CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy. No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_, "general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources, nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has, however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship pledged to national democracy.

The state machinery--as it has been since promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, 1931--is among the most elaborate in the modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth century. This government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and survive.

China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures, without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system, treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power system.

THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION

The five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_) is a legacy of Sun Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of the _San Min Chu I_. Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely, the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers, unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified, independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China a key point of governmental development.

The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was authentic democracy--government both representative and popular--which he desired, not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this dilemma, he employed the concepts _ch'üan_ and _nêng_,[1] which may be translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be encompassed.[2] He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern politics a distinction between the power which the people should have over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's qualifications on all political subjects--this would, in Sun Yat-sen's opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people were to exercise _the four powers_ over the government: initiative, referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to possess the _five rights_ over the people, based on the new separation of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the people; it was a separate institution above other institutions, democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw into office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will.

[Footnote 1: See Sun Yat-sen, _San Min Chu I_, Shanghai, 1927, henceforth cited as "Price translation," p. 296 _ff._; or d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, Wuchang, 1931, p. 348 _ff._]

[Footnote 2: An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with Western concepts is made in the present author's _Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in _L'Esprit des Lois_, Book 11, ch. 2.]

Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may be epitomized as _perfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular control_. The two powers new to the West--examination and control--are to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever its conditions.

The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men, in which qualifying examinations will precede election for administrative posts, and in which the examination and control _yüan_ will--professionally, officially--replace the haphazard play of sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional, expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased.

This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades. Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a dictator. The five-power system was preceded by a Nationalist government which employed the soviet form of organization--the one instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3] This had been set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly like to modify its present organization.[4]

[Footnote 3: See Holcombe, Arthur N., _The Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding elaboration of this curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of the genesis of the National Government.]

[Footnote 4: Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview cited, p. 38, n. 20, above.]

Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p. 330) shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied. Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have, therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies--executive and legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary--as in America, but to examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental, military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race, Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh political experiment of our times.

One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments are like machines in common use; they operate for the general convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government indoctrinating through conspicuous example, motivated heavy ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested but not eradicated by war-time vigor.

THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_).[5] This is not a part of the government, _de jure_, since it is the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers in government. The liberalization of the policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_) as well. Reference to the chart below will clarify the relationship of these agencies:

The KUOMINTANG, as a Party, exercises sovereign powers through

[The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in war-time by]

The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL, which transmits commands to The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency, which transforms these commands into government orders applicable to NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, in the form of ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS

[Footnote 5: The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of government and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih _Yüan_ [Examination _Yüan_], _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_ [Charts of Government and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX (1940), _passim_. This work has not yet been published, since it is a draft printing, to be revised and re-edited before formal publication. The author was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind assistance of Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These charts, provisional as they are, are by far the most systematic presentation of modern Chinese government structure which the author has ever seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the one-paragraph section, _The Supreme National Defense Council_ in Tsiang Ting-fu, "Reorganization of the National Government," _Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on Chinese government have been models of clarity, candor, and concreteness, is obliged to state: "As its major functions are involved in the prosecution of the war, military necessity compels the writer to withhold the details of its organization and work for a later issue."]

The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [_Tsung-ts'ai_] and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p. 125 _ff._).

Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the observer in Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title implies--the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the Kuomintang, President of the Executive _Yüan_, Chairman of the People's Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has apparently disappeared.[6])

[Footnote 6: For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's tiger leaps in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, _passim_. Mr. Isaacs' portrayal of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and villainous in his need for power and his hostility to the proletariat. The Trotskyite viewpoint is a usefully different one from that obviously adopted by the present author.]

Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily Party leaders and including military and political figures who (irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with his own.

A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of needs for immediate action have--in the period of hostilities--led to the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other governmental organ concerned.[7] To the degree that the Supreme National Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and instead of perpetuating Party authority _over_ government, it is itself government.

[Footnote 7: Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political Council and Party-Minister of Publicity.]

Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council, some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political Committee)--for which read Supreme National Defense Council today--acted as follows:

According to Article IV of the _Principles Governing the Organization of the C. E. C._ [of the Kuomintang] passed ... December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members, appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control Committee." ... "During a session of the Political Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central Standing Committees, the President of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five _Yüan_, and the President and Vice-President of the Military Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading members of the special technical committees under the [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of the National Government may be notified if necessary to attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions arise."] ...

It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposed _ex-tempore_, the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but the Committee possesses the power to decide this point _ad hoc_. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session as the minutes of the previous session. _Hence the Chairman and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political Committee must actually represent the opinions of the Chairman and a small number of influential members...._ [Italics added in translation.][8]

[Footnote 8: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited above, p. 658 _ff._]

Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular meetings--whatever others there may be--seem to be considerably less frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues:

The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political Council) has undergone very few changes since its establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies. Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, of governmental policies and their execution, and has also the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the Especially Appointed category and of other governmental officials, and (6) [_sic_] cases submitted for discussion by the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be collectively classified under the two names of execution and legislation.[10]

[Footnote 9: For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G), p. 324, below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have passed the Council on that date at the _14th_ Regular Session; since the Council had been established seventeen months previously, some notion of the frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.]

[Footnote 10: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 662. The author adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial, Examination, and Control _Yüan_, such authority was rarely exercised, the Executive and Legislative _Yüan_ constituting the prime objects of its attention.]

Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control, his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and _modus operandi_ of his authority.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The term National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) is employed in two senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government Committee (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_), commonly translated as Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_--literally, the Chairman of the National Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the National Government period there has been no _President of the Chinese Republic_; the highest officer has been the _President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic_, and as such the titular head of the Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of the Third French Republic.

In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice, only within certain limits, to the Executive or other _Yüan_, with no power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the _Yüan_. As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never interfered in the activities or policies of the various _Yüan_."[11] This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled most admirably the requirements of his office.

[Footnote 11: The same, p. 666.]

Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin _Chu-hsi_, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title, although he patently would have preferred Lin.)

THE COUNCIL OF STATE

The Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_, National Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central Political Council. The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold other important office; hence the Council does not include the most effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted by the Legislative _Yüan_, and inter-_Yüan_ problems are all within the scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to exercise.[12]

[Footnote 12: The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the independent agencies are also adapted in general from Wang Shih-chieh's work, although interviews, other materials, and the practical experience of the author have been taken into account. From 1930 to 1937 the author's father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal Advisor (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên_), directly subordinate to the Council of State, and throughout this period the author served as Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, being authorized by the Council of State to take charge of the American office of the Advisor during the latter's absences from the United States.]

The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the latter's relation to the _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission, are best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13]

[Footnote 13: Adapted from the Examination _Yüan_, _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited; various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_, Shanghai and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] _An Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government_, Chungking, 1940.]

Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which also serves as a link and common formal superior to the five _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs. The Offices of Military (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_) and of Civil Affairs (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with the formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military office was originally designed to carry on more important functions, including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials: memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow outward in response.[14]

[Footnote 14: For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty, see des Rotours, Baron Robert, _La Traite des Examens_, Paris, 1932, _passim_; and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and Uses of Ch'ing Documents," _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1940), particularly p. 5 _ff._, for the Manchu empire.]

THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL | | President of the National Government

THE COUNCIL OF STATE | | | Election Committee on } | | | { Office of the Representation in the } | | | { Comptroller-General People's Congress } | | | { } | | |--{ Office of Civil Affairs Academia Sinica } | | { (Transmission) } | | { Commission for the }--| | { Office of Military Disciplinary } | { Affairs (Transmission) Punishment of Public } | Officials } | } | Planning Committee for } | { THE MILITARY AFFAIRS the Western Capital } | { COMMISSION |--{ The Chairman THE PEOPLES POLITICAL | { The Military Departments COUNCIL | | { THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ |--{ The Executive Ministries | { ("the cabinet") | |--{ THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_ | |--{ THE JUDICIAL _YÜAN_ | { The court system | |--{ THE EXAMINATION _YÜAN_ | |--{ THE CONTROL _YÜAN_

The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of crisis. The Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_) serves scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus, through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications; despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui_) found its work considerably extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing anomaly--that of the city's uncertain status--was removed.

The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy.

THE EXECUTIVE _Yüan_

The Executive _Yüan_ is the political organ which includes the ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the remaining _Yüan_. The President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive _Yüan_ (_Hsing-chêng Yüan_) is the highest executive officer of the government. This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of Finance and Vice-President [_Fu-yüan-chang_] of the _Yüan_) have held this office.

The Executive _Yüan_ may be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in respect to its relations to the President of the National Government, but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress. It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15] It resembles a cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, the _Yüan_ is unique among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The Executive _Yüan_ is peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference.

[Footnote 15: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 671.]

All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the other of the two staff organs (_Mi-shu Ch'u_ or Secretariat, under a Secretary-General; and _Chêng-wu Ch'u_, or Office of Political Affairs,[16] under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally separate but actually almost fused, with the Director serving as a sort of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the Executive _Yüan_.

[Footnote 16: Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.]

THE PRESIDENT OR PREMIER | THE CABINET _______________________________ | | | | Ministry Ministry Ministry etc. (secretarial and administrative staff usually concentrated at this level)

THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ PRESIDENT | THE _YÜAN_ MEETING _______________________________________________________ | (composed of officers of ministerial rank | | and presided over by the President) | | | Office of Political Affairs: Sections Secretariat: Sections | | | | : : | | | | : : ..|.............|............|...|..................... : : | : | : | |________________:__________ : : | : | : | | : |: Ministry Ministry Ministry Ministry etc.

The Executive _Yüan_ Meeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on Tuesday.[17] Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda, prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories: reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the Meeting consists of the _Yüan_ President and Vice-President, the Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18] The work of the Meeting is carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbent _Yüan_ President, takes great interest in the work of the _Yüan_, and makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are the proceedings public.

[Footnote 17: A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical work of the Executive _Yüan_ is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, "Executive _Yüan_," The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.]

[Footnote 18: For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the government.]

In giving effect to the decisions reached by the _Yüan_ Meeting, the _Yüan_ itself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular agency, the _Yüan_--through its Secretariat--addresses the appropriate form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects are within the jurisdiction of the Executive _Yüan_:

(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the Legislative _Yüan_;

(2) the budget, also passed _pro forma_ by the Council of State and put into legal form by the Legislative _Yüan_;

(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the Legislative _Yüan_;

(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials;

(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission;

(6) other matters which the _Yüan_ President sees fit to introduce for discussion or decision.

The Executive _Yüan_ has far outstripped all other _Yüan_ in war-time growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business, and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the Legislative _Yüan_, which has found ample work in the preparation of the Draft Permanent Constitution and the attempt to systematize legislation in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive _Yüan_, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions of the Examination and Control _Yüan_; and the Judicial _Yüan_ has never had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative, examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixth _yüan_, has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military Affairs Commission.

THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs Commission.[19] A similar agency was one of the political wheels on which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to sudden distension of the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixth _yüan_, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese sense. The Commission had its own head, its own _Pu_ (Ministries or Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular government on the one side, and the party administration on the other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth agency--co-ordinator for the first three--began to be needed.

[Footnote 19: _Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_. _The Chinese Year Book_, _v.d._, cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary_, Shanghai, 1937, and the original.]

Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at war cannot be taken as _prima facie_ proof of inefficiency. Personnel is provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is done--delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out--and the creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.

The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman--the Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), who is Chiang K'ai-shek--and seven to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20] The key officers of the armed forces are _ex officio_ members, and the Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, education, agitation, propaganda, espionage, government-sponsored "social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its narrowly military affairs.

[Footnote 20: See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in _The Chinese Year Book, 1938-39_, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, _The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency_, New York, 1940, p. 26 _ff._; and frequent references in _China At War_ and the _News Release_ of the China Information Committee, both semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China Year Book 1939_, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.]

The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines. The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and--less clearly--to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas.

The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main office, there are twelve divisions with the rank of _Pu_. The Department of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_) serves as a military planning and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training (_Chün-hsün-pu_) supervises training facilities, military schools, and in-service training.[21] The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_) and Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_) are explained by their titles; the pension program is probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_) acts as a research and consultative body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü T'ing_) applies some principles of the merit system. A Service Department (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_) is in charge of transportation, supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (_Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui_) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (_Chün-chêng-pu_) occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the Executive _Yüan_, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries on occasion.[22] General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is subordinate to the Generalissimo as _Wei-yüan-chang_ (Chairman) of the Commission.

[Footnote 21: Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of the titles here given, however, are those of the author.]

[Footnote 22: As an instance, see _Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang_ ..., cited above, p. 54, n.^{13}.]

The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23] With the renewed entente, and war of national union for defense, a Political Department (_Chêng-chih-pu_) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister. The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies, in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent, it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity.

[Footnote 23: This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were assigned to every group army, and political departments in the divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization, and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units engaged in military operations.

"Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers and the political men....

"Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China Information Committee, _News Release_, October 2, 1939.

The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is, despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.]

The Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the Communists and independents in the number of Japanese they can destroy, or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression. Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the enemy--army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the authority of the central government pending the _révanche_, and to uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24]

[Footnote 24: The official view of this work, silent on the competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," last citation above, p. 595-600.]

THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXAMINATION AND CONTROL _Yüan_

The appearance of an actual three-power administration--army, government, Party--has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance of the four further _Yüan_. The Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_) was even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the government, failing to display--as an American might expect--a tendency toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive and legislative. The Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_), while exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities. Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent Constitution, and continued codification of administrative law--particularly for coordination of central government and war area (occupied China) affairs.[25] The Examination _Yüan_ (_K'ao-shih Yüan_) has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_) has maintained war-time efforts.

[Footnote 25: Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President of the Legislative _Yüan_, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the work of the _Yüan_ will be found in various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_; in Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, cited above, containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and Organization of the Legislative _Yüan_," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73-88.]

The Legislative _Yüan_, under the _Yüeh Fa_ of 1931, consists of a _Yüan-chang_, a _Fu-yüan-chang_, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members (_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council for a two-year term upon nomination by the _Yüan_ President. The term's shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and transforms the _Yüan_ to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of representation. The President of the _Yüan_ retains sole and arbitrary power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely to exercise arbitrary power.

Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain unimpaired, the _Yüan_ finds much of its work performed at present through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council, administrative action of the Executive _Yüan_, or commands by the Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:

(1) general legislation;

(2) the budget;

(3) general amnesty;

(4) declaration of war (never exercised);

(5) declaration of peace;

(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has referred to the more open and solemn aspects of treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the _Yüan_ by the highest Party agency).[26]

[Footnote 26: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 676 _ff._]

The Judicial _Yüan_ serves as an administrative and budgetary agency for four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_) is, obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China. The Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_) is an agency only potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_). The _Yüan_ President is _ex officio_ chief magistrate of the Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_). Wang Shih-chieh says of this _Yüan_:

Because of the fact that the Judicial _Yüan_ is itself not an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice, the actual work to be performed by the Judicial _Yüan_ is very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for the _Yüan_ itself and approving the general estimates of the organs under it, the Judicial _Yüan_ has only three further duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative _Yüan_ legislative measures connected with the Judicial _Yüan_ and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of the National Government with respect to such cases as special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27]

[Footnote 27: The same, p. 691.]

With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial _Yüan_ might acquire importance through its control of the administrative and technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government than with one another in a unified judicial system.

The Examination _Yüan_, with a President and Vice-President, is composed of a central _Yüan_ office, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü Pu_), operating a selective promotion system, and the Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_). In absolute numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the circumstances, the Examination _Yüan_ finds scope for valuable, creative work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very considerable importance.

The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared, surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_ possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position.

[Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.]

Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system. Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions. At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning.