iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have

placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although it is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into Being and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut. Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.

[179] See previous note and p. 92, 2.

[180] The Stoics appear to have regarded them as γενικώτατα or πρῶτα γένη, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, δ (in other places as 51, β; 79, β, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic categories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; κατηγορία did not suit them so well because of their use of κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1.

[181] Simpl. 16, δ: οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἐξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν ... ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. Plot. En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.

[182] Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being, οὐσία, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also by Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes οὐσία and ποιὸς the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple Mnesarchus.

[183] Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη ... πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, Qu. Qual. S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρώτην ὕλην ἀΐδιον τὴν ἄποιον. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4, that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60); but as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality only belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any authority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief in words.

[184] Simpl. 44, δ: ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324: ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα κατ’ αὐτήν [καθ’ αὑτὴν]· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναί φασιν. Further particulars on matter hereafter.

[185] Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. Dexipp. See following note.

[186] Diog. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται. καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (Ζήνωνος·) οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. The same was held by Chrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), and κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συνβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν (which may be understood, not of individual properties, but of individually determined things) οἷον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίγνεσθαι. (These words are explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits increase or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms αὔξησις and μείωσις, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or diminution of substance in the individual thing.) διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν δύο μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (individual things have two component parts, which are capable of change), τὸ μέν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δέ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως ποιὸν] ὡς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. Porphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἓν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη ... δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται, ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p. 1083 (the Stoics assert) ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποιόν]. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θἀτέρῳ συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν, ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης. That it should be said of this perpetually changing material μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον may appear strange; but the meaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it increases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same subject, an ἰδίως ποιὸν during the change; but the material itself, which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject of increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro. Quæst. Nat. I. 5.

[187] ποιὸν or ποιότης, and also ποιὸς (sc. λόγος). According to Simpl. 55. α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to ποιόν. The first, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether essential or accidental—the πὼς ἔχον as well as the ποιόν. In the second meaning ποιὸν is used to express permanent qualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential—the σχέσεις. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses τοὺς ἀπαρτίζοντας (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιοὺς, i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in their distinctive features. The substantive ποιότης is only used in the last sense.

[188] Simpl. 57, ε (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and Trendelenburg, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν (separable, i.e., from matter) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα [sc. μίαν] ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ’ ἢν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. In place of ἓν νόημα Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438, 96), reads ἐννόημα. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain it with reason, the meaning being that ποιότης constitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential qualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of ποιὸν, and reckoned under that of πὼς ἔχον.

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms ἕξις and σχέσις· ποιότητες, or essential properties, being called essential forms (ἕξεις or ἑκτά); non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (σχέσεις). See Simpl. 54, γ; 55, ε. In determining essential attributes, these, according to Simpl. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential, not when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to σχέσις in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

The distinction between ἕνωσις and συναφὴ also belongs here. That, the oneness of which depends on an essential quality, is ἡνωμένον· everything else is either συνημμένον or ἐκ διεστώτων. Sext. Math. ix. 78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses, ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ ἓν σῶμα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνελέσθαι [l. συνέχεσθαι]. Simpl. 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον νεὼς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπί τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως.

Those ἕξεις which admit of no increase or diminution (ἐπίτασις, and ἄνεσις) are called διαθέσεις or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance, which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where they exist at all, are διαθέσεις, but arts are only ἕξεις. Simpl. Categ. 61, β; 72, δ; 73, β; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24; Stob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was taken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.

[189] Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. Stob. Ecl. i. 434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains ἰδίως ποιὸς by ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.

[190] Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from Plutarch and Stobæus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιρνάμενα (the intermingling materials,—the question here is the possibility of mingling) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαί φασιν. Porphyry in Simpl. Categ. 12, δ disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly distinguish ἕξις, or essential form, from the subject to which it belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said (Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὡς μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. They also distinguish between a thing and its οὐσία. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναί τε τοὐτὸν τό τι ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μήδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μήδ’ ἐν μέρει θεωρεῖσθαι. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and Seneca, Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly compares the relation of an individual thing to its οὐσία with that of a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the ἰδίως ποιὸς distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus (in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιοὺς [= ἰδίως ποιοὺς] ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστῆναι.

[191] L.c. 222.

[192] This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the previous page.

[193] Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic teaching (as Simpl. 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, β). But the Stoic definition of δύναμις (quoted by Simpl. 58, α—ἡ πλειόνων ἐποιστικὴ συμπτωμάτων, with the additional words καὶ κατακρατοῦσα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. Ποιότης may also be connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν ... οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

[194] Plut. Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ’ ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ’ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. Simpl. 69. γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν σωματικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.

[195] Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐστὶ τὴν περὶ κράσεως κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Ibid. 144, α, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν θεόν.

[196] Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους (this follows from their hypothesis, but it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.

[197] Simpl. 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιοτήτων ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν (? ἑκτῶν) ποιοῦντες ἑκτὰς ἕξεις [l. ἑκτὰ καὶ ἕξεις or ἕξεις only]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given above. The conception of a property is compounded of several attributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate properties. If λευκὸν is a χρῶμα, the διακριτικὸν ὄψεως is the ἕξις, or form of λευκὸν.

[198] This follows of necessity, quite independently of the above-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if that intermingling of materials in which each one retains its properties (μῖξις and κρᾶσις in contrast to chemical combination παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be the complete interpenetration of one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i. 376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover, properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to the same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and with their subject-matter.

[199] The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare the remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the λεκτόν.

[200] Simpl. 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. Only the σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are πνεύματα, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties are called ἑκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms). Dexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωριζόντων τὰς ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν ἐρεσχελεῖν δέον ᾖ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl. Categ. 54, γ), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent of the conception of ἑκτόν. According to this passage it was Antipater who wished to include under ἑκτὰ, the κοινὰ συμπτώματα σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.

[201] Conf. Simpl. 57, ε, who after giving the definition of quality, quoted p. 103, 1, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.

[202] Simpl. 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος (including sc. τοῖς οὖσιν) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.

[203] Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. Plotin.