CHAPTER XVII

THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 1906.[1070] The place was badly adapted to such a purpose. It was small, inadequately prepared to house and entertain the one hundred and fifty delegates, secretaries, and newspaper correspondents who had to remain there for over two months and a half. The delegates were quartered at one of the two hotels and the journalists at the other. They were thrown into constant contact with each other. The place swarmed with newspaper correspondents, most of them from France. There were about fifty principal ones, not to speak of the minor ones. They saw or heard or surmised about everything. They brought public opinion to the door of the Conference, and the French particularly were able at times of crisis or of important decisions to exercise a marked influence on the course of the deliberations.[1071]

Among the delegates there were three important groups, the German, the American-Italian-Austrian, and the British-French-Spanish-Russian. The representatives of Morocco and the smaller states took practically no part in the proceedings. In the first group Herr von Radowitz was a nonentity—old, feeble, so elusive and cautious as to be difficult to negotiate with. Count Tattenbach was the positive force, described by his British colleague as “a rasping, disagreeable man, not straightforward or truthful and evidently has to exercise much effort to control his temper.”[1072] He made a bad impression on the delegates by his blunt aggressiveness. Although he knew the Moroccan problem thoroughly, he was unsuited for the delicate negotiations required at the Conference. By his personality and methods he injured his country’s interests. He was more influential with his government than was Herr von Radowitz, but as a rule both men merely carried out orders from Berlin. Mr. White (the American delegate), Marquis Visconti Venosta, and Count Welsersheimb (the Austrian delegate) acted as mediators. M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson were the leaders of the third group. Both had served their respective countries as minister at Tangier. M. Révoil was a supple, subtle reasoner, inclined like Herr von Holstein to lose sight of his objective in the mazes of his argument. He was oversensitive, overcautious, and very mistrustful of Germany. His obstinacy proved in the end of advantage to France, but he would have made a number of mistakes serious for his country and for the success of the Conference if he had not had the advice of Sir Arthur Nicolson. The latter was the most astute member taking an active part in the assembly, although he played his rôle so quietly that the other delegates, particularly the Germans, did not perceive his significance. A true diplomat, he carried out the difficult British policy admirably. It was primarily his work that the Conference thrashed the fundamental problems through to a definite conclusion.

When the Conference was organized, it was decided that the formal session should be reserved for ratification of matters already agreed upon unanimously in the committee of the whole, composed of all the delegates sitting unofficially and engaging in free debate. There was also to be a special committee of formulation to draft the propositions agreed upon.[1073] Naturally the work was done in these two bodies. More important were the direct negotiations between the delegates of France and Germany, which after January 25, at the urging of the other delegates, were almost constantly in progress.

The basic principles governing the work of the Conference in preparing a program of reform for Morocco were laid down by the president, the Duke of Almodovar, in his opening speech. After previous agreement with the French and German delegates,[1074] he stated that everyone wished “reforms based on the triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan, integrity of his empire, and equality of treatment in matters commercial, that is, the open door.” It was not the mission of the conference, he said, to work out a complete plan for the administrative transformation of Morocco, but rather to “study together the means of applying measures which at present appear to be the most urgent and the easiest to introduce.”

The Conference, pessimistic at the beginning, took up first the questions which could be easily settled. Since these were considered primarily from the standpoint of practicality, agreement was soon reached on the following: “Regulation concerning the surveillance and repression of contraband of arms”; “declaration concerning the better collection of taxes and the creation of new revenues”; “regulation concerning the customs duties of the empire and the repression of fraud and of contraband”; “declaration relating to public services and to public works.” The discussion of these matters was unimportant.[1075] The troublesome problems were those of the organization of the police and the establishment of a state bank. The solution of these would determine whether France or Germany should emerge victorious. After the initial success on the minor matters, the delegates confronted these two questions with more hope.[1076]

Marquis Visconti Venosta and Mr. White first tried to mediate upon the basis that Germany should make concessions on the bank, France on the police. M. Révoil was willing, being ready, so he privately informed the British delegate, to associate Italy with France and Spain on the police, but he asked for definite proposals.[1077] At the instigation of the other delegates, Herr von Radowitz and M. Révoil began direct conversations on these matters on January 25.[1078] Puzzled by so many reports of different German projects on the police,[1079] M. Révoil assumed the defensive. But on Sir Arthur Nicolson’s advice he laid his proposals frankly before the German representatives a few days later.[1080] On January 29 M. Regnault, French adviser at the Conference, outlined for Count Tattenbach the French plan on the bank as follows: The bank should be subject to French law and to the French judicial system; the capital should be so divided that France should receive 27 per cent, Spain 23 per cent, Great Britain 20 per cent, Germany 20 per cent, Italy 10 per cent; an administrative council of ten members should be chosen according to nationality by the shareholders; a directory should be named by this council; a committee of discount in Tangier selected from the resident shareholders should be established and a committee of examination should be chosen by the future subscribers; the preferential right to make loans held by the French banks should continue, but perhaps be relinquished in return for an increase in the per cent of capital given to France. M. Regnault justified the project on the grounds that “the preponderance of French economic interests in Morocco must be given expression therein,” that it was a question of maintaining the open door without destroying acquired interests, and that “the open door does not signify that those who are in the house must leave it.”[1081]

On February 3 M. Révoil proposed to Herr von Radowitz that the mandate for the police be given to France and Spain together. “Over its form, extension and control all desirable international agreements could be made,” he said, so as to prevent any other right from being deduced therefrom and to guarantee complete commercial equality. He declared that France pursued no special political aims in Morocco, but that she must demand protection in proportion to her preponderant material interests. He also informed the German delegate indirectly that France might agree to the addition of a third Power to control the execution of the mandate.[1082]

In the end the German government was to accept practically these terms, but at the moment it was averse to making any concessions, believing that the Conference, “so far as grouping and general course are concerned, is turning out favorably for us.”[1083] Since it regarded the bank as more influential in the long run than the police, it rejected the French claim to preference for making loans on the grounds that that claim violated Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid, and proposed the use of the Egyptian mixed codes and the equal division of the capital among the Powers. Thus internationalism instead of a French preponderant control would be established in the bank.[1084]

On the question of the police, which was the more important, the German government offered various plans to prevent France from obtaining military control. It endeavored particularly to interest President Roosevelt in this problem. In a long dispatch to Washington on January 20, it laid three different proposals before the President: First, the individual Powers might participate on a basis of equality in the reorganization of the police by having each one, or at least the more important ones, assume a mandate for a certain port. A time limit should be set, and the Powers should renounce any idea of giving to their occupation a permanent character. For unity of policy the Powers could come to a general agreement on various questions like those of arming and training. Second, one or several smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, or Holland might assume the duty. (Belgium was excluded as being too liable to French influence.) Third, no mandate should be given, but the obligation should be imposed upon the Sultan to maintain at certain points police trained and commanded by foreign officers. The choice of these officers could either be left to the Sultan completely or be confined to certain nationalities, perhaps the smaller Powers. The Chancellor offered to accept any other solution in harmony with the principle of equality and the open door.[1085] On January 24 M. de Lanessan, a French writer, published in the _Siècle_ a solution practically identical with No. 3. The article read in part as follows:

There remains only one admissible solution; to charge the Sultan with the policing of his empire while determining the means over which he should have control and while instituting an international control over the organisation and employment of those means.[1086]

The Chancellor immediately seized upon it with greatest favor and advocated it to President Roosevelt.

The proposal at once called forth vehement opposition in the French press. When Herr von Radowitz mentioned the article to M. Révoil on February 3, the latter replied emphatically that in view of the incompetence of the Sultan the plan was not acceptable.[1087] Thus the issue was joined on the questions of both the bank and the police. In this situation, which had been anticipated by both parties, the French and German governments sought to win the Powers to their respective views.

The German government wished the Austrian, the Italian, and above all the American delegates to mediate in favor of its proposals.[1088] When on January 23 Baron Sternburg explained to Mr. Root, the American secretary of state, the German proposals on the police and asked for the American views, Mr. Root replied that the United States could not participate in any work of Moroccan police but that he personally approved most of proposal No. 3. He said that he would consult the President about the question.[1089]

This reply was eminently satisfactory to Prince Bülow, who immediately urged the American government to mediate upon the basis of M. de Lanessan’s proposals. On January 30 he telegraphed to Washington that the Austrian cabinet had instructed its representative at Algeciras to that effect, that the Italian Foreign Minister had spoken favorably of it, that the Czar had expressed his entire approval of the German position on the open door, that therefore the American government would run no risk in making such a proposal. The time was ripe for it, he stated.[1090] He also sought to influence the President against the French proposal on the bank.[1091]

At Algeciras, however, Herr von Radowitz found that the Italian, American, and Russian delegates all approved the French proposal of February 3 as moderate and practical.[1092] When Count Tattenbach tried on February 3 to persuade Sir Arthur Nicolson to desert France and support Germany, he met with total failure.[1093] As a result Herr von Radowitz again advised his government to compromise.[1094] But in view of the apparently favorable attitudes of the Austrian, Italian, Spanish,[1095] and American governments toward M. de Lanessan’s proposal, Prince Bülow refused.[1096]

Before talking with M. Révoil again, Herr von Radowitz consulted the American, Italian, and Austrian delegates concerning the chances of success of the German proposal on the police. All three declared that France would never accept it, that mediation on the basis of it would be futile. They urged Germany to agree to the French plan, with modifications, in order to prevent a break-up of the Conference.[1097] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, correspondent for the _London Times_, said the same.[1098] Furthermore, Baron Sternburg reported on February 8 that Mr. Root had promised again that he would consult the President about mediating on the German proposal but that he would not undertake any move unless assured of a definite result. When the Ambassador had listed the Powers in favor of the plan, Mr. Root had asked significantly what was the attitude of Great Britain.[1099]

Continuing to rely upon the mediation of the American delegate and to hope for the support of the American and Italian delegates, the German government instructed Herr von Radowitz on February 9 and 12 to hold to plan No. 3 with the two alternatives of choosing the instructors from some minor Power or of permitting the Sultan free play in the choice of them. In case the three delegates refused to mediate, Herr von Radowitz was to talk directly with M. Révoil. If the French delegate refused both the German proposals, Herr von Radowitz should request him to offer a proposal in keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality of all nations in Morocco. If M. Révoil held to his project of February 3, Herr von Radowitz should return to proposal No. 1, dividing Morocco into sectors each under the charge of a single Power.[1100]

As the three delegates advised Herr von Radowitz to speak directly with the French delegate, he did so on February 13. M. Révoil grudgingly agreed to transmit the following offer to his government:

It is proposed that the conference request the Sultan to undertake the organization of the police. He will have the duty of maintaining in the places determined upon, a troop of police which will be formed and commanded by foreign officers chosen freely by the Sultan. The funds necessary to maintain the troops will be placed at the disposal of the Sultan by the new state bank. The diplomatic corps at Tangier will exercise control over the actions of that organization; a foreign officer of one of the secondary Powers will be charged with the inspection and will report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier. This entire organization will be a tentative one to endure from three to five years.[1101]

The German stand on the police was meeting with the more or less openly expressed disapproval of all the important Powers. Sir Arthur Nicolson had taken the French side from the start.[1102] The pro-French attitude of Count Cassini, the Russian delegate, was confirmed by Count Lamsdorff, who on February 12 expressed to Herr von Schoen, the new German ambassador in St. Petersburg, his and the Czar’s entire approval of the French proposal on the police and advised the German government to accept it.[1103] Even the Austrian government urged the German government to compromise. Count Welsersheimb reported that mediation on the German project No. 3 was futile; and on February 12 Count Goluchowski, Austrian foreign minister, declared to the German Ambassador that the German proposal No. 1 was impracticable and hopeless. Regarding the situation as “rather serious,” the Austrian Foreign Minister stated that “Morocco was not worth a war,” and advised that in case of necessity the Conference be permitted to break up without result. Count Wedel, German ambassador at Vienna, warned the _Wilhelmstrasse_ that because of domestic troubles Austria had no desire to become involved in a conflict.[1104]

Although in danger of becoming a minority of one, the German government hoped to win its point by a show of determination.[1105] It complained vigorously to the new Italian government of the pro-French position taken by its delegate, and endeavored to persuade it to support the German views.[1106] It sought to exert direct pressure upon M. Rouvier by instructing Prince Radolin to inform him that Germany had made concessions on the frontier under the expectation that France would agree to the German terms with regard to the rest of Morocco. If the Conference failed, the Ambassador was to assert, the legal status of 1880 in Morocco would again obtain. The Ambassador should also state to the Premier that if he did not stop the anti-German campaign of the French press “we [Germany] must conclude that M. Rouvier has reconciled himself to the idea of assuming the responsibility for the results of this activity.”[1107] On February 13 the German government, in telegrams to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg, declared as follows:

No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of sacrificing one’s own interests merely because they block the way for another Power could lead to such serious consequences that we consider a disruption of the conference as the lesser evil.[1108]

That is, if the Powers wished to prevent a break-up of the assembly, they should persuade France to show more conciliation, for Germany would not recede. A newspaper campaign against the French views on the police accompanied these efforts.[1109]

This defiance did not have the effect desired, for it was based upon an erroneous conception of the determination of France and the views of the Powers. So vehement was the opposition of the French press to the German plan, which was of course known in spite of attempts at secrecy, that the French government could not have accepted it at all. Nor did M. Rouvier have any intention of doing so. The British government, although suspecting that Germany meant to make the Conference fail, was ready to support the French proposals actively by exerting pressure upon the other Powers. On February 14 Sir Edward Grey replied to the defiant German manifesto by arguing to Count Metternich in behalf of the French views.[1110]

In Russia, Count Lamsdorff, who had at the opening of the Conference anticipated a conciliatory policy from Germany, soon became disillusioned, and early in February again promised Russia’s entire support to France. Several of the delegates suspected that while the German representatives realized the necessity of concessions, they were not informing their government of the gravity of the situation.[1111] So Count Lamsdorff advised the French government that the only way in which to make Germany recede was by inducing the other Powers, especially Great Britain, the United States, and Italy to aid Russia in exerting moral pressure upon her and to show her that she was isolated.[1112] He approached the British government with a view to co-operation in favor of France. His friendly expressions were most cordially reciprocated by Sir Edward Grey.[1113] Furthermore, Mr. White and the French and British ambassadors in Washington persuaded President Roosevelt to yield to the French arguments concerning the special interest of France in Morocco, her unique fitness to execute the reforms, her honest desire to maintain the open door. Considering the downfall of M. Delcassé and the acceptance of the Conference as great concessions to Germany, Mr. Roosevelt thought that the latter should now recede in favor of the more practical French proposal about the police. His opinion was confirmed by expressions to the same effect from the Italian, Russian, and even the Austrian governments. The last two urged him to exert his influence with the Emperor for a moderation of the German demands.[1114] The President was coming to suspect Germany of wishing to divide Morocco into sectors and to regard France as the protector of Morocco’s integrity.[1115] He and Mr. Root both thought that Germany, believing herself able to defeat both Great Britain and France since Russia was out of the way, was playing the “big bully”; and the President had visions of the weak German navy’s defeating the British fleet, landing fifty thousand men in England, and taking the island from that guileless Power.[1116] Hence when M. Jusserand asked the President early in February to intervene with the Emperor in favor of the French plan, Mr. Roosevelt agreed to do so.[1117]

With the support of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, the French government was almost certain of success. When on February 13 and 15 Prince Radolin complained about the tone of the French press and about the French proposal for the police, the French Premier, denying any responsibility for the press, handed the Ambassador the following memorandum:

. . . . If M. Rouvier agreed last July that the solution of the question of the Moroccan police should be international in principle, namely by conference, he was not of the opinion that it would be so in execution. As to the mandate for the police, at no moment has the French Government engaged not to ask for it. . . . . Moreover, it is not a question of organizing the police outside of the coastal towns, and it has always been understood that the principal object would be to guard the security of foreigners. . . . . The proposals ought to be examined at Algeciras, France having agreed at the demand of Germany to submit them to the conference.[1118]

At the same time the French reply to the German proposal of February 13 was ready. Urged by Marquis Visconti Venosta and others, who feared a break-up of the Conference, the French government attempted to harmonize the German plan about the police with the French demands. Then Mr. White transmitted the project to President Roosevelt, who in turn would recommend it to the German government as his own, while M. Révoil would reply directly with a more general statement. Although the latter despaired of any success, this plan was carried out.[1119] On February 16 M. Révoil handed the following memorandum to Herr von Radowitz:

There is no opposition to the organization of the police in the ports by the Sultan, or to the payment of the troops and officers by the Bank of State, or to the short duration of that institution, but under the condition that the foreign officers chosen by His Sherifian Majesty be French and Spanish. The point of the German proposition relative to a surveillance of the execution of that organization may be examined if the question of the nationality of the officers has been agreed upon as indicated above.[1120]

On February 19 Mr. Root, declaring to the German Ambassador that Germany’s persistence in her plan about the police would break up the Conference, proposed the following solution:[1121]

1. That the organization and maintenance of police forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors.

2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for some small preference claimed by France, which he [the President] considers immaterial).

3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in management and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their Legations.

That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the government of Italy,[1122] the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspection and verification, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the information of the Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., to be deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance.

4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain, and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade, equal treatment and opportunity in competition for public works and concessions.

These terms, which the French government clung to notwithstanding the opposition of the French press, were unsatisfactory to the German government. At first Prince Bülow refused completely the proposal of February 16, and requested the French delegate to make an offer in keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality for all nations in Morocco.[1123] When the authority of President Roosevelt was added to it, however, the Chancellor receded on some points.[1124] He still held that the Sultan should be permitted to choose the military instructors freely from others besides the French and Spanish nations. But he was willing to limit the nations to those participating in the bank, or, in case France feared that the Sultan might favor German officers, to at least four nationalities. In order to recognize the special rights of France in Morocco, he even agreed that the Sultan might place Tangier and perhaps some other port under the control of France alone; that in the other ports the officers of various nationalities should co-operate. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root realized that this reply would be totally unacceptable to France, and they refused the German request to mediate on that basis.[1125]

On the question of the bank, the situation was just as bad. Since early in February negotiations on it had been neglected in favor of the more important problem of the police. But to keep the Conference going, the German delegates took it up again on February 19. The next day both theirs and the French plans were submitted to the committee of the whole. The German plan provided that: an equal division of capital among the Powers should be made; the Egyptian mixed codes should be used for the bank; a mixed consular court with the addition of a Moroccan delegate to try cases involving the bank should be established at Tangier; the bank should be supervised by a Conseil de Surveillance composed of the diplomatic representatives at Tangier, and managed by a Conseil d’Administration composed of two delegates from each national group and by a director appointed by the Conseil d’Administration; statutes should be drawn up by this latter body and ratified by the Conseil de Surveillance; customs duties, perhaps with the deduction of the sums necessary for the service of the French loan, should be received by the bank; funds for the police organization and for certain needed public works should be furnished by the bank, which should also be charged with the service of the public debt, especially the French loan and the German advance, and should be the financial agent of the state and have priority right to make loans; the Conseil de Surveillance should have the right to reserve funds necessary for the police organization and for the execution of necessary public works independent of the Sultan’s power, to fix the budget, and to advise the Sultan in deciding on public works.[1126]

The French plan contained the following provisions: the capital should be divided into fifteen parts, of which eleven should be subscribed by financial groups in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden, with no Power having more than one part; the other four were to be given to the French group of banks that made the Moroccan loan in 1904 in return for relinquishment of the right of preference for making loans to Morocco; the bank was to be directed by a Conseil d’Administration of fifteen members selected by the shareholders, each chosen from the nationality of the subscribing group; a high commissioner selected by the Moroccan government should watch over the bank for the Sultan; the Conseil d’Administration should select the bank officers and determine their powers; an international committee of discount chosen among the chief merchants and bankers of Tangier possessing at least twenty-five shares should be formed for consultative purposes on credit and discount; the bank should be subject to the French law and to the French judicial system; the statutes should be drawn up by a committee chosen from the various subscribing groups and submitted to the stockholders. France wanted the central office of the bank located at Paris, whereas Germany preferred Tangier.[1127]

The main points of difference between the two projects related to the choice of the central office of the bank, the choice of legislation and jurisdiction, the surveillance of the bank, the division of the capital, and the right of preference. The one side complained that the other project would make the bank into a French institution; the other side complained that the opposing project would create, not an economic institution, but a political one aimed at France—that it disregarded recognized French rights and interests and that it was impracticable.[1128] M. Regnault became indignant at the presumption of the German proposal; Count Tattenbach answered him in kind.[1129] The plans were so divergent that their discussion in committee was postponed until March 3 so that time could be given for further direct negotiations.[1130]

Thus, discussion on both questions reached a crisis. Fear of imminent failure pervaded the Conference. The issue was one of victory or defeat in the whole Moroccan episode. To break the deadlock the pro-French Powers again exerted moral pressure on the German government to force its retreat.[1131]

When the French reply on the police was made to Germany, the Russian government approved it to the German authorities. Count Lamsdorff declared frankly to Herr von Schoen on February 19 his belief that Germany would be isolated in her refusal of the French proposals and that if the Conference broke up she would be blamed, particularly in Russia, for the continuation of the political and economic tension in Europe. If the Björkö ideal were to be realized, he said, France and Germany must become friends.[1132]

On February 20, at French request, Count Witte urged the German government and Emperor William personally to permit a speedy settlement of the Moroccan affair. Until then, he argued, the Continental grouping could not be formed nor could Russia obtain the loan which she so greatly needed for suppressing the revolution.[1133] The German government replied that if Russia wanted the loan quickly, she should advise the French government to be more conciliatory.[1134] On February 23 occurred another conversation between Herr von Schoen and Count Lamsdorff, whose assertions the Ambassador reported as follows:

It is difficult to understand why we [Germany] defend so obstinately an international right on the police question at the Conference which all other Powers, in view of the practical solution offered by the French, are ready to give up. The pessimistic impression has spread throughout the Conference that we aim to frustrate an understanding.

The results of a failure would be incalculable. In France, where feelings are already very much excited and M. Rouvier would be accused of too great conciliation, a crisis with the downfall of M. Rouvier and his replacement by an intransigent person could scarcely be avoided. The continued anarchy in Morocco might bring forth bellicose complications at any moment, in which case England would certainly enter on France’s side while Russia would remain an inactive witness, but at the worst would be affected sympathetically. A European war would enkindle new revolutionary outbreaks which would also lead to difficult times for Germany. But the worst would be that the foundation for the peace program agreed upon by the two monarchs would be destroyed. . . . .

Denying that the outlook was so pessimistic, Herr von Schoen replied that even though the addition of the third Power to the Björkö accord might have to be postponed, that treaty would remain valid; whereupon Count Lamsdorff answered that the Dual Alliance still held good, that if France became involved in a war with Germany, the Björkö accord would collapse.[1135]

When this warning had no apparent effect, Count Lamsdorff hesitated to use the Czar’s influence with the German Emperor.[1136] But as a final effort he had an article published on March 2 in the semiofficial journal, _L’Etat russe_, denouncing the German policy at the Conference and upholding the French.[1137]

Great Britain also gave her fullest support to the French, not only in Algeciras and London, but in the various capitals of the other Powers. In upholding the French proposal to Count Metternich on February 19 the British Minister repeated his belief that British public opinion would point the way to active support of France in case of a war with Germany and would thus force the postponement of an Anglo-German _rapprochement_. The Ambassador answered that if Germany had to give in to every French pretension which arose from the Entente Cordiale in order to gain British friendship, he feared that the price was too high. The German people would come inevitably to look upon the British as their chief enemy. Sir Edward Grey assured him, however, that if the Moroccan affair were settled permanently, he would carry out his promise to work for a _rapprochement_.[1138] He also kept in close touch with the Russian government on Moroccan affairs. While refusing on February 22 Count Lamsdorff’s suggestion to intervene in Berlin in favor of France, he urged Russia to do so.[1139]

The British Foreign Secretary was pessimistic over the outlook for the Conference. He was especially desirous for the onus of the disruption not to rest upon France. To prevent that he was even willing for the Moroccan police to be temporarily organized under the Sultan by officers taken from a neutral minor Power with a French officer selected by the French government in general control. But he hesitated to suggest this solution to France for fear of hurting the Entente Cordiale.[1140] On February 20 he recorded his reactions to the situation as follows:

If the Conference breaks up without result the situation will be very dangerous. Germany will endeavour to establish her influence in Morocco at the expense of France. France to counteract this or even simply to protect herself and a neighbour from the state of disturbance, which is now chronic in Morocco, will be driven to take action in Morocco, which Germany may make a _casus belli_.

If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it. The _Entente_ and still more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . . have created in France a belief that we should support her in war. . . . . If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive us.

There would also I think be a general feeling in every country that we had behaved meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a friendly arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to re-insure herself elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and without the power of making a friend and Germany would take some pleasure, after what has passed, in exploiting the whole situation to our disadvantage, very likely by stirring up trouble through the Sultan of Turkey in Egypt. As a minor matter the position of any Foreign Secretary here, who had made it an object to maintain the _entente_ with France, would become intolerable.

On the other hand the prospect of a European War and of our being involved in it is horrible.

I propose therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the Conference is over, to tell the French Ambassador that a great effort and if need be some sacrifice should in our opinion be made to avoid war. To do this we should have to find out what compensation Germany would ask or accept as the price of her recognition of the French claims in Morocco. There is also a point about Egypt, which might be worked in on our behalf. I should myself be in favour of allowing Germany a port or coaling station, if that would ensure peace; but it would be necessary to consult the Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French would entertain the idea, and if so what port?

The real objection to the course proposed is that the French may think it pusillanimous and a poor result of the _Entente_. I should have to risk this. I hope the French would recognize that in a war with Germany our liabilities would be much less than theirs. We should risk little or nothing on land, and at sea we might shut the German fleet up in Kiel and keep it there without losing a ship or a man or even firing a shot. The French would have a life and death struggle and that expenditure of blood and treasure with a doubtful issue. They ought therefore not to think it pusillanimous on our part to wish to avoid a war in which our danger was so much less than theirs.

I have also a further point of view. The door is being kept open by us for a _rapprochement_ with Russia; there is at least a prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with her. An _entente_ between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done. The present is the most unfavourable moment for attempting to check her. Is it not a grave mistake, if there must be a quarrel with Germany for France or ourselves to let Germany choose the moment, which best suits her.

There is a possibility that war may come before these suggestions of mine can be developed in diplomacy. If so it will only be because Germany has made up her mind that she wants war and intends to have it anyhow, which I do not believe is the case. But I think we ought in our minds to face the question now, whether we can keep out of war, if war breaks out between France and Germany. The more I review the situation the more it appears to me that we cannot, without losing our good name and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world.[1141]

Thus Sir Edward Grey intended to do his utmost to preserve peace even at the risk of antagonizing France. He desired to postpone the Moroccan settlement if necessary until the Anglo-Russian entente could be consummated, believing that then France would be in a far stronger position with reference to Germany. But if war did arise, he was determined to throw his entire influence in favor of active participation.[1142]

In Rome, M. Barrère, loyally seconded by Sir Edwin Egerton, endeavored to interpret the Franco-Italian accords in such a way as to induce the Italian government to take the French side openly in case of a vote at the Conference. The Italian government refused. It also refused to support Germany, and left matters in the hands of its delegate.[1143]

Similarly, the French and British representatives co-operated to prevent Spain, somewhat disgruntled over the Moroccan accords, from refusing to live up to its obligations. The Spanish government promised complete loyalty. But when it appeared that the conference would fail, the Spanish government felt that as host it should endeavor to prevent that issue. On February 19 the Duke of Almodovar read to Mr. Révoil a note in which he said that for the sake of a settlement Spain was willing to accept the following plan as a sort of truce: The police should be organized by the Sultan under the control of the diplomatic corps for three years; the instructors should be exclusively Moroccan except at Tetouan, where they should be Spanish, and at Oudjda, where they should be French; France and Spain might renew their claims after the three years if they saw fit.[1144]

Horrified at the idea, the Anglo-French combination immediately busied itself to bring Spain back into line. At Madrid the British and French representatives informed the foreign office that if Spain deserted her friends the Anglo-French opposition to the German projects would continue anyway. They argued that a break-up of the Conference with the maintenance of the Franco-Spanish accords was preferable to the success of the Conference through the ruin of those accords, in which lay their sole guaranty for the morrow. M. Ojeda, acting minister of foreign affairs, acknowledged to the British representative that “he hated France and French influence in Morocco, and that he had no confidence in and personal dislike for French Ambassador,” but he added that “he would act faithfully in accordance with Spain’s engagements, although he disliked them.” M. Moret, the Spanish premier, also protested his loyalty to the accords. The Duke of Almodovar was instructed to abstain in the future from all initiative not previously concerted with his French colleague.[1145] To prevent any bad feelings from this episode, the British and French governments thanked Spain for her loyalty. Thus the danger from Spain was averted.[1146]

M. Rouvier consulted the smaller governments represented at the Conference with a view to obtaining their open support in case matters were forced to a vote. But they remained neutral.[1147]

The French government, again sustained by Great Britain,[1148] even sought to influence Austria in its favor, and with some success. Finding Count Goluchowski of the opinion that after France’s concessions on February 3 and 16 Germany should show moderation, the French Ambassador hinted discreetly that the Foreign Minister speak to the German government to that effect.[1149] Count Goluchowski, who on February 14 had suggested a compromise to the German government very similar to the French offer of February 16, urged it to accept the offer and to seek compensation in the settlement of the bank question. Both the American and the Italian delegates approved it, he argued, and he predicted that if the Conference broke up Germany would be blamed.[1150] On February 23 Emperor Francis Joseph himself intervened. Calling the German Ambassador to him, he said that Austria would act with Germany at the Conference, but that according to all reports from Algeciras they would be isolated in case of a vote. Such an isolation would be unpleasant for both Powers, but far graver, he said, was the possibility that out of a failure of the Conference might develop a new grouping of the Powers separating Russia from the two monarchies and associating her with Great Britain and France. He declared that it was necessary to avoid that turn.[1151]

The French party at the Conference knew that Germany was isolated, that even her ally, Austria, opposed her policy.[1152] On February 26 M. Révoil, refusing to make any further proposal, asserted to the German delegates: “If the Conference recognizes the utility of new guarantees, we will not refuse to examine them. It belongs to the Conference . . . . to determine the solution.” In other words, he told Germany that, having demanded the Conference, she might permit it to settle the matter.[1153] He and Sir Arthur Nicolson were devising some means by which a rupture of the Conference should not occur over the bank question and by which the responsibility for a rupture should not fall on France and Great Britain. The issue on the bank was not as clear cut as on the police, and public opinion would not understand why financial differences could not be harmonized. So the two men planned to bring the police question up first for decision. They did not favor taking a formal vote on that matter, as Count Lamsdorff suggested,[1154] for they perceived that the American, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish delegates would very probably not vote. But they intended in some way to make plain to Germany the preference of the Conference for the French police proposal. Then if Germany remained adamantine, she would receive the blame for the break-up of the assembly.[1155]

The opportunity came on March 3. During the discussion of the bank in the official session of the Conference, Germany’s views were supported solely by Austria and Morocco and were opposed, for the first time, by a firm British-French-Spanish-Russian group.[1156] That same day, on the motion of Sir Arthur Nicolson and with the aid of the Duke of Almodovar, the Conference voted to take up the question of the police on February 5 instead of that of the bank. The German and Austrian delegates alone opposed the motion, even the Italian representative siding openly against them.[1157] At the session on March 5 Germany was again isolated. Her policy in regard to the police was not even defended by Austria, while the French plan was openly approved by Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and Portugal.[1158]

All the delegates were pessimistic. As direct negotiations had proved futile, M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson both expected that the antagonism would come to a head at the next session and the Conference would break up.[1159] Herr von Radowitz reported to his government that agreement was impossible if Germany held to her present terms, for France would not recede, and that the other representatives, anxious to conclude the Conference, were in favor of the French police proposal. Even Count Tattenbach thought that his government was too obstinate.[1160] In Berlin, however, Herr von Holstein, misjudging the French feeling, planned to meet the crisis by disregarding the Conference and making a direct temporary agreement with the French government. The visit to Berlin of Baron de Courcel, former ambassador at Berlin, on February 20-22, afforded him the opportunity to propose the following terms: In regard to the police the two governments should make a temporary settlement for four or five years; France, in consideration of her special interests in Morocco, should be given one port to police alone, while officers in equal numbers of the various nationalities, including French and German, should co-operate in each of the other seven ports; in the bank France should also be given a slight advantage. Let France accept this internationalization for the time being, he said, and in a few years she and Germany could come to a direct permanent settlement of the Moroccan question by which Germany, in return for concessions elsewhere, would leave the land entirely to France. These concessions he declared to be the utmost that Germany would make; she preferred to let the Conference disband rather than recede further. Baron de Courcel seemed favorable to the plan; but, on March 6, M. Rouvier refused to consider it or any other direct negotiations with Germany.[1161] So that channel was definitely closed.

While this effort was being made, Prince Bülow took personal charge of all the details concerning the Moroccan affair.[1162] The Chancellor had no idea of permitting a disruption of the Conference,[1163] and began to consider a proposal suggested by the Austrian delegate on February 26 for a way out. In its final form this project provided that the organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetouan should be intrusted to the French; in Mogador, Larache, and Mazagan to the Spanish; in Casablanca to the command of a Swiss or Dutch officer with powers of inspection over all the police. It further proposed that this inspector should report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise general control over the reorganization of the police. Herr von Radowitz, Count Welsersheimb, and Marquis Visconti Venosta all declared this to be the least that the French would accept.[1164] The German government endeavored first to have Austria and Italy mediate on the basis of the plan outlined to Baron de Courcel;[1165] but on March 4 Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, regarding the step as futile, refused to do so. Instead he urged that either Count Welsersheimb’s project be accepted _in toto_ or that the selection of officers be left to the Sultan with the understanding that he choose only French and Spanish ones.[1166] From Italy also came a negative response.[1167] When Count Tattenbach himself favored the Austrian plan, the Chancellor accepted it on March 6 with the proviso that the commander at Casablanca choose his officers from other nationalities than French and Spanish, and also that France accede to the German demands on the bank. Then the Chancellor sought to obtain a combined Austro-Italian mediation for the plan.[1168]

On March 8 Count Welsersheimb’s project and the French plan of February 16 were formally introduced in the Conference.[1169] On March 10 both were referred to the committee for formulation on a motion by Herr von Radowitz, who said:

It seems to me that accord ought to be reached on the basis of the two projects. . . . . That of the French delegation certainly contains proposals which deserve the most serious examination. They ought to be completed by those of the Austro-Hungarian project.[1170]

The Austro-German proposal was a welcome surprise to the Conference, which recognized it as a great concession. Sir Arthur Nicolson found that “members of the Conference, with the exception of French and Spanish, are unanimous in favour of” it. He as well as the other delegates did not hesitate to inform M. Révoil frankly of this view. In Algeciras, London, and Paris the British government on March 9-10 stated to the French authorities that Germany’s concessions “had brought an agreement so near that it would not do to let the Conference break up now without a settlement.” “I would,” said Sir Arthur Nicolson to M. Révoil, “support him [M. Révoil] to the best of my ability in whatever course he might take, but I must tell him that in the event of the Conference ending in a failure we should be placed in an exceedingly false position with all the public feeling of Europe against us.”[1171] Sir Edward Grey thought that “Germany has conceded the substance and it would be a great pity, if France sacrificed the substance to the shadow.”[1172]

M. Révoil, whose views were also valid for the Spanish delegates, was totally unwilling to accept the Austrian proposal. He was handicapped by the unexpected fall of the French government on March 7 over a minor question concerning relations with the church. A week before the French Premier would have accepted the Spanish proposal of February 19 as a means of last resort.[1173] Now out of power, though remaining at the foreign office until the new government was formed, M. Rouvier of course could not make concessions even had he so desired. Staunchly supported by the French press, which on March 13 published the instructions to M. Révoil,[1174] he and the French delegate demanded the following modifications in the Austrian plan:

The police instructors at Casa Blanca to be, like at the other seven ports, French or Spanish.

Distribution of ports to French or Spanish instructors to be a matter for agreement between French and Spanish Gov[ernmen]ts. The Inspector General to be a subject of neutral state and to have powers of inspection at all eight ports without right to command or give orders to French and Spanish instructors, and to make his reports to the Sultan of Morocco and not to the diplomatic body at Tangier.

He also preferred as inspector a Swiss or, even better, a Dane to a Dutchman for fear the latter might be too much under German influence.[1175]

Both MM. Rouvier and Révoil believed that Germany would recede on these points, for on about March 8 the Prince of Monaco arrived in Paris from Berlin with a message for M. Rouvier from Prince Bülow to the effect that Germany would accept a French and Spanish police “under the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power.”[1176] The message was undoubtedly misleading and the French hope unjustified.[1177] When Marquis Visconti Venosta, Mr. White, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, at M. Révoil’s request, asked the German delegates March 9, 10, whether they would give way, the latter assured them that Germany had spoken her last word, that “the establishment of the inspector at a port as instructor was a _sine qua non_ condition.”[1178]

M. Révoil was “greatly disappointed” and “a little unstrung.” He told Sir Arthur Nicolson that his government would not accept such a solution. “He said with much bitterness that the Germans had internationalized the finances, and they now intended to introduce the principle throughout Morocco. France would leave the Conference having yielded everything and gained nothing.” His chief concern was that if France were forced to accept the Austrian plan, “the outcry which would be raised against it in France might be utilized to weaken the Anglo- French understanding.” Sir Arthur Nicolson replied that he “would always support him [M. Révoil], but I had given warnings as a friend should.” And Sir Arthur added “that he must face the situation as it stood, and that there could be no question of breaking down the Conference on that point, and at a moment when a favourable end was so nearly reached.”[1179]

In Paris, M. Rouvier

rather demurred [to the British Ambassador] to the supposition that the conference was so favourably impressed by the Austrian scheme. He said that France still counted on her side Spain, England, Russia, Portugal, and others had only been gained over by the German Delegates having persuaded them that Germany would make no further concessions.[1180]

Mr. Eyre Crowe was alarmed for the Entente Cordiale; he urged the greatest caution in advising France to recede. But Sir Edward Grey on March 12 repeated to M. Cambon that in his opinion France “should accept the Swiss at Casa Blanca rather than let the Conference break up.”[1181]

As the pressure of the delegates was so strong, M. Révoil and the Duke of Almodovar began on March 11 to consider tentatively the plan of associating actively a Swiss inspector with the French and Spanish in the policing of Tangier.[1182] Nothing could be decided until the new French government was formed. Meanwhile, the opposition of views became public in the Conference session of March 11 when two matters remaining unsolved on the question of the bank were taken up. In a previous sitting Sir Arthur Nicolson, in agreement with M. Révoil, had proposed that three censors be chosen to oversee the bank. In accepting this proposal Herr von Radowitz stipulated that in order to preserve the principle of internationality the censors should be chosen by the respective governments from the personnel of the banks interested in the Moroccan state bank and that a copy of the censors’ reports should be sent to the governments of the signatory Powers. The French delegates, however, desired that the first censors be selected by the committee drawing up the statutes of the bank and should thereafter be chosen by co-optation and that their reports should be sent to the council of administrators of the bank. The French continued to demand four shares, while Germany was willing to concede them only three.[1183] At the session on the next day M. Révoil refused the Austrian proposal to give the command in Casablanca to an officer of a third Power, but agreed to the inspection by one, preferably a Swiss.[1184]

In reporting M. Révoil’s pertinacity to Berlin on March 11, Herr von Radowitz stated: “I have been told by all my colleagues, even the English, that after our action they would no longer consider justified the French adherence to the points declared inacceptable by us and they have so expressed themselves to M. Révoil.”[1185] On the next day Marquis Visconti Venosta said in confidence to Herr von Radowitz that the latter would “not be able to come to an arrangement with M. Révoil without a positive intervention of the government at Paris. . . . .”[1186] The same day the _Lokalanzeiger_ published an exaggerated report from its correspondent at Algeciras in which the “complete isolation” of France in the committee was spoken of; Italy, Russia, the United States, and even Great Britain, the article read, had put themselves on the German side.[1187]

Instead of maintaining a dignified silence while public opinion and the persuasion of the Powers compelled France to give way or break up the Conference, Prince Bülow tried to increase the pressure by beginning a diplomatic and press campaign against France. With German thoroughness he overdid the thing. On March 12 he sent telegrams to the German ambassadors at Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, Washington, and Paris in which he stated that the generous concessions granted by Germany on March 10 had made agreement seem possible. Then all had been placed in doubt again by sudden and unexpected opposition from the French delegates. The other delegates, including the British, he continued, had expressed to Herr von Radowitz and to M. Révoil their opinion that France should now recede; and, after repeating Marquis Visconti Venosta’s statement, he asked the various governments to intervene at Paris “so that the voice of reason will again rule there and further opposition be given up.”[1188]

The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments agreed to advise France to accept the Austrian compromise. Sir Edward Grey, whom Count Metternich did not ask to intercede in behalf of the plan as he believed that the British Minister would refuse, welcomed the German concessions but loyally upheld the French proposals.[1189] Mr. Roosevelt unexpectedly replied most adversely.

In a letter on March 7 the President advised the Emperor to accept his proposal of February 19. He justified his interference by quoting a passage from Baron Sternburg’s letter to him on June 28, 1905, to the effect that “the Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, during the coming conference, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most practical.” He warned the German government that it would lose “credit” and “moral power” in the world if the Conference failed.[1190] In his reply on March 12 the Emperor announced his acceptance of the Austrian plan, and urged the President to support it.[1191]

Upon receiving that reply Mr. Roosevelt on March 14 denounced the Austrian project to Baron Sternburg as “absurd because it favors the very ideas the conference has been trying to eliminate namely partition and spheres of influence,” and also because it was impracticable. On the other hand, “placing French and Spanish officers in the same ports gives according to my view a safer guarantee than placing them separately in single ports,” he said. In spite of that reply, however, Prince Bülow regarded the German position as “at present not at all unfavorable.”[1192]

Meanwhile, the French were restoring their front. In Paris a new government was formed by M. Sarrien on March 14 with M. Bourgeois at the foreign office. M. Bourgeois, with whom Prince Radolin was on cordial terms, was known to be a conciliatory statesman interested in harmonizing international differences. But he could hardly begin his career in office with an unpopular concession on the Moroccan question. He renewed M. Révoil’s instructions, refusing to compromise on the police in any manner whatever.

It was a bold act. The French government knew that the Russian, Italian, British, and Austrian governments disapproved. Several influential members of the French Parliament tried to persuade M. Bourgeois that the British government, influenced by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would withdraw its support from France. The new cabinet was alarmed by the British advice to accept a neutral police in Casablanca rather than break up the Conference, and some of the ministers suspected that Great Britain and Germany were about to come to an arrangement leaving France in the lurch. In a French cabinet meeting M. Clémenceau was at first the only minister to combat these doubts.[1193]

But the move succeeded. M. Bourgeois quickly repulsed the intervention, half-hearted as it was, of the Russian, Italian, and Austrian ambassadors in Paris in favor of the Austrian plan; he even gathered from his conversation with the Austrian representative that the latter’s government would try to persuade Germany to relinquish her stand on the policing of Casablanca.[1194] In addition, as soon as the French instructions were published, Sir Edward Grey immediately informed the French government that Great Britain would “of course” support it.[1195]

When he learned of the French doubts about the continuation of British aid, he rather indignantly replied that the French leaders, MM. Bourgeois, Etienne, and Clémenceau,

should be told that there has never been any question here of discontinuing our support to France. We have given it throughout at Algeciras and in every capital in Europe where required and shall continue this so long as the French wish it and trust us. Cordial co- operation with France in all parts of the world remains a cardinal point of British policy and in some respects we have carried it further than the late Government here were required to do.

Any advice Nicolson has given to Révoil has been on the understanding that this support would be continued, and if he has given advice freely it has been because of his complete confidence that this was understood by his French colleague. The same is true of my conversations with Cambon. . . . . The Prime Minister has been cognizant of all I have said and has cordially approved of it.

Sir Arthur Nicolson denied that either directly or indirectly had he ever said to the German delegates that France ought to give way on any point.[1196] Sir Edward Grey informed the other governments that the British fidelity to France would continue as before. And on March 18 _Le Temps_ published the instructions to Sir Arthur Nicolson so that public opinion could see how complete that support was.[1197]

If the French leaders intended to bring Great Britain back unreservedly into line by expressing these doubts about British support, they succeeded. M. Bourgeois could with more assurance inform the German Ambassador that France had receded as far as she would. On March 17 Prince Radolin reported his words as follows:

The Minister added that he stood on the defensive, that he supported entirely the previous policy of Rouvier and Révoil, . . . . that he had agreed in principle with the appointment of a general inspector from some lesser state “subject to agreement on details” but that under no circumstances would he permit the inspector to exercise a command or a collaboration. That is a question of principle, a vital question for France and her prestige in Algeria. Moreover in case the conference ends without result, the _status quo_ is no disadvantage for France. Germany, not France, had demanded the conference. “It is your turn now to speak, but not of the police. It is lost effort.”

He accused the German government of being responsible for the pressure of the other Powers on France. According to instructions, Prince Radolin replied in a serious tone but without threat that the steps taken by those governments were caused by Germany’s great concessions of March 10.[1198] But the vote of confidence given without debate to the new cabinet by the Chamber on March 19 showed that M. Bourgeois interpreted French feeling correctly.[1199]

There were signs at Paris and Algeciras as early as March 17 that Austria was seeking some new way out of the deadlock, and that Germany might accept the French view about Casablanca.[1200] Before the Austrian mediation had time to materialize, however, the renewed intervention of the American government turned the scales in favor of France. On March 16 Prince Bülow had replied to Mr. Roosevelt with arguments showing that the Austrian plan would preserve the unity and integrity of Morocco whereas the French plan would divide the country into spheres of influence.[1201] The President remained unconvinced. Thinking that the whole German action was intended to humiliate France, he and American public opinion took the French side. While he no longer believed that Germany aimed at war with her western neighbor, he and his advisers did suspect her of intending by the Austrian proposal to gain a port and a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Germany’s extreme demands were arousing dissatisfaction among the other delegates at Algeciras, he told Baron Sternburg, and Austria and Russia had already asked him to advise Germany to moderate them. So, while he declared that he would not hold out if the other Powers accepted the Austrian plan, he remained hostile to it. He threatened to publish the entire correspondence on the subject if the Conference failed. Baron Sternburg learned that Mr. Root had said privately that Germany’s attitude at the Conference was “petty and unworthy of a great nation,” that she was fast losing the confidence of the world. In reiterating the American stand, Mr. Root wrote to the Ambassador: “If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement [as the Austrian plan].”[1202]

With the net drawing tighter around Germany, Prince Bülow notified President Roosevelt on March 19 that Germany would accept the American plan of having French and Spanish officers in about equal numbers co- operate in each of the ports, supervised by a general inspector from another nation.[1203] President Roosevelt was jubilant over Germany’s acceptance of his plan. He immediately proposed it to the French government and asked the British to support him.[1204]

From this side the President met with strenuous opposition. France and Spain would have nothing to do with the idea of mixed police, except if necessary in Tangier and Casablanca. Complaining of too many peacemakers,[1205] Sir Edward Grey supported the Franco-Spanish view. Mr. Roosevelt suddenly grew timid and refused to defend his project before the Conference.[1206] The German government was therefore forced to fall back on Austrian mediation.[1207]

In a private conversation on March 23 Count Welsersheimb informed M. Révoil that Germany might sacrifice her demand for a neutral police at Casablanca if France would make reciprocal concessions. M. Révoil was willing to limit the number of French shares in the bank to three. But for the other unsettled problems of determining how much international control should be established over the police and bank and how the police should be divided among the various ports, the two men failed to find a solution. On the first question the German government demanded as a _conditio sine qua non_ that the inspector should be made responsible to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise a general supervision over the police. M. Révoil, on the other hand, supported by the British and Spanish delegates, desired that the diplomatic corps be excluded from intervening in this matter at all. On the question of the bank the Germans wanted the various governments and the diplomatic corps at Tangier to have some authority over the censors while the French did not. As to the division of ports the French formally requested that the settlement of this problem and of other details should be left for France and Spain to determine later with the Sultan; the Germans preferred to have the Conference itself divide the ports between these two Powers.[1208]

At that point the Conference again reached a deadlock. With victory in view the French, on March 26, refused to give way;[1209] while the Germans, who had already made the great concession, sought to save as much as they could. They felt compelled to be firmer because the publication in _Le Temps_ on March 21 of the very pro-French instructions to the Russian delegate at Algeciras, succeeding the publication of the French and British instructions, made it appear as if the German government were being coerced into retreat.[1210] With one or two exceptions, the delegates, anxious to conclude the Conference and attributing little importance to these matters, were inclined to think that France ought to recede on the question of the responsibility of the inspector.[1211] President Roosevelt was once more urging that both France and Spain be given a joint mandate and that they accept from the Conference a joint responsibility for every port no matter how the ports were divided.[1212] After the session on March 26, the mediators again set to work. Germany agreed for France and Spain to divide the ports as they wished and to submit their decision to the Conference for approval. Both Powers made concessions on the question of the control of the bank. On the most difficult problem of the responsibility of the police inspector, the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian first delegates met privately at M. Révoil’s suggestion and worked out a formula. Then Mr. White submitted it to the German delegates, and the latter accepted it (March 27).[1213] The difficulties were thereby settled.

In the meantime trouble, which did not come to the surface, had arisen between France and Spain. The Franco-Spanish accord of 1905 had provided for the policing of only five ports, whereas the Conference had dealt with all eight. France wanted the other three left to her; but Spain refused. On March 18 she requested that Tangier be given to her, but the French government rejected the suggestion, offering instead to agree that Casablanca as well as Tangier should be policed by French and Spanish together. This offer was refused by Spain, who on about March 25 made the additional request that she should be given an extra share in the bank by the Conference instead of receiving it later from France according to agreement. The French would not accede to this, but by March 31 the two Powers decided that the officers should be Spanish in Tetouan and Larache, French and Spanish in Casablanca and Tangier, and French in the other four ports.[1214]

The Conference accepted this division, together with the following terms on the police: They should function for five years; they should be inspected at least once a year by a Swiss officer stationed at Tangier[1215] who should report to the Sultan; this officer was also empowered to make as many special reports as he saw fit; he should likewise send a copy of these reports to the dean of the diplomatic corps in order that that body might

confirm that the Moroccan police is functioning in conformity with the decisions taken by the Conference and that it may see whether it guarantees in an efficacious manner and in conformity with the treaties the security of persons and of the property of foreigners as well as that of commercial transactions; . . . . in case of demand before it by an interested legation the diplomatic corps may, after advising the representatives of the Sultan of its action, request the inspector to make an inquiry and draw up a report on the complaint made.

On the question of the bank it was stipulated that the censors should be chosen with the approval of their governments by the various state banks of the countries involved. Instead of using the expression that the censors should exercise “the supervision of the administration of the Bank in the name of the signatory Powers,” a phrase to which the French objected as smacking of internationalization again, the delegates substituted the less colorful one that the censors should exercise “the supervision of which they are invested by the present Act in that which concerns the administration of the bank.”[1216]

Thus, formulas were found. Details were cleared up; minor points settled. On April 7 the delegates signed the general act. The Conference of Algeciras was ended.[1217]

The conclusions of the Conference were determined by the exigencies of international relations and the interests of European Powers, not by the needs of Morocco. The less interested Powers had aimed chiefly at preserving peace in Europe. France and her satellite, Spain, had been concerned with maintaining their interests in Morocco and with preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone had endeavored to defend Moroccan rights, and she had done so only because that policy had been in accord with her interests. The Moroccan delegates had in general been disregarded by the Conference, which assumed that the Sultan would under pressure accept its decisions. Although the assembly had formally acknowledged the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan, it had shown little more regard for them than had the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904-5. While the open door had been allowed, the French and Spanish military control in Morocco assured to those two Powers the main economic advantages. In view of the terms of the Franco-Spanish accord of 1905, it was certain that those Powers would not preserve equality of economic treatment. France and Spain had both fought internationalization so effectively that the international supervision established was entirely inadequate to command respect. The idea that a Power might be charged by the other Powers with the exercise of a mandate for the sake of the “backward people” had not as yet been seriously considered by any government. In February and March President Roosevelt and the German government had discussed the proposal of granting to France and Spain a mandate in Morocco “from all the Powers, under responsibility to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights and opportunities”[1218]—that is, for the advantage of the Western Powers not for that of Morocco—but the trouble lay in the absence of any existing machinery which would have enabled it to be put into effect.

The reforms provided for were hardly more than a beginning. They were unsatisfactory both to the Moroccans and to the French and the Spanish. The Moroccan government was surprised at the outcome of the Conference, having expected that France would be arraigned before that body as before a tribunal. The mass of the Moroccan people remained hostile to reform; they were turning their homage more to the pretender and to Raisouli. Even those ministers who recognized the necessity for change denounced the Conference proposals as benefiting the Europeans and European trade in Morocco but not the Moroccan government. “The conference has turned Morocco over to the French,” said El Tores, a delegate to that assembly, to Dr. Rosen. He thought that either acceptance or rejection of the Conference act by the Sultan would be a misfortune.[1219] Ben Sliman, the Moroccan foreign minister, was equally despondent.

He regarded the outlook after the decision of the Conference as simply hopeless [so Mr. Lowther reported his assertions]. If the Makhzen assented to the Conference’s decision there was an end to the Moorish Government, as a Government. The ports were thereby practically handed over for ever to the Powers. These were of importance to Europeans and of a certain financial value to the Sultan although they were but a small part of the country and their populations a mere handful of those of the Sultan’s subjects, who, in normal times, had acknowledged His Majesty’s rule, and paid taxes. But the decisions of the Conference Ben Sliman considered, in practice if not in theory, left the Sultan no means or hopes of doing anything to re-establish order and restore prosperity to the vast mass of his people, to whose needs at large the proposed reforms were totally inadequate and he was deeply disappointed with them.

His Excellency would therefore infinitely have preferred the reforms to have been so framed that the Powers would have exercised some kind of direction, assistance and advice at the Court itself, the influence of which would have been, in course of time, felt throughout the country to the great advantage of all concerned. As it was, the Makhzen seemed to be left in as impotent and ridiculous a position as ever in the eyes of its subjects.[1220]

Opinion at court was divided upon whether to accept the decisions of the Conference or not. When the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tangier officially communicated the Conference act to the Sultan, the latter tried to delay a decision and to discuss certain points. But on June 18 he reluctantly signed the act with reservations. All indications pointed to the opposition of the Moroccan government to any serious efforts at reforms.[1221]

The Conference had made inadequate provisions for coping with Moroccan opposition. There could be no half-measures in handling Morocco. Europe had to leave her alone entirely or give the mandatory Powers complete freedom to “shoot” reforms into the land. The right to police eight towns would just suffice to involve France and Spain in a series of petty, indecisive clashes with the natives. If they wished to employ more military authority, they would have either to obtain the permission of the Powers or to risk another international crisis by taking an unauthorized initiative. As soon as the execution of the reforms should begin, the inadequacy of all this diplomatic activity would become evident. The Moroccan problem had not been solved.

[Footnote 1070: The Conference opened later than was originally planned, the immediate cause being the marriage of the Infanta Maria Theresa, sister of King Alfonso, to Prince Ferdinand of Bavaria, on Jan. 12. The King of Spain had wanted in December to move the meeting place to Madrid, and both the French and German governments had agreed; but as the Sultan opposed, the proposal had been dropped. Bülow’s opinion was that it made no difference to Germany whether the Conference met at Madrid or Algeciras or elsewhere. “It was a mistake that we originally settled ourselves on Tangier,” he wrote, Dec. 25, 1905. See _G.P._, XXI, 25 ff., Nos. 6911, 6913 ff.; _B.D._, III, 160, No. 196; _L.j., 1901-5_, No. 368; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1906, Protocols et comptes rendus de la Conférence d’Algéciras_ (1906), 5, No. 2 (hereafter referred to as _L.j., 1906_).]

[Footnote 1071: Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 90 ff., 503 f.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96, No. 6952. Tardieu’s book contains almost an official account of the Conference from the French side. He was present as representative of _Le Temps_ and had access to the fullest information, as his articles showed. His book is an excellent example of patriotic historiography carried almost to a hysterical extreme, and his interpretations have to be read with the greatest caution. Dr. Hammann criticized the work when it appeared in 1907 in two articles, one in _Grenzboten_, 1907, p. 12, the other in the _Kölnische Zeitung_, March 30, 1907 (editor’s note, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f.). See also the masterly criticism of French policy by Dickinson, _The International Anarchy 1904-1914_, pp. 134 ff.]

[Footnote 1072: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 243, No. 268; Tardieu, pp. 85 f.]

[Footnote 1073: Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Révoil to Rouvier, Jan. 18, 1906, _L.j., 1906_, 11, No. 4.]

[Footnote 1074: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 9 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 229, No. 248.]

[Footnote 1075: _L.j., 1906_, 264 ff., No. 37.]

[Footnote 1076: _Ibid._, 5 ff., No. 3, and following documents; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 91, No. 6947; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 92, No. 6948; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 119 ff., No. 6967; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 230 f., No. 249.]

[Footnote 1077: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 231 ff., Nos. 250 f.; Monts to F. O., Jan. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 126, No. 6970; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 130 f., No. 6975.]

[Footnote 1078: Révoil wished to push matters into the open sessions of the Conference as much as possible, where he would have more support (Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 119 f., No. 6967).]

[Footnote 1079: As seen below, the German government was proposing several alternative solutions of that question, and the German delegates seem also to have been discussing others on their own initiative. See Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 25 and 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 235, No. 256; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 144 ff.]

[Footnote 1080: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 24, 25, 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 234, No. 254; 235 f., Nos. 256 f.; 236 ff., Nos. 259 f.; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.]

[Footnote 1081: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 128 ff., No. 6974.; Tardieu, pp. 141 ff.]

[Footnote 1082: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4 and 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 242, No. 266; 243 f., No. 268.]

[Footnote 1083: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114, No. 6965.]

[Footnote 1084: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 30, 1906, _ibid._, 128, No. 6973; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29 and 31, 1906, _ibid._, 128 ff., Nos. 6974 f.; Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 132 ff., No. 6977; Tardieu, p. 142.]

[Footnote 1085: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 99 ff., No. 6956; Tardieu, pp. 160 ff. A proposal similar to No. 1 had been made to Roosevelt by Bülow earlier in January (Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54 f., No. 6926). Bülow also offered to support Italy in seeking a general mandate on the police, manifestly in order to create antagonism between Italy and France. The offer was rejected and was soon dropped by Bülow who feared that Italy might later help France penetrate Morocco in return for French aid to Italy in Tripoli. See Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 53 f., No. 6925; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 6965; Tardieu, pp. 146 f. There is no proof in the published British and German documents of Tardieu’s assertion that in January the German government also offered to support Spain in seeking this general mandate. See _ibid._, pp. 145, 155 f. Cf. Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]

[Footnote 1086: Tardieu, p. 146 n.; Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 123 ff., No. 6968.]

[Footnote 1087: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.]

[Footnote 1088: The German government did not desire British mediation, as it feared that Great Britain might try to pose as the protector of France and strengthen the Entente Cordiale (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114 f., No. 6965).]

[Footnote 1089: Sternburg to F. O., Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 102 f., No. 6958.]

[Footnote 1090: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 123 ff., No. 6968; 127, No. 6972. On Feb. 3 Goluchowski declared to the German Ambassador that Austria would go with her ally on the questions of the police and the bank “through thick and thin” (Holstein to Wedel, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137, No. 6981). Dr. Kriege, of the German foreign office, was sent on a special mission to Vienna on Feb. 2 to gain the Austrian support (memo. by Kriege, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137 ff., No. 6982; Wedel to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140, No. 6983). A cabinet crisis in Italy on Feb. 1 prevented the German government from taking any immediate steps to gain Italy’s active support. But Bülow expected Visconti Venosta to be willing to mediate. On Feb. 8 a new government was formed in Rome under Sonnino (Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 143 ff., No. 6987).]

[Footnote 1091: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 131, No. 6976. Bülow also instructed Sternburg to interest the American financiers in the Moroccan state bank so that they would press their government to oppose the French plan and to favor the German one. At the Chancellor’s request, the German banker, Mendelssohn, who was to take charge of German interests in the Moroccan bank, endeavored to arouse the Dutch, American, and Austrian bankers in the same way. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 145 f., No. 6987; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 148, No. 6989.]

[Footnote 1092: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140 f., No. 6984; Tardieu, pp. 152 f.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 500; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 239, No. 262.]

[Footnote 1093: Nicolson reported that Tattenbach argued as follows: “He observed that situation had completely changed since Conference had been agreed upon, and that now _vis-a-vis_ to France I was exactly in the same position as the other delegates. He continued that if I urged my French colleague to make all required concessions on police question, my words would be decisive; while if I declined to say those words, I should be practically encouraging my French colleague to resist; and he hinted that if the Conference fell through a great deal of the responsibility would fall on me.” See Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, 1906, _B.D._, III, 241, No. 265; 242 f., No. 267; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 281; Tardieu, pp. 147 f.]

[Footnote 1094: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 141 f., No. 6985; Tardieu, pp. 153 f.]

[Footnote 1095: The Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, M. Ojeda, had approved it. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 145 and note, No. 6987. On the German attempts to win over Spain see Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.]

[Footnote 1096: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 143 ff., No. 6987.]

[Footnote 1097: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 10, 1906, _ibid._, 148 f., No. 6990; 155, No. 6996; Dennis, pp. 501 f.]

[Footnote 1098: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 151, No. 6992.]

[Footnote 1099: Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6989.]

[Footnote 1100: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 9, 12, 1906, _ibid._, 149 ff., No. 6991; 155 f., No. 6997; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 155, No. 6996; Tardieu, p. 172.]

[Footnote 1101: Quoted from a memorandum given by Radowitz to Révoil on that date. See Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 162 f., No. 7004; Tardieu, pp. 175 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 253, No. 284.]

[Footnote 1102: Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 122, No. 6967; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 151, No. 6992. See the documents in _B.D._, III, 227 ff., Nos. 246 ff.]

[Footnote 1103: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 156 f., No. 6998; Tardieu, pp. 158 f., 194 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 298 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279.]

[Footnote 1104: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 12 and 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 157 ff., No. 6999; 166 f., No. 7007.]

[Footnote 1105: Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., No. 6994.]

[Footnote 1106: Tardieu, pp. 198 ff.; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 154, No. 6995.]

[Footnote 1107: Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 7 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 146 f., No. 6988; 152, No. 6993. Holstein was the inspirer of these dispatches. See Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., No. 6994. On the press war see also Tardieu, pp. 167 ff.]

[Footnote 1108: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 159 f. and note, No. 7000; Tardieu, p. 195. The telegram to Washington, dispatched the next day, was not of identical wording with the others but to the same effect (Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 163 f., No. 7005).]

[Footnote 1109: Tardieu, pp. 74, 163, 167, 176 f., 196; _G.P._, XXI, 152 n.]

[Footnote 1110: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D_, III, 248 f., No. 278; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 254 f., No. 285; Metternich to F. O., Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 164 ff., No. 7006.]

[Footnote 1111: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 244, No. 269; 245, No. 271; Tardieu, p. 154. The accusation was not deserved.]

[Footnote 1112: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 253, No. 283; Tardieu, pp. 79 f., 158 ff., 204 f., 246 ff.; Witte, pp. 298 ff.; _G.P._, XXI, 125 f. n.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp. 386 f.]

[Footnote 1113: According to Bompard, the Russian government was not certain that the Liberal government in London would support France as whole-heartedly as its predecessor had done. Grey’s assertions early in February reassured it entirely (Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, and Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 62 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 7 and 8, 1906, _B.D._, III, 245 f., Nos. 272 f.; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 246, No. 274).]

[Footnote 1114: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 489.]

[Footnote 1115: Tardieu, pp. 160 ff.; Bishop, I, 489.]

[Footnote 1116: Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, quoted in Royal Cortissoz, _The Life of Whitelaw Reid_ (New York, 1921), II, 329 f., 347; Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.]

[Footnote 1117: Tardieu, pp. 161 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 246 ff., Nos. 275 f.]

[Footnote 1118: Radolin to F. O., Feb. 13 and 15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 160 f., No. 7001; 171 f., No. 7010; Tardieu, pp. 200 f.; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 250 f., No. 280; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 259 f., No. 290.]

[Footnote 1119: Tardieu, pp. 179 f., 249 ff. White was very critical of the German tactics in his dispatches to Washington, especially of the German attempt to negotiate directly with the Quai d’Orsay while the Conference was going on (White to Root, Feb. 11, 1905, Dennis, p. 502 and note; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 257 f., No. 287).]

[Footnote 1120: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 172, No. 7011; Tardieu, p. 181; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260 f., No. 292. Révoil was contemplating an involved, vague reply when he talked to Nicolson. At the latter’s advice it was made concise and straightforward (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 287).]

[Footnote 1121: Root to Sternburg, Feb. 19, 1906, quoted in Bishop, I, 489 ff., _G.P._, XXI, 181 ff., No. 7019; Tardieu, pp. 249 f., 180.]

[Footnote 1122: Italy had been chosen for obvious reasons, for she was bound to France by the accords of 1900 and 1902 and to Germany by the Triple Alliance. As such, her choice might be acceptable to both Powers (Tardieu, p. 181).]

[Footnote 1123: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 173 f., No. 7013; Tardieu, pp. 187, 249 ff.]

[Footnote 1124: Bülow’s minute to _G.P._, XXI, 183, No. 7019; Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1906, in Bishop, I, 491 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Tardieu, p. 250.]

[Footnote 1125: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 213, No. 7038.]

[Footnote 1126: The plan was drawn up with the aid of Glasenapp of the Deutsche Bank and of Mendelssohn, who was to take over the German shares in the bank. See Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 27, 1906; _ibid._, 115 ff., No. 6966; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 114 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.]

[Footnote 1127: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 117 f.; Tardieu, pp. 184 f., 221 ff.]

[Footnote 1128: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 f., 120 ff., 136 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204, No. 7031; 205, No. 7033; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _B.D._, III, 265 f., No. 298.]

[Footnote 1129: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 176 f., No. 7015.]

[Footnote 1130: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 ff.]

[Footnote 1131: Rouvier suggested to Révoil that the representative of France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary meet informally and try to find a solution on the police. Nicolson and White opposed the idea as impracticable, and it was soon dropped (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260, No. 291).]

[Footnote 1132: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 178 f., No. 7017; Tardieu, pp. 194 f., 204 f.]

[Footnote 1133: Tardieu, pp. 246 ff.; Schoen to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 192, No. 7025; Eulenburg to William II, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 194, No. 7027 and Anlage, Witte to Eulenburg, Feb. 20, 1906; Witte, p. 301.]

[Footnote 1134: Bülow to Schoen, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 193, No. 7026; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 7028; Eulenburg to Witte, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 202 ff., No. 7030; Tardieu, pp. 195, 295.]

[Footnote 1135: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 211 ff., No. 7037; Witte, p. 301; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311.]

[Footnote 1136: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279, No. 320; Spring Rice to Knollys, March 1, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65 f.]

[Footnote 1137: Tardieu, pp. 247, 249; Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 234 f., No. 7052; Schoen to Bülow, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 251 ff., No. 7068. The article so embittered the German government that Bülow would not show it directly to the Emperor but informed him of it personally so as to take away the sting (see the minutes to the dispatch from Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235, No. 7052).]

[Footnote 1138: A visit of the London City Council to Paris, Feb. 8, gave occasion for confirming the Entente Cordiale (_G.P._, XXI, 185 ff. and note, No. 7021). Grey also intimated to Metternich that France would be willing to eliminate the thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom in Morocco as provided for in the Anglo-French accord. See Metternich to F. O., Feb. 19 and 20, 1906, _ibid._, 179 ff., No. 7018; 185 ff., Nos. 7021 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 263 f., No. 296.]

[Footnote 1139: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 22, 24, 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 269, No. 303; 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311; 278 f., No. 320; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _ibid._, 264 f., No. 297; 270, No. 304; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65.]

[Footnote 1140: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 258, No. 288. Apparently it was not mentioned to the French at all.]

[Footnote 1141: Memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 266 f., No. 299.]

[Footnote 1142: Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, believed that the way to prevent Germany from attacking France because of some French action in Morocco was for Great Britain to inform Germany that she is “absolutely ‘solidaire’ with France as far as the Moroccan question is concerned.” He feared that if Great Britain did leave France in the lurch, “an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain” (memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, and Hardinge’s minute, _ibid._, 266 ff., No. 299). Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, a prejudiced, bitter opponent of Germany, suspected that Germany might demand and seize a port in Morocco or obtain a lease as she had done at Kiaouchau in China. He advised warning the Sultan against Germany. Sir Edward Grey regarded the proposal as premature so long as the Conference was sitting, but said that the eventualities referred to should be kept in mind (minutes to dispatch from Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _ibid._, 272, No. 308).]

[Footnote 1143: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 168 f., No. 7008; Monts to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 161 f., No. 7002; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 162 and note, No. 7003; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Monts to Bülow, March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 286 ff., No. 7103; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _ibid._, 216 f., No. 7043; Tardieu, pp. 198 f., 205 f.; Grey to Egerton, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262, No. 295; Egerton to Grey, March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 283, No. 325.]

[Footnote 1144: “C’est la pire des solutions,” wrote Tardieu, p. 155 and elsewhere. See the conversation between Ojeda and Stumm reported by the latter on Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 189 ff., No. 7024; Tardieu, pp. 155 ff., 199 f.; Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22 and 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; 236, No. 258.]

[Footnote 1145: Tardieu writes that the instructions were “all that France wished” (Tardieu, pp. 207 f., 255).]

[Footnote 1146: Tardieu has a long story about German threats and intimidations toward Spain between Feb. 11 and 20. The King of Spain, he writes, was angry, but Ojeda listened to the siren voice of Stumm, first secretary of the German embassy in Madrid. According to the German documents, Stumm had at least two conversations with Ojeda during February, one on Feb. 20, trying without success to influence Spain to support the German proposals (_G.P._, XXI, 145, 189 ff.). On the Spanish proposal see Tardieu, pp. 199 f., 188 ff., 207 ff.; Grey to Cartwright, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262 n., No. 295; 271, No. 307; Cartwright to Grey, Feb. 21, 22, 24, 1906, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 301; 270 f., No. 305; 273, No. 310; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 269, No. 302; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 271, No. 306.]

[Footnote 1147: The Belgian government informed him that its delegate had orders to abstain from voting in case of a conflict, and to participate actively in the Conference only when the commercial interests of Belgium were involved. The Dutch government said that its delegate would vote with the majority. Sweden replied that she would abstain from voting in case of disagreement (Tardieu, p. 257).]

[Footnote 1148: As Sir Edward Grey knew how interested Austria was in keeping Great Britain and Germany friendly, he impressed upon the Austrian government, Feb. 26, “how unfortunate” was the German stand on the police, and “how impossible it was to improve the relations between England and Germany as long as there was this dispute between Germany and France about a matter on which we had an Agreement with France which was publicly known to the whole world, and which had been the very beginning of our friendship with France” (Grey to Goschen, Feb. 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 276 f., No. 316).]

[Footnote 1149: Tardieu, pp. 202 f.]

[Footnote 1150: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 14 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 166 f., No. 7007; 175 f., No. 7014. To the Italian and American governments Goluchowski openly censured the German attitude (Tardieu, p. 203, and above; Goschen to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 273, No. 309).]

[Footnote 1151: Memo. by Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 213 f., No. 7039; Tardieu, pp. 257 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279, No. 320.]

[Footnote 1152: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _ibid._, 278, No. 318; 279, No. 320.]

[Footnote 1153: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 177 f., No. 7016; Tardieu, pp. 187, 266 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, 276, No. 315.]

[Footnote 1154: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 274, No. 311.]

[Footnote 1155: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 25 and 26, 1906, _ibid._, 274 ff., Nos. 312 f.; Tardieu, Part III, chap. ii, _passim_, pp. 268 ff.]

[Footnote 1156: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 21, March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204 f., No. 7032; 233 f., No. 7051; Tardieu, pp. 143 ff., 227, 223 ff.]

[Footnote 1157: Tardieu, pp. 275 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 159 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 3 and 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f. and note, No. 7051; Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282, No. 323; 283 f., No. 326. The French press played up that vote as a great victory; the German press and government took the opposite view. Nevertheless, the German delegates complained to the Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and even the Austrian delegates about their actions; and the vote undoubtedly helped to accomplish the object of Nicolson and Révoil.]

[Footnote 1158: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 168 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 285 ff., No. 330; Tardieu, pp. 283 ff.]

[Footnote 1159: Nicolson to Grey, March 3 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282 f., No. 324; 285, No. 328. On March 7 Grey again advised the Spanish government to stand firmly with France and Great Britain (Grey to de Bunsen, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 285, No. 329).]

[Footnote 1160: Tardieu states that on March 5 Tattenbach openly said so to several of the delegates (p. 291). Bülow also found it necessary to bolster up the courage of the German delegates. See memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 256, No. 7069. See also Metternich to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 188, No. 7023; Radowitz to Bülow, Feb. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 217 ff., No. 7044; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 7048; 243 ff., Nos. 7061 f. King Edward’s visit to Paris, March 4-5, at which time he showed special favor to Delcassé, was also a significant sign to the Germans (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 510; Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 284, No. 327).]

[Footnote 1161: On this episode see Tardieu, pp. 241 ff., 296; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 278, No. 319; Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 284, No. 327; Nicolson to Grey, March 8, 1906, _ibid._, 288, No. 331; memos. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 206 ff., and note, Nos. 7034 f.; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 7047; 240 f., No. 7059; 250 f., No. 7067; Bülow to Radolin, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 240, No. 7058. Courcel spoke to Louis, of the French foreign office, about the project on March 5. On the next day Rouvier mentioned it to Radolin, only to refuse it. On Holstein’s views see also Lascelles to Grey, March 1, 1906, _B.D._, III, 280 f. and inclosure, No. 321.]

[Footnote 1162: Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 37 f.; memo. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 208 f., No. 7035; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; _ibid._ p. 338, editor’s note.]

[Footnote 1163: See the conversation with Tschirschky on March 16 recorded by Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, pp. 146 f.]

[Footnote 1164: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f., No. 7045; 262 f., No. 7077; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 187 f.]

[Footnote 1165: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 224 f., No. 7046.]

[Footnote 1166: Goluchowski reluctantly agreed to mediate on that basis at first, but after learning of the vote of March 3 and after consulting Welsersheimb he changed his mind (Wedel to F. O. March 1 and 4, 1906, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 7049; 238 f., No. 7056).]

[Footnote 1167: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Radowitz to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235 f., No. 7053.]

[Footnote 1168: Bülow to Radowitz, March 6 and 7, 1906, _ibid._, 245 f. and note, No. 7063; Bülow to Wedel, Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 248 f. and note, No. 7065.]

[Footnote 1169: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 183 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261 ff., Nos. 7076 ff., Nicolson to Grey, March 8 and 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288, No. 331; 289 ff., No. 334. Visconti Venosta, informed at the last minute of the proposed Austrian mediation, refused angrily to co-operate in it. Why he did so is difficult to see. He claimed that the Austrian project was not in keeping with the German view which he represented. This, however, seems a poor excuse, for he had approved the project when it was first suggested. It seems more likely that Visconti Venosta was seeking to avoid taking the Austro- German side publicly against France. The Austrian government was more alarmed at his refusal than was the German government, which consoled itself with the fact that the Italian delegate was performing useful work under cover. See Wedel to F. O., March 9 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 269, No. 7083; 271 f., No. 7087; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 257, No. 7070; Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 272 and note, No. 7088.]

[Footnote 1170: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 189 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 270, No. 7085; Tardieu, p. 293; Nicolson to Grey, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292 f., No. 337. By these words Radowitz did not mean that Germany would accept the French terms, as Tardieu imagines (Tardieu, pp. 308 ff., 313).]

[Footnote 1171: Nicolson to Grey, March 9 and 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f., No. 332; 294, No. 338; Grey to Bertie, March 9, 1906, _ibid._, 289, No. 333; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336; Radowitz to F. O., March 8 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261, No. 7075; 264 f., No. 7079; 269 f., No. 7084; Dennis, p. 503. Cf. Tardieu, pp. 297 f., 308 f.]

[Footnote 1172: Grey to Nicolson, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292, No. 335.]

[Footnote 1173: Bertie to Grey, March 2, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. 322.]

[Footnote 1174: Tardieu, pp. 299 f., 309 f., 321, 328; Grey, _Twenty- five Years_, I, 103.]

[Footnote 1175: Nicolson to Grey, March 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f., No. 322; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336.]

[Footnote 1176: Radolin to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 265 f., No. 7080.]

[Footnote 1177: On March 5, 6, and 7, Bülow showed no inclination to accept the French plan, but held firmly to the Austrian one. See Bülow to Wedel, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 239, No. 7057; 248 f., No. 7065; memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 256, No. 7069. He may, however, have made this statement to the Prince of Monaco without explaining that by “the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power” he really meant the Austrian plan and did not intend an acceptance of the French plan. Tardieu’s assumption that Bülow made the surrender and then receded from his concession after the fall of the French government on March 7, hoping to exploit this embarrassing situation, is, so far as we can tell, devoid of foundation (Tardieu, pp. 293 ff., 314 f.).]

[Footnote 1178: Germany also refused to recede on the police in return for French concessions on the bank (Nicolson to Grey, March 10 and 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 294 f., Nos. 338 f.).]

[Footnote 1179: Nicolson to Grey, March 11 and 12, 1906, _ibid._, 295 f., No. 339; 297 ff., Nos. 341 f.]

[Footnote 1180: Bertie to Grey, March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 296 f., No. 340.]

[Footnote 1181: Crowe’s minutes to the dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299, No. 342; Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 300, No. 344.]

[Footnote 1182: Nicolson to Grey, March 11, 12, 14, 1906, _ibid._, 295, No. 339; 298, No. 341; 303, No. 349. Rouvier also approved this plan. See Hardinge to Nicolson, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 305, No. 354.]

[Footnote 1183: The number of censors was later increased to four, one each from Great Britain, Spain, France, and Germany. See Radowitz to F. O., March 8 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 263 f., No. 7078; 272 f., No. 7089; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 152 f., 182, 189 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 291 f.]

[Footnote 1184: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279, No. 7094.]

[Footnote 1185: Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 273, No. 7089.]

[Footnote 1186: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 274, No. 7090.]

[Footnote 1187: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 274 n.; and in Tardieu, p. 316.]

[Footnote 1188: _G.P._, XXI, 274 ff., Nos. 7091 ff.; Tardieu, p. 318; Bishop, I, 495 ff. Bülow also sent a condensed telegram to the German banker, Mendelssohn, then in St. Petersburg negotiating a loan with Witte.]

[Footnote 1189: Schoen to F. O., March 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279 f., No. 7095; Monts to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 280 f., No. 7097; Wedel to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. 7099; Metternich to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 282 ff., No. 7100; Grey to Lascelles, March 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 301 f., Nos. 347 f.]

[Footnote 1190: Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 259 ff., No. 7074; Bishop, I, 493 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 251 f., 297.]

[Footnote 1191: Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, No. 7093; Bishop, I, 495 ff.; Tardieu, p. 335. The President’s intervention was extremely embarrassing to Bülow, who, after calling Sternburg’s attention to the difference between the original wording of the promise to Roosevelt sent from Berlin in the previous June and that sent to the President by Sternburg, threatened to disavow the Ambassador (_G.P._, XXI, 277 f., No. 7093). However, he did not do so.]

[Footnote 1192: Sternburg to F. O., March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 285 f., No. 7102.]

[Footnote 1193: Bertie to Grey, March 15, 16, 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, 306, Nos. 355 f.; 307 f., No. 358; 309 f., No. 361; Grey, I, 102 ff.]

[Footnote 1194: Tardieu, pp. 327 f., 343; Radolin to F. O., March 14 and 15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 291 f., No. 7104; 295 ff., No. 7107; Bertie to Grey, March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358.]

[Footnote 1195: Grey to Bertie, March 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 303, No. 350; 304, No. 352. In private both Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles Hardinge greatly deplored the French refusal. On March 15 the former wrote to Sir Francis Bertie as follows: “I think the French made a great mistake in not closing at once with the German concession at Algeciras; they could have made it appear to be a diplomatic victory for themselves. . . . . Even the _Times_ correspondent of Algeciras thinks France ought not to break off on such a wretched point as Casa Blanca, which I believe is a useless hole. However, if she does, we shall back her up” (_ibid._, 304 f., No. 353). And on the same day Sir Charles Hardinge wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows: “. . . . If the Conference breaks up over such an absurd point as the Casablanca proposal _we_ shall be in a disagreeable position, as I remember well your opinion that the French position will not be difficult for Germany to undermine in Morocco and we shall then be exposed to any violent action which the French may take to retrieve their losses and shall find ourselves compelled to support France in a war against Germany. If the Conference is broken off I shall not like the outlook. I felt very strong about telling Cambon that in our opinion the Austrian proposal should be accepted rather than allow the Conference to fall through” (_ibid._, 305, No. 354).]

[Footnote 1196: Grey to Bertie, March 15, 1905, _ibid._, 307, No. 357; Grey to Nicolson, March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 304, No. 351; Nicolson to Grey, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 304 n., No. 351; Spring Rice to Lamsdorff, March 17, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 311 f.]

[Footnote 1197: Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 329 f., 347.]

[Footnote 1198: Radolin to F. O., March 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 303 f., No. 7114; Tardieu, pp. 343 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 311, No. 363.]

[Footnote 1199: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, March 14 and 19, 1906), pp. 1290, 1438 f.]

[Footnote 1200: The conversation on March 15 between Bourgeois and the Austrian Ambassador also pointed in this direction. See Bertie to Grey, March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358. See also Nicolson to Grey, March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 308, No. 359; 310 f., No. 362; 311 f., No. 364; 314 f., No. 368; Grey to Bertie, March 17, 1906, _ibid._, 308 f., No. 360.]

[Footnote 1201: Bülow to Sternburg, March 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 293 ff., No. 7106.]

[Footnote 1202: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _ibid._, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; 305 ff., No. 7115; Bishop, I, 497 ff.]

[Footnote 1203: Bülow to Radowitz, March 16, 19, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 298 f., No. 7110; 307 ff., No. 7117; 311, No. 7120; Radowitz to F. O., March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 7111; 306 f., No. 7116; 310 f., No. 7119; Tardieu, pp. 344 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, March 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 309 f., No. 7118.]

[Footnote 1204: Dennis, pp. 505 f.; Grey to Durand, March 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 317, No. 374.]

[Footnote 1205: Grey to Goschen, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315 f., No. 371.]

[Footnote 1206: On this episode see Nicolson to Grey, March 19, 21, 23, 1906, _ibid._, 312 ff., Nos. 365 ff.; 315, No. 370; 318, No. 376; 319 f., No. 379; Grey to de Bunsen, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316, No. 372; Bertie to Grey, March 22, 1906, _ibid._, 317 f., No. 375; Grey to Durand, March 22 and 23, 1906, _ibid._, 317, No. 374; 318, No. 377; Durand to Grey, March 24, 1906, _ibid._, 320 f., Nos. 380 f.; de Bunsen to Grey, March 27, 1906, _ibid._, 325 f., No. 385; Tardieu, pp. 385 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21 and 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 311 f., No. 7121; 321, No. 7126; Radowitz to F. O., March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 310 f., No. 7119.]

[Footnote 1207: The Austrian government was opposed to trying to mediate upon the basis of Roosevelt’s proposal (unsigned and undated memoir handed by Szogyeny to the German government, March 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 321, No. 7127).]

[Footnote 1208: France could afford to make the concession on the bank because she had assured herself of the votes of Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, and the United States, which with her own three votes would constitute a majority. On this discussion see Tardieu, pp. 297, 342, 347 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Bülow to Radowitz, March 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 322 f., No. 7129; Radowitz to F. O., March 16, 23, 25, 26, 1906, _ibid._, 297, No. 7109; 322, No. 7128; 324 ff., No. 7131; 326 f., Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 23, 1906, _B.D._, III, 319 f., No. 379.]

[Footnote 1209: Tardieu, pp. 362, 365 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 26, 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 321, No. 382; 322 ff., No. 383.]

[Footnote 1210: This publication, which was another answer to the exaggerated article in the _Lokalanzeiger_ on March 12, angered the German government. A short time previously Bülow had asked the Russian government to use its influence in moderating the anti-German campaign of the French press, especially of Tardieu in _Le Temps_. Instead of doing so, the Russian government issued this denial that it had ever advised France to accept the Austrian police proposal and asserted that Russia had never ceased and would not cease from acting toward France as a faithful ally. The German government complained to the Russian government against its so manifestly taking the French side, and threatened to refuse German participation in the forthcoming Russian loan. Both Lamsdorff and Witte were impressed by the vigor of the complaints, and tried to explain the affair away. Nelidow had endeavored to influence Tardieu, they said, and had spoken to him in general terms of the instructions which he had just received. To the Ambassador’s amazement, he had discovered an entirely false account of these instructions published in _Le Temps_. On demanding an explanation from Tardieu, the latter said that he had obtained his information in the French foreign office. Both ministers as well as the Ambassador expressed their regrets over the affair, and Lamsdorff published a correct version of the instructions. But as Schoen said, the latter version did not change the previous one much. Osten-Sacken weakened the Russian explanation by admitting to Tschirschky that Nelidow himself had given an “excerpt” of the instructions to the offending journalist. So the German government was not appeased by the excuses (see Bülow to Schoen, March 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 312 f., No. 7122, and following documents). As a matter of fact, those instructions were published on purpose to impress upon Germany that Russia held to the Dual Alliance and did not regard the Björkö accord as binding. See Witte, pp. 298 ff.; Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign Minister_, pp. 23 f.; Tardieu, pp. 330 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315, No. 369; Spring Rice to Grey, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316 f., No. 373.]

[Footnote 1211: Even the Russian and Spanish delegates considered this matter of no importance. See Tardieu, pp. 361 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 330 f., No. 7137.]

[Footnote 1212: Sternburg to F. O., March 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 324, No. 7130.]

[Footnote 1213: Radowitz to F. O., March 26 and 27, 1906, _ibid._, 326 ff., Nos. 7132 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f., No. 7137; Nicolson to Grey, March 27, 1906, _B.D._, 324 f., No. 384; Tardieu, pp. 371 ff.]

[Footnote 1214: On these negotiations see Tardieu, pp. 378 ff. Almodovar tried to reopen the question of Tangier with the French on April 1 but had no success (_ibid._, pp. 394 ff.; see also _L.j., 1906_, p. 239).]

[Footnote 1215: A Swiss was selected at France’s wish because Switzerland was so little interested in Morocco. See Nicolson to Grey, March 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 326 f., No. 386.]

[Footnote 1216: Tardieu, pp. 396 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, p. 210; Lee, II, 362.]

[Footnote 1217: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 27 and 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 328 ff., Nos. 7134 ff.; 331 f., No. 7138; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f., No. 7137; Tardieu, pp. 396 ff. The final act is found in _L.j., 1906_, pp. 262 ff.]

[Footnote 1218: Bishop, I, 492, 494, 496 ff.]

[Footnote 1219: Rosen to Bülow, May 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 601 f., No. 7276.]

[Footnote 1220: Lowther to Grey, April 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 338, No. 402.]

[Footnote 1221: Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 343; Nicolson to Grey, March 13, April 3, 1906, _ibid._, 301, No. 346; 330, No. 392; Lowther to Grey, April 17 and 22, 1906, _ibid._, 337 ff., Nos. 401 f.; 346 f. and inclosure, No. 412; memo. by Geoffray, Aug. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 341 ff., No. 405; Tardieu, pp. 425 ff.]