CHAPTER V.

With the early dawn of the 16th of June, the whole of the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces were in movement towards Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Previously to starting from Brussels for the latter point, his Grace despatched an Order for the movement of the Cavalry and of CLINTON's British Division upon Braine le Comte, as also of the troops under Prince FREDERICK of the Netherlands, consisting of STEDMANN's Dutch-Belgian Division, and of ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian (Indian) Brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, after leaving 500 men, as before directed, in Audenarde.

PICTON's Division quitted Brussels by the Charleroi road about two o'clock in the morning; and the Duke of BRUNSWICK's Corps somewhat later. KRUSE's Nassau Brigade received Orders to follow along the same road, but having been dispersed in extended cantonments between Brussels and Louvain, it required some considerable time to collect together, and did not therefore reach Quatre Bras sufficiently early to take part in the action.

The disposition made by Colonel the Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar at this point, on the night of the 15th, with the Second Brigade of PERPONCHER's Dutch-Belgian Division, has already been described. Soon after ten o'clock on that evening, Major Count LIMBURG STIRUM, Dutch Aide de Camp to the Prince of ORANGE, left Braine le Comte for Nivelles, with a Verbal Order from the Dutch-Belgian Quartermaster General, enjoining General PERPONCHER to hold his ground to the last extremity, to support his Second Brigade by the First, and even to ask for aid from the Third Anglo-Allied Division, and from the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry Division; and, at all events, to send an Officer to acquaint the Commanders of these Divisions with the state of affairs. This message appears to have reached Nivelles about midnight.

Previously to this, that is, between nine and ten o'clock in the evening, Captain CRASSIER's Company of the 27th Battalion of _Chasseurs_ moved out from Nivelles towards Quatre Bras _en reconnaissance_. About two o'clock in the morning, PERPONCHER himself followed with the remainder of the _Chasseurs_, which body reached Quatre Bras at four o'clock. General BYLANDT, who commanded the First Brigade, ordered the remaining Battalions of the latter, and his Artillery, to commence their march from Nivelles at five o'clock. The 7th Dutch Line Battalion was directed to remain at Nivelles until relieved by ALTEN's Division.

At three o'clock in the morning, PERPONCHER arrived at Quatre Bras, and after having reconnoitred the position, immediately commenced operations for recovering the ground lost on the previous evening. Just at this time a detachment of about fifty Prussian Hussars of the 2nd Silesian Regiment, under Lieutenant ZEHELIN, who, on the previous day, had been driven back from near Gosselies, and had retreated towards Hautain le Val, gallantly advanced to the front, attacked the Enemy's Outposts, forced them to retire, and then formed a chain of Vedettes. As soon as the Dutch-Belgian troops had advanced to within a short distance of these Prussian Hussars, the latter moved off by their left towards Sombref.

Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar's Brigade penetrated deeper into the Wood of Bossu, and secured the entrances into it from the French side.

PERPONCHER directed the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau to take post on an eminence in advance towards Frasne, and stationed the 3rd Battalion of this Regiment more to the left. The latter, however, was soon relieved by the 27th Chasseurs, which Battalion, on reaching Quatre Bras, at four o'clock in the morning, had detached two Companies to the left. These moved steadily forward in extended order towards the Wood of Delhutte, outside of which the Enemy showed his Light Troops. They succeeded in forcing back the French into a hollow way bordering the Wood, where the latter maintained themselves for some little time, and then retired into the Wood itself. Taking advantage of the cover afforded by the edge of the Wood, the French now poured a deadly fire upon their assailants, who retreated to some favourable ground a little in advance of their Battalion.

The Prince of ORANGE arrived at Quatre Bras about six o'clock, and immediately reconnoitred the position of the Enemy, and that occupied by his own troops. Having expressed his perfect satisfaction with all the arrangements and dispositions which had been made, both on the previous evening and on that morning, he ordered the troops then present to take up a position more in advance, for the purpose of imposing upon the Enemy; enjoining at the same time, all unnecessary firing, it being desirable under then existing circumstances, to avoid bringing on prematurely an attack by the Enemy.

* * * * *

NEY, having quitted Charleroi at a very early hour in the morning, returned to Gosselies, where he communicated with REILLE, whom he ordered to assemble the force then with him, consisting of two Infantry Divisions and their Artillery, and to advance upon Frasne: to which point the Marshal repaired in person. Here he collected all the information which the Generals and other Officers had been able to obtain respecting the Enemy; and being naturally anxious to make himself acquainted with the details of the force placed so suddenly under his orders, he desired Colonel HEYMÈS, his first Aide de Camp, to repair to every Regiment, and note down their strength and the names of the Commanding Officers; after the performance of which duty, Colonel HEYMÈS laid before the Marshal a return of the troops in the Field.

The uncertainty in which NEY was placed as to the amount of force concentrated by the Allies during the night in rear of Quatre Bras, and the conviction which he had reason to entertain that the Prussians were in strong force at no very great distance on his right, and that therefore any check experienced by the Main Column under NAPOLEON, would endanger his Right Flank and even his line of communication, rendered him cautious in attacking a point so considerably in advance of the Emperor's Left, without ample means at hand to enable him, in case of disaster, to maintain that line, or, in the event of success, to effectually establish himself at Quatre Bras, and derive every possible advantage from its possession, by checking, if not defeating in detail, any body of troops that might be approaching it as a point of concentration from either Nivelles or Brussels.

Hence he became extremely anxious for the arrival of D'ERLON's Corps and the promised Third Corps of Heavy Cavalry under KELLERMANN; the more so, as although LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTE's Light Cavalry of the Guard was nearer at hand, he had been desired by NAPOLEON not to make use of it. Officers of the _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard (in consequence of the deficiency of Staff Officers) were sent to the rear in the direction of Marchienne au Pont, with Orders to hasten the march of the First Corps upon Frasne; while NEY himself was busily occupied in reconnoitring the Enemy's position and movements.

Whilst so employed, a despatch reached him from the Emperor, acquainting him that he had just ordered KELLERMANN's Dragoons to march to Gosselies, where they would be at his disposal; stating, at the same time, his intention to withdraw LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTE's Light Cavalry of the Guard from the force under his command; and expressing a wish to be informed of the exact disposition of the First and Second Corps, and of the Cavalry Divisions attached to them, as also of the probable strength of the Enemy, and of the particulars which had been obtained concerning him.

* * * * *

The 5th Battalion of Dutch Militia, which arrived at Quatre Bras about seven o'clock, was ordered, some time afterwards, to occupy the Farm of Gemioncourt. The other Battalions of BYLANDT's Brigade, as they arrived in succession, formed a Reserve, extending itself from the point of intersection of the two high roads along the Nivelles road, and in rear of the Wood of Bossu. About nine o'clock, Captain STIEVENAAR's Foot Battery attached to BYLANDT's Brigade also arrived at Quatre Bras.

Aided by these reinforcements, the Prince of ORANGE made his dispositions for impeding as much as possible the expected French attack, and maintaining his ground in front of Quatre Bras until the arrival of the Allied troops, which he knew were rapidly approaching from Brussels and Nivelles. The arrival of the First Brigade induced him to make a further advance, and extension to the right, of the Second Brigade; retaining a firm hold of the Wood of Bossu.

He disposed of his Artillery in the following manner: upon the high road, in advance of his Centre and in front of Frasne, he placed two guns of PERPONCHER's Divisional Horse Artillery; three guns a little in left rear of these, and three guns towards the left, so as to keep the road to Namur in view. He also placed six guns of the Divisional Foot Artillery a little to the right of, and in line with, the advanced guns of the Horse Battery, and the remaining two guns on the Right Wing of his First Line.

His Royal Highness had unfortunately no Cavalry in the Field; yet such was the firm countenance which he displayed in the arrangement of his nine Battalions and sixteen guns that the Enemy, unaware of this circumstance, and probably misled by the appearance, at an early hour, of the chain of Vedettes formed by the Prussian Detachment of Hussars, to which allusion has previously been made, and also conceiving that a considerable force had already assembled at Quatre Bras, made no vigorous attempt, until the afternoon, to dislodge him from his position.

Between ten and eleven o'clock, the Duke of WELLINGTON arrived in person at Quatre Bras, where he joined the Prince of ORANGE, of whose dispositions he fully approved. He reconnoitred the ground; observed only a few of the Enemy in front, who occasionally fired a shot; saw that there was a little popping musketry, but that nothing more serious was at that time threatened in this quarter.

Conceiving that the Enemy was not in any great force at Frasne, while at the same time, accounts reached him that Prince BLÜCHER, in his position at Ligny, was menaced by the advance of considerable masses; the Duke, accompanied by his Staff and a small escort of Cavalry, shortly afterwards rode off to hold a conference with the Prussian Commander, whom he found at the Windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and Bry; whence he had an opportunity of observing the French preparatory dispositions for attack.

These having led the Duke to conclude that NAPOLEON was bringing the main force of his Army to bear against BLÜCHER, he at once proposed to assist the Prince by first advancing straight upon Frasne and Gosselies, as soon as he should have concentrated sufficient force, and then operating upon the Enemy's Left and Rear, which would afford a powerful diversion in favour of the Prussians, from the circumstance that their Right Wing was the weakest and most exposed, and considering the object of NAPOLEON's movement, the one most likely to be attacked.

Upon a calculation being made, however, of the time which would elapse ere the Duke would be able to collect the requisite force for undertaking this operation, and of the possibility of BLÜCHER being defeated before it could be carried into effect, it was considered preferable that WELLINGTON should, if practicable, move to the support of the Prussian Right by the Namur road. But a direct support of this kind was necessarily contingent on circumstances, and subject to the Duke's discretion. The latter having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive, rode back to Quatre Bras.

* * * * *

It was nearly eleven o'clock when General FLAHAUT, an Aide de Camp of the Emperor, after passing through Gosselies, arrived at Frasne, with the following letter from the latter to the Marshal:

"Au Maréchal NEY. "To Marshal NEY.

"MON COUSIN--Je vous envoie MY COUSIN--I send you my mon Aide de Camp, le Général Aide de Camp, General FLAHAUT; FLAHAUT, qui vous porte la présente who brings you the present letter. lettre. Le Major Général a dû vous The Major General [SOULT] will donner des Ordres; mais vous give you the Orders; but you will recevrez les miens plus tôt, parceque receive mine sooner, because my mes Officiers vont plus vite Officers go quicker than his. You que les siens. Vous recevrez will receive the Order of Movement l'Ordre du Mouvement du Jour; of the Day: but I wish to write to mais je veux vous en écrire en you respecting it in detail, détail, parceque c'est de la plus because it is of the highest haute importance. importance.

"Je porte le Maréchal GROUCHY "I direct Marshal GROUCHY with avec les 3e et 4e Corps d'infanterie the Third and Fourth Corps of sur Sombref. Je porte ma Garde Infantry on Sombref. I direct à Fleurus, et j'y serai de ma personne my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall avant midi. J'y attaquerai be there personally before noon. l'Ennemi si je le rencontre, et I shall attack the Enemy there j'éclairerai la route jusqu'à Gembloux. if I meet with him, and I shall La d'après ce qui ce clear the road as far as Gembloux. passera, je prendrai mon parti There, according to what will peutêtre à trois heures après midi, happen, I shall make my decision; peutêtre ce soir. Mon intention perhaps at three o'clock in the est que, immédiatement après que afternoon, perhaps this evening. j'aurai pris mon parti, vous soyez My intention is that, immediately prêt à marcher sur Bruxelles, je after I shall have made my vous appuierai avec la Garde qui decision, you may be ready to sera à Fleurus ou à Sombref, et march on Brussels. I will support je désirerais arriver à Bruxelles you with the Guard which will be demain matin. Vous vous mettriez at Fleurus or at Sombref; and I en marche ce soir même si je would desire to arrive at Brussels prends mon parti d'assez bonne to-morrow morning. You would march heure pour que vous puissiez en this evening even if I make my être informé de jour et faire ce decision at a sufficiently early soir trois ou quatre lieues et être hour that you may be informed of demain à sept heures du matin à it in daylight, and traverse this Bruxelles. evening three or four leagues, and be at Brussels to morrow at seven o'clock in the morning.

"Vous pouvez donc disposer vos "You may then dispose your troupes de la manière suivante:- troops in the following manner:- Première Division à deux lieues First Division at two leagues in en avant des Quatre Chemins s'il front of Quatre Bras, if in doing n'y a pas d'inconvénient. Six so there is no inconvenience. Six Divisions d'infanterie autour des Divisions of Infantry about Quatre Quatre Chemins, et une Division Bras; and one Division at Marbais, à Marbais, afin que je puisse so that I may draw it to myself at l'attirer à moi à Sombref, si j'en Sombref, if I should have need of avais besoin. Elle ne retarderait it. It would not otherwise retard d'ailleurs pas votre marche. Le your march. The Corps of the Corps du Comte DE VALMY, qui a Count DE VALMY, which has 3,000 3,000 Cuirassiers d'Élite, _Cuirassiers d'Élite_, at the à l'intersection du chemin des intersection of the Roman road with Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, that of Brussels, in order that I afin que je puisse l'attirer à moi, may draw it to myself if I should si j'en avais besoin; aussitot que have need of it: as soon as my mon parti sera pris, vous lui decision is made, you will send enverrez l'Ordre de venir vous him the Order to rejoin you. I rejoindre. Je désirerais avoir avec would desire to have with me the moi la Division de la Garde que Division of the Guard commanded by commande le General LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES, Général LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES, and I send you the two Divisions et je vous envoie les deux Divisions of the Corps of the Count DE du Corps du Comte DE VALMY VALMY to replace it. But in my pour la remplacer. Mais dans mon present design, I prefer to place PROJET ACTUEL, JE PRÉFÈRE PLACER LE the Count DE VALMY in such a Comte DE VALMY de manière à le manner as to be able to recall him rappeler si j'en avais besoin, et ne if I should have need of him; and point faire de fausses marches au not to make false marches for Général LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES; General LEFÈBVRE DESNOUETTES: puisqu'il est probable que je me since it is probable that I shall déciderai ce soir à marcher sur decide this evening to march on Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, Brussels with the Guard. However, couvrez la Division LEFÈBVRE cover LEFÈBVRE's Division par les deux Divisions de Cavalrie with the two Cavalry Divisions of D'ERLON et de REILLE, afin de D'ERLON and REILLE, in order to ménager la Garde; et que, s'il y spare the Guard; and that, if there avait quelque échauffourée avec shall be any affray there with the les Anglais, il est préférable que English, it may be with the Line ce soit sur la Ligne que sur la rather than with the Guard. Garde.

"J'ai adopté comme principe I have adopted as a general général pendant cette Campagne, principle during this Campaign de diviser mon Armée en deux to divide my Army into two Ailes et une Réserve. Votre Aile Wings and a Reserve. Your Wing sera composée des quatre Divisions will be composed of the four du 2e Corps, de deux Divisions Divisions of the Second Corps, de Cavalerie Légère, et de deux the two Light Cavalry Divisions, Divisions du Corps DE VALMY. and the two Divisions of the Corps Cela ne doit pas être loin de 45 à 50 DE VALMY. That ought not to be mille hommes. far from 45,000 to 50,000 men.

"Le Maréchal GROUCHY aura à "Marshal GROUCHY will have peu près la même force, et nearly the same force, and will commandera l'Aile Droite. La Garde command the Right Wing. The formera la Réserve, et je me porterai Guard will form the Reserve, and sur l'une ou l'autre Aile, I shall repair to one or other selon les circonstances. Le Major Wing according to circumstances. Général donné les Ordres les plus The Major General is giving the précis pour qu'il n'y ait aucune most precise Orders that there difficulté sur l'obéissance à vos may be no difficulty as regards Ordres lorsque vous serez détaché; obedience to your Orders when les Commandants de Corps devant you will be detached; the prendre mes Ordres directement Commanders of Corps must take quand je me trouve présent. Selon my Orders directly from me, when les circonstances, j'affaiblirai l'une I am present. According to ou l'autre Aile en augmentant ma circumstances, I shall weaken the Réserve. one, or the other, Wing in augmenting my Reserve.

"Vous sentez assez l'importance "You will sufficiently perceive attachée à la prise de Bruxelles. the importance attached to the Cela pourra d'ailleurs donner lieu capture of Brussels. That will à des accidents, car un mouvement otherwise give occasion to aussi prompt et aussi brusque incidents: for a movement equally isolera l'Armée Anglaise de Mons, prompt and abrupt will isolate the Ostende, etc. Je désire que vos English Army from Mons, Ostend, dispositions soient bien faites pour &c. I would desire that your qu'au premier Ordre, vos huit dispositions may be well made Divisions puissent marcher rapidement, that, at the first Order, your et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles. eight Divisions may march rapidly and without obstacle upon Brussels.

"N." "N."

"Charleroi, le 16 Juin, 1815." "Charleroi, 16th June 1815."

This letter, which was intended to convey to NEY a general notion of NAPOLEON's intentions, prescribed to him, at the same time, as a principle, that he was to consider his movements subordinate to those of the Emperor. The latter intimated his purpose of attacking the Enemy at Fleurus, should he find him there, and of pushing on as far as Gembloux, where he would decide upon his plan of further operation, "perhaps at three o'clock in the afternoon, perhaps in the evening;" immediately _after_ which NEY was to be ready to march upon Brussels, supported by NAPOLEON with the Guards, it being the Emperor's desire to reach that capital in the morning.

The idea of advancing upon Gembloux, and of capturing Brussels by a _coup de main_, which could only be effected by a vigorous repulse and signal defeat of the Corps of ZIETEN, and by a successful turning and partial dispersion of those of PIRCH and THIELEMANN, as also by the rapid march of a closely collected force under NEY, proves that NAPOLEON had either been insufficiently informed as to the general dispositions of his opponents, or had greatly miscalculated the degree of energy and promptitude required in his movements for the execution of such a design.

Very shortly afterwards, NEY received the official Order of Movement to which NAPOLEON adverted in his letter as having been sent by SOULT. It instructed him to put the Second and First _Corps d'Armée_, as also the Third Corps of Cavalry which had been placed at his disposal, in movement upon Quatre Bras; to take up a position at that point; thence to push forward reconnaissances as far as possible on the roads to Brussels and Nivelles, _d'où probablement l'Ennemi s'est retiré_; to establish, should he meet with no impediment, a Division with some Cavalry at Genappe; and to detach another Division towards Marbais, in order to cover the interval between Sombref and Quatre Bras. He was also to desire the General Officers commanding the two _Corps d'Armée_ to assemble their troops, collect the stragglers, and order up all the waggons belonging to the Artillery and to the Hospitals that might still be in the rear.

In pursuance of these instructions, NEY despatched Orders of Movement to Counts REILLE and D'ERLON.

The former was desired to put the Second Corps immediately on the march, for the purpose of taking up the following position:--the Fifth Division in rear of Genappe, upon the Heights which command that town, the left _appuied_ upon the high road; one or two Battalions covering all the _débouchés_ in advance on the Brussels road; the Ninth Division, following the movement of the Fifth, to take up a position in second line on the Heights to the right and left of the village of Bauterlet; the Sixth and Seventh Divisions at Quatre Bras.

It was at the same time intimated to REILLE that the three first Divisions of D'ERLON's Corps were to take post at Frasne; the Right Division to establish itself at Marbais along with PIRÉ's Division of Light Cavalry; that the former was to cover his (REILLE's) march towards Brussels, and both his Flanks; that two Divisions of KELLERMANN's Corps were to take post at Frasne and Liberchies; and that the Regiments of the Guard under Generals LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES and COLBERT were to remain in their actual position at Frasne.

This Order had scarcely been sent off to REILLE when NEY received from the latter a despatch, dated Gosselies, 16th June, a quarter past ten A.M., announcing his having just received from GIRARD (whose Division was still at Heppignies) a verbal report by one of his Officers, to the effect that the Enemy continued to occupy Fleurus with Light Cavalry; that hostile masses were observed advancing along the Namur road, the heads of their Columns reaching as far as St Amand; that these troops were gradually forming, and gaining ground; that as far as could be judged at that distance, the Columns appeared to consist of six Battalions each; and that movements of additional troops were perceived in their rear. REILLE added that General FLAHAUT, in passing through Gosselies, had made him acquainted with the purport of the Orders he was conveying to the Marshal, whereupon he had communicated with Count D'ERLON, in order that the latter might follow the movement which he (REILLE) had intended to commence as soon as the Divisions were under arms, but that in consequence of this report from GIRARD he would wait for the Marshal's further instructions, holding the troops ready to march.

About the same time, Orders reached NEY from NAPOLEON, desiring him to unite the Corps under REILLE and D'ERLON, and the Cavalry Corps under KELLERMANN, which latter, it was stated, was on the point of commencing its march towards him; remarking also, that with these troops he ought to be able to destroy whatever forces the Enemy might bring forward; that GROUCHY was going to advance upon Sombref; and that the Emperor was setting off for Fleurus, to which place the Marshal was to address his reports.

In consequence of these instructions, NEY became anxious for the speedy concentration of his troops, and again sent Orders to REILLE and D'ERLON to move up their Divisions. The information which he had obtained concerning the Enemy in his front, and GIRARD's report of the assembling of troops in front of Fleurus, induced him to be cautious in his proceedings, and not to attempt any impetuous onset until he could have all his force more in hand, instead of the greater portion of it being, as it then was, lengthened out in Columns of Route along the Charleroi high road; and, in this respect, his views were in perfect accordance with the last despatch which he had received from the Emperor, enjoining him in the first instance, to unite the two Corps of REILLE and D'ERLON. Hence, in debouching from his position at Frasne, about one o'clock, his advance was by no means vigorous: it was limited to a gradual pressing forward of the Light Troops, and amounted to little more than a reconnaissance.

About two o'clock, NEY, calculating that D'ERLON's Corps could not be far in his rear, and hoping that the sound of his cannonade would hasten its march, resolved to attack the Enemy's forces which intercepted his advance upon Quatre Bras. PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, constituting a strong line of Skirmishers with well disposed Supports, covered the advance of the Infantry Divisions of BACHELU and FOY, whilst that of JEROME followed as a Reserve.

The force with which NEY thus entered the field, consisted of Three Divisions of REILLE's Corps, of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, of 4 Batteries of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery: altogether--

16,189 Infantry 1,729 Cavalry 38 Guns.

The Prince of ORANGE's force consisted of DE PERPONCHER's Division (with the exception of the 7th Dutch Line Battalion); of 1 Battery of Foot, and 1 of Horse, Artillery: altogether--

6,832 Infantry 16 Guns.

It was not long after two o'clock when the Duke of WELLINGTON returned to Quatre Bras from the Prussian Army. He observed attentively, with his glass, the movements of the French, and told the Prince of ORANGE he would be attacked directly.

In a few minutes, the French advanced, and the Dutch-Belgian troops gradually retired; but the Prince, aware of the great advantages which the position of Quatre Bras would derive from the possession of the Farm of Gemioncourt, adjoining the Charleroi road, as also of the Wood of Bossu on the Right, and of the inclosures of Piermont on the Left Flank, endeavoured, with that view, to make a stand, as soon as his Centre reached the first named point. The 5th Battalion of Dutch Militia which occupied this Post, successfully withstood several attacks, during which NEY drew up his forces along the ridge which, intersecting the high road in the immediate (French) rear of Gemioncourt, extends on one side towards the Wood of Bossu, and on the other in the direction of Piermont.

The vast preponderance of force on the part of the French, was now quite manifest to the Prince of ORANGE, who found himself compelled to withdraw the main body of his troops into the Wood of Bossu, still retaining, however, the Post of Gemioncourt. He gave an Order to Captain STIEVENAAR's Foot Battery to fall back and take up a flanking position near the Wood. Here this Officer, who possessed the highest merit, lost not a moment in reopening his fire, but scarcely had he done so when he was mortally wounded. At the same moment one gun was damaged so as to become useless. The Enemy rapidly advanced in such superior force as to compel the Battery to resume its retreat. Captain BYLEVELD's Horse Battery retired by the opposite side of Gemioncourt. One of its limbers blew up, severely wounding an Officer, and occasioning the gun attached to it to be relinquished. The French pressed forward with their Light Troops; and part of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, seizing a favourable opportunity, gallantly charged the 27th Dutch Light Infantry, threw it into confusion, and made many prisoners. At this time a portion of BACHELU's Infantry Division on the right advanced towards the village of Piermont.

* * * * *

It was about half past two, or perhaps a quarter before three o'clock, when the Prince of ORANGE, whose situation had become extremely critical, as he directed his anxious looks towards that point of the horizon which was bounded by the elevated ground about Quatre Bras, had the inexpressible satisfaction of recognising, by their deep red masses, the arrival of British troops upon the field.

These comprised the Fifth Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir THOMAS PICTON, and consisting of the Eighth British Brigade, under Major General Sir JAMES KEMPT, the Ninth British Brigade, under Major General Sir DENIS PACK, and of the Fourth Hanoverian Brigade, under Colonel BEST. The head of the Column, leaving Quatre Bras on its right, turned down the Namur road, along which the Division was speedily drawn up; the British Brigades in Front, and the Hanoverian Brigade in Second Line. Captain RETTBERG's Battery of Hanoverian Foot Artillery took post on the right, and Major ROGERS's Battery of British Foot Artillery on the left, of the Division. The 1st Battalion of the 95th British Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sir ANDREW BARNARD, was despatched in haste towards the Village of Piermont, of which it was to endeavour to gain possession.

The French, on perceiving the arrival of the British Infantry, opened a furious cannonade from their Batteries, with a view to disturb its formation, while NEY, anxious to secure the vantage ground of a Field which he plainly foresaw, was likely to become the scene of a severe contest, renewed his attack upon Gemioncourt, still bravely defended by the 5th Dutch Militia. Hereupon, PERPONCHER, having received an Order to advance this Battalion along the high road, immediately placed himself at its head, as did also the Prince of ORANGE himself, who rode up to it at the same moment. The manner in which His Royal Highness personally led on his National Militia on this occasion, was distinguished by the most resolute and conspicuous gallantry. The Battalion was exposed to a most destructive fire from some guns which the Prince seemed determined to capture. Placing himself frequently at its head, and waving his hat, he presented in his own person so brilliant and heroic an example, that for a considerable time the Battalion maintained its ground most bravely against the far superior number of the Enemy. It was composed, however, of young and inexperienced soldiers, who had not attained sufficient confidence to fight in anything like deployed order; and, therefore, when, a few minutes afterwards, a swarm of Cavalry rushed upon it, it soon lost its compactness, and broke into a confused and hasty retreat; whilst the French Infantry succeeded in obtaining possession of the Farm, in which they firmly established themselves.

The Duke of WELLINGTON, who now assumed the command, was so much alive to the importance of maintaining Gemioncourt and its inclosures, that he gave directions for its immediate occupation by a British Regiment, but the one destined for this service having by some accident been otherwise disposed of, some delay occurred, and the 28th British Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sir CHARLES PHILIP BELSON, was then marched down towards that point, under the guidance of Lieutenant Colonel GOMM, on the Staff of the Fifth Division. As the Battalion approached the Farm, the latter was discovered to be already occupied by the French, whereupon it was withdrawn to its Division.

The Third Dutch-Belgian Light Cavalry Brigade, under General VAN MERLEN, had shortly before this reached the Field, and now advanced to the support of the Dutch Infantry retiring from Gemioncourt; but they were met and defeated by PIRÉ's Cavalry, and pursued along the high road nearly to Quatre Bras, where they arrived in great disorder; a portion of them coming in contact with the Duke of WELLINGTON himself, and carrying his Grace along with them to the rear of Quatre Bras. The latter, however, succeeded in arresting their further flight, and in bringing them again to the front. The French Cavalry did not, on this occasion, follow up the pursuit, evidently hesitating to approach very near to the Allied Infantry, the latter appearing well formed, and fully prepared to receive them. The Dutch-Belgian Infantry retreated to the Wood of Bossu, abandoning four guns to the Enemy, who closely pursued them, and now began to penetrate into the Wood.

Meanwhile, BACHELU, on the French Right, threw a considerable force into Piermont in sufficient time to secure its possession before the 1st Battalion 95th British Regiment had approached the Village, and was pushing forward another strong body towards a small Wood that lay still more in advance, on the opposite side of the Namur high road, the possession of which along with that of Piermont would have effectually cut off the direct communication between Quatre Bras and Ligny. Here, for the first time in this Campaign, the troops of the two nations became engaged. The Skirmishers who successfully checked the further advance of the French, and secured the Wood, were the 1st Battalion of the British 95th Rifles, whom the old Campaigners of the French Army, at least those who had served in the Peninsula, had so frequently found the foremost in the fight, and of whose peculiarly effective discipline and admirable training they had had ample experience.

The possession of Gemioncourt proved of the utmost importance to NEY's position, which now assumed a definite character, and, in a purely tactical point of view, offered great advantages. The southern portion of the Wood of Bossu was occupied by his extreme Left, while his extreme Right was in full possession of Piermont; and these points were connected by a narrow valley extending along his whole front, bounded on either side by a hedgerow, and intersecting the Charleroi road close to Gemioncourt. The outer fence was strongly occupied by his Light Troops, ready to cover the formation and advance of his Columns of Attack, for the support of which by Artillery, the Heights constituting his main position in rear of Gemioncourt, offered every facility.

Scarcely had PICTON's Division taken up its ground, when the Duke of BRUNSWICK's Corps arrived upon the field. It was not complete; its Artillery (under Major MAHN) and the 1st and 3rd Light Battalions (commanded by Major HOLSTEIN and Major EBELING), having been stationed in distant cantonments, had not yet joined. The 2nd Light Battalion (under Major BRANDENSTEIN) was immediately detached to the Wood near Piermont on the left of the position, and of which the possession had already been secured by the 1st Battalion of the British 95th Regiment: the two Rifle Companies of the Advanced Guard Battalion (under Major RAUSCHENPLATT) were moved into the Wood of Bossu; on the right of which some detachments of Cavalry were posted for the purpose of observing the Enemy's dispositions in that quarter. The remainder of these troops, by a movement to their left, when close upon Quatre Bras, deployed in rear of, and in a direction parallel to, the Namur road, thus forming a Reserve to PICTON's Division. The absent portion of the Corps reached the field in the course of the action, as will hereafter be explained.

The Duke of WELLINGTON's force in the Field at this moment was as follows:--

+------------------------------------------------+--------+-------+----+ | |Infantry|Cavalry|Guns| + +--------+-------+----+ |British {|Eighth Infantry Brigade | 2,471| | | | {|Ninth do. do. | 2,173| | | | | | | | | |K.G. Legion |Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6| | | | | | | |Hanoverians {|Fourth Infantry Brigade | 2,582| | | | {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6| | | | | | | |Brunswickers {|Advanced Guard Battalion | 672| | | | {|2 Battalions of the Light | | | | | {| Infantry Brigade | 1,344| | | | {|Line Infantry Brigade | 2,016| | | | {|Regiment of Hussars | | 690| | | {|Squadron of Lancers | | 232| | | | | | | | |Dutch-Belgians {|Second Infantry Brigade | 6,832| | | | {|Third Cavalry Brigade | | 1,082| | | {|Half Battery of Horse Artillery| | | 2| | {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 8| | {| Do. Horse do. | | | 8| | | +--------+-------+----+ | | | 18,090| 2,004| 30| +----------------+-------------------------------+--------+--------+----+

The following is the amount of force which Marshal NEY had actually in the Field:--

+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+ | |Infantry.|Cavalry.| Guns| | +---------+--------+-----+ |Fifth Infantry Division | 5,003| | | |Sixth do. do. | 6,591| | | |Ninth do. do. | 4,595| | | |3 Divisional Foot Batteries | | | 24| |1 Reserve Foot Battery | | | 8| |Second Cavalry Division | | 1,729| | |1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6| | +---------+--------+-----+ | | 16,189| 1,729| 38| +-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+

The cannonade which had opened against the Fifth British Division as it took up its ground, continued with unabated vigour. The French Light Troops were now observed advancing from the inclosures that skirted the foot of their position, and to meet them the Light Companies of the different Regiments of PICTON's Division were immediately thrown forward. On the French extreme Right all further progress was checked by the gallant manner in which the 1st Battalion 95th British Regiment, though opposed by a much superior force, retained possession of the Namur road, which they lined with their Skirmishers, while the Wood in rear was occupied by the Battalion Reserve and the 2nd Brunswick Light Battalion. On the French Left, however, the incessant rattle of musketry in the Wood of Bossu plainly indicated by its gradual approach in the direction of Quatre Bras, that the Dutch-Belgian Infantry were yielding to the fierce onset of the Enemy in that quarter.

The protection which the French would derive from the possession of the eastern portion of this Wood for the advance of their masses over the space between it and the Charleroi road, instantly became apparent to the British Commander; in fact, the previous pursuit of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry along this road proved the expediency of establishing some restraint to such facility for a hostile advance in that direction; and he therefore requested the Duke of BRUNSWICK to take up a position with a part of his Corps between Quatre Bras and Gemioncourt, so as to have his Left resting upon the road, and his Right communicating with PERPONCHER's Division, part of which was deployed along the skirt of the Wood.

The Duke of BRUNSWICK immediately ordered forward the Guard Battalion (under Major PRÖSTLER), the 1st Line Battalion (under Major METZNER), and the two Light Companies of the Advanced Guard Battalion, which he posted in Close Columns upon, and contiguous to, the road, on the ground indicated, and threw out a line of Skirmishers connecting these Columns with the two _Jäger_ Companies in the Wood. As an immediate Support to the Infantry, he stationed the Brunswick Hussars (under Major CRAMM) and Lancers (under Major POTT) in a hollow in their rear; while as a Reserve to the whole, the 2nd and 3rd Line Battalions (under Major STROMBECK and Major NORRMANN) were posted _en crémaillère_ contiguously to the houses of Quatre Bras, which important point they were to defend to the last extremity.

Whilst this disposition on the Anglo-Allied Right was in progress, two heavy French Columns were observed descending into a valley below Gemioncourt, where, under cover of the strong line of Skirmishers, which had been for some time engaged with those of PICTON's Division, they were divided into separate smaller Columns of Attack. The cannonade from the French Heights, which now sensibly quickened, was telling fearfully amidst the Fifth British Division; and a fresh impulse having been given to the Enemy's Light Troops by the near approach of their own attacking Columns, the British Skirmishers, overpowered by numbers only, were seen darting, alternately and at short distances, to the rear, through the line of smoke that had been raised midway between the contending Armies.

At this critical moment, when the rapid progress of the French in the Wood of Bossu, and their imposing advance against his Left Wing, threatened to compromise his disposal of the Brunswick troops on the right of the Charleroi road, WELLINGTON, by one of those electric inspirations of his master mind with which he had been wont in former Campaigns to frustrate the best devised plans of his opponents, resolved not to await the attack, but to meet it. He instantly ordered the advance of KEMPT's and PACK's Brigades, with the exception of the 92nd Regiment, which (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel CAMERON) was to continue at its post on the Namur road, close to Quatre Bras.

During the advance of these two Brigades, which was made with admirable steadiness and in the best order, the Skirmishers fell back upon their respective Battalions, all of which now presented a clear front to the Enemy. From the heads of NEY's Columns, as well as from the thick lines of Skirmishers by which they were connected, a severe and destructive fire was opened and maintained against the British line, along which the gallant PICTON, the far famed Leader of the no less renowned "Fighting Division" of the British Army in the Peninsular Campaigns, was seen galloping from one Regiment to another, encouraging his men, and inciting them by his presence and example. The troops significantly responded to his call by those loud and animating shouts with which British soldiers are wont to denote their eagerness to close with their enemies. The interval between the adverse lines was rapidly diminishing: the fire from the French suddenly began to slacken; hesitation, quickly succeeded by disorder, became apparent in their ranks; and then it was, that, animating each other with redoubled cheers, the British Regiments were seen to lower their bristling bayonets, and driving everything before them, to pursue their opponents down to the outer fence of the valley, whence the French line had advanced in the full confidence of triumph.

KEMPT's Brigade, in consequence of the greater proximity of its original position to that of the Enemy, was the first to overthrow the French Infantry. The 79th Highlanders, on the left of the line (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DOUGLAS), made a gallant charge down the hill, dashed through the first fence, and pursued their opponents, who had advanced in two Battalion Columns, not only across the valley, but through the second fence; and, carried on by their ardour, even ventured to ascend the Enemy's position. By this time, however, their ranks were much broken: they were speedily recalled, and as they retraced their steps across the valley, they derived considerable support from the adjoining Battalion in the line, the 32nd Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel MAITLAND), which was keeping up from the first hedge a vigorous fire against the French, who now lined the second fence. The remaining Regiments of both Brigades had all in like manner charged down as far as the nearest hedge, whence they inflicted a severe loss upon their Enemies as these precipitately retired, with their ranks completely broken and disordered on passing through the inclosure.

On the right of the line, the 42nd Highlanders (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT MACARA), and 44th Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel HAMERTON), had advanced to within a very short distance of Gemioncourt, in which, and behind the hedges lining the valley, the French were seeking shelter.

During the progress of this contest on the Anglo-Allied left of the Charleroi road, the Brunswick troops were not permitted to remain in quiet possession of their advanced position on the right, which indeed was well calculated to attract NEY's attention. A Battery was immediately drawn up on the opposite Height westward of Gemioncourt, from which, as also from the incessant fire maintained by the Enemy's Skirmishers posted at no great distance from the front of the line, a very destructive fire was maintained against the Brunswick troops. The Regiment of Hussars particularly suffered, standing in line, and frequently receiving an entire discharge from the Battery. The Brunswickers were, for the most part, young and inexperienced soldiers--in every sense of the word, _raw_ troops: and the numerous casualties which befel their ranks in this exposed situation might have produced a fatal influence upon their discipline, but for the noble example of their Prince, whose admirable tact and calm demeanour were most conspicuous on this trying occasion. Quietly smoking his pipe in front of his line, he gave out his Orders as if at a mere field day; and was only restrained from taking offence at the representations made to him by some of his Staff of the imminent danger to which he was exposing himself, from a consciousness of the kindly motives by which they were dictated.

At length, the continued havoc created amongst his devoted followers by the fire from the French Heights, excited the impatience of the Duke himself for at least the means of retaliation; and as his own Artillery was still upon the march from its cantonments, he sent to the Duke of WELLINGTON a request to be furnished with some pieces of cannon.

This was immediately acceded to, and four guns were moved forward and posted on the right of the Brunswick Infantry; but they had scarcely fired a few rounds when the Enemy's cannonade was redoubled; two of the guns were quickly disabled, and several of the horses attached to the limbers were killed. At the same time, two Columns of French Infantry were seen advancing in succession along the edge of the Wood of Bossu, preceded by a Battalion in line, and supported by some Cavalry, of which description of force there also appeared to be a considerable mass advancing along the Charleroi road. As the French Infantry rapidly approached the right of the line of the Brunswick Skirmishers, the latter were forced to retire, as were also the Dutch-Belgian Infantry that lined the Wood at this part of the field. The Duke of BRUNSWICK, perceiving that the bend of the wood in rear of his Regiment of Hussars was likely to impede the freedom of its movements, immediately ordered the latter to proceed to the opposite side of the Charleroi road, and retire towards Quatre Bras, there to remain in readiness to act according to circumstances. Then, placing himself at the head of his Lancers, he gallantly charged the advancing Infantry, which, however, received them with so much steadiness and good order, and opened upon them so destructive a fire, that the attack completely failed, and the Regiment withdrew to Quatre Bras.

Finding the strength of the Enemy's forces to be so overpowering, the Duke now ordered the Infantry posted contiguously to the Charleroi road, also to retire upon the main position. The 1st Line Battalion moved hastily along the road, while the Guard Battalion, with which the Duke himself was at this time present, retired across the fields eastward of the isolated House upon the Charleroi road, towards the Allied line, posted upon the road to Namur. Major PRÖSTLER, who commanded the Guard Battalion, rendered himself conspicuous by his exertions to execute this movement in as orderly a manner as possible, but the eager and close pursuit by the French Light Troops, now emboldened by success, a shower of round shot upon the Column, and the approach of the Enemy's Cavalry, spread such a panic among these young troops that they fled in confusion, some through Quatre Bras, and others through the Anglo-Allied line on the left of that point; and it was in the moment of attempting to rally his soldiers, not far from the little garden of the House before mentioned, that the Duke of BRUNSWICK was struck from his horse by a shot which terminated the career of this gallant Prince.

In the mean time the Brunswick Hussars were ordered forward to cover the retreat of the Infantry, and repel the advance of the French Cavalry, which was now seen in rapid motion along the Charleroi road, as if incited and emboldened by the loud shouts of triumph sent forth by their Light Troops in front. The Hussars, whose order while advancing, was quickly disturbed by a straggling fire from the French Infantry, to which their Right Flank became exposed, failed in producing the slightest check upon the Cavalry, and were soon seen wheeling about and in full flight, closely pursued by their opponents.

To the 42nd Highlanders and 44th British Regiment, which were posted on a reverse slope, and in line, close upon the left of the above road, the advance of French Cavalry was so sudden and unexpected, the more so as the Brunswickers had just moved on to the front, that as both these bodies whirled past them to the rear, in such close proximity to each other, they were, for the moment, considered to consist of one mass of Allied Cavalry. Some of the old soldiers of both Regiments were not so easily satisfied on this point, and immediately opened a partial fire obliquely upon the French Lancers, which, however, Sir DENIS PACK and their own Officers endeavoured as much as possible to restrain; but no sooner had the latter succeeded in causing a cessation of the fire, than the Lancers, which were the rearmost of the Cavalry, wheeled sharply round, and advanced in admirable order directly upon the rear of the two British Regiments.

The 42nd Highlanders having, from their position, been the first to recognise them as a part of the Enemy's forces, rapidly formed Square; but just as the two Flank Companies were running in to form the rear face, the Lancers had reached the Regiment, when a considerable portion of their leading division penetrated the Square, carrying along with them, by the impetus of their charge, several men of those two Companies, and creating a momentary confusion. The long tried discipline and steadiness of the Highlanders, however, did not forsake them at this most critical juncture: these Lancers, instead of effecting the destruction of the Square, were themselves fairly hemmed into it, and either bayoneted or taken prisoners, while the endangered face, restored as if by magic, successfully repelled all further attempts on the part of the French to complete their expected triumph. Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sir ROBERT MACARA, was killed on this occasion, a lance having pierced through his chin until it reached the brain; and within the brief space of a few minutes, the command of the Regiment devolved upon three other Officers in succession: Lieutenant Colonel DICK, who was severely wounded, Brevet Major DAVIDSON, who was mortally wounded, and Brevet Major CAMPBELL, who commanded it during the remainder of the Campaign.

If this Cavalry attack had fallen so unexpectedly upon the 42nd Highlanders, still less had it been anticipated by the 44th Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel HAMERTON, perceiving that the Lancers were rapidly advancing against his rear, and that any attempt to form square would be attended with imminent danger, instantly decided upon receiving them in line. The low thundering sound of their approach was heard by his men before a conviction they were French flashed across the minds of any but the _old_ soldiers who had previously fired at them as they passed their Flank. HAMERTON's words of command were, "Rear rank, right about face!"--"Make ready!"--(a short pause to admit of the still nearer approach of the Cavalry)--"Present!"--"Fire!" The effect produced by this volley was astonishing. The men, aware of their perilous position, doubtless took a most deliberate aim at their opponents, who were thrown into great confusion. Some few daring fellows made a dash at the centre of the Battalion, hoping to capture the Colours, in their apparently exposed situation; but the attempt, though gallantly made, was as gallantly defeated. The Lancers now commenced a flight towards the French position by the Flanks of the 44th. As they rushed past the Left Flank, the Officer commanding the Light Company, who had very judiciously restrained his men from joining in the volley given to the rear, opened upon them a scattering fire; and no sooner did the Lancers appear in the proper front of the Regiment, when the front rank began in its turn to contribute to their overthrow and destruction.

Never, perhaps, did British Infantry display its characteristic coolness and steadiness more eminently than on this trying occasion. To have stood in a thin two deep line, awaiting, and prepared to receive, the onset of hostile Cavalry, would have been looked upon at least as a most hazardous experiment; but, with its rear so suddenly menaced, and its flanks unsupported, to have instantly faced only one rank about, to have stood as if rooted to the ground, to have repulsed its assailants with so steady and well directed a fire that numbers of them were destroyed--this was a feat of arms which the oldest or best disciplined Corps in the world might have in vain hoped to accomplish; yet most successfully and completely was this achieved by the gallant 2nd Battalion of the 44th British Regiment, under its brave Commander, Lieutenant Colonel HAMERTON.

In this attack occurred one of these incidents which, in daring, equal any of the feats of ancient chivalry, which makes the wildest fables of the deeds of the knights of old appear almost impossible; which cause the bearing of an individual to stand out, as it were, in relief amidst the operations of the masses; and which, by their characteristic recklessness, almost invariably insure at least a partial success.

A French Lancer gallantly charged at the Colours, and severely wounded Ensign CHRISTIE, who carried one of them, by a thrust of his lance, which, entering the left eye, penetrated to the lower jaw. The Frenchman then endeavoured to seize the Standard, but the brave CHRISTIE, notwithstanding the agony of his wound, with a presence of mind almost unequalled, flung himself upon it--not to save himself, but to preserve the honour of his Regiment. As the Colour fluttered in its fall, the Frenchman tore off a portion of the silk with the point of his lance; but he was not permitted to bear the fragment beyond the ranks. Both shot and bayoneted by the nearest of the soldiers of the 44th, he was borne to the earth, paying with the sacrifice of his life for his display of unavailing bravery.

In the mean time, the leading portion of PIRÉ's Light Cavalry, from which the Lancers that attacked the 42nd and 44th British Regiments had been detached, as already described, continued its advance along the high road towards Quatre Bras, driving in the Brunswick Hussars, who were now galloping confusedly upon the 92nd Highlanders then lining the ditch of the Namur high road contiguous to Quatre Bras. Pursued by the _Chasseurs à Cheval_, and finding no opening for their passage, they made for the Right Flank of the Regiment: and, as they were flying past, the Grenadier Company was wheeled back upon the road so as to oppose a front at that point to the flank of the pursuing Cavalry, upon which the Highlanders now poured a most destructive volley. The shock thus occasioned to the French Cavalry was immediately perceptible; but though thrown into confusion, the main body soon reformed, and retired with much steadiness and regularity.

The front of the Column, however, impelled by the furious ardour with which it had advanced, or, perhaps, imagining itself still followed and supported by the main body, dashed in amongst the houses of Quatre Bras, and even advanced to some distance beyond them, cutting down several stragglers whom they found there, principally belonging to the routed Brunswick Infantry, as also groups of wounded. Many of them rushed through the large opening into the Farm Yard of Quatre Bras, which was situated immediately in rear of the Right of the 92nd. A few daring fellows finding they had proceeded too far to be able to retire by the same direction in which they had advanced, wheeled round suddenly at the point where the high roads intersect each other, and galloped right through the Grenadier Company of the Highlanders, shouting, and brandishing their swords, and receiving a fire from some of the rear rank of the Regiment as they dashed along the road. None of them escaped: one, an Officer of the _Chasseurs à Cheval_, had already reached the spot where the Duke of WELLINGTON was at that moment stationed in rear of the Highlanders. Some of the men immediately turned round and fired: his horse was killed, and at the same moment a musket ball passed through each foot of the gallant young Officer. Those of the French _Chasseurs_ who had entered the Farm Yard, finding no other outlet, now began to gallop back, in small parties of two or three at a time, but few escaped the deadly fire of the Highlanders.

About this time, KELLERMANN reached the Field, with the Eleventh Heavy Cavalry Division under Lieutenant General L'HERITIER. This augmented NEY's forces to the following amount:

+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+ | |Infantry. | Cavalry. |Guns.| | +----------+-----------+-----+ |Force already in the Field | 16,189| 1,865| 38| |Eleventh Cavalry Division | | 1,743| | |1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6| | +----------+-----------+-----+ | | 16,189| 3,608| 41| +-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+

The French Infantry upon the extreme Left had by this time possessed themselves of the greater portion of the Wood of Bossu, from the Allied rear of which numerous groups of wounded and runaways were now seen to emerge; indeed, it soon became evident that no dependance could be placed on the continued occupation of the Wood by the Dutch-Belgian forces, and that the whole brunt of the Battle would have to be borne by the British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick forces. Upon the extreme French Right, all attempts to turn the opposite Flank of the Allies were successfully checked by the steadiness and gallantry of the 95th British Regiment, supported by the 2nd Brunswick Light Battalion.

NEY, although he had failed in his first general attack upon the Anglo-Allied line, had fully ascertained that the raw troops of which the Dutch-Belgian and Brunswick Cavalry in the Field were composed, were totally incapable of competing with his own veteran warriors of that Arm, and he therefore determined to take advantage of KELLERMANN's arrival for the execution of a vigorous Cavalry attack. Retaining General PIQUET's Brigade in reserve, he combined, for this purpose, General GUYTON's Brigade, consisting of the 8th and 11th _Cuirassiers_, with PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division; and also taking advantage of his greatly superior Artillery force, he caused the attack to be preceded and covered by a tremendous cannonade, occasioning great havoc in the ranks of the Anglo-Allied Infantry, the range for which the French Gunners had by this time ascertained with fearful precision.

It was not long before the British Battalions most in advance were warned of the approach of hostile Cavalry by the running in of their Skirmishers; and scarcely had they formed their Squares when the Batteries respectively opposed to them having ceased their fire, a rushing sound was heard through the tall corn, which, gradually bending, disclosed to their view the heads of the attacking Columns; and now began a conflict wherein the cool and daring intrepidity with which British Infantry are accustomed to defy the assaults of Cavalry was exemplified in a manner that will ever reflect honour and glory upon the Regiments to whose lot it fell, on this memorable Field, to assert and maintain their country's prowess. A rolling fire from the muskets of the 42nd Highlanders and 44th British Regiment, given at a moment when the Enemy's horsemen were almost close upon their bayonets, though most destructive in its effects upon their own immediate opponents, checked not the ardour and impetuosity of the general attack. These two diminutive Squares, now completely surrounded by the French Cavalry, seemed destined to become a sacrifice to the fury with which a rapid succession of attacks was made upon them; no sooner was one Squadron hurled back in confusion, than another rushed impetuously forward upon the same face of a Square, to experience a similar fate; and sometimes different faces were charged simultaneously.

A strong body of _Cuirassiers_ now passed the Right Flank of the two Regiments, along the high road, with an evident intention of making another attempt upon Quatre Bras.

PICTON, who had been watching with intense anxiety the contest maintained by the 42nd and 44th British Regiments in their exposed situation, and who had become convinced of the utter hopelessness of obtaining any efficient support from the Allied Cavalry then in the field, could no longer restrain his impatience to fly to the rescue of the devoted Squares; and, as a substitute for Cavalry, he decided upon immediately assailing that of the Enemy with his own oft tried Infantry. With this view, he united the Royals (under Lieutenant Colonel COLIN CAMPBELL) and the 28th Regiment, both of which Corps were at that moment standing in Column at quarter distance. Led on by both PICTON and KEMPT, the united Column, with loud shouts, boldly advanced into the midst of the Enemy's Cavalry; the whole extent of ground along its front appeared to swarm with Lancers, _Chasseurs à Cheval_, and _Cuirassiers_, a considerable portion of whom were now seen rapidly forming for an attack upon the Column; but PICTON constantly on the alert, and at the same time desirous of arriving at such a distance as would enable him to present an efficient flank fire in support of the 44th Regiment, continued advancing until the last moment, when he suddenly formed it into Square.

The repeated and furious charges which ensued, were invariably repulsed by the Royals and the 28th, with the utmost steadiness and consummate bravery; and although the Lancers individually dashed forward and frequently wounded the men in the ranks, yet all endeavours to effect an opening, of which the succeeding Squadron of Attack might take advantage, completely failed. The ground on which the Square stood was such that the surrounding remarkably tall rye concealed it in a great measure, in the first attacks, from the view of the French Cavalry until the latter came quite close upon it; but to remedy this inconvenience, and to preserve the impetus of their charge, the Lancers had frequently recourse to sending forward a daring individual to plant a lance in the earth at a very short distance from the bayonets, and they then charged upon the lance flag as a mark of direction.

The advance of the Royals and the 28th had been almost immediately followed, under the same form, by that of the 32nd Regiment, which, having reached a convenient distance, halted, and formed Square so as to support, at the same time, by a flank fire, the Royals and 28th, and the Square of the 79th Highlanders, which latter Regiment constituted a connecting link with the 95th British Regiment upon the extreme Left.

Upon the advance of the Regiments belonging to KEMPT's and PACK's British Brigades, BEST's Hanoverian Brigade occupied the Namur road in their rear, along which the Landwehr Battalions Lüneburg, Osterode, and Münden (respectively commanded by Lieutenant Colonel RAMDOHR, Major REDEN, and Major SCHMID) were deployed, while the Landwehr Battalion Verden (under Major DECKEN), also in line, was posted somewhat in advance.

In this position, PICTON's Division sustained repeated assaults of the French Cavalry, which attacked the Squares simultaneously, and in every direction: as a portion rushed upon one Square, other Squadrons passed on to assail the next; some parties, taking advantage of sinuosities of the ground, awaited, like birds of prey, the favourable moment for pouncing upon their victims; no sooner was one attacking Squadron driven back and dispersed by a stream of musketry from the face of a Square, than a fresh party would rush from its cover upon the same ranks, in the vain hope that the means of breaking its onset had been expended; but a reserved fire never failed to bring down upon it a similar fate. Viewed from a little distance, the British Squares could at times be scarcely discerned amidst the surrounding Cavalry; and as the latter was frequently observed flying back from sudden discharges of musketry, a spectator might easily have imagined the Squares to be so many immense bombs, with every explosion scattering death and confusion among the masses that rushed so daringly into their fatal vicinity.

The French Cavalry, by its repeated failures to make any impression on the British Infantry by the manner in which it had passed through and through the intervals between the Squares, and in which the charging Squadrons when dispersed had got intermingled, was now in great disorder--Lancers, _Chasseurs_, and _Cuirassiers_, were mixed together and crossing one another in every direction, seeking out their respective Corps. To retire and reform had therefore become with them an absolutely necessary measure; but this afforded no respite to the devoted Squares, against which the Batteries upon the French Heights now played with terrific effect.

* * * * *

During the French attack of the British Squares on the eastern side of the Charleroi road, a considerable body of _Cuirassiers_ advanced along the latter, with the evident design of making another attack upon the Anglo-Allied Centre at Quatre Bras. The Belgian Cavalry, which was again ordered forward, endeavoured to check this movement, but with no better effect than that which attended its former attempt; in fact, it retired sooner, charged and pursued by the _Cuirassiers_, against whom a rapid fire was now opened from the 92nd Highlanders, who still lined the ditch of the Namur road, close to Quatre Bras, a fire so destructive in its effects that the steel clad warriors were completely staggered, and the order of their advance so thoroughly shaken that they were compelled to retire in confusion.

* * * * *

In addition to the furious cannonade to which they were subjected, the foremost of PICTON's British Battalions, more especially the 42nd and 44th Regiments, were exposed to a rapid and destructive fire, which, as soon as the Enemy's Cavalry had been withdrawn, was opened upon them by the French troops advancing from the inclosures of Gemioncourt. To check this, Skirmishers were thrown forward, but from the want of sufficient ammunition, they could reply but very feebly to the fire of their opponents, who, not suffering the same disadvantage, were picking them off as fast as they could load. Their line soon became fearfully thinned, and finally their ammunition was totally exhausted, to which circumstance the Officer on whom the command of them had devolved (Lieutenant RIDDOCK, 44th Regiment) called the attention of Sir DENIS PACK, who ordered him to close his men to their centre and to join his own Regiment.

He had just executed the first part of the Order, when the French Cavalry having rallied and reformed, renewed their attacks upon the British Squares. Squadrons of _Cuirassiers_ and Lancers, in their onward course, swept past Lieutenant RIDDOCK and his party, while others intercepted his direct line of retreat. He instantly formed four deep, and with his front rank at the charge, he made good his way through the Enemy's Cavalry, as far as the south face of the Square formed by the 44th Regiment; which, however, was so hotly pressed at the moment as to be unable to receive him, whereupon he ordered his men to lie down close to their bayonets, until a favourable opportunity should offer for their admission within the Square.

A repetition of the former scene on this part of the Field now took place, and the attacks, which were conducted with similar impetuosity, were met by a resistance equally undaunted. As if to overawe the Square formed by the Royals and 28th British Regiments, the French Cavalry now made a simultaneous attack upon three of its faces, and these consisted mainly of the latter Corps. PICTON, who was again in the Square, upon perceiving the approach of this apparently overwhelming force, suddenly and emphatically exclaimed, "28th! remember Egypt!" They answered him with a loud cheer, and reserving their fire until the Cavalry had approached within a few yards of the Square, their muskets were coolly and deliberately levelled at their assailants, who in the next moment were hurled back in wild disorder, horses and riders tumbling over one another, and creating indescribable confusion. Similar in their results were all the attacks made upon the other British Squares, which maintained their ground with the same unshaken steadiness and gallantry.

These repeated charges by the French Cavalry, though conducted by veteran soldiers, with admirable order and compactness, and though affording innumerable instances of individual gallantry and daring, were certainly not carried on in a manner calculated to ensure success over Infantry distinguished by such high training and such undaunted bravery as the British proved themselves to possess on this memorable occasion. There was no indication of a systematic attack upon any particular point by a rapid succession of charging Squadrons--no _forlorn hope like_ rush upon the opposing bayonets by the survivors of a discharge of musketry levelled at a leading Squadron, and that rush followed up with lightning-like rapidity by the next Squadron, which, in spite of the intervening space encumbered with the bodies of men and horses overthrown in the first charge, would thus obtain the greatest chance of effecting by its own weight and compact order, a breach in the Square at the point originally selected for the assault.

No such system of attack was attempted; but, on the contrary, it almost invariably happened that the leading Squadron no sooner received the fire from the point attacked, than it either opened out from the centre to the right and left, and retired, or, it diverged altogether to one flank, leaving the succeeding divisions, in both cases, to observe the same movement; and, in this manner, the whole of the attacking force exposed itself to a far more extended range of fire and consequent loss, than if it had pursued the more daring, and at the same time, more decisive, mode of attack just described.

* * * * *

Whilst a considerable portion of the French Cavalry was thus fruitlessly assailing the British Squares, a body of Lancers, which had advanced considerably in the rear of those Squares, made a sudden and unexpected charge upon the Hanoverian Landwehr Battalion Verden, which was then, as previously explained, deployed a short distance in front of the Namur road: it was completely successful, and the greater part of the Battalion was cut down by the Lancers, who, emboldened by this triumph, were preparing to cross the Namur road, where a well directed fire opened upon them by the Landwehr Battalions Lüneburg and Osterode, lying concealed in the ditch by which it was lined, threw them into disorder, and forced them to a precipitate retreat.

The whole of the French Cavalry was now withdrawn for the purpose of reforming its broken and disordered ranks, leaving the Anglo-Allied Infantry to be again assailed by a vigorous cannonade from the Heights above Gemioncourt. The only movement on the part of the Anglo-Allied forces was the advance of the Brunswick Guard Battalion and 2nd Line Battalion in front of Quatre Bras, by the right of the Charleroi road, as a precautionary measure against any flank attack that might be attempted from the Wood of Bossu upon the advanced Battalions of PICTON's right.

* * * * *

It was long past five o'clock. The French Infantry in the Wood of Bossu was continually making progress towards the Namur road, across which increased numbers of the Dutch-Belgian troops, to whom the defence of the Wood had been entrusted, were seen hastily retiring. In Piermont, the French Light Troops had been reinforced, and they were now evidently preparing for a more vigorous attack upon the extreme Left of WELLINGTON's forces; whilst certain movements in the vicinity of Gemioncourt gave intimation of an intended renewal of the attack upon Quatre Bras. All prospect of the Anglo-Allied Cavalry encountering NEY's veteran Dragoons with any chance of success had entirely vanished; whilst, on the other hand, the latter were on the point of being reinforced by the arrival of another Cavalry Division. PACK's Brigade had expended nearly the whole of its ammunition; its exposed position, and the continued Cavalry charges in its rear having precluded the transmission of the necessary supply. The Brunswickers had been greatly discouraged by the death of their gallant Prince; and the losses sustained by all the troops engaged had already been truly frightful.

It was at this very moment, when WELLINGTON's situation had become so extremely critical, that two Infantry Brigades of the Third Division, under Lieutenant General Sir CHARLES ALTEN, most opportunely reached the Field of Action by the Nivelles road. They were the Fifth British Brigade, commanded by Major General Sir COLIN HALKETT, and the First Hanoverian Brigade, under Major General Count KIELMANSEGGE; and were accompanied by Major LLOYD's Battery of British Foot Artillery, and by Captain CLEEVES's Battery of Hanoverian Foot Artillery.

By the arrival of these troops WELLINGTON's force was augmented as follows:--

+------------------+---------------------------+--------+-------+----+ | | |Infantry|Cavalry|Guns| | | +--------+-------+----+ | |Force already in the Field | 18,090| 2,004| 30| | | | | | | |British { |Fifth Infantry Brigade | 2,254| | | | { |Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6| | | | | | | |K.G. Legion | Do. do do. | | | 6| | | | | | | |Hanoverians |First Infantry Brigade | 3,189| | | | | | | | | |Dutch-Belgians |7th Dutch Line Battalion | 731| | | | | +--------+-------+----+ | | | 24,264| 2,004| 42| +------------------+---------------------------+--------+-------+----+

About the same time, NEY's troops were reinforced by the remaining Division of KELLERMANN's Corps of Heavy Cavalry, so that his whole force was constituted as follows:--

+-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+ | |Infantry. | Cavalry. |Guns.| | +----------+-----------+-----+ |Force already in the Field | 16,189| 3,472| 44| |Eleventh Cavalry Division | | 1,502| | |1 Battery of Horse Artillery | | | 6| | +----------+-----------+-----+ | | 16,189| 4,974| 50| +-----------------------------+----------+-----------+-----+

NEY, on perceiving the arrival of this reinforcement to the Anglo-Allied troops, despatched a peremptory Order to D'ERLON to hasten to his support and join him without a moment's delay; and having well calculated the advantages he still retained, he resolved upon a bold and vigorous effort to secure the victory.

The greater portion of the Wood of Bossu was now in his possession; and this circumstance appeared to him to present the means of establishing himself at Quatre Bras, and of thus enabling him effectually to turn WELLINGTON's Right Flank, and cut off his line of retreat upon Brussels. With this view he had already greatly reinforced his Infantry in the Wood through which he had even ordered the advance of two Batteries, in a direction parallel to, and within a very short distance of, its eastern boundary, so that they might be prepared to act upon the plain, as soon as circumstances rendered such a proceeding advisable or expedient. He now also threw forward additional Light Troops to strengthen his extreme Right in the vicinity of Piermont; whilst his Cavalry, so vastly superior, both in numbers and in efficiency, to that which the British Commander had brought into the Field, constituted his main central force, and compensated in a great measure for the deficiency created in this point of his line by the drawing off of the Infantry to the Flanks.

The two French Batteries above alluded to as having advanced along the interior of the Wood of Bossu, suddenly opened a destructive fire from the edge of the latter upon the Brunswick troops posted on the right of the Charleroi road, just as LLOYD's Battery arrived at Quatre Bras. The Duke instantly ordered the advance of this Battery into the open space between the Charleroi road and the Wood, for the purpose of silencing the French guns; but before the British Artillerymen could unlimber, several horses of the Battery were killed, wheels were disabled, and, from the proximity of the Enemy's guns, some of the Gunners were literally cut in two by the round shot with which they were so closely assailed. Nevertheless, the Battery succeeded, not only in silencing its opponents, but also in forcing back into the wood a French Column of Infantry, which, advancing directly towards the Brussels road, had endeavoured to turn its Right Flank: after which brilliant services, LLOYD, perceiving no adequate Support, judged it prudent, in the then crippled state of his Battery, to retire to his former Post, abandoning two guns for which he had not a sufficient number of horses remaining, and which consequently could not be recovered until the termination of the action.

HALKETT's Brigade, shortly after passing Quatre Bras, was ordered to bring up its left shoulders; and, entering the rye fields in front of the Namur road, it proceeded some little distance in advance, and halted.

KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade continued its march along the Namur road, and received Orders to strengthen the extreme Left, as also to support, and, where necessary, to relieve the exhausted British Battalions, which had so bravely withstood the fiercest onsets of a most daring and well organised Cavalry, and had so unflinchingly endured the incessant cannonade maintained against them by the well served Batteries on the French Heights.

It was during the advance of the Third British Division to take up its ground--HALKETT proceeding directly to the front, and KIELMANSEGGE moving along the Namur road to the left--and under cover of the heavy cannonade which was maintained against the Allied line at this time, that again a Column of French Infantry advanced from out of the Wood, towards the Brussels road, and entering the latter by the isolated House southward of Quatre Bras, established itself in and about that building and its inclosures.

Shortly afterwards, another Column advanced in support of the former one, which then emerged from its cover, and began to ascend that part of the Anglo-Allied position occupied by the 92nd Highlanders. On perceiving this, Major General BARNES, Adjutant General to the British forces, who had just ridden up to the right of the Regiment, placed himself very conspicuously at the head of the Highlanders, waving his hat, and exclaiming, "92nd, follow me!" In an instant the latter sprang out of the ditch in which they had hitherto been posted, and with great gallantry and steadiness charged down the slope. The French Infantry hastily fell back, until having gained the partial shelter afforded them by the isolated House and its inclosures, they opened a most destructive fire upon the Highlanders, who nevertheless slackened not their pace, but drove the French out of their cover. Their Commanding Officer, Colonel CAMERON, here received his death wound, and having lost the power of managing his horse, the latter carried him at its utmost speed along the road until he reached Quatre Bras, where his servant was standing with his led horse, when the animal, suddenly stopping, pitched the unfortunate Officer on his head. The supporting Column, however, securing the garden opposite to the House and on the right of the road, seemed resolved to make a stand against the further advance of the Highlanders; but the latter, by a judicious disposition of their force in three divisions--one towards each flank of the garden, and the other directly to the gate in front--and again uniting as soon as these points were secured, once more rushed upon their foes with the bayonet, displaying, under a terrific fire, the most undaunted bravery.

As soon as the French turned their backs, the 92nd poured upon them a volley which proved most destructive, and continued their advance, pursuing the Enemy along the edge of the Wood, into which they finally retired upon perceiving a disposition on the part of the French Cavalry to charge, and finding themselves exposed to a heavy cannonade which was rapidly thinning their ranks to a fearful extent. Subsequently, in consequence of their very severe loss, they were withdrawn through the Wood to Quatre Bras.

Again the French Skirmishers were creeping up the slope from the Gemioncourt inclosures, and PACK, who had united the remains of the 42nd and 44th Regiments into one Battalion, made the best show of resistance in his power to their teazing _tiraillade_; but being aware how very small a quantity of ammunition remained in his men's pouches, his anxiety on this point became extreme, the more so as he had good reasons for apprehending fresh attacks of Cavalry. His advanced position in the immediate proximity of the formation of the Enemy's Columns of Attack, naturally kept him on the look out for effective British support; and on observing the head of HALKETT's Brigade, as the latter was advancing from Quatre Bras, he instantly despatched an Aide de Camp to that General, with a message, that his own Brigade had expended nearly the whole of its ammunition, and that if he did not offer him a Support, he would be under the necessity of almost immediately abandoning his position. HALKETT at once acceded to the proposal by sending forward the 69th British Regiment, and desiring its Commanding Officer, Colonel MORICE, to obey any Orders he might receive from General PACK.

In pursuance of Orders received from the Duke, HALKETT moved the remainder of his Brigade into the space between the Wood of Bossu and the Charleroi road, fronting the French Left Wing. Here he found the Brunswick Infantry retiring with precipitation: he immediately put himself in communication with their Commanding Officer, Colonel OLFERMANN, and by aid of the support which his Brigade presented to their view, he succeeded in bringing them up under cover, in the ditch which, traversing the space between the Wood and the high road, ran nearly parallel with the Enemy's line.

Leaving his Brigade in the position he had taken up, in support of the Brunswickers and of PACK's Brigade, and pending the arrival of further instructions from the Duke, HALKETT galloped to the Front, nearly beyond the Farm of Gemioncourt, for the purpose of ascertaining, if possible, the disposition and intentions of the Enemy. He was not kept long in suspense, NEY's arrangements for another general attack having been concluded; and, observing the Cavalry destined to advance against the Allies on both sides of the Charleroi road in motion, he turned round his horse and hastened to dispose his Brigade in such a manner as to render it fully prepared to brave the coming storm. On his way, he sent an intimation to PACK of his discovery, and Orders to the 69th Regiment to prepare forthwith to receive Cavalry.

A sudden and heavy cannonade had already opened from the French Heights--a sure prelude to the attack which was about to take place--and the 69th Regiment was in the act of forming Square, when the Prince of ORANGE rode up to it and asked what it was doing. Colonel MORICE explained that he was forming Square in pursuance of the instructions he had received; upon which His Royal Highness, remarking that he did not think there was any chance of the Cavalry coming on, ordered him to reform Column, and to deploy into line. During this last movement a strong body of French _Cuirassiers_, taking advantage of the surrounding high corn, and of the circumstance of the Regiment lying in a hollow, approached unperceived quite close to the spot, and rushing suddenly and impetuously upon a Flank, succeeded in completely rolling up the Regiment, riding along and over the unfortunate men, of whom great numbers were cut down, and in the midst of the confusion thus created, captured and carried off one of the Colours; in defence of which Major LINDSAY, Lieutenant PIGOT, and Volunteer CLARKE, highly distinguished themselves, and were desperately wounded. Some Officers and men took shelter in the Square formed by the 42nd and 44th Regiments; the mounted Officers gained the other side of the road, pursued by about twenty of the Enemy, and escaped by riding through one of the Hanoverian Battalions lining the Namur road.

The 30th Regiment, which had also been deployed into line by the Orders of the Prince of ORANGE, most fortunately discovered, in sufficient time, the approach of Cavalry (notwithstanding the extraordinary height of the rye, which greatly impeded all observation), formed Square with remarkable rapidity, and, reserving their fire until the very last moment, they completely dispersed and drove off a body of PIRÉ's Lancers, and a portion of KELLERMANN's _Cuirassiers_, which troops had made a charge upon them, enveloping two faces of their Square. PICTON, who, from the opposite side of the high road, was an eye witness of this scene, was so much pleased with the perfect steadiness of the Regiment, that, seizing a favourable opportunity of galloping up to it, he called for the Commanding Officer, and told Lieutenant Colonel HAMILTON that he should report to the Duke the gallant conduct of his Corps. Indeed the steadiness and gallantry of the 30th in this Battle were so conspicuous as also to draw upon them the well merited commendations of the Prince of ORANGE, and Generals ALTEN, HALKETT, and KIELMANSEGGE.

The 73rd Regiment (under Colonel HARRIS), and the Brunswickers, were equally on the alert; but the French Cavalry, on finding them prepared, diverged towards the high road.

The 33rd Regiment (under Lieutenant Colonel ELPHINSTONE), had formed Square upon its leading Company (the Grenadiers) at the moment the latter had reached some rising ground; in which position it became a conspicuous mark for the fire, at point blank distance, of a French Battery which opened upon it with great spirit. It was deemed advisable to deploy it into line, in which formation the Regiment advanced towards the two Brunswick Battalions then fiercely engaged with the Enemy's Light Troops near the skirt of the Wood; but upon approaching the latter, a report was spread along the line that French Cavalry was in its rear, whereupon the Regiment rushed precipitately into the Wood, within which it was speedily reformed.

* * * * *

Whilst that portion of KELLERMANN's Dragoons which had dispersed the 69th Regiment, were sweeping gallantly onwards in their bold career along the high road towards Quatre Bras, the greater body of this Corps advanced into the open space on the right of that road. Here PICTON's gallant little bands found themselves again involved in one general onset of Cavalry, made with a violence and fury which seemed to betoken a desperate resolve to harass the devoted Squares to the last extremity, and to carry every thing by main force. At the same time a dense cloud of Skirmishers, bursting forth from the inclosures of Piermont, threatened to turn the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Army; whilst the French Infantry in the Wood of Bossu, close upon the northern boundary of the latter, equally endangered its extreme Right.

At this moment, NEY's prospects were bright enough to justify his hopes of success, and he hailed the captured Colour, presented to him by the _Cuirassier_ LAMI of the 8th Regiment, as the harbinger of victory. In fact, on whatever point of his line NEY now directed his view, his operations were full of promise as to the result.

It was certainly a most anxious moment to the British Chief: but frightfully crippled as were his resources by the failure and hasty retreat of the great bulk of the Dutch-Belgian Infantry, by the evident inferiority and utter helplessness of his Cavalry, and by the dreadfully severe losses already inflicted upon his British Regiments, he calmly surveyed the field of slaughter, and deliberately calculated upon the extent to which the heroic valour and admirable spirit so unequivocally displayed by the British and German Infantry would enable him to bear up against the storm that now spread its fury along his whole line, until his eagle glance might detect some favourable opening, seize some critical moment, to deal the stroke that, by a combination as sudden as the launching of the thunderbolt of the storm itself, should avert its fury, or oppose to it a barrier that might exhaust its strength.

The arrival of LLOYD's British, and CLEEVES's German, Batteries, attached to ALTEN's Division, had already made a most important addition to the Duke's Artillery force; the former took post in front of Quatre Bras on the right, the latter on the left, of the Charleroi road.

Almost immediately afterwards, Major KUHLMANN's Battery of Horse Artillery of the King's German Legion, belonging to the First Division, which it had preceded on the Nivelles road, reached the Field, and moved rapidly to the point of intersection of the Brussels and Nivelles road, where it came into action, at the very moment the _Cuirassiers_ who had fallen upon HALKETT's Brigade were advancing in mass along the former road towards Quatre Bras. Two guns under Lieutenant SPECKMANN were posted so as to bear directly upon the French Column, and completely to enfilade the road; and as the Cuirassiers approached with the undaunted bearing that betokened the steadiness of veterans, and with the imposing display that usually distinguishes mailed Cavalry, a remarkably well directed fire was opened upon them: in an instant the whole mass appeared in irretrievable confusion; the road was literally strewed with corses of these steel clad warriors and their gallant steeds; KELLERMANN himself was dismounted, and compelled like many of his followers to retire on foot.

* * * * *

It was at this moment that Colonel LAURENT, who had been despatched from the Imperial Head Quarters, reached NEY, with a pencilled note requiring the Marshal to detach the First Corps towards St Amand. Having fallen in with the head of the Column of that Corps, he had taken upon himself to alter the direction of its march; and, on coming up with Count D'ERLON, who had preceded his Corps, and was then in front of Frasne, he showed him the note, and explained to him where he would find the head of his Column. Shortly afterwards, General D'ELCAMBRE, Chief of the Staff to the First Corps, arrived to report the movement which was in course of execution.

NEY now saw clearly that at the very moment he required the aid of D'ERLON's Corps, not only to counterbalance the arrival of reinforcements which had joined WELLINGTON, but to give an efficient support to the renewed general attack he had projected, that Corps had been placed beyond his reach, and that he must, in all probability, continue to fight the battle without any addition to the force he had already in the Field. Nevertheless, he did not allow the circumstance to suspend the execution of his operations; and, with the hope of yet securing the assistance of the First Corps, he sent back General D'ELCAMBRE, with a peremptory Order for its return towards Quatre Bras.

It was soon after this that NEY received another despatch from NAPOLEON, dated at two o'clock. From its general tenor it was evidently written previously to the departure of Colonel LAURENT with the Order for the flank movement of D'ERLON's Corps, and therefore the bearer of it must have taken longer time than was necessary in conveying it to the Marshal. It announced that the Prussians were posted between Sombref and Bry, and that at half past two GROUCHY was to attack them with the Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, and expressed the Emperor's wish that NEY should also attack whatever Enemy might be in his front, and, after having repulsed the latter, fall back in the direction of Ligny, to assist in enveloping the Prussians. At the same time it stated, that should NAPOLEON succeed in defeating the latter beforehand, he would then manoeuvre in NEY's direction, to support in like manner the Marshal's operations. It concluded by requesting information both as to NEY's own dispositions and those of the Enemy in his front. This despatch reached NEY at a moment when he was most seriously engaged, when the issue of the battle was extremely doubtful, and the probability of his being enabled to afford the support required by NAPOLEON most questionable.

Upon the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied forces, the advance of the French Light Troops from Piermont and its vicinity was met in a most determined and gallant manner by the head of KIELMANSEGGE's Hanoverian Brigade (which after having moved along the Nivelles road, exposed to the continued fire from the Batteries on the French Heights, had just reached that part of the field), in conjunction with the 1st Battalion 95th British Rifles, and the 2nd Brunswick Light Battalion. The most determined efforts were made by the Enemy to turn the Anglo-Allied Flank. The French Infantry had already gained the high road, and were boldly pressing forward, when the British Rifles, the Brunswick Light Infantry, and the Hanoverian Field Battalion Lüneburg (under Lieutenant Colonel KLENCKE) dashed in amongst them. The contest was obstinate and severe; but the Allied Light Troops having been reinforced by the Hanoverian Field Battalion Grubenhagen (under Lieutenant Colonel WURMB), gradually obtained the ascendancy, and, dislodging their opponents from one inclosure after another, continued steadily advancing, and gaining ground.

Along the whole front of the central portion of the Anglo-Allied Army, the French Cavalry was expending its force in repeated but unavailing charges against the indomitable Squares. The gallant, the brilliant, the heroic, manner in which the remnants of KEMPT's and PACK's Brigades held their ground, of which they surrendered not a single inch throughout the terrific struggle of that day, must ever stand pre-eminent in the records of the triumphs and prowess of British Infantry.

To relieve them as much as possible from the severe pressure they experienced, now that their ammunition was almost entirely exhausted, some of the Hanoverian Battalions were judiciously thrown forward so as to afford them a close, immediate, and efficient, support, while others continued to line the Namur road; a disposition for which the arrival of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade had presented the ready means, and which imposed an impregnable barrier to any further advance of the French Cavalry, whose ranks were now thoroughly disordered, and their numbers greatly diminished, by their perseverance in a contest the hopelessness of which began to appear but too evident.

* * * * *

During that part of the Battle just described, NEY received a further despatch from the Emperor by Colonel FORBIN JANSON. It was dated a quarter past three, and announced to the Marshal that NAPOLEON was at that moment seriously engaged. It desired NEY to manoeuvre immediately so as to turn the Right of the Prussians and fall upon their Rear, and contained the remark that the latter would thus be taken _en flagrant délit_ at the moment they might be endeavouring to join the English. The impossibility of NEY's complying with these directions was already sufficiently apparent.

* * * * *

At this time, WELLINGTON received an addition to his forces by the arrival of the 1st and 3rd Brunswick Light Battalions, and the Brunswick Brigade of Artillery under Major MAHN, consisting of a Battery of Horse, and another of Foot, Artillery. The guns were immediately posted close upon the Namur road, at a short distance to the left of Quatre Bras; and their fire, combined with that of the British and German Batteries, soon produced a very perceptible effect upon the French Artillery. The Infantry reinforced the 1st and 3rd Brunswick Line Battalions occupying the houses of Quatre Bras.

The most important reinforcement, however, was the arrival, at nearly the same moment--about half past six o'clock--of the First British Division, under Major General COOKE, consisting of the First Brigade of Guards, commanded by Major General MAITLAND, and the Second Brigade of Guards, commanded by Major General Sir JOHN BYNG.

Their line of march having been by the Nivelles road, they came very opportunely upon the most critical point of the Anglo-Allied position, namely, its extreme Right, just at the moment when the French Light Troops, having driven out the Dutch-Belgian Infantry, showed themselves in force along the northern boundary of the Wood of Bossu, and some of their Skirmishers had almost gained the high road.

WELLINGTON's force was still further augmented by the recently arrived troops as follows:--

+-------------+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+ | | |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Guns.| | | +---------+--------+-----+ | |Force already in the Field | 24,264 | 2,004 | 42 | | | | | | | |British {|First Infantry Division | 4,061 | | | | {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 6 | |K.G. Legion | Do. Horse do. | | | 6 | | | | | | | |Brunswick {|1st and 3rd Light Battalions | 1,344 | | | | {|Battery of Foot Artillery | | | 8 | | {| Do. Horse do. | | | 8 | | | +---------+--------+-----+ | | | 29,669 | 2,004 | 70 | +-------------+-----------------------------+---------+--------+-----+

NEY's force actually present continued as before:--

+---------+--------+-----+ |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Guns.| +---------+--------+-----+ | 16,189 | 4,974 | 50 | +---------+--------+-----+

The Prince of ORANGE, who had galloped along this road to meet the Guards, immediately ordered the Light Companies under Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN, to enter the Wood. They rushed forward with a loud cheer, and commenced a brisk fire on their opponents, who were soon made sensible of the superior description of force now brought against them. The remainder of the Brigade speedily followed, and the loud, sharp, animated rattle of musketry, which was progressing rapidly into the very heart of the Wood, plainly indicated that even in this quarter, where the French had hitherto been the most successful, and whence they might not only have molested the Anglo-Allied troops on the eastern boundary of the Wood, but have most seriously endangered the Right of the British position, they were now encountering a most vigorous and determined resistance.

* * * * *

HALKETT's Brigade, with the Brunswickers, resolutely maintained the ground on which they had been charged by the French Cavalry. As the latter retired, the Light Companies of the Brigade, with a portion of the Brunswickers on the right, and some Hanoverian Riflemen on the left, advanced in pursuit. The French threw forward a line of _Tirailleurs_ to check them, and a brisk fire was maintained on both sides. The cannonade on this side of the field was also kept up with great spirit. At length the French Cavalry advanced, forcing back HALKETT's Skirmishers upon their respective Columns, on which they then charged. Their attack, however, was not made with much energy, and, upon their being uniformly repulsed, the Light Troops resumed their former ground. HALKETT pushed forward his Battalions to the line of his Skirmishers, and then moving towards his right, in the direction of the ravine, which descends from the Wood, drove across the rivulet a body of French Infantry, from which a portion of his Brigade had suffered a severe fire. In this part of the affair one of PICTON's Battalions--the Royals--co-operated. The two Brunswick Battalions continued boldly to advance even beyond this line, resting their right close upon the Wood.

* * * * *

In the meantime, BYNG's Brigade had closely followed up MAITLAND's in support, having previously sent forward its Light Companies under Lieutenant Colonel MACDONELL round by Quatre Bras, skirting the eastern border of the Wood. The spirited and determined nature of the advance of the British Guards not admitting of that restraint which, considering the many intricate parts of the Wood, was essential for the preservation of order, led to great confusion in their ranks by the time they reached the southern extremity, after having fairly driven out the French; and in this state they ventured to pursue the Enemy on the open ground, but were quickly repulsed by his Reserves; and the French Artillery poured so destructive a fire into this portion of the Wood, that MAITLAND deemed it advisable to withdraw the 2nd Battalion (under Colonel ASKEW) to the rivulet, where it was immediately joined from the rear by the other Battalion of his Brigade (the 3rd, under Colonel the Hon. WILLIAM STUART).

The time which would have been occupied in restoring the order and regularity that had been so completely lost during the progress of these Battalions through the Wood, was considered too precious for that purpose at such a moment, and the Brigade was ordered to form line to its left, outside the Wood, the men falling in promiscuously as fast as they emerged from their cover, and extending the line into the plain between the Wood and the Brussels road. Thus formed, the line advanced, though but for a short distance, when it opened and continued a brisk fire, under which the French Infantry, in its immediate front, deployed with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. This advance had been followed by the Brunswick Guard Battalion, which was now manoeuvring to form on the left of MAITLAND's Brigade.

The French Cavalry, which had been watching for an opportunity to charge the Brigade, now made a dash at its Left Flank. When the irregular formation of the latter, which has been already explained, is considered, it is evident that any attempt to form Square at that moment would have involved the British Guards in inextricable confusion, and have rendered them an easy prey to the French horsemen. Rapid as was the advance of the latter, its object was frustrated in a manner which testifies the extraordinary discipline of the men of that Brigade. Mere discipline it was not; it was an instinctive momentary impulse, which seemed to animate the whole Corps with the sole conviction, that the only step to be taken, the only chance left for safety, consisted in a general and instantaneous movement to the ditch which bounded the Wood on their right. This was accomplished with complete success, and the French Cavalry, which had advanced in full confidence of an easy triumph, were hurled back in confusion by a volley from the ditch, which the Brigade had lined with a rapidity, a dexterity, and a precision, quite wonderful; while at the same moment, the Brunswick Battalion threw itself into Square, and received the Cavalry with a degree of coolness, steadiness, and gallantry, which won for it the warmest admiration and encomiums of the British who witnessed the manoeuvre. The flanking fire which was thus brought to bear so suddenly on the French Cavalry by the Brunswickers, and the destructive front fire so deliberately poured in amongst them by the British Guards from the ditch, fairly drove them out of this part of the Field.

* * * * *

More to the left, the French were retiring before HALKETT in perfect order, covered by their Skirmishers. As that General's Brigade neared the Farm House of Gemioncourt, Major CHAMBERS of the 36th Regiment, an experienced Officer, incited by the desire of capturing a Post which had been throughout the day a _point d'appui_ to the French Centre, led on two Companies of his Corps towards it. They made a gallant rush into the courtyard, but were met by a smart fire which forced them back. Major CHAMBERS, however, rallied his men in the orchard; and having instructed them how to proceed in their attack, the place was instantly carried.

The further advance upon the Anglo-Allied Left had, in the meantime, kept equal pace with that on the Right. NEY had been compelled to yield the strongholds by aid of which he had hoped to force the Duke's position: his Infantry had been driven out of Piermont and the inclosures in front of his Right, as also out of the Wood of Bossu on his Left: Gemioncourt, also, in front of his Centre, had been captured; while the plain between the two positions, over which his Cavalry had executed innumerable charges--charges that were occasionally suspended merely that the scattered bands might rally afresh to renew the onslaught with redoubled vigour, and that his Artillery might pour upon the devoted Squares its destructive missiles, by which each was shattered to its very centre,--was now completely cleared from the presence of a single horseman.

It was long after sunset, and darkness was sensibly approaching, when WELLINGTON, now that his Flanks and Centre were relieved, in the manner already described, from the severity of a pressure of such long duration, led forward his victorious troops to the foot of the French position. The loud shouts which proclaimed the triumphant advance of his forces on either Flank were enthusiastically caught up and responded to by those who constituted the main central line, and who had so nobly and so resolutely withstood and defied the impetuous battle shock by which they had been so repeatedly and so pertinaciously assailed.

NEY, convinced of the utter futility, if not imminent hazard, of protracting the contest, withdrew the whole of his forces, and concentrated them on the Heights of Frasne, throwing out a strong line of Picquets, to which WELLINGTON opposed a corresponding line, having the southern extremity of the Wood of Bossu on the Right, the inclosures south of Piermont on the Left, and Gemioncourt in the Centre, for its main Supports.

The French Picquets manifested an extraordinary degree of vigilance; the slightest movement on the side of the Anglo-Allied Picquets instantly attracted attention, and was noticed by a concentrated fire from the watchful Sentries of the Enemy. No movement, however, of any consequence was made on either side during the night. The wearied combatants sought that rest of which they stood so much in need, and the silence in which the Anglo-Allied bivouac soon became hushed, was only disturbed by the arrival of additional reinforcements, consisting principally of British Cavalry.

* * * * *

NEY was joined by the First Corps, after the termination of the action. At nine o'clock, D'ERLON presented himself to the Marshal for the purpose of reporting to him his proceedings, and of receiving his Orders, after which the Corps was bivouacked in the rear of Frasne; with the exception, however, of DURUTTE's Division (the Fourth), and JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry Brigade, which D'ERLON had left on the Field of Ligny; in front of the extreme Right of the Prussian Army; a measure which he had deemed advisable in order to prevent the Enemy from debouching into the plain between Bry and the Wood of Delhutte.

It is singular that NAPOLEON, who at Fleurus held so powerful a Reserve as that consisting of the Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps, and who was in perfect ignorance of the true state of affairs at Quatre Bras, should have ventured to withdraw from NEY a force amounting to more than one half of that which he had originally placed at his disposal. It was decidedly a false step, from which no advantage resulted on his own Field of Battle, whilst there can be very little doubt that it lost him that of Quatre Bras.

* * * * *

The losses sustained in this Battle by the Anglo-Allied Army in killed, wounded, and missing, were as follows:--

British 2,275 Hanoverians 369 Brunswickers 819 ------ 3,463 men.

To these must be added the loss of the Dutch-Belgian troops, amounting probably to about 1,000 killed and wounded, which makes the entire loss of the Anglo-Allied Army equal to about 4,463 men.

The French loss amounted to about 4,000 killed, wounded, and missing.

* * * * *

Such was the Battle of Quatre Bras: a battle in which the British, the Hanoverian, and the Brunswick, Infantry, covered itself with imperishable glory; to estimate the full extent of which we must constantly bear in mind, that the whole brunt of the action fell upon that Infantry; that throughout the greater part of the day it was totally unaided by any Cavalry, that Arm of the Allies in the field having, at the outset, proved itself incompetent to engage with the French; and, lastly, that it was completely abandoned in the latter part of the action by the Second Dutch-Belgian Infantry Division, amounting to no less than 7,533 men.

When the imagination dwells upon that which constitutes one of the most prominent features of the Battle--the manner in which the gallant PICTON, on finding there was no Cavalry at hand wherewith to charge effectively that of the Enemy, led on the British Infantry, and dashed into the midst of the French masses, stoutly maintaining his ground in defiance of their oft repeated assaults, invariably scattering back their charging Squadrons in confusion, and this, too, in the face of a splendid Cavalry, animated by the best spirit, and headed by a KELLERMANN, whose fame and merit were so universally acknowledged--with what exulting pride and heartfelt gratitude must not the British nation reflect on the heroic valour displayed by her sons in their noble fulfilment of the desires and expectations of her Cambrian Chief!

The zealous and cordial support which the Hanoverians and the Brunswickers afforded to their British brethren in arms, the devotion with which they commingled with them in the thickest of the fight, are indelibly engraven in the grateful memory of every true German, and remain recorded as a lasting theme of admiration in the history of their fatherland.

The defeat sustained by the French was certainly not attributable, in the slightest degree, to any deficiency on their part, of either bravery or discipline. Their deportment was that of truly gallant soldiers, and their attacks were all conducted with a chivalric impetuosity, and an admirably sustained vigour, which could leave no doubt on the minds of their opponents as to the sincerity of their devotion to the cause of the Emperor.

* * * * *

In a strategical point of view, both parties gained certain important advantages, and lost others which had been comprised within their respective plans of operation.

NEY had succeeded in preventing the junction of the Anglo-Allied Army with the Prussians, and might have obtained still more important results, had he not been deprived of the services of D'ERLON's Corps, the arrival of which he had been so fully led to expect.

WELLINGTON, though he had been compelled to relinquish all hope of being enabled to afford that aid to BLÜCHER which, in the morning, he had proffered to him, yet, by maintaining his ground at Quatre Bras sufficiently long to admit of the arrival of reinforcements which enabled him to obtain a brilliant victory, he completely succeeded in frustrating the grand object of NEY's movements, which had been to defeat the Anglo-Allied troops thus advancing, in detail, and also to operate upon BLÜCHER's Right Flank. The Duke's success gave ample and convincing evidence of the sagacity and foresight with which his plans had been devised and matured, as also of the soundness of those calculations by which he had for some time previously placed himself, with the confident security of a master of his art, in a posture of defence, fully prepared to meet every emergency, from whatever point, or however suddenly, the coming storm might arise. And now that he had gained the Battle, and secured the important point of Quatre Bras, upon which the remainder of his troops were advancing, and where the greater portion of them would arrive in the evening and during the night, he was perfectly ready and willing, should the Prussians prove victorious at Ligny, to renew the contest on the following morning, by attacking NEY with his collected force; and then, if successful (of which little doubt could be entertained), by a junction with BLÜCHER's Right, to operate upon NAPOLEON's Left, so as to bring the great mass of the combined Armies to bear directly upon the main body of the French; or, in case of a defeat of the Prussians, to make good his retreat along his principal line of operation, in such a manner, as to secure a position between Quatre Bras and Brussels, favourable for a co-operation of BLÜCHER's forces with his own, and for presenting a bold and determined stand against the further advance of the French Emperor.

Orders were now forwarded for the movement of CLINTON's Division on the following morning, at daybreak, from Nivelles to Quatre Bras: and of COLVILLE's Division, at the same hour, from Enghien to Nivelles. The Reserve Artillery was directed to move at daybreak, on the following morning, to Quatre Bras, there to receive further orders; and the Tenth Infantry Brigade, under Major General Sir JOHN LAMBERT, was directed to march, at the same hour, from Assche to Genappe, there to remain until further orders.

* * * * *

The tremendous roar of Artillery in the direction of Ligny gave a sufficient intimation to the Duke that a great Battle had taken place in that quarter, but as it seemed to continue stationary, and only ceased as night set in, he was doubtful of the result, and remained in this state of suspense and uncertainty until the following morning; the Officer who had been despatched in the night to Quatre Bras from the Prussian Head Quarters with the expected communication, having been surprised in the dark, and made a prisoner by the French.