The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History Third Edition

CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE:

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NAPOLEON 44

Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi 44, 45

He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th 45

His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout confirm the view above given of his plan of campaign 45

The general order of movement issued on the evening of the 14th of June 45, 46

Accident in the transmission of his orders to General Vandamme on the 15th 46

Desertion of General Bourmont 47

The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediate supervision 47

Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and 16th 48

Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney 48, 49

He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Piré to Frasnes 49

And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies 49

Backwardness of the 1st Corps 50-52

At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 51

D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness 52

Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on the evening of the 15th 53

He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe 53

He expected Blücher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wellington 53

He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of the 15th 54

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55

1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff 56

2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 _et seq._

Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and unsatisfactory 56

A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61

Rogniat’s criticism 57

Napoleon’s answer 57

Charras and Jomini 58, 59

Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations 59

The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon 60

B. The question as regards the non-occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63

(1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61

(2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62

3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63

4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64

The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs 64

The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th 65

The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th 65, n. [122]

The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value 66-67

The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69

That no mention is made in the written orders of the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69