CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER

AND WELLINGTON 70

Blücher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate at Sombreffe 70

And without consulting Wellington 70

The nature of the understanding between them 70 _et seq._

Müffling’s statement generally misunderstood 71

There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details 72

Bülow’s disobedience of orders 73

Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full information of the situation 73

Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels 74

He retained his headquarters at Brussels 74

He thought it probable that the French would advance by way of Mons 74

Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75

The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance 76

And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P.M. of the 15th 77

Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and 7 P.M. 77

They were simply for the concentration of the various divisions of his army 78

But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78

Information that Blücher is concentrating at Sombreffe arrives in the evening at Brussels 78

And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After Orders” which direct a general movement towards the east 79

Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequent orders of the Duke 79

The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 80

Müffling’s statement 80

The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond 81, n. [170]

The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey have been lost 81

The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th 82

They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83

This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton’s division at Waterloo 83

It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M. of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. [182]

But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher and the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition 85

Character and meaning of the “Disposition” 86

The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of the Letter to Blücher 87-88

Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 88

But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton 88

His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89

NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90

1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo” 90

Its surprising statements 90

2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington and Blücher in the event of a French invasion 91

3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness in deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras 92

4. Wellington’s original intention of concentrating at Nivelles considered 93

It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93

A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffe he could run no great risk in concentrating at Quatre Bras 94

B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so 94

If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny 95

C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition 95, 96

5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied armies criticized 96

Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy 96

Opinions of Charras and Napoleon 97, 98

6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98

But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at Quatre Bras undeserved 99

Because this decision of Wellington’s was based on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100