CHAPTER XII.

THE REDIVISION OF THE COMMUNAL LAND.

Peasant Russia of the time of serfdom was a kind of a single tax realm. Land was treated by the peasantry as the only source of taxable income. Accordingly, the terms of the general subdivisions of the land were adapted to the censuses (_revisions_), made by the government for the assessment of the poll-tax, at average intervals of fifteen years.

The division of the nation into “taxable orders” and “privileged orders” did not correspond to the new idea of equality before the law, proclaimed by the reformers who surrounded Alexander II. A commission was appointed in 1858 to consider the question of the repeal of the poll-tax, and of a general reform in the financial system. After twenty-five years of hard labor (very liberally remunerated, I feel bound to state, to the credit of the government), the Commission brought about the repeal of the poll-tax[145]. In the meantime the censuses were held in abeyance, since they had for their sole purpose the assessment of the tax. The general redivision was consequently delayed. Wherever, and so long as the rent did not cover the taxes, partial subdivisions took place yearly to readjust the assessment of the taxes to the changed condition of the several tax-payers. Rise of rent made the intervention of the community unnecessary, and the practice of partial subdivisions fell into disuse. Yet, while at first everybody had been anxious to be relieved from his share of land, which imposed a heavy obligation upon the holder, everybody now became eager for land, since it brought a certain income. Inequality of landholding, which developed with the growth of population, produced a keen antagonism within the village. About the time of the Ryazañ census, in a few communities the strife was already over, having resulted in the victory of the _mir_. But in the great majority the controversy had just reached its climax.

In 6 bailiwicks (out of the 45), _i. e._ in 87 communities, a serious obstacle to the subdivision arose from the lease of communal land.

A strong opposition was shown by the wealthy members of the community, who held the lots of the emigrants, and of outside workers, for long terms, and had advanced the rent for the whole period of lease. The subdivision would necessarily have had the effect of rendering their agreements void[146], while it would have been useless to have sued the lessors[147]. The remedy lies in the fact that, under given circumstances, the present law enables a small minority to put a stop to the subdivision.

The resolution must be passed by a vote of two-thirds of the _mir_. Now, about one-fifth of the householders are absent from home, engaged in some wage-earning occupation, and there is also a certain percentage among the emigrants who have not yet severed their relations with the community. After subtraction of both these groups, which are counted in the vote, it becomes very easy for the stronger households to stand against the advocates of subdivision. Furthermore, those who are in the habit of leasing their plots would have no interest in the subdivision, even if present. The case of the adherents of the _mir_ thus becomes a very precarious one. This is strikingly evidenced by the following figures:

_Ranenburg. _Dankoff. Per cent._ Per cent._ Total of the community 100 100 Lessors 25 24 ---- ---- Remainder 75 76 Vote required for subdivision 66⅔ 66⅔ ---- ---- Opposition sufficient to stay the same.[148] 9 10

We know that the lessor class is constantly growing with the increase of the population, and the spread of the movement from the village. Thus the young generation grows indifferent to the custom of the village community.

The old-fashioned households, on the other hand, are accumulating the plots of the declining farmers, and show a pronounced opposition to agrarian communism. There still remain the intermediate groups of the “weak” householders, who faithfully preserve their allegiance to the _mir_. The position of these groups is, however, very unstable.

It follows that the formation of classes within the _mir_ tends to perpetuate the expropriation of the “weak” families, and the concentration of communal land, formerly held by them, in the hands of the “strong.”

It is true that it is only the right of possession which is conferred upon the lessee of communal land. But there are many facts that go to show the possible evolution of possession into property.

Attention has been called in Russian economic literature to the tendency toward private property developing among the former serfs out of the redemption of their plots. At the time of the Ryazañ census there were 364 communities concerned in the region under consideration, and it was in 100[149] out of this number that the opposition against the redivision of the communal land came to the front. Those who had been paying the redemption tax at the time when the taxes exceeded the net income of the lots, objected to the decrease of the latter after the land had acquired a certain value. The wealthier householders had threatened to pay at once the whole amortization debt that hung over their plots, so as to compel the community to deed them over to their owners at the time, according to law[150].

Whatever may have been the final outcome of the issue this time[151], “the ides of March are not gone.” The nearer we approach the end of the period of redemption, the greater becomes the material interest attaching the individual to his plot, and the greater, consequently, his opposition to the redivision of the land. At present, since the Statute of Redemption has been extended to all divisions of the peasantry, the conflict between agrarian communism and the interests of the individual has become universal. The old peasant common law, which developed naturally as the consequence of economic equality, now proves oppressive for the destitute, no less than for the wealthy. Given the existing class distinctions within the community, there is no good reason why the proletarian, on leaving his village, should sacrifice his right of property to the _mir_, instead of alienating it for his own benefit.

Thus the play of economic interests is dissolving the village community into, on the one hand, a landless rural proletariat, and, on the other hand, a peasant _bourgeoisie_, to whom the title to a large portion of communal land is destined to be transferred.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XII., THE “INALIENABILITY” SCHEME.

The antiquated presumption of the homogeneity of the village found its practical expression in a scheme which came out of the peasantist press, and caught the ear of the ruling classes. This was the proposal to declare communal land inalienable. The question at issue has had its history. So long as the capitalized amortization tax exceeded the value of the land, the number of peasants who had redeemed their lots in absolute property was limited to a score of the wealthiest householders in a district. It took about 20 years before the rise of rent brought the price of land above the redemption debt, as decreased by the previous amortization payments made by the peasants. It then became profitable for speculators to advance the money necessary for the repayment of the remainder, so as to compel the community to carve out the lot into a separate tract, and thus make the sale feasible. As this speculation dates only from the eighties, the statistics gathered by local investigations are as yet insufficient. The question can be properly handled only when we have the data of a large region comprising, at least, several _gubernias_. So the matter has been dealt with in a series of articles in the Russian press. It appears that a considerable number of peasant plots have passed, by sale, into the hands of strangers, thanks to the law permitting the alienation of communal land. (Sec. 165 of the General Statute of the Peasants freed from bond serfdom.)

To see our way clearly through the question at issue, we have to discover who are the buyers of the land sold by the peasants.

We have seen that only a minor portion of the quarterly lots have been purchased by merchants. As a rule, the small lots sold by the nobility are acquired by peasants only. (_Cf._, next chapter.)

The question at issue is thus one that has been settled as between peasants alone, and that affects neither the interests of the nobility nor those of the capitalistic class. In such cases it may well please the Russian government to throw a sop to the peasantists. This _mésalliance_ of oriental paternalism with some queer sort of state socialistic prohibitionism, however, would be apt to meet with opposition from the very ones who were supposed to be benefited.

As the process of dissolution is obviously spreading from within, and not from without the village, inalienability of peasant land would simply mean gratuitous expropriation of the poor for the benefit of the wealthy members of the community.

We notice that the percentage of emigrants among the quarterly possessors who have enjoyed the right of alienating their land has been far greater than that among the former state peasants who live in agrarian communism:

_Title of possession._ _Ranenburg. _Dankoff. Per cent._ Per cent._ Quarterly possession 17 12 Agrarian communism 9 5

To what is this difference due? A single concrete example will clear up the matter.

“In 1881 a small community of 5 households, former serfs of Gregoroff, emigrated from the village of Bigildino, district of Dankoff. Their land, 30 dessiatines, was sold to a rich peasant in consideration of 1500 rubles. The emigrants could not make a living at home, and most of them were yearly laborers.” (_Loc. cit._, part II., pp. 115, 247.) According to Mr. Greegoryeff (_Emigration of the peasants of the gubernia of Ryazañ_), 300 rubles, the price of an average peasant holding of 6 dessiatines, is sufficient to enable a peasant family to start farming in Southern Siberia. A peasant who has been absolutely ruined is thus enabled, through the sale of his lot in the communal land, to rise to the position of a farmer in the new country. Devotion to the sacred customs of forefathers would hardly be able to withstand such a temptation as this, but for the helpful right hand of the most gracious Bureaucracy.

I shall, of course, be charged with pessimism, as I have been recently on account of my views on the emigration of the peasants. (_Cf._, _The public and the Statute on Emigration, by A. Bogdanoffsky, p. 38, in the Severny Vestnik_, May, 1892). The usual method of reasoning followed takes some such course as this: Granted that the case is presented true to life as it actually stands, the evil consequences are nevertheless due to the present abnormal condition of the peasantry, and under normal circumstances, the objections are “no good.” Unhappily, however, these very “abnormal” conditions are developing spontaneously, while the creation of “normal” conditions is beyond the jurisdiction of the well-wishers of the peasantry.