i. 8, ῥῆμα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other

forms being called κατηγορήματα.

[171] The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγόρημα was somewhat bluntly referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα.... Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. Hence for the latter the names σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα. See following note.

[172] In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according to Ammon. l.c. being called ὄνομα, and the other five cases πτώσεις· a statement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those terms. In Diog. 65, the cases (γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ) are called πλάγιαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγόρημα. According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (ὀρθὰ), such as ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται· passive verbs (ὕπτια), such as ὁρῶμαι· neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν· and verbs which, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation (ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point Philo, De Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια, also Dionys. Thrax, § 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, α, ζ; Diog. 191; and respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα or κατηγόρημα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case; περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an oblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject, the verb is called ἔλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα, as in the sentence Πλάτων φιλεῖ, φιλεῖ is so called; for these words only make a complete sentence by the addition of an object thus: Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα. If this is necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it is called ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα· such, for instance, is the word μέλει, for to complete the sentence it is not enough to say Σωκράτει μέλει, but the object must be added, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This difference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch, ii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is evidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the meaningless οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν—τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα, which at least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto. Gramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299, Bekk.; Suid. σύμβαμα (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who, in his equally inaccurate account, has ἀσυμβάματα. The example which Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting anent σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα proves, of course, nothing.

[173] There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the position held by the categories. By several, definition and division were treated of most improperly under the head of language.

[174] According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined by Chrysippus as ἰδίου (which must be read in Diog. in place of καὶ) ἀπόδοσις· by Antipater as λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην) ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὁρισμὸς gives in detail what ὄνομα gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the conceptions of words of similar meaning, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονὴ, εὐφροσύνη (Alex. Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained: γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων· which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a conception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely think of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422 suggests ἀναφορητῶν, which, however, requires explanation); εἶδος as τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (Diog. 60). γενικώτατον is ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (Diog. 61; conf. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις (division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμὸς has a special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the previous definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3, in Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds of division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8 διαιρέσεις mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker’s Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων) on the subject of στέρησις and ἕξις. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.

[175] Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36–144, is invaluable for its careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct the Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious combinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine of the categories are besides a few notices in other writers principally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25–30.

[176] The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too numerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of expression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, α, this were the point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, α; 15, δ; 16, δ, who quotes these as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of whom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero. Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories are given, Ibid. 47, ζ, 91, α.

[177] That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the categories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by his observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion—which are based entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.

[178] It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time speak of ὂν, at another of τί, as being the highest conception of the Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud ... quod est [τὸ ὂν] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [τὸ γενικώτατον]. It is, however, more usual to find τί. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: κοινὸν τὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol. 278, b, 20: οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τὶ οἱ ἀπὸ στοᾶς γένος τοῦ ὄντος (τὶ as the genus, of which ὂν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τὶ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὂν ... ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγοιεν ἂν τὸ ἠπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: τὸ τὶ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον. Math. x. 234: The Stoics affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. Sen. l.c. 13: Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale ... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum, inquiunt, natura quædam sunt, quædam non sunt: examples of the latter are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter,