CHAPTER XVI

THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

I. GERMAN PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

After the Björkö treaty had been annulled by the Russian government, the Moroccan affair once more held the chief attention of the German foreign office. Already important, it became more so; for there was no longer any reason for the German government to use the Moroccan affair as a means of conciliating France and there was added need for it to justify to the German people and to the world the long diplomatic campaign over Morocco by checkmating France at the Conference.

Our chief object [wrote Prince Bülow on November 23] must be to avoid isolation at the conference. If we have the majority or all the other Powers against us on a question upon which we have engaged ourselves, boldness and threats will be of no use since after all that has occurred, our situation would be almost ludicrous.[959]

At almost the same moment the French Premier sounded the German government as to whether it would agree for France and Spain together to receive a police mandate from the Conference.[960] The inclusion of Spain, he said, would prevent the concession from appearing one-sided in favor of France and would enable the latter to keep her promise not to seek a general mandate. He added that Germany might be forced to agree to that solution. Replying doubtfully to these overtures, Herr von Flotow advised the French government to make the proposal directly in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic form. A few days later (November 30) Herr von Kühlmann reported that M. Vaffier-Pollet, representative of the Comité du Maroc in Tangier, and Count de Chérisey, former secretary of the French legation in Tangier, had proposed to him in Paris that the German and French governments make a secret agreement before the Conference to the following effect: The _status quo_ in Morocco should be maintained for three or four years, after which, if conditions had not improved, Germany should not oppose the bestowal upon France of the police mandate for all of Morocco; in return, Germany should be assured of the open door and of the right for German capital to participate to the extent of 45 per cent in all governmental enterprises in Morocco, of territorial compensation in the French Congo region, and of the cession of the French right of preference to acquire the Belgian Congo.[961] Although M. Rouvier stood behind this offer, the German government did not know it and did not reply. It was much disposed to consider the overture made through Herr von Flotow; but this fact the French Premier could not know, and, misled by the German silence, he never returned to the subject.[962]

The German Chancellor’s willingness to negotiate directly with France showed that he was beginning to appreciate Germany’s increasingly unfavorable position in international relations. He knew that the German government faced a hard campaign and that its public opinion, which had no particular interest in Morocco and was averse to war, must be convinced of the justice of the German cause and aroused to the seriousness of the international situation. In the Reichstag on December 6 the Chancellor therefore warned the nation that while animosities had been overcome, new ones were possible, and that the British were particularly anti-German. Repeating all the German accusations against the French Moroccan policy, he justified at length Germany’s defense of her interests. He avowed his strong desire for the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations. He assured his hearers that Italy remained loyal to the Triple Alliance. But he urged his country to be prepared for any emergency.[963] The speech was widely approved.[964]

The Chancellor’s utterances were soon answered by M. Rouvier through the publication of a French _Livre jaune_ of over three hundred pages, which was supplemented by a speech in the Chamber on December 16.[965] Therein, to the satisfaction of the French, the German accusations were denied and the national policy of France toward Morocco was exonerated.[966] According to the reports of the German representatives in Paris in December and January, France was firmly resolved not to recede further, and the French government was making military preparations.[967]

These manifestations did not augur well for the German government. Nor did the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of September 1, 1905, which it learned of at some time before the Conference opened.[968] The knowledge of the terms gave a concrete basis to the mistrust of France’s intentions toward Morocco, and stiffened German resistance. On December 25 the German government envisaged three ways in which the Conference might end: first, a provisorium of about three years might be agreed upon, at the end of which each Power would recover its freedom of action; second, a separate agreement with France might be made, but only in case the latter offered suitable terms; third, a general police mandate for Western Morocco might be given to France. This last result, equivalent to a French victory, the German government was determined not to permit, holding a conflict as preferable.[969] In fact, none of these solutions was very palatable to the government. But it was determined to hold firm,[970] and the instructions to Herr von Radowitz and Count Tattenbach, the German delegates at the Conference, were optimistic.

The delegates were to uphold the open door and economic equality for all. They should combat the monopoly for making loans to Morocco claimed by the French banks. As Germany had already recognized the legitimate interests of France by permitting her to regulate the frontier, the mandate for police reforms in the west should be given to a number of Powers and should be internationally organized for a limited number of years. If a division of mandated areas were made, Germany should receive her share—one with a port advantageously located for later expansion into the interior; however, Germany was ready to agree with the others not to draw any advantage for herself from this mandate. All the signatory Powers should participate equally in establishing and directing the proposed state bank, for which adequate international organization and control should be provided. Above all, the delegates should not permit themselves to be isolated or to stand alone with Morocco. Thus, in general, they were to work for the internationalization of Morocco.[971]

Prince Bülow became more and more optimistic as the Conference approached.[972] At his urging, the Sultan promised to select carefully his delegates to the assembly and to co-operate with the Powers there.[973] The Chancellor expected the neutral Powers to support Germany against the monopolistic desires of France. He particularly courted President Roosevelt; for, although he knew that Mr. White, the American delegate, would not be permitted to take the initiative at the Conference, the Chancellor thought that the President and his delegate would be able, behind the scenes, to exert a powerful influence.[974] From Russia, Prince Bülow anticipated no interference. The Austrian Foreign Minister stated his government’s readiness to go hand in hand with Germany at the Conference.[975] Spanish mistrust and jealousy of France with reference to Morocco might be aroused and used.[976] To that end the German government prevented the selection of the anti-German M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate.[977]

Toward Italy, embarrassed by her situation as Germany’s ally and France’s friend through an agreement over Morocco, the Chancellor modified his former tactics. He offered to support her as a candidate for the general police mandate at the Conference.[978] But the Italian government refused. Sending the aged and experienced Marquis Visconti Venosta as delegate, it gave him permission to act as he saw fit in order to keep his head out of the noose.[979] The German Chancellor approved this choice and welcomed the Marquis’ statement that he would endeavor to mediate between France and Germany and to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion.[980] Prince Bülow planned to exploit Italy’s position by laying down a flat _non possumus_ on the question of permitting France to receive the mandate for the police, with the expectation that the Italian government would then press France to accept the German terms in order to prevent a conflict wherein it would be forced to choose sides.[981]

The Chancellor instructed Prince Radolin to impress French official circles with the fact that Germany would never permit France to obtain a general police mandate or a special position in the state bank, that if France persisted in refusing to agree to the open door in Morocco, a “very critical situation would arise” which “would lead inevitably to a grave conflict” between the two states.[982] Prince Bülow was pleased to learn that the French people were growing nervous and that M. Rouvier, M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador in Madrid, and others were asserting France’s wish for a peaceful and satisfactory solution.[983]

The main reason for the Chancellor’s growing optimism was the fact that in December a Liberal government had come to power in England and that British public opinion was more friendly to Germany. Prince Bülow and the Emperor both expected an improvement in Anglo-German relations, and exerted their influence in achieving it.[984] The Chancellor did not believe that the new Liberal government would stiffen the French resistance by holding out the prospect of active aid in case of war as the Unionist cabinet had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal victory at the elections in January as a clear rejection of chauvinism and an equally clear expression by the nation of an earnest desire for peace and for further improvement in Anglo-German relations. He learned that Edward VII had spoken in favor of a peaceful settlement.[985] Then, just after the Conference opened, the King and the Emperor entered into personal correspondence once more.[986] The Chancellor therefore expected the British government to play the rôle of mediator instead of active French partisan, and he endeavored to impress this duty upon it.[987] In view of this situation he believed that France would accept the German solution of the Moroccan problem.[988]

Although the Chancellor knew that France was improving her defenses, he did not anticipate a war.[989] He notified General Moltke, the new chief of staff, that he need take no precautionary measures.[990] The Emperor also regarded the French fears of war as “ludicrous, bordering on insanity.” Late in December he roundly declared to Mr. Werner Beit, a friend of Edward VII, and to the Marquis de Laguiche, French military attaché in Berlin, that “there is absolutely no cause for any war or for any concern about an attack from us,” adding, however, these more ominous words:

Even if we had the best intentions and were loyal and wished to remain peaceful, there would be danger that in case of continued inciting of France by London, she [France] might, relying on certain aid from England, conduct herself toward us so ill-manneredly and provocatively that finally our national honor would come into question, for the sake of which we should have to resort to arms; then we would have to strike and therewith, through our “illegal attack” on France, give the occasion for England’s aid. And it is monstrous perfidy [for England] to work toward such.[991]

Thus, hopeful for peace but not entirely averse to war, the German leaders saw the Conference begin.

II. FRENCH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

In spite of the failure of his overtures to the German government in November, the French Premier assured the _Wilhelmstrasse_ on the eve of the Conference that he wished to reach an understanding at that assembly on the basis of “no victor, no vanquished.” Nevertheless, both he and the French nation were determined to uphold France’s ambitions and claims toward Morocco. On January 8, 1906, Prince Radolin wrote that there prevailed in France “grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike complications. . . . . In press and public it is said that Germany wishes war, that France has receded . . . . on all points, but without satisfying Germany.” At the Conference, thus Prince Radolin interpreted French opinion, “proposals would be made which would be contrary to her honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France must defend herself and be prepared for any eventuality. . . . . Germany makes no secret of her armaments, and therefore it is imperative for France also to keep her powder dry.”[992]

In this state of mind the French Parliament during the latter half of 1905 investigated French defences and put 200,000,000 francs at the disposal of the war Minister for repairing them, particularly on the eastern frontier. That work was actively begun; food and munitions were brought in; the frontier forces were increased by reserves; drilling and trial mobilizations were held.[993] As M. Delcassé had prophesied, M. Rouvier returned completely to the international policy of the fallen Minister in order to achieve victory at the Conference. The French government realized that the opposition of the French and German policies was so complete as to make retreat difficult for either party. Preparing for the worst, M. Rouvier yet hoped to exert sufficient moral pressure on Germany at the Conference to gain a French victory without precipitating a war.[994] To that end he supplemented the military measures by diplomatic work. He was certain of Russia’s support because, aside from the alliance, Russia had urgent need of a French loan, which M. Rouvier would not permit until after a satisfactory conclusion of the Moroccan affair.[995] Russia’s influence was restricted by the revolution and by a lack of interest in Morocco. But a promise from the Czar to exercise his personal power with Emperor William II in favor of conciliation would be of eminent value, and M. Rouvier sought to obtain it.[996] He also wished to have President Roosevelt act similarly at the proper moment. This plan was to bear fruit later; but at the time the American government replied that it had small concern in the Moroccan conference and that, while standing for the open door and exerting its influence for peace, it would interfere as little as possible in the deliberations. Mr. Root, the secretary of state, told the British Ambassador that the American delegate would “avoid any action which could tend to weaken Anglo-French entente.”[997] M. Rouvier also received “satisfactory assurances” from the Austro-Hungarian government; he did not expect opposition from it or from Belgium.[998] Far more important was the continuation of British aid, both for its own sake and for holding Italy and Spain in line.[999] From the new Liberal government that came in early in December, the French Premier was immediately assured of diplomatic aid by word and act.

III. BRITISH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

When internal disputes over the question of tariff reform finally forced the resignation of the Unionist government on December 4, the Liberals, with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister, entered office. In response to the popular demand they were pledged to continue the foreign policy of their predecessor, and the presence at the foreign office of Sir Edward Grey assured the fulfilment of that pledge. The Foreign Secretary was a Liberal Imperialist, a follower of Lord Rosebery. He had been one of the rebels against the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman, a Gladstonian Liberal, because of the latter’s denunciation of the Boer War. Regretting that Lord Rosebery would not enter the cabinet, Sir Edward Grey at first refused office unless the Premier would accept a peerage and leave the leadership in the House of Commons to Mr. Asquith, another Liberal Imperialist. After much persuasion from his friends and after the influence of the Liberal Imperialists had been increased by the appointment of Mr. Haldane as secretary of war, Sir Edward receded from his demand.[1000]

The new Foreign Secretary found the “mud of foreign politics” deeper than any he had ever been in; but he was soon steering himself through it as nimbly as his predecessors. Although an idealist who hated war, he was not afraid of it, for, he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, January 15, 1906, “We can protect ourselves . . . . for we are more supreme at sea than we have ever been.”[1001] He followed the ways of _Realpolitik_, playing the “grand game” of prestige politics in the ordinary way with national interest as his ultimate guide. He impressed other men with whom he had personal contact as trying to be entirely frank and honest and sympathetic. Yet his insularity, his lack of knowledge of the Continent, really prevented him from appreciating any other state’s point of view. Combining the limitations of a “downright Britisher” with high moral and political rectitude, he usually believed that Great Britain was in the right and acted accordingly. Then he was unable to comprehend why other Powers misinterpreted her policy.[1002]

With regard to Russia, Sir Edward Grey immediately stated to the Ambassador his hope for a settlement of the outstanding questions. Count Benckendorff thought that negotiations were impossible “while things in Russia were in their present condition.” Appreciating this fact, Sir Edward Grey answered that “during this inevitable delay, it would be the policy of our Government not to do anything which would make the resumption of negotiations or a settlement more difficult later on.”[1003] In January of the next year, Count Witte, Russian premier, proposed to the British government that Czar Nicholas and King Edward—diplomats he distrusted as being too slow—should at a personal meeting conclude a general agreement in return for which Great Britain should make a loan to Russia. The British Ambassador soon showed him the impracticability of the idea.[1004] In the same month Count Benckendorff talked vaguely and informally with Mr. Spring Rice of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and of Persia—all to no object, for, as the British government perceived, Russia was indifferent to an agreement.[1005] But some progress was made toward a _rapprochement_. The two governments co- operated on the Cretan and Macedonian questions.[1006] Treating each other more frankly,[1007] each refused to take advantage of the other early in 1906 by making a loan to Persia.[1008] The British government renewed its assurances about Tibet in January.[1009] British bankers agreed to participate in a forthcoming loan to Russia.[1010] The Czar and King Edward were on cordial terms, the former late in January even intimated to his uncle that he would be pleased with a visit from him.[1011] And the two governments were in harmony in their policy of helping France at Algeciras. So while the work of achieving the entente was slow, the British government did not let it cease.

The British Foreign Secretary also continued the previous policy toward Germany. He knew very little of that Power, did not understand it,[1012] and nursed a deep suspicion of it from his experiences as undersecretary of state for foreign affairs from 1892 to 1895. He was determined not to let Great Britain fall again into that state of trouble with other Powers, which he thought had enabled Germany to treat her so high- handedly at that time and to make demands upon her inimical to her interests.[1013] His advisers in the foreign office, Sir Charles Hardinge and Mr. Eyre Crowe, were of a similar mind, lacking the balanced and comprehensive judgment characteristic of Lord Sanderson, who after years of service retired from his position as permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in January, 1906.[1014]

Sir Edward Grey was now confronted with the same kind of action on the part of Germany which had previously angered him. He saw a conference approaching at which the new friendship with France would be tested, at which it would be either broken or confirmed. He was resolved that if possible it should not be broken, though he did not necessarily intend that it should become stronger. “It was a matter of interest,” he said on August 3, 1914, with reference to this crisis, “to preserve it [the Entente] as well as a point of honour to act up to the diplomatic obligations contained in it.”[1015] At the time (December 21, 1905) he expressed himself more concretely to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows:

The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. As far as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to concede to France the special position in Morocco, which we have promised France not only to concede to her but to help her by diplomatic methods to obtain.

If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great success for the Anglo-French _Entente_; if she fails the prestige of the _Entente_ will suffer and its vitality will be diminished.

Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her point at the Conference.[1016]

Thus for the sake of interest and honor, that invincible pair, Sir Edward Grey based British policy upon the matter of prestige. Whereas Lord Lansdowne had admitted that the Anglo-French declaration over Morocco did not bind Germany, the new British Foreign Secretary was determined that Germany should formally recognize France’s preponderant position in Morocco. It is to be inferred from his statement that Germany had the alternative of accepting France’s monopolization of the Sherifian Empire passively or of challenging it and then being forced to accept it.

That this ominous feeling was not peculiar to Sir Edward Grey was shown early in January by a letter which Lord Ripon, one of the older members of the cabinet, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. It read in part as follows:

One cannot help being anxious about this Morocco business. I am sorry though not surprised to hear that you think the Germans intend to make the Conference a failure. That a European war should arise out of the matter seems almost impossible, but when one has to deal with a potentate like the German Emperor one can feel no real security.[1017]

On December 19 Count Metternich gave to Sir Edward Grey a general explanation of Germany’s policy on the Moroccan question, expressing the hope that the British government would play the part of conciliator at the Conference.[1018] The British Minister replied on January 3. The Conference filled him with concern, he said. After having studied the documents more thoroughly, he had found that Lord Lansdowne had stated to Count Metternich “that, in the event of war between Germany and France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion, it would be impossible for England to remain neutral.” This statement, he went on, he made his own; for, while the British government “wanted to avoid trouble between Germany and France,” and would not “egg” France on at the Conference, yet since the entente was very popular in England he “really thought that if there was trouble, we [Great Britain] should be involved in it. . . . . It was not a question of the policy of the Government,” he told the Ambassador; “what made a nation most likely to take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that it would be impossible to be neutral.” British opinion, he declared, would be moved not by hostility to Germany but by the wish to preserve friendship with France. He made an Anglo-German _rapprochement_ contingent upon a happy outcome of the Conference, an improvement in Franco-German relations and the assurance thereby that the Entente Cordiale would not be endangered. He spoke frankly, he said, because the situation might later become such as to make openness more difficult. When Count Metternich reminded him that Lord Lansdowne had qualified his statement concerning the possibility of active British aid by the further assertion, “in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany upon France,” Sir Edward Grey made no reply. But the meaning of his statement was clear to the Ambassador, who accepted it as an honest rendition of the British position.[1019]

The bluntness of these remarks seemed justified immediately by the varying reports about Germany’s intentions which came to the British foreign office. The German Emperor was in a friendlier mood although angry at the tone of the British press. Baron Richthofen and Herr von Radowitz both spoke of a desire for conciliation.[1020] The British Consul in Hamburg, however, learned from Herr von Tschirschky of the German foreign office on New Year’s Day that “Germany’s policy always had been and would be to try to frustrate any coalition between two States which might result in damaging Germany’s interests and prestige, and Germany would, if she thought that such a coalition was being formed, even if its actual results had not been carried into practical effect, not hesitate to take such steps as she thought proper to break the combination.”[1021] And Prince Bülow’s brother, minister at Berne, remarked to his British colleague on December 31:

No doubt the sudden intervention of Germany [in Morocco] had not been dictated by the desire to safeguard German interests in that region. The object had been a higher one. Germany was bound in self-defense to emancipate herself from the isolation with which she was threatened. First Russia, then Italy, and lastly England had been won over by France. The cordon must be broken, and the penultimate defeat of Russia had furnished the propitious moment. . . . . He thought that a _détente_ would make itself felt when once the Conference was over.[1022]

It was becoming more and more apparent that Anglo-German antagonism would accentuate the difficulties of the Conference. Prince Bülow informed the British government on January 11 that he advocated reforms on an international basis. Stating that M. Rouvier had promised not to seek a general police mandate for France,[1023] the Chancellor made it understood that Germany could not accept that solution. In talking to the British Ambassador on the next day Herr von Holstein foresaw danger since France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the results of the Conference, “seek to create a _fait accompli_ by invading Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and war would be the result.” Asseverating that France was preparing for war, Herr von Holstein said that the danger could be averted if the British government would hint to the French that in the event of their invading Morocco it was doubtful whether British opinion would approve of supporting France by force of arms.

Upon being consulted, Sir Francis Bertie denied that France had any such intention, and asserted that

any communication to the French Gov[ernmen]t such as the Baron [Holstein] suggests would shake the confidence of the French Gov[ernmen]t in H[is] M[ajesty’s] present Gov[ernmen]t resulting from their assurances as to policy of England (and) might lead France either to make concessions to Germany in Morocco injurious to us or bring her out of Morocco by concessions elsewhere detrimental to our interests but not greatly to those of France.

After this Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Frank Lascelles, January 15, the following curt response to Herr von Holstein’s suggestion:

I hope the result of Morocco conference will prevent the contingency, which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. Should it however be otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on the part of France which comes within the terms of the Anglo-French declarations of April 1904. Herr von Holstein should know this.[1024]

In these negotiations the British Foreign Secretary tried to impress the German government with the fact that Great Britain placed herself squarely on the French side. This was one facet of his policy. The other had to do with France.

The British government was as eager for France to win at the conference as was the French government. To that end Sir Francis Bertie informed M. Rouvier on December 22 that his government

would loyally act up to the engagements taken by their predecessors and . . . . would give to France their unreserved support in the Conference on Morocco within the four corners of the Anglo-French Agreement and the programme arranged between the French and German Governments; but in order to enable them to do so effectively, and to put them in a position to act in concert with France, it would be desirable that His Majesty’s Government should be made acquainted with the views of the French Government on the matters to be discussed, and as to the concessions, if any, which might be made for the satisfaction of Germany.

The British government, he said, wished to avoid the accusation of being more French than the French. Going farther still, the Ambassador assured M. Rouvier that his government was in no way associated with the friendly manifestations toward Germany then being made in England. While the British government wanted friendly relations with Germany, he stated, an improvement in those relations “would depend on the attitude of the German Government in regard to Morocco and other questions in which England was interested.” The cordiality with which M. Rouvier agreed to respect this wish showed how conscious both governments were of the mutual advantages in loyal co-operation.[1025]

The need therefor was manifested at once in the case of Spain. While King Alfonso was regarded as entirely loyal,[1026] M. Moret, the Spanish premier who supplanted M. Montero Rios in December, was mistrusted by the British and French governments as being too friendly toward Germany and uncertain in his attitude toward the Moroccan agreements. Both governments knew of German efforts to win Spain, both learned of the German Emperor’s offer in November of a military convention to the King of Spain, and both learned that at Germany’s request the Spanish government had not appointed M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate to the Conference.[1027] At the French initiative the two governments late in December pressed M. Moret to remain loyal to them. These efforts won over the Spanish Premier. He frankly admitted that the Emperor had made the offer, but denied that he had ever considered it. He stated that Spain would support the French policy during the Conference, and hoped that the three Powers would work harmoniously together. And he told the French that “it will facilitate his support of them at the Conference if they will provide money to quiet the Spanish Opposition.”[1028] Nevertheless, the British government suspected that the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish delegate and proposed president of the Conference, would be “in the hands of the German Ambassador [Herr von Radowitz].” Sir Edward Grey also feared that Spain might, to the detriment of British interests, be induced to cede a part of her possessions along the north coast of Morocco or elsewhere to Germany.[1029] So Spain remained under constant observation and pressure by the Entente Cordiale.[1030] The British government put similar pressure upon Italy. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27 of the British policy, Sir Edward Grey remarked that the four Powers most interested in the Mediterranean were all good friends now and that he “hoped we should all come out of the Conference as good friends as we went in.” The Italian government protested that it had “not only friendship but also an alliance to be considered.” This item Sir Edward Grey ignored, and in Rome Sir Edwin Egerton repeatedly asserted that “a European political combination did not appear to regard special agreements respecting a local question, such as that of Morocco.” This veiled threat and curious interpretation of the Triple Alliance were valuable aids to M. Barrère in urging Italy to the Anglo-French side. The selection as delegates of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who had made the agreement with France in 1900, was regarded as insuring a pro-French policy. But the Italian government could make no promises of support, and Sir Edward Grey feared that the Marquis might, by trying to play the “fine” but “dangerous” rôle of mediator at the Conference, suggest some solution which would be altogether unacceptable.[1031]

The Anglo-French co-operation extended to planning the procedure at the Conference and to drawing up instructions for the French delegates. Every precaution was taken for victory. The British were as sensitive to alarms as were the French. About the middle of December both governments heard that the proposed Austrian delegate thought it possible to bring matters before the Conference not mentioned in the program. M. Rouvier took immediate steps in Vienna to prevent that danger.[1032] Furthermore, the two governments planned that the less difficult problems should be considered first and the police question last. M. Rouvier proposed that the published Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish, and Franco-German agreements over Morocco should be laid before the Conference, but Sir Edward Grey objected that they might then be discussed and questioned by the Powers. The British Foreign Secretary thought that “it should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction to a _de facto_ state of affairs than to create a new situation.” M. Rouvier accepted this suggestion. It was also in accordance with a British proposal that the French delegate was instructed to refuse to argue the matter of France’s right in the Algero-Moroccan frontier region, since it might lead to an “embarrassing discussion.”[1033]

The main problem which the British and French governments had to solve was that of the police. For, as they learned from Prince Bülow,[1034] Germany would propose either that Morocco be divided into sectors, each one under the police power of a different state, or that the policing be done by a lesser Power disinterested in Morocco. While the first solution could be easily rejected, the second one would be more difficult for France to combat without exposing herself to the accusation of selfishness. If the Conference broke up because of a refusal, France would be blamed. At this point the two governments received a suggestion from M. Bacheracht, Russian minister at Tangier and a delegate at the Conference, to the following effect: “All considerations of a political character and all references to ‘special interests,’ etc., should not be touched upon in discussion” of the police question. The problem should be considered solely from a practical point of view, of how to assure protection and safety to the foreigners. Clearly that work could be done best by France and Spain, who had had experience in handling Mohammedans, who were already policing portions of Moroccan soil, and who could employ Mohammedans from their North African territories to aid them. The policing might be regarded as experimental and temporary so as to mollify German opposition. If Germany rejected the plan, she would receive the discredit for breaking up the Conference. The British and French authorities accepted this proposal at once, for, as MM. Paul and Jules Cambon said, it would be “difficult to combat.”[1035]

After this thorough preparatory discussion, M. Rouvier sent the following instructions to M. Révoil, a copy of which he also gave to the British government: The repression of contraband trade should be committed to France and Spain alone. A state bank should be established in which French participation in capital and in personnel should be in harmony with France’s superior rights in Morocco resulting from the loan contract of June, 1904, and from the high percentage of trade (approximately 80 per cent) which France together with Great Britain and Spain had with that country as compared with that (approximately 10 per cent) of Germany. The bank should be under the French legal system and its president a Frenchman. Moroccan revenues should be augmented, but not merely by an increase in customs duties. The thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom might be extended. “In a general manner it is in the economic program that we are disposed to accord the most complete satisfaction. But you will avoid a definitive acquiescence in those solutions until you are certain that the delegates do not aim to adopt unacceptable solutions relative to the organization of the police.” This question should refer solely to the policing of the coastal towns and should not concern the Moroccan army. Any internationalization of the police should be refused. The plan of dividing Morocco into sectors among the Powers, that of selecting a minor Power to accomplish the task, and that of selecting officers from neutral Powers should be absolutely refused. The policing should be conferred upon France and Spain alone.

In case the proposals conforming to our desires on that matter meet with insurmountable opposition . . . ., we would consider that, the economic questions being regulated according to our views, an accord for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in that which concerns the police would be an acceptable solution, if that accord respects our rights and implies the renunciation by the other contracting parties to all action tending to reopen the question with the Sultan without previous agreement with us. . . . . In résumé . . . . no one will expect of us an adhesion to any solution of a nature to compromise the future of our national interests. Under that condition, you will show on all occasions our sincere desire to respect the rights of other countries, to open Morocco to the free competition of commercial interests, and you will affirm at the same time our desire to maintain our rights and interests only with the most formal guarantees of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, the independence and the established traditions of his Empire.[1036]

A few days later, with the approval of Spain, M. Rouvier advised the French delegate to reject as “absolutely inacceptable” any plan to neutralize Morocco.[1037]

These instructions denoted a determination to defeat internationalization, by all means to exclude Germany from Morocco, and to divide Morocco between France and Spain.

While these negotiations were in progress, the French government was sounding Great Britain as to a defensive agreement against Germany. Toward the middle of December Major Huguet, French military attaché in London, spoke to General Grierson, director of military operations in the British war office, about the French fears of a German attack, and questioned him about the British organization for war. When he asked whether the British general staff had ever considered operations in Belgium, General Grierson replied that “as a strategical exercise” he had worked out a plan for them last spring.[1038]

On December 28 Major Huguet dined with Colonel Repington, a retired officer serving as military correspondent on the _London Times_. The conversation turned immediately to the Colonel’s article of the previous day, in which he had denounced the attempts being made toward an Anglo- German _rapprochement_, expressed anxiety over the international situation, and advised full loyalty to France. The two men found themselves in entire agreement over the possibility of complications and over the need for France and Great Britain to be prepared for co- operation in case of a German aggression. Major Huguet said that the French embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey, the new British foreign minister, had not renewed the assurances given by his predecessor.[1039] Time was pressing, he said, for the Conference of Algeciras would open on January 16. He wished that Sir Edward Grey would broach the subject at the next diplomatic reception. The French “knew that our sympathies were with them,” so Colonel Repington has recorded the military attaché’s words, “but they wanted to know what we should do in case Germany confronted them with a crisis.”

Colonel Repington immediately communicated the conversation to the British Foreign Secretary, who was then electioneering in Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30 as follows: “I can only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it.” The Colonel also reported Major Huguet’s words to Sir George Clarke, secretary of the Defence Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They agreed that in view of the German menace, active steps toward co- operation should be taken. As Colonel Repington was a free-lance, they suggested that he open unofficial conversations with Major Huguet and communicate the results to the British officials. The Colonel prepared a set of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These questions were considered by M. Rouvier, M. Etienne, minister of war, M. Thomson, minister of marine, his naval staff, General Brun, and General Brugère. On January 12 a cordial reply was returned to Colonel Repington who then imparted it to the Defence Committee.[1040]

When Major Huguet related these incidents to his ambassador, M. Cambon was so struck by the fact that British as well as French authorities were studying the problem of how quickly the British forces could be mobilized for action on the Continent that he went immediately to Paris to consult M. Rouvier.[1041] The latter approved of the plan to broach Sir Edward Grey for a closer and more definite understanding.

Before returning to London, M. Cambon visited his brother in Madrid. There the two prepared the ground for later discussion by a conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson which the latter reported (January 2) as follows:

They [MM. Cambon] asked me, supposing, as they considered probable, that the Conference failed, what did I think would be the consequences? I replied that in my opinion it was quite possible that the Sultan would then apply to Germany to take in hand the military, financial and police administration. They remarked that that would mean war. I said that I did not consider that this would necessarily follow; but I did think that they would have to take up a very firm attitude at Fez, and prevent the Sultan from handing himself over to the Germans.[1042]

This alarming forecast, together with the staunch diplomatic support which the British government was rendering France, strengthened the French authorities in their resolve. When M. Cambon reached London, he had a long conversation with Sir Edward Grey on January 10 which the latter recorded as follows:

M. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor desired war, but that His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous policy. He had succeeded in inciting public opinion and military opinion in Germany, and there was a risk that matters might be brought to a point in which a pacific issue would be difficult. During the previous discussions on the subject of Morocco, Lord Lansdowne had expressed his opinion that the British and French Governments should frankly discuss any eventualities that might seem possible, and by his instructions your Excellency [Sir Francis Bertie, ambassador in Paris] had communicated a Memorandum to M. Delcassé to the same effect. It had not been considered necessary at the time to discuss the eventuality of war, but it now seemed desirable that this eventuality should also be considered.

M. Cambon said that he had spoken to this effect to M. Rouvier, who agreed in his view. It was not necessary, nor, indeed, expedient, that there should be any formal alliance, but it was of great importance that the French Government should know beforehand whether, in the event of aggression against France by Germany, Great Britain would be prepared to render to France armed assistance.[1043]

The British statesman, embarrassed by the question, replied that he personally could give the French government no promise of active aid. He put the Ambassador off by pointing out that the Prime Minister was away, that the members of the cabinet were all electioneering, and that the verdict of the elections was doubtful. He said that he could only state as his personal opinion that “if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement [of April 8, 1904] . . . . public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favour of France.” When he added that Great Britain earnestly desired “that the conference should have a pacific issue favourable to France,” M. Cambon replied that “nothing would have a more pacific influence on the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany attacked France, she would find England allied against her.” Sir Edward Grey answered that he thought that “the German Emperor did believe this, but that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the subject.” He could give no assurance, he said, of which he was uncertain. He “did not believe that any Minister could, in present circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the sympathy of Great Britain might be with France in the case of a rupture with Germany, the expression which might be given to it and the action which might follow must depend largely upon the circumstances in which the rupture took place.”[1044]

As Sir Edward Grey thus postponed a definitive answer until after the elections, M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that time. But he asked that in the meantime the “unofficial communications” between the British admiralty and war office and the French naval and military attachés “as to what action might advantageously be taken in case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war” might be permitted to continue. “They did not pledge either Government,” he said.[1045]

Sir Edward Grey immediately sent a report of this conversation to the Prime Minister and to Lord Ripon, and he met his friend, Mr. Haldane, at Berwick on January 12 to discuss the matter, particularly the French request concerning the military conversations.[1046] He had learned that under the Unionist cabinet in the previous year such military and naval conversations had taken place, and that at the present time official conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the French naval attaché while the military conversations were being held unofficially between the French military attaché and Colonel Repington. When consulted on January 11, General Grierson replied that “if there is even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France or to take the field on her side in Belgium in consequence of a violation of Belgian territory by the Germans, we should have as soon as possible informal communication between the military authorities of France and/or Belgium and the General Staff.”[1047] Neither Sir Edward Grey nor Mr. Haldane saw any reason why these conversations should not be carried on officially also. As the former argued:

It was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obligation to go to war, but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular in Britain. It was certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter of that Agreement, the pro-French feeling in Britain would be very strong, so strong probably as to justify a British Government in intervening on the side of France or even to insist on its doing so. We must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside. But modern war may be an affair of days. If there were no military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain might desire it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert plans for common action.[1048]

The Prime Minister feared the interpretation that would be put upon these conversations. “I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations,” he wrote to Lord Ripon on February 2. “It comes very close to an honourable undertaking; and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine.” However, he considered them to be merely “provisional and precautionary measures” not binding the government, “raising no new question of policy and therefore within the competence of the War Office.” So he agreed to them.[1049] It was definitely understood that these military conversations did not bind the governments.[1050] On January 17 they were begun between the French military attaché and General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the French and British general staffs until the outbreak of the World War.[1051]

The same reasoning applied to Belgium, for both the French and the British authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality in order to strike France suddenly from the northeast.[1052] On January 15 Sir Edward Grey therefore instructed General Grierson to open conversations with the Belgian military authorities “as to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium for the defence of her neutrality. Such communications,” he continued, “must be solely provisional and noncommittal.”[1053] Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché in Brussels, broached the subject on January 18 to General Ducarne, Belgian chief of staff, remarking that the British Minister would bring up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister.[1054] After consulting the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed to the conversations.[1055] This decision was anticipated by Colonel Barnardiston, who had learned that the Belgian military authorities were quietly making preparations for instant mobilization.[1056] The Anglo-Belgian negotiations continued at least until the end of April.[1057]

These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. The Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only half-a-dozen persons; the ones with France were not known to all the members of the British cabinet although reports of them leaked out in the press about the middle of 1906.[1058] Sir Edward Grey wanted to prevent either these conversations or any military or naval action from being regarded as provocations. In informing Lord Tweedmouth, first lord of the admiralty, of the Anglo-French conversations, he wrote, January 16:

Meanwhile the mood of the German Emperor is said to be pacific; the tone of German diplomacy is quiet and not aggressive. Any movement of our ships which could be interpreted as a threat to Germany would be very undesirable at this moment and most unfortunate so long as there is a prospect or even a chance that things may go smoothly at the Morocco Conference which meets today. I hope therefore that the Admiralty won’t plan any special cruises or visits to Foreign ports or unusual movements of squadrons without consulting the F[oreign] O[ffice] as to the possible political effect.

I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is satisfactory as regards possibilities between Germany and France; if so the quieter we keep for the present the better.[1059]

With the opening of these conversations a new military problem confronted the British which Mr. Haldane, then minister of war, has described as follows:

It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even further south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.[1060]

At the time, in January, the Committee of Imperial Defence, although not all of its members knew of the military conversations then beginning, studied the question. It decided that “four Divisions and a Cavalry Division” could be landed at the nearest French port in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.[1061] The admiralty was prepared “to bar the Channel against the German squadrons.”[1062] The Minister of War began a thorough reorganization of the army in order to make British aid effective at the desired moment in the future.[1063]

Having settled this matter, Sir Edward Grey had the difficult problem of how to answer M. Cambon’s question about a formal agreement.[1064] As it was inconvenient then to hold a cabinet meeting, Sir Edward Grey talked over the reply to be given with the Premier and Mr. Haldane, who were both in London after January 26, and asked Sir Francis Bertie to write his opinion.[1065]

The Ambassador wrote that France did not desire war at all, but that if a conflict did arise over Morocco either then or later she expected active British support. He warned his chief that if his answer did not assure to France

more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or of neutrality in the event of a war provoked by Germany, there is serious danger of a complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the French Government and of public opinion in France. The Government would consider that they had been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of a war without ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country.

Such concessions might not be very great sacrifices for France but they might well be very detrimental to the interests of the British Empire, for, in the temper in which France would then be, it could not be expected that she would give them much consideration.[1066]

Sir Edward Grey’s personal opinion was that “if France is let in for a war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco, we cannot stand aside, but must take part with France.” While pondering the question of an alliance, he saw the great difficulties in making one.[1067] He decided to adapt the policy of his predecessor in office to the new situation created by M. Cambon’s request. This policy is best explained in the long dispatch which Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Francis Bertie about his interview with the French Ambassador on January 31:

The French Ambassador asked me again to-day whether France would be able to count upon the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon her by Germany.

I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister and discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to submit.

In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities had been in communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want of a formal engagement.

In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had spoken to me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan Agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain neutral. I urged upon Monsieur Cambon that this, which I had reason to know had been correctly reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral effect which Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement between England and France with regard to armed co-operation.

In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it, that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic support, and should we take an engagement which might involve us in a war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war.

I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his mind, and to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a formal declaration as he desired.

M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan incident so quickly that if it were necessary for the British government “to consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his request for some form of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed out the difficulties of giving this assurance—that it would be a “solemn undertaking,” that it would have to be put in writing and submitted to the cabinet and also to Parliament. He said that it would constitute the transformation of the entente into a defensive alliance, that it could not be given unconditionally, and that the conditions “would be difficult to describe.” He again asked M. Cambon “whether the force of circumstances bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance in words which could be given at this moment.” He added that German pressure “might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was needed. When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had expressed his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon France, no British government could remain neutral, the latter replied that he had said this first to Count Metternich and not to him,

because, supposing it appeared that I had overestimated the strength of feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany; but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France, because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France.

Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people would be unwilling to fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if “it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France.” He said, however, that British sentiment was much averse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to aid France. While he was ready to reopen the conversation at any time in the future, he did not think that the situation justified such a radical change at that time.[1068] M. Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[1069]

Thus, Sir Edward Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the outbreak of the World War. He was open and frank with both France and Germany. To the German government he emphasized the probability of British intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to the French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak as firmly on that score as he did to the German government. Instead of binding Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which would have forced him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward Morocco and Germany—Sir Edward Grey kept British hands free. In giving France sufficient assurance to maintain Anglo-French intimacy and co-operation, he depended upon the uncertainty of British support in a crisis to hold France back. He relied upon the same uncertainty—this time, however, that Great Britain might enter a Franco-German conflict—to restrain Germany. By this apparently simple but really intricate policy he sought to satisfy the needs of British foreign relations.

[Footnote 959: Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 14 f., No. 6900.]

[Footnote 960: Rouvier was apparently led astray by William II’s instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to tell Rouvier that “he would lay no hindrances whatever in the way of the French policy” (Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 596 f. and note, No. 6836). Rouvier sounded the German embassy first through a third person and then unofficially through M. Louis of the foreign office.]

[Footnote 961: Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 20 ff., No. 6906.]

[Footnote 962: On this episode see _ibid._, Nos. 6901, 6903 ff. The editors of _G.P._ assure us that there is no indication in the documents that Rouvier followed up the subject (_ibid._, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux states that Rouvier was back of the overture made through Vaffier- Pollet. He also asserts that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of Mogador and its hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused (_Agadir, ma politique extérieure_ [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no reference to this proposal in _G.P._ Caillaux is probably referring to the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.]

[Footnote 963: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 250 ff., 272 ff.; see also Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 43 f. At the opening of the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the Emperor declared that Germany stood with all Powers in “correct relations” and with the most of them in “good and friendly relations” (Schulthess _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 132 f.).]

[Footnote 964: Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Dec. 2 and 11, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 92 ff.]

[Footnote 965: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre), pp. 4034 ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of 501 to 51 (_ibid._, p. 4050).]

[Footnote 966: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 662 ff.]

[Footnote 967: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 693, No. 6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 52, No. 6924.]

[Footnote 968: So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). There is no indication in _G.P._ that those terms were known.]

[Footnote 969: Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 28 f., No. 6914. It contained the conclusions of a conference by Bülow with Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Klehmet.]

[Footnote 970: On Jan. 8 the government published a _Weissbuch_ on Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating the German accusations against the French policy. According to Bülow it was intended to supplement the French _Livre jaune_ (_G.P._, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance made a painful impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely courteous” and hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which Germany professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press (Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 215 f., No. 235.).]

[Footnote 971: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 38 ff., No. 6922 and Anlage.]

[Footnote 972: Metternich was very pessimistic about the outcome. See Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 673, No. 6364.]

[Footnote 973: Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 12, No. 6898.]

[Footnote 974: Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 641 f., No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., Nov. 3, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 9 f., No. 6896; Bülow to Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 11 f., No. 6897; memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. Choate, ambassador in London, had been selected as American delegate in August (_Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence_, II, 172 ff.); but the final choice rested on Mr. White, ambassador at Rome.]

[Footnote 975: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 27 n.; cf. Steed, _Through Thirty Years_, I, 234.]

[Footnote 976: According to a minute by the Emperor William to a dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only reference to this incident which _G.P._ contains), during the visit of the King of Spain to Germany in the previous November the Emperor had “proposed to the Spanish King to renew the agreement with his father and a convention regarding the common action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that he knew nothing of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.” Nothing came of the matter. See _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160, No. 197; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, _ibid._, 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208.]

[Footnote 977: Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]

[Footnote 978: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54, No. 6925.]

[Footnote 979: So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian foreign minister. (Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 34 ff., No. 6921).]

[Footnote 980: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6925; Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, _ibid._, 56 ff., No. 6928.]

[Footnote 981: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 59, No. 6929.]

[Footnote 982: Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 30 f., No. 6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 31, No. 6917; memo. by Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 32, No. 6918.]

[Footnote 983: Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; _ibid._, 25 f., No. 6911; Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, 1906, _ibid._, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f., No. 6934; Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 697 f., 6888; Radowitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.; Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 67, No. 6936).]

[Footnote 984: Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; 685 ff., No. 6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, _1905_, p. 154. The Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, and the Emperor’s minutes.]

[Footnote 985: So D. M. Wallace, special representative of the _London Times_ at the conference, asserted to Radowitz (Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 95 n.).]

[Footnote 986: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 524 ff.; Edward VII to William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111 f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 6962.]

[Footnote 987: “If England restricts herself to the diplomatic support of the French claims, peace and the permanent open door are assured. But as soon as France has reason to count on the armed help of England for the conquest of Morocco and for any results therefrom, then both peace and the open door will be endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 94, No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to Lascelles, Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of Grey’s, on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was given out to the press. See _ibid._, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 ff., No. 6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; _ibid._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]

[Footnote 988: For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to Moltke, Jan. 24, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.]

[Footnote 989: A report of a partial French mobilization on the eastern frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately proved to be untrue (_ibid._, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).]

[Footnote 990: The German government had announced a new navy bill, which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in _Le Matin_ insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, _Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher, und Briefe_ (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke, however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé fall.

“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to be armed against an attack from Germany” (_G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).]

[Footnote 991: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 690 ff., No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s conversation with Laguiche was published in _Le Temps_ on Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect to the Belgian minister (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14).]

[Footnote 992: Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 60 f., No. 6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 51 f., No. 6924; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 92 ff. See also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 58 f.).]

[Footnote 993: According to Moltke, France was making military and financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The fortifications on the eastern frontier are being strengthened and put in a more defensive condition. Their provisions in munitions and food are being replenished. The forces of the frontier defence troops are apparently being brought approximately to the legal number for peace time by the addition of troops from the interior. Moreover, reserves are here and there being called up to undergo their legal drilling.

“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered in every way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons and drilling of the border troops by day and night are occurring.

“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as preparations for an intended mobilization but only as precautionary measures, which are easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).

According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the sum of 270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses (_Zur europ. Politik_, II, 103).]

[Footnote 994: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 498; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.]

[Footnote 995: The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, declared that in forty years he had never received such positive instructions (Tardieu, p. 88; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 298; Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 204, No. 223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan just before the conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to William II, Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as follows: “. . . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as the price of her support [at the conference]” (_B.D._, III, 178, No. 216).]

[Footnote 996: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. 498. Witte apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for an immediate French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, that was Spring Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 57 f.).]

[Footnote 997: Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 217, No. 236.]

[Footnote 998: Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; _B.D._, III, 165, No. 204.]

[Footnote 999: See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.]

[Footnote 1000: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 193 ff.; Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, _An Autobiography_ (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.]

[Footnote 1001: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 178, No. 216.]

[Footnote 1002: Cf. Spender, _The Public Life_ (1925), I, 112 ff.; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 215 f.; cf. Hermann Lutz, _Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg_ (Berlin, 1927).]

[Footnote 1003: Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 218, No. 204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]

[Footnote 1004: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 f., 57; Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 22, 26.]

[Footnote 1005: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, II, 55 f.]

[Footnote 1006: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 222 ff., No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]

[Footnote 1007: See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 622 f.]

[Footnote 1008: _Ibid._, chap. xxvii, Part III. Nicolson suspected that Russia acted so loyally because she had no money with which to make the loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, 1906, _ibid._, 242, No. 228).]

[Footnote 1009: Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 323, No. 304.]

[Footnote 1010: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 220, No. 205.]

[Footnote 1011: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 223, No. 208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61 f.]

[Footnote 1012: Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 1013: Grey, I, 100 f.]

[Footnote 1014: Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, _B.D._, III, 397 ff.; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 1015: Grey, I, 100 f.]

[Footnote 1016: _B.D._, III, 162, No. 200.]

[Footnote 1017: Lucien Wolf, _Life of the First Marquess of Ripon_ (London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61.]

[Footnote 1018: Metternich gives the date of the conversation as Dec. 18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160 f., No. 198; Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]

[Footnote 1019: On this conversation between Grey and Metternich see the following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey to Campbell-Bannerman, Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., 114, and in _B.D._, III, 209 ff., No. 229; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 45 ff., Nos. 6923 f. Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10, 1906. See Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 64, No. 6933. See also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from Metternich, _ibid._, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van Grooten, secretary of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to his government on Jan. 14 as follows: “Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that Great Britain has engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan question and that she will meet her obligations fully even in case of a Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give proof of the same sentiments” (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, p. 19). The report is exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.]

[Footnote 1020: Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206 ff., Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163, No. 203.]

[Footnote 1021: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257 f.]

[Footnote 1022: Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 167 f., No. 209.]

[Footnote 1023: Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 and inclosure, No. 245 (see above).]

[Footnote 1024: On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 3, R. Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 207 f., No. 226; 217 ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos. 240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 and 15, 1906, _ibid._, 211 f., No. 230; 225, No. 243; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 224, No. 242; memo. by Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.]

[Footnote 1025: Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 162, No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon (Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197).]

[Footnote 1026: Tardieu, pp. 81 f.]

[Footnote 1027: Nicolson thought that he would have been “an admirable selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of Germany’s veto was, “a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec. 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]

[Footnote 1028: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 178, No. 216.]

[Footnote 1029: Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, D. Jan. 5, R. Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 209, No. 227.]

[Footnote 1030: Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, Jan. 3, 1906, as follows: “All the four Powers most directly interested in the Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were satisfactory to themselves and it was most undesirable that they should allow these arrangements to be disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 215, No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14, 20, 21, 1905, _ibid._, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, _ibid._, 163, No. 202; 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163 ff., No. 204.]

[Footnote 1031: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 244; Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey, Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.]

[Footnote 1032: Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, _ibid._, 149 f. and inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 158 f., No. 195.]

[Footnote 1033: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 244 and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 228 f., No. 247.]

[Footnote 1034: Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 217 ff., No. 237.]

[Footnote 1035: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 205 f., No. 224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 213 ff., No. 233. See also Bompard’s conversation with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 59 f.]

[Footnote 1036: Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 220 ff., No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 164, No. 204. In talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15 Rouvier added a third alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the Powers” (notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 f., No. 245 and inclosure).]

[Footnote 1037: Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 233 f., No. 253.]

[Footnote 1038: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; _ibid._, 172, No. 211.]

[Footnote 1039: This display of doubt about Great Britain’s loyalty was one of France’s best means of gaining that Power’s support. See Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.]

[Footnote 1040: The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences_ (London, 1920), I, 2 ff.]

[Footnote 1041: Général Huguet, _L’intervention militaire britannique en 1914_ (Paris, 1928), p. 15.]

[Footnote 1042: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206, No. 224.]

[Footnote 1043: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, 70 f.; _B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210_a_.]

[Footnote 1044: This document is sufficient proof against the accusation of the editors of _G.P._ that Grey went further in his assertions to the French Ambassador in his first conversation with the latter, and that afterward, apparently restrained by the more pacific Premier, he qualified his position in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that Grey’s statements of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree, except that in the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions which he had already formulated in the earlier interview (see _G.P._, XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).]

[Footnote 1045: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 70 ff., in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff., and in _B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s account to Rouvier of the conversation is given in _ibid._, 173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present at that interview.]

[Footnote 1046: Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.]

[Footnote 1047: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 172, No. 211.]

[Footnote 1048: Grey, I, 72 f.]

[Footnote 1049: “C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” (Repington, I, 13). On this affair see Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London, 1920), p. 184; Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 189 f.]

[Footnote 1050: Grey, I, 70 ff.]

[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, 13; _B.D._, III, 169, editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey wrote to Asquith that he never knew anything more of the course of those conversations (Grey, I, 92).]

[Footnote 1052: Sydenham, _My Working Life_, pp. 186 f., 190; Haldane, _Before the War_, p. 45; Repington, I, 3. The British based their belief on the German construction of obviously unnecessary railroads to the Belgian frontier (_Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_ [1915], pp. 365 f.).]

[Footnote 1053: Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 176 f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 179, No. 217_b_.]

[Footnote 1054: In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 Barnardiston wrote that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting that Sir C. Phipps, the British minister in Brussels, had already mentioned the matter to the Belgian Foreign Minister (_ibid._, III, 188). In some notes by Barnardiston deposited in the war office, he stated that Phipps would speak to the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts that there is no record of such a communication; rather, that the Foreign Minister learned of the military conversations from the Belgian Minister of War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject between Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being sent to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that both the Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs knew of the conversation (editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 203; _Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, p. 355; Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the conversations were approved by both foreign ministers.]

[Footnote 1055: Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 187 f.]

[Footnote 1056: Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 179 f.]

[Footnote 1057: On these negotiations see the correspondence between Grierson and Barnardiston in _ibid._, pp. 187 ff.; _Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, pp. 350 ff.; Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 ff.]

[Footnote 1058: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191.]

[Footnote 1059: _B.D._, III, 203.]

[Footnote 1060: Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 45 f.]

[Footnote 1061: Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 221_a_; memo. by Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov. 6, 1911, _ibid._, pp. 186 f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.]

[Footnote 1062: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; _B.D._, III, 193, No. 220_a_.]

[Footnote 1063: Haldane, _Before the War_, chap. iv.]

[Footnote 1064: Grey informed Cambon of the approval of the naval and military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed answering the larger question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 177, No. 215; 225, No. 244.)]

[Footnote 1065: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 ff.; Grey, I, 84. Grey’s omission to consult the entire cabinet has been severely criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong. See especially Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191; Earl Loreburn, _How the War Came_ (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193.]

[Footnote 1066: Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 174 ff., No. 213.]

[Footnote 1067: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 216; Grey, I, 75.]

[Footnote 1068: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253 ff.; Grey, II, 76 ff.; _B.D._, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey exchanged memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed from Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with Germany, to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This passage does not occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The French note contains no allusion to the argument given in the following passage of Sir E. Grey’s draft: ‘I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 183 f., No. 220_a_). On Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with Cambon, who made some changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized the reasons why the British government could not give the desired assurance, speaking in part as follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I thought that if the Cabinet were to give a pledge which would morally bind the country to go to war in certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even result in that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were very strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 184 f., No. 220_b_).]

[Footnote 1069: So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary (Grey, I, 85; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 220_b_). Grey was absent from the foreign office for some time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.]