns upon the Outpost of Maladrie, about a mile in front of Thuin.

This cannonade, which announced the opening of the Campaign by the French, was heard by the Prussian troops forming the Left Wing of STEINMETZ's Brigade; but the atmosphere, which was extremely thick and heavy, was most unfavourable for the conveyance of sound; so much so, that the greater portion of the Right Wing of the Brigade remained for a considerable time in ignorance of the Enemy's advance.

The firing, however, was distinctly heard at Charleroi; and ZIETEN, who, by the reports which he forwarded on the 14th to WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER, had fully prepared these Commanders to expect an attack, lost no time in communicating to them the important fact, that hostilities had actually commenced.

Shortly before five o'clock, he despatched _Courier Jägers_ to their respective Head Quarters, Brussels and Namur, with letters containing the information that since half past four o'clock, he had heard several cannon shots fired in his front, and at the time he was writing, the fire of musketry also, but that he had not yet received any report from his Outposts. To BLÜCHER he at the same time intimated that he should direct the whole Corps to fall back into position; and, should it become absolutely necessary, to concentrate at Fleurus. His report to the Duke of WELLINGTON arrived in Brussels at nine o'clock in the morning; that to Prince BLÜCHER reached Namur between eight and nine o'clock. The former, while it placed the British Commander on the _qui vive_, did not induce him to adopt any particular measure--he awaited further and more definite information; but the latter satisfied the Prussian Field Marshal that he had taken a wise precaution in having already ordered the concentration of his several Corps in the position of Sombref.

The Prussian troops at Maladrie checked, for a time, the advance of the French upon Thuin, and maintained their ground for more than an hour, with the greatest bravery. They were overpowered, and driven back upon Thuin. This place was occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, under Major MONSTERBERG, who, after an obstinate and gallant resistance, during which the Battalion suffered an immense loss, was forced to retire, about seven o'clock, upon Montigny, where he found Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, with two Squadrons of the 1st West Prussian Dragoons.

The French succeeded in taking this village, and the retreat was then continued in good order, under the protection of WOISKY's Dragoons, towards Marchienne au Pont; but before reaching this place, the latter were attacked, and completely overthrown by the French Cavalry; and the Infantry getting into disorder at the same moment were partly cut down, and many were taken prisoners. Indeed so severe was the loss which the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr suffered in this retreat, that the mere handful of men which remained could not possibly be looked upon as constituting a Battalion in the proper meaning of the term. It was reduced to a mere skeleton. Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY was wounded on this occasion; but continued, nevertheless, at the head of his Dragoons.

Captain GILLHAUSEN, who, as before stated, commanded the Prussian Battalion posted at Lobbes, as soon as he had satisfied himself that Thuin was taken, saw the necessity of effecting his own retreat, which he did, after the lapse of half an hour, drawing in his Picquets, and occupying the Bridge over the Sambre with one Company. He then fell back, and occupied the Wood of Sar de Lobbes, where he received an Order, as soon as the Post of Hoarbes was also taken by the Enemy, to continue his retreat, taking a direction between Fontaine l'Evêque and Anderlues.

The Post at Abbaye d'Alnes, occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr, under the temporary command of Captain GROLLMANN, also fell into the hands of the French, between eight and nine o'clock.

As soon as the Commander of the First Prussian Brigade--General STEINMETZ--was made acquainted with the attack upon his most Advanced Posts along the Sambre, he despatched an Officer of his Staff--Major ARNAULD--to the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN at St Symphorien, situated on the road between Binche and Mons, to make him fully acquainted with what had taken place, and with the fact that his Brigade was falling back into position. On his way, Major ARNAULD directed Major ENGELHARDT, who commanded the Outposts on the right, to lose not a moment in withdrawing the chain of Picquets; and on arriving at Binche, he spread the alarm that the French had attacked, and that the Left of the Brigade was warmly engaged, which rendered it necessary that the Right should retire with the utmost expedition. Until this Officer's arrival, the Prussian troops in this quarter were wholly ignorant of the attack; the state of the atmosphere, to which allusion has already been made, having prevented their hearing the slightest sound of any firing. They had a much greater extent of ground to pass over in retreat than the rest of the Brigade, and yet, by the above unfortunate circumstance, they were the last to retire.

ZIETEN, having ascertained, about eight o'clock, that the whole French Army appeared to be in motion, and that the direction of the advance of its Columns seemed to indicate the probability of Charleroi and its vicinity being the main object of the attack, sent out the necessary Orders to his Brigades. The First was to retire by Courcelles to the position in rear of Gosselies; the Second was to defend the three Bridges over the Sambre, at Marchienne au Pont, Charleroi, and Châtelet, for a time sufficient to enable the First Brigade to effect its retreat towards Gosselies, and thus to prevent its being cut off by the Enemy, after which it was to retire behind Gilly; the Third and Fourth Brigades, as also the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, were to concentrate as rapidly as possible, and to take up a position in rear of Fleurus.

The three points by which the First Brigade was to fall back, were Mont St Aldegonde, for the troops on the right, Anderlues for those in the centre, and Fontaine l'Evêque for the left. In order that they might reach these three points about the same time, ZIETEN ordered that those in front of Fontaine l'Evêque should yield their ground as slowly as the Enemy's attack would admit. Having reached the line of these three points, about ten o'clock, the Brigade commenced its further retreat towards Courcelles, having its proper Left protected by a separate Column consisting of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr and two Companies of Silesian Rifles, led by Colonel HOFFMANN, in the direction of Roux and Jumet, towards Gosselies.

At Marchienne au Pont stood the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment, belonging to the Second Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps. The Bridge was barricaded, and with the aid of two guns, resolutely maintained against several attacks; after which these troops commenced their retreat upon Gilly, by Dampremy. In the latter place were three Companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, with four guns. These also retired about the same time towards Gilly, the guns protecting the retreat by their fire from the Churchyard; after which they moved off as rapidly as possible towards Gilly, while the Battalion marched upon Fleurus; but the 4th Company, which defended the Bridge of La Roux until Charleroi was taken, was too late to rejoin the latter, and therefore attached itself to the First Brigade, which was retreating by its Right Flank.

* * * * *

Lieutenant General Count PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry formed the Advanced Guard of the Centre Column of the French Army: it was to have been supported by VANDAMME's Corps of Infantry, but by some mistake, this General had not received his Orders, and at six o'clock in the morning had not quitted his bivouac. NAPOLEON, perceiving the error, led forward the Imperial Guards in immediate support of PAJOL. As the latter advanced, the Prussian Outposts, though hard pressed, retired, skirmishing in good order. At Couillet, on the Sambre, about a mile and a half below Charleroi, the French Cavalry fell upon a Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Prussian Regiment, surrounded it, and forced it to surrender.

Immediately afterwards, the French gained possession of Marcinelles, a village quite close to Charleroi, and connected with this town by a dike 300 paces in length, terminating at a Bridge, the head of which was palisaded. Along this dike the French Cavalry ventured to advance, but was suddenly driven back by the Prussian Skirmishers, who lined the hedges and ditches intersecting the opposite slope of the embankment; a part of the village was retaken, and an attempt made to destroy the Bridge. The French, however, having renewed the attack with increased force, succeeded in finally carrying both the dike and the Bridge, and by this means effected their entrance into Charleroi. Major ROHR, who commanded this Post, now felt himself under the necessity of effecting his retreat with the 1st Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment, towards the preconcerted position in rear of Gilly, which he did in good order, though hotly pursued by Detachments of PAJOL's Dragoons.

By eleven o'clock, the French were in full possession of Charleroi, as also of both banks of the Sambre above the town, and REILLE's Corps was effecting its passage over the river at Marchienne au Pont.

The right Column of the French Army, commanded by Count GÉRARD, having a longer distance to traverse, had not yet reached its destined point, Châtelet on the Sambre.

* * * * *

The Fourth Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps, as also the advanced portion of the Third, continued their retreat towards Fleurus; General JAGOW, who commanded the latter, having left the two Silesian Rifle Companies and the Fusilier Battalion[8] of the 7th Prussian Regiment at Farciennes and Tamines, for the purpose of watching the points of passage across the Sambre, and of protecting the Left Flank of the position at Gilly. But, from the moment the French made themselves masters of Charleroi, and of the left bank of the Sambre above that town, the situation of the First Brigade under General STEINMETZ became extremely critical. ZIETEN immediately ordered General JAGOW, whose Brigade was in reserve, to detach Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment of Infantry to Gosselies, for the purpose of facilitating General STEINMETZ's retreat. The Colonel found that General RÖDER (commanding the Reserve Cavalry of the Corps) had posted there the 6th Regiment of Prussian Uhlans (Lancers) under Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW, to whom he confided the defence of Gosselies, which he occupied with the 2nd Battalion of the 29th Regiment, while he placed himself in reserve with the other two Battalions.

As soon as the French had assembled in sufficient force at Charleroi, NAPOLEON ordered Count PAJOL to detach General CLARY's Brigade towards Gosselies, and to advance with the remainder of the First Corps of Reserve Cavalry towards Gilly. General CLARY, with the 1st French Hussars, reached Jumet, on the left of the Brussels road, and only but little more than a mile from Gosselies, before the First Prussian Brigade had crossed the Piéton. He now advanced to attack Gosselies, but was met by Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW and his Dragoons, who defeated and repulsed him, and thus secured for General STEINMETZ time to pass the Piéton; and as soon as the latter had turned the Defile of Gosselies, Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment moved off to rejoin the Third Brigade.

The check thus experienced by General CLARY led to his being supported by Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES, with the Light Cavalry of the Guard and the two Batteries attached to this force; and a Regiment from Lieutenant General DUHESME's Division of the Young Guard was advanced midway between Charleroi and Gosselies as a Reserve to LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES. The Advanced Guard of REILLE's Corps, which had crossed the Sambre at Marchienne au Pont, was also moving directly upon Gosselies, with the design both of cutting off the retreat of ZIETEN's troops along the Brussels road, and of separating the Prussians from the Anglo-Allied Army. D'ERLON's Corps, which was considerably in the rear, received orders to follow and support REILLE.

General STEINMETZ, upon approaching Gosselies, and perceiving the strength of the Enemy and the consequent danger of being completely cut off, with the utmost promptitude and decision directed the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr to march against the Enemy's Left Flank, with a view to divert his attention and to check his advance, while, protected by the 6th Lancers and the 1st Silesian Hussars, he continued his retreat towards Heppignies. This plan was attended with complete success; and STEINMETZ reached Heppignies with scarcely any loss, followed by General GIRARD at the head of the Seventh Division of the Second French _Corps d'Armée_, with the remainder of which REILLE continued his advance along the Brussels road. Heppignies was already occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 12th Prussian Regiment, and with this increase of strength STEINMETZ drew up in order of battle, and upon GIRARD's attempting to force the place, after having previously occupied Ransart, he advanced against him, and drove him back in the direction of Gosselies. A brisk cannonade ensued, which was maintained on the part of the Prussians, only so long as it was deemed necessary for covering their retreat upon Fleurus.

* * * * *

In conformity with ZIETEN's Orders, General PIRCH II., when forced to abandon Charleroi, retired to Gilly, where, having concentrated the Second Brigade, about two o'clock, he took up a favourable position along a ridge in rear of a rivulet; his Right resting upon the Abbey of Soleilmont, his Left extending towards Châtelineau, which Flank was also protected by a Detachment occupying the Bridge of Châtelet, GÉRARD's Corps not having as yet arrived at that point. He posted the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment in a small Wood which lay in advance on the exterior slope of the ridge; four guns on the right, upon an eminence commanding the valley in front; two guns between this point and the Fleurus road, as also two guns on the right of the road, to impede as much as possible the advance of any Columns towards Gilly. The Sharp Shooters of the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment, by lining some adjacent hedges, afforded protection to the Artillery. The 2nd Battalion of the 28th Regiment was stationed beyond the Fleurus road, near the Abbey of Soleilmont, in such a manner as to be concealed from the Enemy. The 1st Battalion of this Regiment stood across the road leading to Lambusart; and its Fusilier Battalion was posted more to the left, towards Châtelet. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr was posted in support of the Battery in rear of Gilly. The 1st Battalion of this Regiment, previously mentioned as on the march from Dampremy to Fleurus, passed through Lodelinsart and Soleilmont, and rejoined the Brigade in rear of Gilly, before the affair had terminated. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Regiment formed the Reserve. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons were posted on the declivity of the ridge towards Châtelet: they furnished the Advanced Posts, and patrolled the valley of the Sambre, maintaining the communication with the Detachment at Farciennes, belonging to the Third Brigade.

General PIRCH, foreseeing that in the event of the Enemy succeeding in turning his Right, a rapid advance along the Fleurus road would be the means of greatly molesting, if not of seriously endangering, his retreat upon Lambusart, took the precaution of having this road blocked up by an _abatis_ in the Wood through which it led.

VANDAMMME did not reach Charleroi until three o'clock in the afternoon, when he received Orders to pursue the Prussians, in conjunction with GROUCHY, along the Fleurus road. It was, however, a considerable time before any advance was made. In the first place, the whole of VANDAMME's Corps had to cross the Sambre by a single Bridge; secondly, both Generals were deceived by exaggerated reports concerning the strength of the Prussians in rear of the Fleurus Woods; and GROUCHY who had gone forward to reconnoitre, returned to the Emperor with a request for further instructions. Upon this, NAPOLEON undertook a reconnaissance in person, accompanied by the four Squadrons _de Service_; and having formed an opinion that the amount of force in question did not exceed 18, or 20,000 men, he gave his Orders for the attack of General PIRCH's Brigade.

The French Generals having directed their preparatory dispositions from the Windmill near the Farm of Grand Drieu, opened the engagement about six o'clock in the evening, with a fire from two Batteries. Three Columns of Infantry advanced in echelon from the right, the first directing its course towards the little Wood occupied by the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment; the second passing to the right of Gilly; and the third winding round the left of this Village. The attack was supported by two Brigades of General EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps, namely, those of Generals BOURTHE and BONNEMAIN; of which one was directed towards Châtelet, thus menacing the Prussian Left Flank, and the other advanced along the Fleurus road.

The Battery attached to the Second Prussian Brigade was in the act of replying with great spirit to the superior fire from the French Artillery, and the Light Troops were already engaged, when General PIRCH received ZIETEN's Orders to avoid an action against superior numbers, and to retire by Lambusart upon Fleurus.

Perceiving the formidable advance and overwhelming force of the Enemy, he did not hesitate a moment in carrying those Orders into effect, and made his dispositions accordingly; but the retreat had scarcely commenced when his Battalions were vigorously assailed by the French Cavalry. NAPOLEON, in the hope of profiting by this retrograde movement, sent against the retreating Columns the four Squadrons _de Service_ of the Guard, under General LETORT, a distinguished Cavalry Officer attached to his Staff. The Prussian Infantry withstood the repeated attacks of the French Cavalry with undaunted bravery, and aided by the gallant exertions of Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, who boldly met the Enemy with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and checked his progress, the greater part of it succeeded in gaining the Wood of Fleurus. The Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment (of which it will be recollected, one Company had previously been captured on the right bank of the Sambre) was the only Column broken on this occasion. It had been ordered to retire into the Wood by Rondchamp, but before it could complete the movement, it was overtaken by the Enemy's Cavalry, by which it was furiously assailed, and suffered a loss of two thirds of its number.

The Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment was more fortunate. When about five hundred paces from the Wood, it was attacked by the Enemy's Cavalry on the plain, but forming Square, and reserving its fire until the French horsemen had approached within twenty or thirty paces, it gallantly repelled several charges. As the vigour with which these attacks were made began to slacken, the Battalion cleared its way with the bayonet through the Cavalry that continued hovering round it. One of its Companies immediately extended itself along the edge of the wood, and kept the French Cavalry at bay. The latter suffered severely on this occasion, and General LETORT who led the attacks was mortally wounded.

The Brandenburg Dragoons had been detached by ZIETEN in support of PIRCH's Brigade, and opportunely reaching the Field of Action, made several charges against the French Cavalry, which they repulsed and compelled to relinquish its pursuit.

PIRCH's Brigade now took up a position in front of Lambusart, which was occupied by some Battalions of the Third Brigade, and General RÖDER joined it with his remaining three Regiments of Cavalry and a Battery of Horse Artillery. At this moment, the French Cavalry, which was formed up in position, opened a fire from three Batteries of Horse Artillery, and thus brought on a cannonade, with which, however, the affair terminated.

The First Prussian Brigade having safely executed its retreat from Heppignies, towards Fleurus, reached St Amand about eleven o'clock at night.

The Detachments left by the Third Brigade at Farciennes and Tamines, had been previously called in, and effected their retreat without any molestation, as did also, subsequently, the Second Brigade from Lambusart, by Boulet, towards Fleurus, protected by the Reserve Cavalry.

ZIETEN's Corps, at three o'clock in the morning had possessed a line of Advanced Posts, from Dinant on the Meuse, crossing the Sambre at Thuin, and extending as far as Bonne Esperance, in advance of Binche; thus stretching along a space of from forty to fifty miles in length: its main force occupied the Sambre from Thuin as far as its confluence with the Meuse, an extent of, at least, thirty six miles, exclusive of the numerous windings throughout the whole course of the river between those two points. The men had, since daybreak, been constantly under arms, in motion, and almost as constantly engaged, pursued, and assailed upon all points by an overwhelming superiority of force, headed by the _élite_ of the French Cavalry; and it was not until about eleven o'clock at night that the Corps effected its concentration in position between Ligny and St Amand, at a distance varying from fourteen to twenty miles in rear of its original extended line of Outposts; after having successfully and gloriously fulfilled the arduous task imposed upon it of gaining sufficient time for the concentration, on the following day, of all the Prussian Corps, by stemming, as well as its scattered force would admit, the imposing advance of the whole French Army.

The loss of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ on the 15th of June, amounted to 1200 men. The Fusilier Battalions of the 28th Regiment and of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, reduced to mere skeletons, were united, and formed into one Battalion.

Before ten o'clock on the morning of the 15th, a further Order was despatched from the Prussian Head Quarters to the Third _Corps d'Armée_, to the effect that after resting during the night at Namur, it was to continue its march upon the morning of the 16th, towards Sombref.

At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon a despatch was forwarded to BÜLOW, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the Corps after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux by daybreak of the 16th, at the latest.

By three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, the Second _Corps d'Armée_ had taken up the position assigned to it between Onoz and Mazy in the immediate vicinity of Sombref, with the exception, however, of the Seventh Brigade, which, having been stationed in the most remote of the Quarters occupied by the Corps, did not reach Namur until midnight. Here the latter found an Order for its continuance in Namur until the arrival of the Third _Corps d'Armée_; but as this had already taken place, the Brigade, after a few hours' rest, resumed its march, and joined its Corps at Sombref about ten o'clock in the morning of the 16th June.

THIELEMANN passed the night at Namur, which he occupied with the Tenth Brigade; the Ninth Brigade bivouacked on the right, and the Eleventh on the left, of Belgrade, a village at a short distance from the town, on the road to Sombref; the Twelfth Brigade in rear of the Ninth; the Reserve Cavalry at Flavinne, between that road and the Sambre; and the Reserve Artillery on the left of the road.

* * * * *

It has already been explained that on the 14th, BLÜCHER sent off a despatch to BÜLOW desiring him to make such a disposition of his Corps as should enable his troops to reach Hannut in one march; and that at midnight of the 14th, a second despatch was forwarded, requiring him to concentrate the Fourth Corps at Hannut. The first of these despatches reached BÜLOW, at Liege, at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th; when he issued the necessary Orders with an instruction that they should be acted upon as soon as the troops had dined, and forwarded a report of this arrangement to Head Quarters. These Orders to his troops had been despatched some hours, and the consequent movements were for the most part in operation, when, towards noon, the second despatch arrived. BÜLOW, considering the effect which the change required by this new Order would have upon the troops, inasmuch as their reception was prepared in quarters to which, in this case, they would no longer proceed, and they would have nothing provided for them in the destined bivouac near Hannut, also as a great proportion of them could not receive the Orders for the change in the direction of their march until evening, decided upon deferring the new movement until daybreak of the 16th. The despatch, moreover, did not require him to establish his Head Quarters at Hannut, but merely suggested that the latter appeared the most suitable for the purpose. The General was, besides, perfectly unconscious of the commencement of hostilities, which, indeed, he had expected would be preceded by a Declaration of War; and he had also good grounds for an opinion which he had formed that it was in contemplation to assemble the whole Army at Hannut.

He made a report to Head Quarters of his reasons for deferring the execution of the Order, with the intimation that he would be at Hannut by midday of the 16th. Captain BELOW, on BÜLOW's Staff, who carried this despatch, arrived at nine o'clock in the evening of the 15th at Namur, where he discovered that the Head Quarters of the Army had been transferred to Sombref.

At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 15th, another despatch was forwarded to BÜLOW from Namur, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the Fourth Corps, after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux, by daybreak of the 16th at latest. The Orderly who carried it was directed to proceed to Hannut, the presumed Head Quarters of BÜLOW's Corps on that day. On reaching that place, the Orderly found the previous despatch lying in readiness for the General, and, mounting a fresh horse, he then went on with both despatches to Liege, where he arrived at sunrise. The Orders which they contained had now, however, become impracticable, in consequence of BÜLOW's not having immediately carried into effect the _first_ Order to collect at Hannut; and thus by one of those mischances, which, in war, occasionally mar the best planned operations, the opportune arrival of the Fourth Prussian Corps at the Battle of Ligny, which would, in all probability, have changed the aspect of affairs, was rendered a matter of impossibility.

Late in the evening, and after Prince BLÜCHER had established his Head Quarters at Sombref, Captain BELOW arrived with the before mentioned report from Count BÜLOW; on receiving which his Highness was made sensible that he could no longer calculate with certainty upon being joined by the Fourth Corps on the following day.

* * * * *

It was seven o'clock in the evening of the 15th, when Marshal NEY, who had just arrived, joined the Emperor near Charleroi, at the point where the road to Fleurus branches off from the one to Brussels. Having expressed the pleasure he felt at seeing him, NAPOLEON gave him the command of the First and Second _Corps d'Armée_; explaining at the same time that REILLE was advancing with three Divisions upon Gosselies; that D'ERLON would pass the night at Marchienne au Pont; that he would find under his orders PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division; as also the two Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard, of which, however, he was not to make use except as a Reserve. "Tomorrow," added the Emperor, "you will be joined by the Reserve Corps of Heavy Cavalry under KELLERMANN. Go and drive back the Enemy."

* * * * *

It has already been shown in the preceding Chapter, that the extreme Left of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army, composed of DE PERPONCHER's Second Dutch-Belgian Division, rested upon the Charleroi road to Brussels. The Second Brigade of this Division, under Colonel GÖDECKE, was thus located:--1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, at Hautain le Val; the 2nd Battalion, at Frasne and Villers Peruin; the 3rd Battalion, at Bezy, Sart à Mavelines, and Quatre Bras; both Battalions of the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, at Genappe. There was also at Frasne a Dutch Battery of Horse Artillery, under Captain BYLEVELD.

Early on the morning of the 15th, these troops were lying quietly in their cantonments, perfectly unconscious of the advance of the French Army, when they heard a brisk cannonade at a distance in the direction of Charleroi; but not having received the slightest intimation of the Enemy's approach, they concluded that the firing proceeded from the Prussian Artillery practice, which they had frequently heard before, and to which they had therefore become accustomed. Gradually towards noon, however, the cannonade became more distinctly audible; and, in the afternoon, the arrival of a wounded Prussian soldier completely set at rest all doubt as to the advance of the French. An Orderly was immediately despatched with the intelligence to the Regimental Head Quarters, whence it was also communicated to General DE PERPONCHER's Head Quarters at Nivelles.

In the meantime, Major NORMANN, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, drew up the latter with the Battery in position in rear of Frasne, and upon the road to Quatre Bras, after having posted a Picquet of observation in advance of the village.

PERPONCHER lost not a moment in ordering both Brigades of his Division to hasten towards their respective points of assembly; the 1st Brigade, under General BYLANDT, to Nivelles, and the 2nd, under Colonel GÖDECKE, to Quatre Bras.

Before this Order, however, could possibly reach these troops, Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, who commanded the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, at Genappe, having been informed by the Officer of the Dutch-Belgian _Maréchaussées_, who had been compelled to quit his post at Charleroi, that the French were advancing from that place, took upon himself to move forward with the above Regiment from Genappe to Quatre Bras, and despatched a report of such movement to the Head Quarters of the Brigade at Hautain le Val, as also, subsequently, to General DE PERPONCHER at Nivelles, by Captain GAGERN, of the Dutch-Belgian Staff, who happened to be just then at Genappe, for the purpose of collecting information.

About six o'clock in the evening, parties of Lancers belonging to PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division of REILLE's Corps appeared in front of Frasne, and soon drove in Major NORMANN's Picquet.

This Officer placed a Company on the south or French side of Frasne, for the purpose of preventing as long as possible the entrance of the French into the Village. BYLEVELD's Battery took post on the north side of the Village, and the remaining Companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau drew up in its support. Two guns were upon the road, and three on each side of it. After some time, the Lancers, having been reinforced, compelled the Company before mentioned to retire through the Village and fall back upon the main body, which then opened a vigorous fire, by which this front attack by the French Cavalry was defeated. The latter then made a disposition to turn the Left Flank of these troops; on perceiving which Major NORMANN and Captain BYLEVELD resolved upon falling back to within a short distance in front of Quatre Bras. The retreat was conducted in excellent order, the Battery continuing to fire along the high road.

Quatre Bras was the _rendezvous_ of the Second Brigade; and the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, which was cantoned in its immediate vicinity, had already, without waiting for the receipt of superior Orders, assembled at that point. Prince BERNHARD, on arriving there with the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, and learning the particulars of the engagement at Frasne, assumed the command as Senior Officer, and being fully impressed with the importance of securing the point of junction of the high road from Charleroi to Brussels, with that from Namur to Nivelles, came to the resolution of making a firm stand at Quatre Bras. This decision accorded entirely with the spirit of the Orders which had in the meantime been despatched from Braine le Comte, the Dutch-Belgian Head Quarters, on the receipt of intelligence of the French having crossed the Sambre. General DE PERPONCHER, who commanded the Division, had also approved of the Prince's determination, and Colonel GÖDECKE who was at Hautain le Val, and who had hitherto commanded the Second Brigade, now tendered his command to his Serene Highness, who immediately accepted it.

The Prince pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, in Column, upon the high road towards Frasne, detached two Companies of the 1st Battalion, and the Volunteer _Jägers_, to the defence of the Wood of Bossu, and the remaining Companies on the high road towards Hautain le Val; and posted the remainder of the Brigade at Quatre Bras, along the Namur road. Of BYLEVELD's Horse Battery, four guns were posted in advance in the direction of Frasne, two on the road to Namur, and two in rear of the main body.

By the determined show of resistance which his Serene Highness displayed, as well as by the vigorous cannonade which he maintained, PIRÉ's Advanced Guard, the Left Flank of which became endangered by the Dutch occupying the Wood of Bossu, was forced to retire in its turn, which it did unmolested, and brought back intelligence that Quatre Bras was occupied by ten Battalions with Artillery, and that WELLINGTON's troops were moving to concentrate at this important point.

At ten o'clock at night, NEY's forces were thus disposed:--PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division and BACHELU's Infantry Division occupied Frasne, a village situated upon the Brussels road, about two miles and a half on the French side of Quatre Bras; the two Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard were in reserve in rear of Frasne; REILLE was with two Divisions, and the Artillery attached to them, at Gosselies: these Divisions ensured the communication until the arrival of D'ERLON's Corps, which was to remain that night at Marchienne au Pont. The remaining Division of REILLE's Corps (GIRARD's) was at Heppignies, and thus served to maintain the communication with the Main Column under NAPOLEON. The troops were greatly fatigued by having been kept constantly on the march since three o'clock in the morning; the strength of the different Regiments, the names of their Colonels, and even of the Generals, were unknown to the Marshal, as also the number of men that had been able to keep up with the heads of the Columns at the end of this long march.

These circumstances, combined with the information brought in from Quatre Bras, induced NEY to decline risking a night attack upon that point; and he contented himself with taking up a position in advance of Frasne. Having issued such Orders as he deemed essential, and enjoined the most vigilant look out, he returned to Charleroi, where he arrived about midnight; partook of supper with NAPOLEON (who had just arrived from the Right Wing of the Army), and conferred with the Emperor upon the state of affairs until two o'clock in the morning.

* * * * *

The first intimation which the Duke of WELLINGTON received on the 15th, of hostilities having commenced, was conveyed in the report already alluded to, as having been forwarded by General ZIETEN, shortly before five o'clock in the morning, and as having reached Brussels at nine o'clock. It was not, however, of a nature to enable the Duke to form an opinion as to any real attack being contemplated by the Enemy in that quarter. It simply announced that the Prussian Outposts in front of Charleroi were engaged. It might be the commencement of a real attack in this direction, but it might also be a diversion in favour of an attack in some other direction, such as Mons. In fact, until further information was received, it could only be considered in the light of an affair of Outposts.

Not long after three o'clock in the afternoon, the Prince of ORANGE arrived in Brussels, and informed the Duke that the Prussian Outposts had been attacked and forced to fall back. His Royal Highness had ridden to the front at five o'clock in the morning, from Braine le Comte, and had a personal interview at St Symphorien, with General VAN MERLEN, whose troops were on the immediate right of the Prussians, who had retired. After having given to this General Verbal Orders respecting his Brigade, the Prince left the Outposts between nine and ten o'clock, and repaired to Brussels to communicate to the Duke all the information he had obtained respecting the Enemy's attack upon the Prussian Advanced Posts.

This, however, was not sufficiently conclusive to induce his Grace to resolve upon any immediate step; but, in about an hour afterwards, that is, about half past four, General VON MÜFFLING, the Prussian Officer attached to the British Head Quarters, waited upon the Duke with a communication which had been despatched from Namur by Prince BLÜCHER at noon, conveying the intelligence that the French had attacked the Prussian Posts at Thuin and Lobbes on the Sambre, and that they appeared to be advancing in the direction of Charleroi. The Duke was fully prepared for this intelligence, though uncertain how soon it might arrive. The reports which had been made to him from the Outposts, especially from those of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, stationed in the vicinity of Mons and Tournai, gave sufficient indication that the Enemy was concentrating his forces. But, as observed in the preceding Chapter, his Grace was determined to make no movement until the real line of attack should become manifest; and hence it was, that if the attack had been made even at a later period, his dispositions would have remained precisely the same.

The Duke at once gave Orders for the whole of his troops to assemble at the Head Quarters of their respective Divisions and to hold themselves in immediate readiness to march. At the same time an express was despatched to Major General DÖRNBERG, requiring information concerning any movement that might have been made on the part of the Enemy in the direction of Mons.

The following were the movements ordered by the Duke. Upon the Left of the Army, which was nearest to the presumed point of attack--PERPONCHER's and CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Divisions were to be assembled that night at Nivelles, on which point ALTEN's British Division (the Third) was to march as soon as collected at Braine le Comte; but this movement was not to be made until the Enemy's attack upon the Right of the Prussian Army and the Left of the Allied Army had become a matter of certainty. COOKE's British Division (the First) was to be collected that night at Enghien, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

Along the central portion of the Army--CLINTON's British Division (the Second) was to be assembled that night at Ath, and to be in readiness also to move at a moment's notice. COLVILLE's British Division (the Fourth) was to be collected that night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which were to be moved to Audenarde.

Upon the Right of the Army--STEDMANN's Dutch-Belgian Division, and ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian (Indian) Brigade were, after occupying Audenarde with 500 men, to be assembled at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning.

The Cavalry were to be collected that night at Ninhove, with the exception of the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion, who were to remain on the look out between the Scheldt and the Lys; and of DÖRNBERG's Brigade, with the Cumberland Hussars, which were to march that night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that town.

The Reserve was thus disposed--PICTON's British Division (the Fifth), the 81st British Regiment, and BEST's Hanoverian Brigade (of COLE's Division), were to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment's notice. VINCKE's Hanoverian Brigade (of PICTON's Division) was to be collected that night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight on the following morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the road between Alost and Assche for further orders. The Duke of BRUNSWICK's Corps was to be collected that night on the high road between Brussels and Vilvorde. KRUSE's Nassau Brigade was to be collected at daylight on the following morning upon the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. The Reserve Artillery was to be in readiness to move at daylight.

* * * * *

It was ten o'clock at night when the first intelligence of the attack made by the French in the direction of Frasne, was received at the Prince of ORANGE's Head Quarters, at Braine le Comte. It was carried by Captain GAGERN, who, as previously mentioned (see page 70), had been despatched by Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, with his Serene Highness's report of the affair, to General PERPONCHER at Nivelles, and who was subsequently sent on by the General, with this information to the above Head Quarters. Lieutenant WEBSTER, Aide de Camp to the Prince of ORANGE, started soon afterwards for Brussels, with a report from the Dutch-Belgian Quartermaster General, DE CONSTANT REBECQUE, stating what had taken place, and detailing the measures which he had thought proper to adopt. These measures did not entirely coincide with the instructions above given, as issued by the Duke, because they were consequent upon the affair at Frasne, with which his Grace at that time was unacquainted; but they were perfectly consistent with the spirit of those instructions, inasmuch as they were not adopted "until the Enemy's attack upon the Right of the Prussian Army, and the Left of the Allied Army had become a matter of certainty." The Enemy's advance along the Charleroi road had already been successfully checked at Quatre Bras, and the necessity of immediately collecting at this important point, the troops ordered by the Duke "to be assembled that night at Nivelles" was too obvious to be mistaken.

* * * * *

A little before ten o'clock on the same evening, a further communication reached the Duke from Prince BLÜCHER, announcing the crossing of the Sambre by the French Army, headed by NAPOLEON in person; and the required intelligence from other quarters having arrived almost at the same moment, and confirmed him in the opinion "that the Enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack," he issued, at ten o'clock P.M., the following Orders for the march of his troops to their Left:--ALTEN's Division to continue its movement from Braine le Comte upon Nivelles. COOKE's Division to move from Enghien upon Braine le Comte. CLINTON's and COLVILLE's Divisions to move from Ath, Grammont, and Audenarde, upon Enghien. The Cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.

* * * * *

The disposition of the French Left Column, under NEY, during the night of the 15th, has already been shown. The Centre Column of the French Army was thus located--VANDAMME's Corps bivouacked in the Wood of Fleurus; PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry at Lambusart; the Third Light Cavalry Division, under DOMON, on the left, at the outlet of the Wood, and the Heavy Cavalry Corps of EXCELMANS between the Light Cavalry and VANDAMME; the Guards bivouacked between Charleroi and Gilly; and LOBAU's Corps, together with MILHAUD's Heavy Cavalry Corps, lay in rear of Charleroi. The Right Column, consisting of GÉRARD's Corps, bivouacked in front of the Bridge of Châtelet, which point it had reached during the evening.

* * * * *

The result of the proceedings on the 15th was highly favourable to NAPOLEON. He had completely effected the passage of the Sambre; he was operating with the main portion of his forces directly upon the preconcerted point of concentration of BLÜCHER's Army, and was already in the immediate front of the chosen position, before that concentration could be accomplished; he was also operating with another portion upon the high road to Brussels, and had come in contact with the Left of WELLINGTON's troops; he had also placed himself so far in advance upon this line, that even a partial junction of the forces of the Allied Commanders was already rendered a hazardous operation, without a previous retrograde movement; and he thus had it in his power to bring the principal weight of his arms against the one, whilst, with the remainder of his force, he held the other at bay. This formed the grand object of his operations on the morrow.

But however excellent, or even perfect, this plan of operation may appear in theory, still there were other circumstances, which, if taken into consideration, would scarcely seem to warrant a well grounded anticipation of a successful issue. NAPOLEON's troops had been constantly under arms, marching, and fighting, since two o'clock in the morning, the hour at which they broke up from their position at Solre sur Sambre, Beaumont, and Philippeville, within the French frontier: they required time for rest and refreshment; they lay widely scattered between their Advanced Posts and the Sambre; NEY's forces were in detached bodies from Frasne as far as Marchienne au Pont, the halting place of D'ERLON's Corps; and although VANDAMME's Corps was in the Wood of Fleurus, LOBAU's Corps and the Guards were halted at Charleroi, and GÉRARD's Corps at Châtelet. Hence, instead of an imposing advance, with the first glimmering of the dawn of the 16th, the whole morning would necessarily be employed by the French in effecting a closer junction of their forces, and in making their preparatory dispositions for attack; an interval of time invaluable to the Allies, by the greater facility which it afforded them for the concentration of a sufficient force to hold their Enemy in check, and to frustrate his design of defeating them in detail.

* * * * *

In taking a calm retrospect of the dispositions made by NAPOLEON on the night of the 15th of June, we become strongly impressed with a conviction, that to the laxity of those dispositions, to the absence which they indicated of that energetic perseverance and restless activity which characterised the most critical of his operations in former Wars, may, in a very great degree, be attributed the failure of the Campaign on the part of the French. The great advantages derived by NAPOLEON from the result of his operations during the 15th, have been already set forth; but of what avail were those advantages to him, if he neglected the requisite measures for effectually retaining them within his grasp; or if, having secured them, he hesitated in following them up with the promptitude and energy which their complete development demanded of him? His position, if judged by that of his most advanced forces, was all that could be desired; but, by fatally neglecting to concentrate the remainder of his troops in the immediate support of that advance, the important advantages which such a position held forth were completely neutralized. Doubtless the troops required rest; but, if one portion required it more than another, it was that which now lay most in advance: they had performed the longest march, and had withstood, in addition, the whole brunt of the action; so there was no reason whatever why the remainder of the French Army should not have been so far advanced as to afford direct support to the important position taken up by the leading Divisions: that which had been so successfully effected by the heads of the Columns, might have been attained with infinitely greater ease and security by the masses which followed. And even supposing that serious impediments stood in the way of the full accomplishment of this concentration, such as the usual delays occasioned by the lengthening out of the Columns of March, to what did they amount in comparison with so many brilliant instances of what had been overcome by the noble and heroic efforts of a French Army headed by NAPOLEON? Had it even required some sacrifice, which at the most could only have consisted in the temporary diminution of strength, by the loss of stragglers on the march, what was this when placed in the balance with the fulfilment of the grand design of NAPOLEON's invasion of Belgium--preventing the junction of the Allied Armies, and overthrowing them in detail?

The commencement of this design, in which the essential requisite was rapidity of movement, had been eminently successful: a vantage ground had been gained which offered the most encouraging prospect of success: of BLÜCHER's four Corps, only one, ZIETEN's, had assembled in the chosen position of Ligny, on the night of the 15th; PIRCH's, which had arrived from Namur, was in bivouac between Onoz and Mazy, about six miles from Ligny; THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted its cantonments around Ciney at half past seven o'clock in the morning, passed the night at Namur, about fifteen miles from Ligny; BÜLOW's Corps, supposed by BLÜCHER to be then at Hannut, was still at Liege, about sixty miles distant from Ligny. Between this position of Ligny and that occupied by the leading Divisions of NAPOLEON's main Army, namely the villages of Lambusart, Wagnée, and the Wood of Fleurus, there was an interval of not more than from two to three miles! Hence every thing was favourable to the French Emperor's plan, which only required to be carried on with the same vigour and activity that had marked its commencement; the fate of NAPOLEON, of France, and of Europe, hung upon its issue; not an hour, not a moment should have been suffered to pass unheeded; and had the French Right been concentrated during the night in this position, as also the Left under NEY, between Gosselies and Frasne, and had an impetuous attack, with overwhelming force, been made not later than five o'clock on the following morning, upon both ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, not at that time united, it is very possible that these troops would have been beaten in detail, that THIELEMANN's Corps, advancing from Namur, would either have shared the same fate, or have moved off in the direction of Hannut or Liege to effect a junction with BÜLOW, whilst NEY would either have been enabled to secure the important point of Quatre Bras before the arrival of any considerable portion of the Anglo-Allied troops, or would have held his own force advantageously disposed for a junction with that of NAPOLEON, on the latter moving to the left, by the Namur road, for the purpose of bringing the great mass of his Army against WELLINGTON.

Instead of this, what happened? Of the French Right, its main force remained the whole night at Charleroi and Châtelet, on the Sambre, whilst between the Advance of NEY's forces at Frasne and his Rear at Marchienne au Pont, there was an interval of about twelve miles. NAPOLEON did not advance towards Fleurus until between eleven and twelve o'clock on the 16th, by which time ZIETEN's, PIRCH's, and THIELEMANN's Corps were all concentrated and in position, and he did not commence the Battle of Ligny until nearly three o'clock in the afternoon; while NEY, on his side, in consequence of his operations having been rendered subordinate to those of the Emperor, delayed to advance with any degree of vigour until between two and three o'clock, about which time WELLINGTON's Reserve reached Quatre Bras, from Brussels, and joined the forces then engaged in front of that point!

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: The Prussian Regiments of Infantry generally consisted of three Battalions, of which the Third was the Fusilier Battalion.]