CHAPTER V.

COMMUNAL TENURE AND SMALL HOLDINGS.

Two economic features determined the further development of Russia, after the abolition of serfdom. Personal dependence of the serf was replaced, as above shown, by economic dependence of the “peasant-proprietor” compelled to seek work for wages beyond the limits of his own holding. Inequality of condition among the peasants, created by legal discrimination and furthered by the fiscal system, furnished the basis for the division of labor by which the peasants tried to fill up the holes in their farming. What were these occupations, and how did they react upon the village community?

In the times of serfdom the village community, as above mentioned, enjoyed certain rights to the land which was used by the master himself. Pasture, and water, and way in the landlord’s estate were free to the community. The emancipation deprived the peasants of these privileges and put them under the necessity of entering into agreements, of one kind or another, with the landlord for the use of these easements.

Where lack of water, or the necessity of a way through the landlord’s estate, has been artificially created by the reform, it is obviously the community as a whole that must contract the agreement.

In so far, however, as rented pasture is concerned, the usual communistic rule is put on trial by the growing inequalities that have arisen in the business of stock breeding within the village community. About one fourth of the community is composed of the poorest families, who own no horses, and oftentimes no cattle at all.[53] It is obvious that whenever the use of a pasture is rented for horses or cows, a not inconsiderable part of the community is practically excluded from the agreement. The assessment of the obligation in proportion to the shares held by the several householders in the communal land would be unjust to the poorest part of the community.

Another basis for the distribution is found, in many instances, in the number of heads of cattle belonging to each householder, _i. e._ outside of the province of agrarian communism; the poor are thus released from the burden of payments. But, on the other hand, the community becomes virtually the voluntary partnership of its wealthier members. The economic tendency of the time is shown by the following figures:[54]

+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------+ | | Rented pasture. | Total | | +------------------------+------+ in | | Party of the renter. | In consideration of | | class | | +------+------+----------+ | and | | |Labor.|Money.|Mixed.[55]|Total.|region.| +-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+-------+ | _Former State peasants._ | | | | | | |1. Community | | 1 | | 1 | | |2. Individuals | | | 1 | 1 | | +-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+ | | All to former State peasants| | 1 | 1 | 2 | 91 | | | | | | | | | _Former serfs._ | | | | | | |1. Community | 93 | 22 | 8 | 123 | | |2. Community, obligation | | | | | | | discharged _per_ | 12 | 14 | | 26 | | | head of stock | | | | | | |3. Community, beside individuals | | 3 | 3 | | |4. Partnerships and individuals| | 1 | 1 | 2 | | +-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+ | | All to former serfs | 105 | 37 | 12 | 154 | 562 | +-------------------------------+------+------+----------+------+-------+

We find the province of communism extended in only two villages of the former state peasants, who had nothing to do with the landlords’ pasture before the emancipation. On the other hand, the right of pasture held by the _mir_ in the landlord’s fields in the times of serfdom has disappeared in 408 out of the 562 free communities. Yet wherever pasture is rented, the _mir_ prevails, and individual agreements are the rarest exception. The latter form is, however, likely to keep pace with the development of money economy in rural relations. So long as the easement is granted in consideration of a certain amount of farm work to be done, (and this is now the ordinary rule), it is to the landlord’s advantage to secure the collective labor of a whole community at once, instead of entering into a special agreement with each peasant for a small service. The fulfilment of the obligation is secured by the joint suretyship of the community, while to sue each peasant for failure to perform two or three days’ work would be far too troublesome. It certainly matters little to the landlord, how the labor is distributed among the several members of the community, and it was but in 12 cases out of 105 that the agreement was made for so much work to be done _per_ head. On the other hand payment was stipulated for at so much _per_ head in 14 out of 37 cases, in which the transaction was one of money. But as soon as the agreement is made in this form, the householders can act individually as well as through the _mir_, and this was in reality the case in 6 communities out of the 156, the peasants managing to get their cattle counted as part of the landlord’s flock.

We notice here how economic inequality weakens the tie of communism, even where that communism has its roots set deep in the prevailing methods of agriculture, the cattle grazing in one flock upon the common pasture under the surveillance of the communal shepherd.

Quite naturally we find individualism to be the rule as soon as we come to the tenure of arable land, which is cultivated by the householders individually:

+-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+ | | Number of | Rented |Land, per| |Party to the agreement.|communities.|dessiatines.| cent. | +-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+ | _Ranenburg._ | | | | |Community | 25 | 2195 | 12.0 | |Partnerships | 2 | 143 | 0.8 | |Individuals | 265[56] | 16009[56]| 87.2 | | +------------+------------+---------+ | Total | 290 | 18347[57]| 100 | | | | | | | _Dankoff._ | | | | |Community | 23 | 2240 | 16.2 | |Partnerships | 3 | 42 | 0.3 | |Individuals | 230[56] | 11561[56]| 83.5 | | +------------+------------+---------+ | Total | 256 | 13843[57]| 100 | +-----------------------+------------+------------+---------+

As appears from this table, in so far as peasant farming has survived on the landlord’s estate, agrarian communism has been almost entirely superseded by individual tenancy.

Should not, however, the few cases of communal tenure be considered, on the contrary, as signs of a budding agrarian communism? Is it not a fact that peasant tenancy has sprung into existence from nothing within recent times, and that in 48 villages agrarian communism has acquired a foothold even in that tenancy which was always considered as being essentially an individualistic form of landholding?

Such was the argument of an optimistic school of peasantists, which gained much credit in Russia in a few years ago.[58] In reality, however, nothing like a growth of communism can be seen in the recent rise of communal tenancy. As a matter of fact the latter is restricted solely to communities of former serfs.[59] Consequently it is but the title of possession that has changed, and that from tenure in perpetuity into tenancy at will, for periods of from 3 to 12 years.

On the other hand, the land which had been before the emancipation occupied by the village community of the serfs, is now held by the individual tenant.

Let us compare the area of land held by the tenants in 1882 with the tracts carved out of the peasants’ possession in 1861.[60]

_Carved out _Rented in 1861._ in 1882._

Ranenburg 3710 3274 Dankoff 5179 4327

Really worth thinking over is the question; why could not communal tenure stand the competition of individual peasant tenancy?

In the first place the lots leased by the community are considerably larger than those rented by individual peasants.[61] Moreover by the joint suretyship of all the members of the community a security is offered lacking in small individual contracts. Quite naturally the terms on which land is rented by the community are more favorable for the peasants than those of individual contracts.[62]

The result of cheaper rent is the better condition of the communities in question as compared with the average.[63]

Why then should not other communities imitate this praiseworthy example? The answer seems to be found precisely in the higher economic level of the communities concerned, which carries with it greater uniformity of interests:

+-----------------------+------------------------------------------+ | | Percentage of householders. | |Classes of communities.+-----------+------------+-----------------+ | |Engaging in|Indifferent.|Letting out their| | | tenure. | | own lots.[64] | +-----------------------+-----------+------------+-----------------+ | _Ranenburg._ | | | | |Tenure by the community| 64 | 25 | 11 | |Tenure by individuals | 26 | 57 | 17 | | _Dankoff._ | | | | |Tenure by the community| 58 | 25 | 17 | |Tenure by individuals | 25 | 59 | 16 | +-----------------------+-----------+------------+-----------------+

The language of the figures is unequivocal. Wherever land is leased by the _mir_, the prevailing majority is made up of tenants, while under ordinary circumstances they form but a small minority. On the contrary above one-half of the village assembly consists at large of those householders who are indifferent to the question, and would not put themselves to the trouble of incurring responsibility.

Thus it is in the growing heterogeneity of the village that the cause of the decline of communism in tenancy is to be sought.

On the other hand, the same reason accounts for the substitution of the usual method of distribution of land and burdens by the community, through subdivision of the rented land in proportion to the money invested by each householder.

The question arises whether that can really be called tenure by the community, where a part of its members keep out of the agreement, and the land is held severally, and _pro rata_ to the capital invested? It seems to be rather a joint partnership.

Yet partnership is by nature an individualistic contract, whether the parties to such contract be the “elders” of the _mir_, or common business men.[65] We consider therefore rental partnership only as a stage of transition from communal to individual tenancy.

As above mentioned, in those very communities where communal tenure is yet in existence, side by side with it individual tenancy has taken root:

_Ranenburg._ _Dankoff._ _Dessiatines._ _Per cent._ _Dessiatines._ _Per cent._

Held by the _mir_ 2195 66 2240 81 Held by individuals 1138 34 534 19 ---- --- ---- --- Total rented 3333 100 2774 100

Thus communism in tenancy is passing away; small holdings for a term of one summer have become to-day the dominant form of rental agreements.[66]