CHAPTER 16

Research, Development, and the Future

Psychological warfare is part of civilization. Civilization, no matter how one defines it, is not a static thing. It is an immense fermenting, active, often turbulent composite of the _whys_ and _hows_ of the way men and women think and behave. The short-run factors in a civilization are often as important as the long-run ones. Though the United States from 1860 to 1960 has been a steady part of the west European, predominantly Christian civilization, the United States has undergone immense changes of fashion, belief, appetite, preference, and behavior. With any changing, developing civilization, "war" may seem like a very static term, so that the Civil War and the war of the Western powers against Germany of 1939-45 may to some degree seem comparable phenomena. They are comparable, but only within sharp limits.

=The Meaning of War.= Nowhere is the transitoriness and changeability of modern civilization more evident than in the significance which intelligent men and women attach to the term _war_. War was "noble" in 1861-65, but in 1941-45 it was "noble" only for the most perfunctory and most hollow oratory. Push the contrast farther: "psychological warfare" was an unknown element in 1861-65; by 1941-45 it had become fashionable. (One can seriously doubt that President Lincoln ever worried about Northern citizens becoming "un-American" under that rubric, though he had plenty of traitors to worry him.) The years 1945-53 were momentous. A whole string of new ideas, new terms, and new behavior patterns appeared within the USA in a mere eight years. What the next twenty years will bring is deeply uncertain.

War is coming to mean the effectuation or prevention of revolution, not the half-savage, half-courteous armed conflict of sovereign nations. War is getting to be chronic again.[55] War between entirely comparable states such as the United States and Canada, Mexico and Cuba, Indonesia and India, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or any similar combination, is getting to be more and more unthinkable. War between ideologically dissimilar states, such as North Korea and South Korea, Communist China and Nationalist China, Viet Minh and Viet Nam, USSR and USA, is getting to be virtual normality.

=Research into Tension.= It is true of all people that they solve particular problems, in many cases, some time after the occasion for solving the problem has passed. What is called "decision" in government, politics, and in personal affairs is very often not the selection of one very real course of action as against another equally real course of action, but the confirmation of a commitment already made. If this is true of every-day life, it is even more true of scholars and experts. One of the disabilities of our time in the field of the social and psychological sciences and the humanities lies in the fact that although government officials recognize problems some months or years after they have arisen and finally attempt to deal with them, scholars frequently get around problems decades after any practical occasion for decision has passed.[56]

Nowhere is this more evident than in the discussion of tensions as a cause of war. Tension certainly contributed very much to the outbreak of war in 1914. It is possible that the tensions and hostilities of Europe in the 1930s which allowed Fascism and Communism to become threatening and powerful also contributed in the end to the outbreak of war in 1939. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the coming of war in September 1939 was itself the result of tension except as a very remote and indirect cause. This author believes that tension leads to a perpetuation of a kind of civilization in which wars are possible, but cannot persuade himself that an additional factor of tension within civilization as we know it can be an immediate cause of war.[57]

Research into tensions has been carried fairly far. It may be that the wartime role of tension can be ascertained by scientific methods, so that the psychological warfare of Power A can cause so much more tension than Power B, either among the élite or among the general population, that Power B cannot further continue the war. Alternatively, it is imaginable that Power A may be able to relax tension so sharply among the élite or broad population of Power B that Power B's potentiality for war, or decision to wage war, can be postponed.

For purposes of research it seems worthwhile to suggest that tension appears to be highly prevalent in the two most powerful military civilizations on earth today: the USSR and its satellites, on the one hand, and the cluster of Western powers, on the other. Tension appears to be caused by the complexity of every-day life, the demands made upon the psychophysiological organization of each individual human being, by the technological facilities available, and through the relief offered within each civilization by the opportunity to discharge hatred against members of the other civilization instead of recognizing self-hatred for the very real problem which it is.

In other terms, it is tough to be modern; the difficulty of being modern makes it easy for individuals to be restless and anxious; restlessness and anxiety lead to fear; fear converts freely into hate; hate very easily takes on political form; political hate assists in the creation of real threats such as the atomic bomb and guided missiles, which are not imaginary threats at all; the reality of the threats seems to confirm the reality of the hate which led to it, thus perpetuating a cycle of insecurity, fear, hate, armament, insecurity, fear, and on around the circle again and again.

=Revolutionary Possibilities in Psychology.= It is possible, but by no means probable, that the rapid development of psychological and related sciences in the Western world may provide whole new answers to the threats which surround modern Americans, including the supreme answer of peace as an alternative to war or the secondary answer of victory in the event of war. Nothing in the existing academic literature on the subject of psychology of war, the psychiatry of modern mass behavior, the psychology or psychiatry of present-day power politics, justifies the inference that an applicable solution to our "problems" is at all near. The "problems" are almost all aspects of our entire lives and one cannot solve life like a Delphic riddle or a single scientific experiment.

It would be unwise of U.S. military and political leaders to overlook developing strengths within American every-day talk and thinking, whether academic or popular. Too specific a concentration on the problem of winning a war may cause a leader or his expert consultants to concentrate on solutions derived from past experience, therewith leading him to miss new and different solutions which might be offered by his own time. Changes need not always be thought of as weaknesses, which they are if past criteria are retained as absolute standards. Men born in the period 1910-20 may have endowments which are not commonly found among men born in the period 1930-40, yet it is entirely possible that the generation born during 1930-40 may have capacities and resistances which the older generation does not altogether appreciate.

Apply this concept to Communism. Communism loses strength every day that it exists: each day deprives it of novelty, each day makes it a littler more familiar, each day makes its leaders one day older. If Americans can learn how to be flexible and imaginative and to understand themselves as they really are, they might find that the real American appeal to the youth of the world would be much greater than the Communist appeal. It was unfortunately characteristic of the United States in the early 1950s of the Cold War that U.S. propaganda was based on ideals and standards _older_ than the ideals and standards competitively presented by the Communists, and that therefore in many parts of the world the struggle between Americans and Communists appeared to be a struggle on our side of the old against the young. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States army in Korea in 1950-53 was one of the most revolutionary armies in history, an army dedicated to non-victory, pledging allegiance to a shadowy world government of the United Nations behind the practical reality of the government of the United States. Perhaps never before in many centuries have men fought so matter-of-factly, so calmly, so reasonably. They fought well and did not need to be jazzed up with the hashish of "making the world safe for Democracy" or "establishing the Four Freedoms."

The temper of the U.S. forces in Korea in 1951 was demonstrated by a Reserve sergeant who scarcely knew he was in the Reserves until he was on a boat bound for Pusan. He was a practical man, anxious to get home, but willing to do his share in this war as long as he had to. He was given the assignment of testing the voice plane of U.S. headquarters at Taegu. The loudspeaker was not working quite right, and he was instructed to test the plane at 500, 1,000 and 1,500 feet. The plane flew low over U.S. headquarters. The roar of the engines almost deafened everyone within the building, yet even above the roar of the engines there could be heard the bone-chilling hum of the silent loudspeaker--an immense magnification of the noise one hears from a radio set which is turned on without being tuned to a station. Everyone expected the sergeant to say, "This is the EUSAK voice plane testing; one-ah, two-ah, three-ah!" Instead the immense voice came through clearly, through brick, and plaster, and wood, through air and trees. It must have reached four miles. The gigantic voice of the sergeant seemed to roar over half of South Korea as he said, "Why--don't--you--imperialist--sons o' bitches--go--back--to--Wall-Street--where--you--belong?" It was said that fifty colonels grabbed for their phones simultaneously, but the purely American gimmick to the whole story lay in the fact that the sergeant was not punished. No damage was done. The Americans thought their enemies were funny or silly. We had shown that we were not afraid of Communist ideas. Several South Koreans told the author that they regarded the Americans as inscrutable people indeed.

The development of modern civilization is certain to have developments in war both as to the purpose of war and as to the modes of war. It seems likely that in the face of the supreme danger of atomic and thermonuclear weapons nations will resort more and more to small wars and semi-war operations which will offer the opportunity of strategic advantage without the cataclysmic danger of a world-wide showdown. In a very hush-hush way the U.S. Army is looking into the possibilities of small and irregular kinds of war; security regulations prohibit the author from discussing some of the interesting new developments in this field.

=National Research and Development Programs.= The United States Government considered as a whole has developed a very adequate scientific research program. Most of this is quite properly keyed to the physical and mechanical sciences, in which the most tangible results are obtained. Substantial strides are being made in the medical and allied fields. Some research is, however, being carried out in fields pertaining to psychological warfare. These are worth describing, but it must be remembered that research on PsyWar may not affect PsyWar itself as much as research in other fields which, by changing the character of war, will change PsyWar too.

Within the general research field, two basic approaches have been recognized by the U.S. Army as being distinct from one another: developmental research and operations research. _Developmental research_ consists of that research which creates new weapons, new methods of war, new devices or procedures, doing so by digging through modern science, investigating its applicability to military problems, and then advancing the frontier of science, when necessary, in the military interest. The goals of _operations research_ are more modest and, in some respect, more provocative. Operations research takes operations as they exist and reexamines them from beginning to end to discover how much of each operation is scientifically pertinent to its stated goal, what economies, modifications, or changes might be introduced, and how the operation might be improved.

=Developmental Research in PsyWar.= At the time of the close of the 1950-53 phase of Korean hostilities, the PsyWar being conducted by the United States Army in Korea showed little sign of having been influenced by developmental research into this field of activity. The leaflets were not better than the leaflets of World War II, nor even very different. Because of the peculiar political limitations of the war, the radio program was not as good as the performance of ABSIE under Eisenhower. The tactical use of loudspeakers had shown a very marked improvement over World War II standards, but to a non-engineer such as the present writer neither the Communist loudspeakers nor our own seemed strikingly better or different.

Developmental research had a great deal to offer, but the gap between initial scientific advance and practical military application appeared to be too broad to warrant the assumption that the research had transformed the U.S. PsyWar program.

=Operations Research in Korea.= Operations research--sometimes slangily called _opsearch_--was applied to the Korean war with highly uneven results.[58]

Among other things, Army officers in the PsyWar field showed, early in the Korean war, that land forces possessed tactical opportunities which combat propaganda could exploit very effectually. Various experiments were tried, none of them so decisive as to affect the outcome of the war, but some of them of real tactical value and others of great importance in obtaining Chinese prisoners.

One of the points examined was surrender as a _process_. Surrendering does not depend upon the disposition of the individual enemy soldier to say _yes_ or _no_ to the war as a whole. He could say _no_ a thousand times and still be on the other side shooting at us.

The actual physical _process_ of surrender is an elaborate one consisting of the psychological processes of getting ready to give up on the other side, the physical capacity to surrender when the opportunity for getting captured presents itself, and the alternative, more difficult process of deliberately leaving the other side and getting to our side alive. In 1951 and 1952 there were considerable developments along this line. Americans learned much about how to teach enemy soldiers to surrender. Late in 1952 and early in 1953 the front had become so static that it took extraordinary heroism for soldiers--outside of a tiny minority engaged in reconnaissance patrols--to get away from their own side and surrender to the enemy without being killed by their friends as deserters or by the enemy as sneak attackers.

The U.S. public did not realize that throughout the Korean war the Communists--Russian, North Korean, and Chinese--enjoyed a distinct radio advantage over the UN side both as to funds available for programs and as to number of station-hours on the air. The language gap between the Americans and Chinese was so extreme that it was hard for Americans to realize that the Chinese broadcasts covered wider audiences and covered them better than did our own. American restraint in this field may have been dictated in part by the fact that the war was a limited war consisting of combat only with those armed Chinese Communists on North Korean territory, but not with armed Chinese Communists elsewhere in the Far East.

=Philosophy and Propaganda Development.= In terms of specific literature of PsyWar it is difficult to find many contributions of professional philosophers to PsyWar since the end of World War II. This is curious, in view of the Communist propagation of philosophy, no matter how perverted its form, as a major weapon. The American philosopher, Dr. George Morgan, who became a career diplomat, was simultaneously a Soviet-area expert and a key figure in the Psychological Strategy Board. There were not many others like him.

Philosophy offers an opportunity for the reexamination of cultural values. The indoctrination of those professors who will teach the teachers of the generation after next will influence the capacity of future Americans to have a world-view which will give them the utmost opportunities for action in the military field while retaining as far as possible the blessings of U.S. civilian civilization. That U.S. civilization is still civilian and not military is, of course, beyond cavil.

The William Jackson committee was a voice crying in the wilderness when it asked for new terms and new ideas against which to set U.S. propaganda operations in the world of modern strategy. Philosophers may have had the capacity for finding some of the answers, but philosophers, of all people, do not like to be jostled or hurried. The author has never heard of a philosopher employed on a confidential basis by the United States Government to think through the historical and cultural rationale of a U.S. military victory for the future. Writers such as F. S. C. Northrop and Erich Fromm--to name only two sharply contrasting personalities--have written books which possess high significance for the international propaganda field. The connection appears, however, to be tangential.

=Literary Contributions.= Almost all the best propagandists of almost all modern powers have been, to a greater or less degree, literary personalities. The artistic and cultural aspect of writing is readily converted to propaganda usage. Elmer Davis is a novelist as well as a commentator. Robert Sherwood is one of America's most distinguished playwrights. Benito Mussolini wrote a bad novel. Mao Tse-tung is a poet and philosopher, as well as a Communist party boss. Down among the workers in the field, such American novelists as James Gould Cozzens, Pat Frank, Jerome Weidman, and Murray Dyer, have worked on U.S. psychological warfare.[59]

Though literary men have converted their writing to propaganda purposes, few of them have gone on to define the characteristics of a specific conversionary literature or to compile canons of literary style applicable to the propaganda field. The contributions may lie in the future.

=The Social Sciences.= The American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAOPR) is the professional league of U.S. propagandists and analysts of public opinion; its quarterly, _Public Opinion_, is the key journal in the field. The members of this association are drawn both from the social sciences and from the psychological sciences, ranging from such practical operatives as Dr. George Gallup and Elmo Roper to austere theorists like Professors Nathan Leites and Hadley Cantril.

A good argument can be presented to the effect that the skills brought from the social-science into the propaganda field are more valuable once they are employed full time in that field than an attempt to apply political science, or sociology, or economics, each as an individual compartment, to the field of propaganda. There is still no book available with the title _The Politics of Knowledge_,[60] even though the reception, control, prohibition, and dissemination of knowledge is a major factor in all modern governmental processes both in and out of the propaganda field.

=Psychology and Related Sciences.= There has been an immense amount of work done by psychologists, much of it classified, on the field of propaganda. Some of this work is refreshing in the extreme and should provide nasty surprises for the Communists in a major war. Other parts are restatements which if translated into operations might or might not prove feasible with the kind of army we Americans have or are likely to have.

One of the most conspicuous developments since World War II has been the application by psychologists, sociologists, and persons in related field of _quantifying techniques_. The introduction of rigorous scientific requirements of _number_ into the attempted reportage of propaganda behavior or propaganda results is having a significant effect. Quantification may not obtain everything which its devotees claim for it. There is a wide area of human behavior which is significant to the ordinary person, or even to the expert in descriptive terms, and which loses much of its significance if the descriptive and allusive terms are replaced by measurements, tables, and graphs. There is, however, no danger that quantification will replace description as the sole tool of research in the propaganda field.

What quantification does do is develop a common area of discussion between propagandists and nonpropagandists. In many instances quantification can demonstrate results where allegations of failure or of success would have nothing more than personal authority to support them. Within our own particular kind of civilization quantification has a special appeal because of the American trust in engineering and in numbers. The conclusions of the Kinsey reports on men and on women seem much more authoritative to the ordinary man because they are presented with an ample garniture of numbers, even though Havelock Ellis's pioneer works in the psychology and behavior patterns of Western sex life may have been much more tangible and much more revolutionary in their time.

=Projection and Research.= All propaganda involves a certain degree of projection--the propagandist attempts to identify himself with a situation which he does not face in real life and to issue meaningful communications to persons about situations which they themselves do not face _yet_. Much of the psychological research on tactical PsyWar remains yet to be done, although from the quantitative point of view there have been significant U.S. achievements within the past four years.

Another aspect of projection is left unexplored because of its immense difficulty and its dangerously unscientific character. Consider the problem this way: the United States one day before the outbreak of war with a hypothetical enemy, such as the Soviet Union, will possess a certain group of characteristics. Representative individual lives within this country can be determined to possess certain habits concerning mass communication, trust in mass communication, and response to symbols which may come through press, radio, or other mass devices.

One day after the outbreak of war the United States will change _because_ the war has broken out.

One month after the outbreak of war the United States will no longer be the USA_{1} which existed on war-day. It may well have become USA_{25} because of the rapidity and variety of change. Three Soviet hydrogen bombs and twelve Soviet atomic bombs might change many of our national, economic, political, and psychological characteristics, and no one, not even an American, could predict this change in advance. The best he could do would be to get ready to study the change as it occurred, to understand the rate and direction of the change, and to assess the meaning of the change in light of the conduct of war.

The same would be true of the USSR; that country, like any other major country, would change under the impact of war. Who could have predicted the renascence of Russian patriotism and traditionalism resulting from the Nazi invasion of 1941? Even if we know where the Russians are as of the outbreak of war, we won't know where they will head or how fast they will head there, once war has broken out.

The scientific problem presented by attempted serious study of a U.S.-Soviet war is therefore very difficult indeed. It is really a problem involving three clusters of moving bodies. The first cluster will be the American people, their behavior, and their institutions; the second cluster, the Russians and allied peoples, their behavior and their institutions; the third cluster, the changing methods of communication existing between them.

It can be said even now, simply by referring to the character of the American people and their past history, that if the Communist leaders of the USSR start a general war, the end of that war is sure (under sets of words and ideas which have yet to be developed in the future) to involve the reconciliation of the inhabitants of the USA with the Russian people. In other words, USA_{v} and USSR_{v} can and must have certain relationships with each other, preeminent among which are attempts at undoing war damage, at political and cultural reconciliation, and the undertaking of the rebuilding of a world which both these great peoples can support with enthusiasm and _hope_.[61]

USA_{v} and USSR_{v} are imaginable. USA_{1} and USSR_{1} for the day preceding the outbreak of war, or, alternatively, the day on which the war occurs, will be known elements. American science in many fields can help U.S. mass communications and therewith help our armed forces if we learn how to ascertain how the Soviet leadership changes, how Soviet élite groups change, and how the Soviet population changes during the course of the war. We must not only be able to guess what is happening to them physically, but must try to appreciate and to understand what is happening to them psychologically and semantically. This is an immense task. It is by no means certain that our research and development facilities can give us an adequate research program to handle the problem.

This much can be said: if the Americans understand the Russians before the war and during the war, it will be the first time that a nation has kept its enemy in wide-awake sight.

The usual process in the past has been the acceptance of a few exaggerated stereotypes of the national characteristics of the potential enemy, the ascription of every possible kind of infamy and inhuman characteristic to the enemy during the war, and the redefinition of the enemy as a friend after the war. It would be strange and wonderful if the U.S. Government and the U.S. propagandists (or conceivably as much as a large minority of the U.S. population) could learn how to fight the USSR in order to _help_ the Russians escape from a tyranny which has already hurt them much more than it has hurt us.

The Germans suffered a tragic, overwhelming, and perhaps decisive psychological defeat in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and in the Ukraine, when they carried with their field forces such naïve and tragic Nazi misconceptions of Russian and Ukrainian character as to defeat every opportunity they may have had for a serious anti-Communist alliance of Germany with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. They destroyed themselves not through ignorance, but through what they _thought_ they knew. If they had been more calm, less assured, more willing to learn from immediate experience, and less indoctrinated with their own preposterous misconceptions of Russian and Ukrainian character, they might have found Russian and Ukrainian allies who would have joined them in the final extermination of the Soviet system.

The world Communist movement has already suffered very serious setbacks because of its failure to project U.S. behavior successfully from the summer of 1950 onward. If the Russian and Chinese Communists had understood Americans well and had made a correct evaluation of the American response to the invasion of South Korea, they would not have driven the United States from lethargy to alertness, from weakness to military strength, from vulnerability toward Communist and crypto-Communist propaganda to sharp and angry recognition of Communist manipulation of symbols such as "progressives," "people's governments," and "liberation."

=Communist Developments.= If the U.S. Government agencies know about the scientific development of Soviet propaganda techniques in the last few years, they have certainly not told this author. What is here presented is therefore derived from first-hand interrogation of Communists, from escapers in both Europe and Asia, and unclassified materials.

Sociologically it would seem that the Russian Communists attempted definite improvements of the techniques of Communist revolution and that these improvements have in large part failed in the European satellites. The governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany have turned out to be poor governments--despite the fact that from the Soviet point of view it was a sharp innovation to leave them in pseudo-parliamentary form instead of creating outright Soviet facsimilies.

At the Chinese end of the Moscow-Peking axis the sociology of revolutionary propaganda and organization appears to have worked out much more successfully than at the Russian end. The Chinese Communists, perhaps because they were Chinese, perhaps because they were tougher and more experienced Communists than the Russians, got their country under rigid control and then undertook social and political experiments on a very audacious scale. They have managed not to be un-Chinese while creating in China the kind of pervasive dictatorship which Communist control appears to require.

In the manipulation of satellites and in particularization of propaganda, the North Korean Communist army, the Viet Minh army in Indochina, and the Malayan Races Liberation Army on the Malay peninsula, appear to have near-optimum localism and particularism without suffering serious deviation from the main Communist world-wide pattern. In North Korea, of course, Chinese intervention and Soviet support have sharply modified the position of the North Korean People's Army, but the Annamite and Malay Communist forces appear to be fighting with high morale and considerable success, despite the duality of control from Peking and Moscow, and despite the difficulties of reconciling Asian nationalism with Marxian-world doctrine.

Another Communist technique is now known through Edward Hunter's provocative pioneer book[62] by its correct name of "brain-washing." This involves the transformation of a human personality. The author has himself interrogated victims of brain-washing and can attest to the terrifying depth to which this process is carried. The victim of brain-washing is subject to very slight persuasion at the rational level. He is not even given much propaganda as U.S. propagandists of recent years might recognize the product. Instead, the process of brain-washing consists of a frontal attack on all levels of the personality, from the most conscious to the most hidden. The Communists seek through fatigue and sustained interrogation to create a condition similar to what is called "nervous breakdown" in popular parlance. Then they rebuild the personality, healing their victim into Communist normality.

One victim to whom the author talked had been so subject to Communist brain-changing that he thought himself a real Communist even though he had been reared a Catholic. He was completely convinced of the Communist cause and of his own life and place in that cause after the brain-washing had been completed. Unfortunately for Communism, the man got into serious sexual difficulties, difficulties of a kind which any American psychiatrist would recognize as potentially devastating.

As a result of his sexual frustrations he suffered a mild equivalent of the medically recognized phenomenon of the schizophrenic break--that terrible moment of false enlightenment in which the psychotic personality cuts loose with a truth of his own and shuts off most or all communication with normal people--with the consequence that he was walking along Nanking Road in Shanghai, a normal Communist in one instant of time and (as he put it to the author) in a millionth of a second he suddenly realized he was a Catholic, an anti-Communist, the enemy of every man, woman and child in sight--and at war with his entire environment. As this writer understood it, the poor man, though adjusted to the Communist environment after brain-washing, happened to go crazy--crazy enough to come back to our side.

Who can say which is sane, which insane? When two social and cultural systems are completely at odds with one another it may be impossible to be "normal" in both of them.

Scientifically the Chinese process of personality transformation lacked some of the pharmaceutical features apparent in the Western Communist conversions for purposes of confession. It appears to be a combination of audacious practical experimentation with well-known procedures from textbooks of Pavlovian psychology. It is, of course, an interesting scientific question to ask one's self: could Communist psychological researchers do enough psychological research to understand their own difficulties and to de-Communize themselves in the very act of seeking better psychological weapons for Communism? If the people in charge of Communist psychological techniques were scientists, as American psychologists generally are, there might be a real point of discussion. Unfortunately, most of them appear to be artists, believers, and fanatics. The history of the fanatical religions which have inflamed and ripped so much of mankind across the centuries is not such as to suggest that Communism will de-Communize itself by becoming more Communistic or more scientific.

Logically considered, the United States remains the largest extant revolutionary experiment in the world--the first immense human community which survives without profound dogma or profound hatred and which attempts to make short-range, practical, and warm-hearted (though ideologically superficial) concurrence the foundation for a political and industrial civilization. If the United States wins a few more wars it may be that the rest of mankind will be persuaded that our kind of practicality is not only humanly preferable, but scientifically more defensible than the philosophies of competing civilizations. It seems unlikely that Communist research can outstrip us in the propaganda field so far as the race is run in purely scientific terms; artistically and gadget-wise the Communists are just as inventive as we are and often more enthusiastic.

=Private PsyWar and Covert Techniques.= Another aspect in the development of PsyWar was the inevitable possibility that skills learned in wartime would not be forgotten in time of peace. Many of the background studies made for OWI during World War II have been developed, on the constructive side, into serious scientific contributions to ethnology, anthropology, or psychology. The postwar studies of RAND Corporation have in part been released in unclassified form and add to our knowledge not only of propaganda but of mankind. The RADIR project at Stanford University, the Russian research program at MIT and Harvard, and other governmentally inspired or encouraged undertakings have borne similar fruit for private scholarship and discussion.

On the other side of the coin, it is very hopeful to note that the many and dangerous techniques developed by OSS for covert propaganda, some of which were applied with considerable success in Europe, have not been introduced into domestic U.S. politics, commercial competition, or other forms of private life. After each war there is often a danger that the coarsening of a culture by the war will lead to the application of wartime skills to peacetime situations. This was emphatically not the case in the Presidential campaigns of 1948 and 1952, even though persons of rich PsyWar experience in World War II were on the staffs of both Stevenson and Eisenhower.

It is often forgotten that some of the deadliest and most effective revolutionary enterprises in the nineteenth century were undertaken without the consent or assistance of the existing governments. Karl Marx was certainly not an invention of Lord Palmerston. Bakunin did not operate out of the French Foreign Office.

In the postwar discussion of USA-Communist rivalry, recommendations were often made on the U.S. side that we should counter Soviet covert operations with our own covert operations against the USSR. What has been forgotten in this context is the fact that such operations have been made illegal and dangerous under United States law. Under Federal law as it exists today no Underground Railway could be developed to assist Soviet escapers in the way that Negro slaves were relayed across the Free States to Canada in the years before Emancipation. One of the chief blocks to U.S. covert operations is the immense growth in all directions of the power, authority, and responsibility of the Federal Government; this growth makes it almost impossible to wage revolutionary or conspiratorial operations from U.S. territory without the prior approval of U.S. authorities--which the authorities, under traditional international law, cannot give and cannot afford to give.

It would seem desirable, if the Cold War situation persists over a long period of time, for Americans to reexamine the restraints which they have placed upon their own citizens and to attempt a revision of the laws which would permit pro-American secret activities to be launched without permitting anti-American activities of the same kind to be carried on. One immediately comes to the conundrum:[63]

How can the Government say _yes_ to the one and _no_ to the other without being cognizant of what happens?

The answer would appear to lie in the older body of our law in that a withdrawal of governmental authority from some fields would leave the individual responsible and subject to indictment and trial if his enterprises should prove deleterious to the United States Government, but not subject to punishment if his enterprises hurt the known antagonists of the USA.

Phrased in another way, this means that the USA might, in a long-range Cold War situation, be required to make some domestic recognition of the fact that the Communist states are the antagonists but not the military enemies of the U.S. system of government and that as antagonists of this system of government such states, their representatives, their property, and their organizations, should not be afforded any more protection under our laws than is given to the National City Bank of New York in the laws applicable to the city of Moscow, or the American Telephone & Telegraph Company in the laws which apply in Budapest. For a long time the Communist states have treated even the most innocent business enterprise and social club on our side as though they were attainted with an inherent factor of criminal and subversive intent. The withdrawal of U.S. legal protection from all things Communist might allow the American people--or those among them who so chose--to develop proclivities for adventure and trouble-making against the Communists. These proclivities are now sternly repressed by Federal statute.

=The Future of Psychological Warfare.= PsyWar has become an existing art. Where it had no practitioners at all in the United States between 1919 and 1940, it has had a long and distinguished roster of active and reserve officers, civilian consultants, and demobilized veterans interested in the field ever since 1945. A wide variety of military establishments have had PsyWar responsibilities assigned them. Substantial cadres of officers and skilled enlisted personnel have been recruited and trained. Radio and leaflet facilities are ready to accompany our land, sea, and air forces wherever they may have to go. A U.S. strategic center for global propaganda, instantly convertible to wartime use, exists in the Operations Coordinating Board under the National Security Council.

This is not the end of the story.

One of the paradoxical but deeply true factors in the study and conduct of propaganda is this: the more people know about propaganda, the better they can resist it.

Propaganda was a tremendous bogey in the 1920s. It probably seems very ugly and frightening to most people born before 1920. It does not seem too frightening, so far as the author can judge, to Americans born after 1930. Those born in the period 1920-30 appear to be divided in their emotional reactions to mass persuasion situations.

PsyWar is not magic. It is a valuable auxiliary to modern warfare and a useful concomitant to modern strategy. If a particular strategic policy is sanely and effectively devised as a feasible deterrent to war, the PsyWar procedures supporting that strategy will contribute to the prevention of war. Psychological warfare represents a recognition and acceptance in the military and strategic field of skills which grow about us every day.

In so far as ultra-destructive weapons may have increased the tenseness and bad temper of people who must live under the perpetual but remote threat of atomic bombing, one can say that physicists have upset the nerves of mankind and that it is now up to the propagandists to reassure and to reconcile the peoples.

Whatever PsyWar does, it certainly does not and should not increase the bitterness of war. Fighting itself is the supreme bitterness. Radio broadcasts and leaflets even in wartime only rarely should promote hatred. The situation which the world faces is dangerous because of technological development, not because of psychological knowledge. PsyWar ranks as a weapon, but it is almost certainly the most humane of all weapons.

Apart from PsyWar, what military weapon destroys the enemy soldier's capacity to fight by saving his life? PsyWar tries to bring him over alive and tries to send him home as our friend. No rival weapon can do this.

PsyWar, no matter what it may be called in the future, cannot be omitted from the arsenal of modern war. Neither can it outlast war. Its improvement is a cheap, valuable, and humane way of increasing the military potential of any country whether we think that country to be politically right or politically wrong.

Since 1945 we Americans have written more, studied more, and talked more about PsyWar than have any of the other free peoples. This is a hopeful sign. It can be read as an indication that the American love of the gadget, the American quest for a novelty, can be turned to the arena of the soul. The Communists are better liars, better schemers, better murderers than we shall ever be; they start off by being better fanatics. Is it not in the American spirit that we should out-trick them, out-talk them, and out-maneuver them? We have a very creative and resourceful civilization at our backs. We have no Führer to guide us and no party line to comfort us; we don't even want such things. Hard though it may be, we can live with our own consciences and not seek for keepers.

The Communists have started a fight with us. That fight may go on a long time. If they want to stop fighting we shall certainly try to find peace with them. But if they push the fight to its bitter end--

We shall not fail.

APPENDIX

Military PsyWar Operations, 1950-53

On 25 June 1950, when the invasion of the Republic of Korea began, no real military PsyWar organization was tangibly evident. A planning staff headed by Colonel J. Woodall Greene had been re-created in the Far East Command's GHQ in 1947, but it was hardly prepared to direct full-scale propaganda operations on such short notice, especially with a total lack of field operating units. Yet the staff with hasty augmentation did go into action--in effect, became its own operating unit--two days following the invasion, using both leaflets and radio in a strategic campaign that was continued without interruption for over three years.

At the same time that General MacArthur made provision for the PsyWar planning staff in the Far East Command, the Department of the Army's G2 in 1947 directed the inauguration of a long-range program of extension courses to be administered primarily to the specialists of the Military Intelligence Reserve. One such specialty in the military intelligence career program was psychological warfare.[64]

Parallel with the development of training literature based on World War II experience, the Army experimented with the use of PsyWar in field maneuvers. A special unit, called the Tactical Information Detachment,[65] was formed at Fort Riley, Kansas.

=Organization of Field Operational Units.= Less than a month after the 1950 invasion, the Department of the Army announced the approval of a new organizational concept for PsyWar field operational units. The new concept, profiting by the organizational happenchance in all theaters of operations during World War II, established two functional units: one for _strategic_ propaganda support, the other for _tactical_ propaganda support.

=Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.= Although the concept for new unit organization and function was not conceived overnight, FEC's Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) with its dual planning and operating responsibilities pointed up the urgent need for a unit properly manned and equipped to support full-scale strategic operations in any area. So the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was born. Not only was it designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations, but it likewise was created to support the national world-wide propaganda effort when so directed. It was built on a basic framework of three companies:

_Headquarters and Headquarters Company_, containing the command, administrative, supervisory and creative personnel necessary for propaganda operations.

_Reproduction Company_, containing intricate equipment and skilled personnel capable of producing leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and multiple color.

_Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company_, designed to replace or augment other means of broadcasting radio propaganda.

In 1953 a fourth type company was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina--the _Consolidation Company_. This unit was very flexible and had the job of creating and conducting PsyWar in support of consolidation operations in areas under Military Government control.

=Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.= The Group's junior partner in the conduct of PsyWar support operations was the Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. This unit specifically supported an army in the field with adequate _tactical_ propaganda support. Like the Group, it supported the national propaganda objectives, but it interpreted the directives that came from the theater commander in terms of more immediate objectives. Its targets were smaller, lived under unusual circumstances, and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities--a real challenge for the L&L Company. Organizationally it was a trimmed-down version of the Group. Its _company headquarters_ and _propaganda platoon_ were the offspring of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The _publications platoon_ was a smaller, more adaptable version of Reproduction Company. And the _loudspeaker platoon_ was the tactical counterpart of the strategic Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.

The Tactical Information Detachment, moving from Fort Riley to Korea in the fall of 1950, was reorganized as the _1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company_ and, attached to EUSAK, served as Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the campaign. It adjusted its location, equipment and propaganda tone to keep pace with the ups and downs of the Korean war.

=Psychological Warfare Center.= Paralleling the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Department of the Army PsyWar training was started in the spring of 1951. A faculty was collected at the Army General School to start the world's first formal school of military propaganda.

At the same time, reserve officers whose civilian specialties were in or related to mass communications were recalled to PsyWar assignments. Several RB&L groups and L&L companies were activated and trained at Fort Riley. One of these, the _1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group_, was deployed to Japan to become the strategic propaganda support unit in FEC, thereby relieving the hard-pressed Psychological Warfare Section of its operational functions. The Group left Fort Riley in July 1951 at the height of the Missouri Valley floods, forcing the unit to take emergency detours by bus and train in order to meet its scheduled port of embarkation call. The 1st was the only group to have been used in active operations. Other groups were employed in training missions. In addition, Reserve groups and companies trained periodically at key locations where sufficient specialized personnel were available to keep the units on a ready, stand-by basis.

In April 1952, the PsyWar training activities at Fort Riley were moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where the new Psychological Warfare Center was located. This Center not only provided unit training supervision and facilities, but it fathered a new activity, the Psychological Warfare Board, designed to evaluate and test new PsyWar equipment and techniques. And the Psychological Warfare School, an outgrowth of the classes conducted by the Army General School, was formally recognized and established as one of the Army's specialist schools. More than four hundred officers have received diplomas as PsyWar officers at the time of this writing (1953). Most of the graduates have been Army officers, although successfully completing the course have been students from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, U.S. Information Agency, and from nine Allied nations.

=Psychological Warfare Staff, FEC.= For nearly two years, the Psychological Warfare Section operated under the general staff supervision of Intelligence (G2). Since World War I days G2 had been given the responsibility for monitoring PsyWar activity, a practice that was evident throughout World War II. In 1947 the Department of the Army transferred the monitorship and supervision of PsyWar to Plans and Operations (G3). The shift was effected in FEC in 1952.

Early in 1953 PWS was transferred to the staff of the commander, Army Forces Far East (AFFE), a paper transaction to put the staff in a closer position to coordinate the plans and operations of the supporting army PsyWar units.

Throughout the Korean conflict, PWS, like its area commander, wore two hats: PWS was also the PsyWar operations coordinating agency for the United Nations Command.

Broad objectives made possible throughout the war years the development of literally thousands of appropriate themes. One theme so prominent in World War II propaganda, that of _unconditional surrender_, was never used. UN policy denied its use, and PWS enforced the prohibition.

=Psychological Warfare Staff, EUSAK.= Recognizing the need for PsyWar officers on army and corps staffs, the Department of the Army hastened to make an allocation for these officers to be integrated into headquarters structures. The PsyWar officers finally came to rest in the G3 staff section.

Eighth Army's PsyWar division of G3 had the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company under its operational control. EUSAK's PsyWar officer kept a tight control over the propaganda output of the L&L Company by physically moving the propaganda platoon into his EUSAK staff office.

Each of the corps PsyWar officers had under his operational control one loudspeaker section (with a varying number of teams) from the L&L Company.

=Radio Operations.= Radio in the Korean conflict was used jointly as a strategic and a consolidation medium. From the beginning of the war, radio was the voice of our military policy. An ambitious network, supervised in 1950-51 directly by PWS and thereafter by the 1st RB&L Group, became known and recognized as the Voice of the United Nations Command. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Japan Broadcasting System (JBS) transmitted on a cooperative basis, with the U.S. Government buying air time. The 1st RB&L Group's radio unit furnished programming assistance through key stations in Seoul (KBS), Taegu (KBS), Pusan (KBS) and Tokyo (JBS). In addition, the Group furnished technical assistance to KBS in order to keep as many as twelve network stations on the air.

=Leaflet Operations.= As in World War II, leaflets were delivered primarily by two means: aircraft and artillery. B-29s of the Far East Air Force ferried leaflet bombs on night missions deep into strategic areas. Light bombers and liaison craft in support of EUSAK dropped both leaflet bombs and bundles on tactical targets. The leaflet bundle was a Korean war development. It was wrapped, tied, and fuzed in such a manner that it would open and release its leaflets in mid-air. The 105mm. howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.

Tremendous quantities of leaflets were printed. The 1st RB&L Group on many occasions averaged better than twenty million pieces of printed propaganda every week. To this, the 1st L&L Company in Korea added an average of three and a half million leaflets per week.

=Loudspeaker Operations.= The airborne loudspeaker was the object of experimentation, but the bulk of loudspeaker broadcasts were made from vehicle mounts, such as tanks, and from emplacements. During the static battle situation of 1951-53, most of the broadcasts were of the latter kind. Range of the voice casts was short, something like two thousand yards under ideal conditions. Personnel and equipment were supplied by the 1st L&L Company, and scripts were prepared by PsyWar Division, G3, EUSAK.

=Results of Military PsyWar Operations.= When the question was asked, "Just how effective was PsyWar?" the answer was vague. Clear-cut immediate evaluation of the effects of each propaganda campaign was often impossible to ascertain because of the many intangible conditions that were prevalent in the target area--conditions that were constantly changing.

Some critics of the PsyWar operations in the Far East Command charged that there were exaggerated claims of prisoners of war who surrendered as a result of propaganda. They pointed out that a head count of prisoners is an inaccurate measure of _direct_ effects of PsyWar used in support of military operations, because rarely is the taking of prisoners the _sole_ goal of any major PsyWar campaign.

Other critics expressed the belief that emphasis had been placed on _quantity_ rather than _quality_ of propaganda. By quantity they meant propaganda measured by bookkeeping statistics. By quality they meant propaganda that, planned with potent intelligence, was capable of exploiting propaganda opportunities with maximum psychological impact.

Did PsyWar achieve its goal?

The effects of planned persuasion in a thousand days of radio broadcasts, in tens of thousands of loudspeaker appeals, in billions of leaflets, may be measured only in retrospect. The question may be answered when reaction in the target area has reached (or fails to reach) favorable proportion, provided that the tangible results of the military operations can be clearly separated from those of concurrent and subsequent strategic international information operations.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Histories of warfare, of politics (though there are no good recent ones, Edward Jenks' little book being half a century out of date), of political theory (especially the excellent though dissimilar volumes by G. H. Sabine and by G. E. C. Catlin), of particular countries, of diplomacy, of religion, and even of literature all cast a certain amount of light on the subject. No writer known to the author specializes in the topic of historical propaganda; none takes up the long-established historical role of non-violent persuasion in warfare. Some of the sociologists and anthropologists, such as Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Geoffrey Gorer, Ruth Benedict (to mention a few at random) have presented approaches which would justify re-evaluations of history in a way useful to propaganda students; but they have not yet persuaded the historians to do the work.

[2] 7 Judges 22-23.

[3] Leon Wieger, S. J., _Textes Historiques_, Hsien-hsien, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 628-633.

[4] The author's attention to this reference was drawn by an unpublished undated typescript article in the War Department files by Lt. Col. Samuel T. Mackall, Inf.

[5] Lo Kuan-chung, _San Kuo chih Yen-i_, translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor as _San Kuo or Romance of the Three Kingdoms_, Shanghai, 1929, vol. 1, p. 46.

[6] Recent writers on Genghis, such as Lamb, Vladimirtsov, Fox and Lattimore all credit the Mongols with a higher technological level of warfare than has been the custom among most Western historians. H. G. Wells' simple but compelling description of the Mongols in his _Outline of History_ is worth re-reading in this connection.

[7] Petis de la Croix, _The History of Genghizcan the Great, First Emperor of the Antient Moguls and Tartars_ ..., London, 1722, p. 154.

[8] Benedict Figken, _Historia Fanaticorum_, Danzig, 1664.

[9] Philip Davidson's _Propaganda and the American Revolution_, Chapel Hill, 1941, is a careful scholarly study of this period. Comparable studies have not yet been written concerning other American wars. Military and civilian historians have a fascinating piece of research awaiting them in the material concerning Confederate and Federal psychological warfare. Each participant in the Civil War was vulnerable to the propaganda of the other. Subversive and clandestine pro-Confederate propaganda in the North is outlined in George Fort Milton's engrossing _Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column_, New York and Washington, D. C., 1942, but no comparable study covering all forms of propaganda on either side is yet available.

[10] Various new editions of Paine's chief works are available in popular and inexpensive form. They are worth study as good propaganda.

[11] In his _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, page 17 and following, this author attempted to present some of the relationships of ideology to other methods of social control and, in connection with that enterprise, was furnished by the philosopher, A.O. Lovejoy, with a definition of "ideology" more systematic and more elaborate than the one used here.

[12] For example, in the 1920's the Soviet press expressed resentment and amusement over a ruse adopted by the British during the course of operations along the Northwest Frontier. Plane-mounted loudspeakers had told the tribesmen, in Pushtu, that God was mad at them for having broken the pledged peace, with the result that they scattered and gave up. This maneuver exasperated the Russians, who themselves were making equally sweeping propaganda inroads on the other side of the Pamirs. The Russians were attacking religion, and having heavy going; it struck them as improper warfare to make use of local superstition.

[13] _Webster's New International Dictionary_, Second Edition, Springfield, 1944.

[14] The late Huey Long is reported to have created a new word in the language of rustic Louisiana, the word "damlyingnewspapers." By instilling in his followers contempt for the "capitalist" press, he got them to the point where they _disbelieved_ anything which they saw in print, and _believed_ everything which "Ol' Huey, the Kingfish" himself told them. This operation was technically competent, since one of the most effective means of putting propaganda across is to draw alarmed attention to unfriendly propaganda and then just "happening to mention" the "truth" (that is, the promoted side). Long attributed to the newspapers a large number of lies which they did not print, along with the "lies" (which were in historical fact true) that they _did_ actually print. Since most of his followers either boycotted the press or read it in a hostile frame of mind, they never found out whether the newspapers said what Huey said they said, or not. You can try this out on your neighbors or friends by making up some idiotic "quotation" (such as, "The Jewish _Vorwaerts_ says that pickled onions are a cause of immorality" or "_Le Temps_ of Paris says that Alaska is preparing to secede") and the listener will be so busy scoffing at _what_ the paper allegedly said that he will take no time to find out whether the paper _did_ say it or not. Such attributions occur in everyday life; the smart propagandist attributes plenty of rich, ripe, silly quotations to his opponent. How many people actually _know_ what the Communists have said on any given topic? Or bother to check on the actual claims of the Zionist organization? Or the statements of the Arabs in Palestine?

[15] The literature in this field is carefully described in two volumes by a three-man team consisting of Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey and Bruce Lannes Smith, the first being _Propaganda and Promotional Activities, An Annotated Bibliography_, Minneapolis, 1935, and the sequel being _Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, A Comprehensive Reference Guide_, Princeton, 1946. The booklists provide material in plenty for any academic-minded inquirer. The essays in the two volumes are well worth reading, although the authors have undergone the professorial delight of inventing a private language of their own. Parts of the latter book, especially, read like proceedings out of an unfamiliar lodge meeting; but there is sound sense and acute observation behind the vocabulary. It must, however, be parenthetically noted that during World War II the key propaganda jobs were held by a radio commentator, a dramatist, a newspaperman, a New York banker, and an absolutely astonishing number of men from commercial radio--along, of course, with a sprinkling of Army and Navy officers in Washington, and a heavy majority of non-specialist officers in the field. The propaganda experts were not, in most instances, called in to do the actual chore of propaganda. Among the exceptions were Leonard W. Doob, author of _Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique_, New York, 1935, who served in the War Department's Psychological Warfare Branch and in the Washington propaganda center at OWI; C. A. H. Thomson, who served as a propaganda staff officer both in Washington and overseas after being a collaborator with the Lasswell group; and Drs. Edwin Guthrie and A. L. Edwards, whose chapter "Psychological Warfare" in [E. G. Boring, editor] _Psychology for the Fighting Man_, Washington, 1943, pp. 430-447, is a lucid epitome of the topic.

[16] This means that if you want to get baptised, you've got to get _all_ the way under the water or it doesn't count.

[17] See Doob's book, mentioned above, especially pages 71 through 89 and 413 through 417.

[18] See the bibliographies by Harold Lasswell and others, mentioned above, for a wealth of literature giving more technical and scientific breakdowns than this. The formula STASM represents what was actually used in preparation of up-to-the-minute propaganda spot analysis for the War Department General Staff by Propaganda Branch during World War II. Some further aspects of this formula are presented in my article, "Stasm: Psychological Warfare and Literary Criticism" in _The South Atlantic Quarterly_, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1947, pp. 344-348.

[19] See Harold Lasswell's _Propaganda Technique in the World War_, New York, reissue 1938, Chapter II, "Propaganda Organization," for a description of the attempts to coordinate policy and propaganda in World War I.

[20] Chicago, 1946. The discussion of what censorship authorities regarded as propaganda material possessing value for the enemy, of the wartime OC-OWI relationship, and of censorship of short-wave broadcasts are of particular interest to the student of psychological warfare.

[21] In a somewhat different context, it is interesting to note that Chinese Protestant churches, made up of Chinese church members, like to hire ministers who mouth their Chinese with a strong American accent. The American missionaries established the American accent as part of the liturgical paraphernalia of Protestantism, and the Chinese preachers trained under them accepted the American mispronouncing of Chinese as a part of the religion. It is odd to see a church full of Chinese using absolutely unbelievable tones while singing hymns or making appropriate individual responses. At that, they are no funnier than the Chinese Buddhists, who memorize long Indian sutras without understanding a single syllable.

[22] On World War I, see Harold Lasswell's _Propaganda Technique in the World War_, previously cited; George Creel's _How We Advertised America_, New York and London, 1920, the very title of which is an indication of its chief shortcoming; Lt. Col. W. Nicolai, _Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg_, Berlin, 1920, by the German general staff officer chiefly responsible for staff work on propaganda and public opinion, a very thoughtful though prejudiced book; Heber Blankenhorn's enjoyable little classic, _Adventures in Propaganda_, Boston, 1919 (Blankenhorn was the only American officer to see field service in propaganda in both wars, as a Captain in I and a Lieutenant Colonel in II); and George G. Bruntz' scholarly monograph _Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire_ in 1918, Stanford, 1938. Readers desiring further references should consult the bibliographies by Lasswell, Casey and Smith, cited above.

[23] Colonel Nicolai, book cited in footnote 1. pages 160-161.

[24] For a pro-Hitler view of the world, see Wyndham Lewis' _Hitler_, London, 1931, if a copy is to be found. The author would probably prefer for the book to disappear. It is an eloquent, very pro-Nazi book, putting the Hitlerite terminology into the English language and--what is more important--infusing into the clumsy German pattern of thinking-and-feeling a lightness of touch which makes Naziism more palatable. The book converted no one in its time, and is not apt to do harm at this late date; but it will make the English-reading reader understand some of the novelty, the revolutionary freshness, the bold unorthodoxy which made millions of people turn to Hitlerism as an escape from the humdrum heartbreak of Weimar Germany. Much of the book is devoted to the problem of power--street-fighting, mass demonstrations, slogans, symbolisms--which so fascinated the Nazis.

[25] See Carl J. Friedrich, _The New Belief in the Common Man_, Brattleboro (Vermont), 1945, chapter III, "Independence of Thought and Propaganda," pp. 81-120, for a cogent discussion of this mentality. The present author, in _Government in Republican China_, New York, 1938, pp. 18-23, describes in epitome the method whereby the ancient Confucian leadership of China, while propaganda-conscious, used ideology as an economical, stable method of control and avoided its maleficent features. In one of the few poorly argued passages of a great work, Arnold J. Toynbee overlooks this peculiar characteristic of Confucianism and merely equates the Confucian dogma with those of other "universal churches" (_A Study of History_, London, 1939, vol. V, especially pages 654-5).

[26] People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., _Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotzkyite Centre ..., Verbatim Report_, Moscow, 1937, page 111. These trials were themselves propaganda; in this particular instance, propaganda of a rather poor order, since they failed to convince the foreign public and presumably persuaded only those portions of the Russian public who were so gullible that they needed no further persuading. For a brilliant illumination of them in terms of a readable novel, see Arthur Koestler, _Darkness at Noon_, New York, 1941; the same author also has a book of essays on the totalitarian mentality under the rather fancy title, _The Yogi and the Commissar_, New York, 1945. On the same subject, see Louis Fischer's _Men and Politics_, New York, 1942.

[27] This document establishing the COI, along with the other major documents pertaining to American psychological warfare, may be found in J. P. Warburg's book cited above, _Unwritten Treaty_.

[28] In the course of a routine day of work on overseas propaganda in 1942, the author, who was then in SSG of MIS, found it necessary to get in touch with Military Intelligence proper, Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the office of the Assistant to the President, the Office of Facts and Figures, the British Political Warfare group (which was vainly seeking its American opposite number), the Office of Civilian Defense, the Research and Analysis Branch of the office of the Coordinator of Information, the office of the Librarian of Congress, the Foreign Information Service, and the Department of Agriculture. Each of these either operated propaganda, or had policy or intelligence contributions to make. The Board of Economic Warfare naturally came into the field too. This was during a period of German and Japanese victories, so that even if propaganda had been coordinated, it probably would not have been much more effective than it was. From what could be figured out later, no real harm was done at this time. Nor was much achieved.

[29] The bibliographies are cited above, on page 38. The journal comes out, as its title indicates, four times a year; it is published by the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. Every major library has it. The review section provides a good survey of new writing in the field. Journals such as _The American Political Science Review_, _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_, _The Infantry Journal_, and _The American Historical Review_ often have significant articles or book reviews in this field. _International Affairs_ (Royal Institute for International Affairs, London) has excellent reviews of books arranged by geographic subheads. Opinion and propaganda topics are usually lumped together in academic studies; material on the one is apt to lead to the other.

[30] San Tzu Ching, translated and annotated by Herbert A. Giles, Shanghai, 1910, pages 2 and 3. The translation quoted is not by Giles.

[31] On the transmitting side, nothing could be more ruinous than mere translation, the more literal the worse, of a single basic broadcast for all audiences irrespective of language or culture. For the text of war communiqués or of official documents, this is permissible, but for news or feature broadcasts, few things could be worse. It is not possible to translate subtle psychological appeals embedded in news or commentary; such materials by their nature must follow forms acceptable to the audience, building up confidence with familiar allusions and creating a sense of "we-ness" between the actual announcer and his listeners. Equivalents can be worked out. The same basic policies can be transposed. The same source of news and intelligence can be exploited. But the actual program cannot be translated verbatim from one language to another; it must be transposed not only from one language but from one culture to another.

[32] Free advertisement.

[33] Bad news about his side is not necessarily the only kind of bad news for the enemy to know. Gloomy news about our side can harm the enemy listener if his government is running a propaganda campaign to raise production, promote thrift, etc., by claiming things are worse on _their_ side. In such a case, good news about us would be good for him. News must be fitted to the propaganda plan and to the propaganda situation.

[34] Walter Lippmann's book, _Public Opinion_, was first published in New York in 1922 but it is still clean-cut as a basic statement of the problems of public opinion. The author's own life as a commentator is remarkable in fulfilling the mission which he implicitly set himself when writing about public opinion: the job of lifting issues into emotional and psychological contexts in which the resulting judgment will be based on socially sound factors.

[35] The American newspapers between 1942 and 1945 carried intermittent accounts of these personal and political problems, frequently in the columns of commentators rather than in the regular news sections. (The book by Warburg is of course _Unwritten Treaty_, mentioned above.)

[36] For popular histories of the OSS, see _Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage_ by Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden (New York, 1946) or Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain, _Cloak and Dagger_ (New York 1946). An exciting thriller novel by Darwin Teilhet gives an oblique and guarded description of black propaganda and clandestine polling: _The Fear Makers_ (New York, 1945); Teilhet was himself in OSS. For an interesting description of OSS field operations, see Nicol Smith's _Into Siam_ (New York, 1946). OSS was picturesque from the very start, and it is likely that other participants in OSS work will from time to time bring out books on their adventures.

[37] Bureau of the Budget, _United states Government Manual, 1946, First Edition_, Washington, 1946, says of the Military Intelligence Division, "It has charge of propaganda and psychological warfare" (page 198). The fiat may be a little more precise than circumstances warrant, but it at least shows where, for the record, psychological warfare belonged.

[38] See Charles E. Merriam's study, _Political Power_, Chicago, 1933, and his later works for suggestive approaches to the political setting of propaganda problems. He developed the terms miranda and credenda for modern political science usage.

[39] While this statement is plainly a matter of individual opinion, the author considers that his own experience supports his opinion in this instance. He wrote plans on almost every operating level in the governmental and military hierarchy during World War II, all the way from drafting plans for the Joint (American) and Combined (British-American) Chiefs of Staff down to helping field agents in the China Theater work out practical little propaganda plans for their own missions, or planning the writing, use, and classification of leaflets one by one, in collaboration with OWI operators. He found planning to be fascinating at the top, and worthwhile at the bottom of the pyramid, but he found no significant correlation between the top and the bottom, save in the sense which he makes plain.

[40] In the pseudo-technical propaganda slang of the OWI people, this was called "spelling out." The same people "stockpiled" "campaigns" to "needle" the enemy.

[41] So far as he knows, the author was the first--about May of 1942--to urge that a surrender pass be made to look like an official document, with banknote-type engraving and with formal style. Unfortunately, it was printed in green, instead of the old-fashioned orange-gold of the U.S. Treasury yellowbacks, and was sent to the jungle areas of the South and Southwest Pacific, where everything was green to start with.

[42] These suggestions are based on the comment of Major Martin Herz, who prepared the leaflets at Anzio beachhead and subsequently was leaflet expert at SHAEF.

[43] No author, publisher, place or date. Issued by the unit. The reference is to page 55.

[44] The Department of the Army is understood to be preparing a Field Manual and Technical Manual for Psychological Warfare which will describe the doctrines and the equipment, respectively, to be used in combat propaganda situations.

[45] In the postwar period a great many reflective publications began to appraise what had happened in the PsyWar field. One of the best of these is Daniel Lerner's _Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day_ (New York, 1949), which covers the European operation in detail. This was followed by _Propaganda in War and Crisis_, edited by Daniel Lerner (New York, 1951). A heavier work, covering many of the same problems is _The Language of Politics_, by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and associates (New York, 1949). Leonard Doob's work on propaganda, long the leading American text in the field, was issued in a revised, postwar edition (New York, 1948); the postwar book does much to put "psychological warfare" in perspective. A simpler text than Doob's, useful for less advanced students, is Frederick C. Irion's _Public Opinion and Propaganda_ (New York, 1950). A manual directly pertaining to psychological warfare is _America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare_ edited by Robert E. Summers (New York, 1951); this also contains a bibliography which is helpful to the layman. Three outstanding works summarize the postwar propaganda position of the U.S. Government: Charles A. H. Thomson's _Overseas Information Service of the United States Government_ (Washington, 1950) shows the continuity of the problem from war to peace; Wallace Carroll's _Persuade or Perish_ (Boston, 1948) argues the necessity of maintaining an opinion offensive; and Edward Barrett's illuminating discussion, _Truth is Our Weapon_ (New York, 1953), brings the story down to the Eisenhower Administration.

[46] New insights into the nature of the Soviet antagonist were presented by three related monographs originally prepared inside RAND Corporation, the research facility which often works with the U.S. Air Force. Nathan Leites, _The Operational Code of the Politburo_ (New York, 1951), digests Soviet fundamentals of international behavior. Margaret Mead's _Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority_ (New York, 1951) applies anthropological and psychiatric methods of analysis; this book, to the military or general reader, should be prefaced by reading her distinguished work, _Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies_, which is now available in an inexpensive, paper-bound reprint (Mentor Books, New York, 1952). Philip Selznick makes the point that organization is itself a Communist power-achieving instrument in his _The Organizational Weapon_ (New York, 1952), the third of the RAND group. Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, a Regular Army officer, prepared the challenging study of the specific military content of Communist thinking in _The Front is Everywhere_ (Norman, Oklahoma, 1950). Among the many good recent books about the Communist challenge, R.N. Carew Hunt, _The Theory and Practice of Communism_ (New York, 1951), is outstanding for its dispassionateness while James Burnham's _The Coming Defeat of Communism_ (New York, 1951) is a ringing appeal to our side to meet the challenge. Stefan T. Possony, in _A Century of Conflict_ (Chicago, 1953), presents the most coldly damning and most far-ranging critique of Communist operations which this writer has seen. Willmoore Kendall rendered Americans a service with his careful translation, editing and introduction of A. Rossi, _A Communist Party in Action_ (New Haven, 1949), while Bob Darke, in a British counterpart, gives a less intellectual and much abbreviated description of the British Communist set-up and operations in _The Communist Technique in Britain_ (London, 1952). Communist revelations of "capitalist" conspiracies which tell more about the haunted, anxious, nasty minds of the Communists than about our own operations are, among others, L. Natarajan, _American Shadow Over India_ (Bombay, 1952), and Jean Cathala, _They are Betraying Peace_ (Moscow, 1951).

[47] Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Communism as a Competing Civilization in Southeast Asia," a contribution to _Southeast Asia in the Coming World_, Philip W. Thayer, editor (Baltimore, 1952).

[48] For a contrary point of view, see the works by Harry Stack Sullivan, Brock Chisholm, and others.

[49] Problematical in all such attempts of working officers to define "victory" is the serious intellectual issue of avoiding means which by themselves defeat the ends which are sought. If the means are "dangerous" or "immoral" by the standards of the society which applies them, their value becomes low indeed. For the covert side of U.S. operations, see the breezy and popular volumes on OSS: Lt. Col. Corey Ford and Major Alastair MacBain, _Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS_ (New York, 1946); Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, _Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage_ (New York, 1946); and the most vividly concrete narration of the group, Elizabeth P. MacDonald, _Undercover Girl_ (New York, 1947). For an astonishing work which seems to violate security on every page, see Commander Roy Olin Stratton, _SACO--The Rice Paddy Navy_ (Pleasantville, N. Y., 1950); this is the description of a Navy group in China which the author shows to be more covert than OSS itself. A dry, German view of Anglo-American espionage in Holland is given in that superb, true-life adventure story, H. J. Giskes, _London Calling North Pole_ (London and New York, 1953).

[50] See the works of Freda Utley, Herbert Feis, the Linebarger-Djang-Burks political science text (New York, 1954), and others, not to mention the contributions by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and other Communist leaders.

[51] The author himself pleads guilty to having criticized the French unduly without accepting a reasonable share of U.S. responsibility for the situation in Indochina (Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Indochina: The Bleeding War," _Combat Forces Journal_, March 1951), and was deservedly rebuked from some French readers for his denigration of French imperialism. The author cannot endorse as wise, shrewd, or kind the French political decisions in Indochina, hut he can say that the Americans who made (or failed to make) basic policy concerning that area have been as irresponsible and foolish as the French. He trusts that, by the time this note reaches print, a more effectual Franco-American understanding will have replaced the previous difficulties.

[52] Psychological warfare is, of course, neither very psychological nor is it necessarily warfare. Indeed, within the context of a rigidly purist and scholastic definition, psychological warfare is not psychological, in that most of its operations are very definitely _not_ a part of present-day scientific psychology. Neither is it _warfare_ because it can be operated before war, during war, after war, or contemporaneously with and apart from war. As pointed out above, war involves the inescapable content of public lawful _violence_. It is hard to ascribe violence to a short-wave broadcast or to a leaflet. In Korea in 1951 the author heard that a Chinese soldier was found dead--mashed by a leaflet bomb which had failed to explode at the proper altitude. If this story is true, that particular soldier was one of the few genuine _war_ victims of military or strategic propaganda both so pretentiously called "psychological warfare" by Americans of the mid-twentieth century.

Anthony Leviero, who summarized American PsyWar in _The New York Times_ in a series of articles between 9 December and 14 December 1951, is both an experienced general staff officer and a first-class newspaper man. His comment in 1953 on the new Operations Coordinating Board was encouraging or ominous. He stated in his _Times_ dispatch of 4 September 1953 that the William Jackson committee had found that "psychological warfare did not exist as such." If this meant that the new OCB was to sweep aside the limitations of top-secret pedantic definitions and move toward a refreshingly concrete manipulation of the world scene, the news was encouraging indeed. If the new Board was, however, to be dedicated to the manufacture of new, complicated and secret definitions of its own, the news was bad. Given the time-lag on the declassification of Government materials, it may be twenty-five years, or 1978, before the precise definitions of 1953 are available to the public. The tendency of the Board to succeed or to fail will be evident by the time this material is in print; given the personalities involved, the prognosis appeared optimistic.

[53] This kind of issue has not been neglected in our public discussions or our schools. Two sides of one famous case are given in Owen Lattimore, _Ordeal by Slander_ (New York, 1951) and the bitterly anti-Lattimore book by John T. Flynn, _The Lattimore Story_ (New York, 1953). A serious intelligent attempt to answer some of the problems posed by PsyWar and the resulting loyalty issues within a democracy are the works of Nathaniel Weyl, _Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History_ (Washington, 1950), and _The Battle Against Disloyalty_ (New York, 1951). A formidable presentation of what the Communists are doing is offered in Ralph de Toledano, _Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats_ (New York and Boston, 1952) and in Major General Charles A. Willoughby, _Shanghai Conspiracy_ (New York, 1952). The kind of round-table often intellectually conceived and executed within American schools is well portrayed in the special issue of _Columbia Journal of International Affairs_ (New York, spring, 1951), in which the entire issue is given to a synthesis of international problems in the propaganda field under the heading "Propaganda and World Politics." Stefan Possony's magistral _A Century of Conflict_ (Chicago, 1953) provides an excellent general framework.

[54] Nothing in previous U.S. experience prepared Americans for the invasion of the individual personality which has long been accomplished by the Communists but which was first publicized in adequate fashion after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. The pioneer book in this field, and still the best, is Edward Hunter's _Brain-Washing in Red China_ (New York, 1951). This author has known Mr. Hunter for twenty-odd years and can vouch for him as a man with a sober respect for fact, though he does have a vivid taste in adjectives; he has seen not only Mr. Hunter but has gone over some of the raw material which Hunter used and can testify to the reality and sympathy with which Hunter portrays this rather gruesome process. On a different scale, Wilbur Schramm has given a description of what happens when _The Reds Take a City_ (New Brunswick, 1951), in a book of that name written jointly with John W. Riley.

[55] A sharp contrast between the old politics and the new is shown by the unfortunate book prepared in the Department of State and now hastily, even guiltily, allowed to go out of print by the United States Government Printing Office because it showed that some Americans were guilty or naïve enough to try to love and trust the Soviet state within the same system as our own. One does not know whether to laugh or to weep at the spectacle of men lamenting the fact that they were once innocent and hopeful. The book, prepared by the late Harley Notter and others, is Department of State Publication 3580, General Policy Series 15, _Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation_ (Washington, 1949). That not all was innocence, even when things so seemed, is amply attested by Freda Utley's controversial but brilliant summary, _The China Story_ (Chicago, 1951).

[56] The function of decision-making has been brilliantly though solemnly explored in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, _Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics_ (Princeton, N.J., 1954.)

[57] For a contrary point of view, see _Tensions That Lead to War_, edited by Hadley Cantril (Princeton, 1950).

[58] The author had the opportunity of observing opsearch in the Korean war on three different occasions: September 1950, March 1951, and November and December 1952 and early January 1953. He visited Korea itself twice and also spent a great deal of time, part of it in a public capacity and part of it as a free-lance author, in the periphery of that war--areas such as Hong Kong, Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and India.

[59] Several novels have touched on PsyWar problems. The most hard-hitting of the lot is Jerome Weidman, _Too Early to Tell_ (New York, 1946). Covert PsyWar whispering techniques are thinly disguised and much improved, technically, in Darwin Teilhet, _The Fear Makers_ (New York, various dates). The covert side of some of these adventures is portrayed, among others, by W. Stanley Moss, _A War of Shadows_ (New York, 1952); Ray Franklin Kauffman, _The Coconut Wireless_ (New York, 1948); and Chin Kee Onn, _Silent Army_ (New York, 1953). As exciting as fiction are Mark Gayn and John Caldwell, _American Agent_ (New York, 1947), describing the work of an enthusiastic amateur, and L. C. Moyzisch, _Operation Cicero_ (New York reprint, 1952), portraying a first-class professional. Alexander Foote, _Handbook for Spies_ (London, 1949), and J. V. Davidson-Houston, _Armed Pilgrimage_ (London 1949), are interesting distillations of personal experience which touch on espionage and PsyWar.

[60] The author professes he would like to write a preliminary work on this subject himself some day, if no one else essays the task first.

[61] V = Victory day.

[62] Edward Hunter, _Brain-Washing in Red China_ (New York, 1951).

[63] If one good book can be mentioned without prejudice to the many other good books in the same field, attention can be drawn to the excellent undergraduate text which explores the present U.S. position on the press, George I. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin, _The Press and Society_ (New York, 1951). At the opposite end of the spectrum, see Oleg Anesimov, _The Ultimate Weapon_ (New York, 1953). The first book takes the U.S. as it is and does not envisage profound responses coming as the inevitable accompaniment of frightful change; the second book states the outside problem in shocking terms, but asks of Americans things which neither they nor their press are ever apt to approve.

[64] The development of this activity was handed to the Chief of Army Field Forces, in whose G2 section Colonel Donald Hall was the PsyWar officer. The first of these courses with its supporting textbook was not ready for release by the Army General School until 1949, just one year before the Korean conflict began. In 1949 likewise appeared the first officially approved Army field manual on the subject of psychological warfare support of military operations.

[65] Teams from this detachment, armed with leaflets and loudspeakers, were sent to and participated in major maneuvers in continental United States, in the Caribbean area, and in Hawaii. These teams were attached to the "enemy" forces, and exposed the maneuver troops to military propaganda in action. The Tactical Information Detachment suddenly suspended its planning of simulated propaganda operations for Exercise Pluto in 1950. As the only PsyWar operational unit in the Army, the Detachment was hustled off to Korea.

Index

Abbeville, 164

Adams, Samuel, 23

Adipadi, 185

Aggression, timing, 43

Aims, long-range, 126

Air dropping, 229

Air rescue, 142, 231

Air support, 228

Aircraft, World War I, 69

Allen, George, 271

Alsop, Joseph, 273

Alsop, Stewart, 182

American Association of Public Opinion Research, 290

American Broadcasting Station in Europe, 270, 288

American Expeditionary Forces, 67. _See also_ Pershing's headquarters

American operations, effects, 103

American policy in Indochina, 260-262

American Revolution, 21 black leaflet, 20

American-Russian meeting, 202

Andersen, Hans Christian, 156

Anger motif, 233

Annamites, 263

Announcers, radio, 58

Anti-Communist appeals, 246

Anti-Semitic propaganda, 138

Anzio, 82, 212, 239

Appeals, black action, 237

Armed Forces Radio Service, 272

Armed Forces Radio Stations, 34

Army Air Forces, 183

Army Forces, Far East, 305

Army General School, 304

Aryan myth, 78

Aryan racialism, 25

Asia, Communism in, 251

Athenians, 7

Atrocities, 46, 79

Attu, 214

Audience, 123

Austria, 184

_Azad Hind_, 185

_Azad Hind Fauj_, 8

Aztecs, 17

Bakunin, Mikhail, 297

Balkan states, 163

Balloons, 21, 69

Barrett, Edward W., 271

Bataan, 223

Beaverbrook, Lord, 64

Belgium, 13

Belly tank, 170

Benedict, Ruth, 3

Bengal, 8

Benton, William, 184, 271

Black counterpropaganda, 148

Black, Lt. Col. Percy, 91

Black propaganda, 44, 88

Blaine, James G., 49

Blankenhorn, Heber, 64, 67

Boers, 24

_Bolshevik_, 71

Bombs leaflet bombs, 172, 192 V-l, 130, 237 V-2, 237

Bonus troubles, 214

"Book that won the war," 23

Bose, Subhas Chandra, 8

Boxes, packing, 171

Braden, Thomas, 182

Brain-washing, 295_ff_

Breakdown of propaganda items, 122

Brest-Litovsk, 71

Brewitt-Taylor, C. H., 8

Britain in 1940, 163

British, 81

British Admiralty, 87

British Broadcasting Company, 45, 82, 87

British Foreign Office, 64, 87

British in Indochina, 260

British psychological warfare, 263-264

British War Office, 87

Brogan, Denis W., 277

Brown, Don, 208

Broz-Tito, Josip, 87, 89

Bruntz, George G., 64

Buchan, John, 64

Bulgaria, 132

Bullock, Gen. William, 266

Burden, Capt. J. A., 37

Burma, 23, 24, 168, 185, 209, 224. _See also_ North Burma

Buttles, Lt. Col. Bruce, 97

Byelorussia, 13

Cambodia, 186, 262

Canton, 96

Cantril, Hadley, 290

Capabilities, psychological, 158

Capacity, own, 164

Caribbean pirates, 17

Casablanca, 47

Casey, Ralph D., 38

Catholicism, 260

Catlin, G. E. C., 3

Censorship, Russian, 105

Central Intelligence Agency, 274, 276

Central Intelligence Group, 115, 184

Central Pacific, 187

Chandler, Douglas, 83

Changes of nations in wartime, 292-293

Cheka, 225

Chiang Kai-shek, 52, 75, 223

China, 5, 15, 185, 227, 255-257 Central China, 1944, 163 Communist China, 47, 52, 106, 204 Japanese garrisons in, 58 organization, 170 reorganized National Government, 185 OWI in, 57 Protestant churches in, 59 revolution of 1927, 75 Chungking Government, 106

China-Burma-India Theater, 10, 98 Forward Echelon headquarters, 57

China Theater, 187, 213

Chinese Communists, 262-263, 265, 289, 294

"Chinese Federal Reserve Bank," 141

Chinese prisoners, 288

Chinese railway campaigns, 209

Christmas cards, 213

Churchill, Winston, 24, 87, 157

Cinema, 210

Civil defense, 251

Civil Information and Education Section, 189

Civilians, friendly, 209

Clandestine stations, 45

Classification, 54

Clausewitz, Carl von, 28, 30

Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 189

Cleavage, 143

Cleveland, Grover, 49

Cold War, 244, 286, 298 description, 247 in Asia, 264 nature, 248 origins, 248-249 outcome, 254 termination, 253 warfare within, 249

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 174, 194

Command function, 98

Commanders, American theaters, 168

_Commando_, 24

Commands, contingency, 234

Commands, to enemy forces, 233

Commissioner General for South-East Asia, 264

Committee for a Free Asia, 273_ff_

Committee for a Free Europe, 273_ff_

Common causes, 282

Communist appeals, 246

Communist goal, 262-263

Communist-dominated governments, 294

Communist Manifesto, 74

Communism, 71, 78

Communist Party, 126

Communists, 155, 186

Confederate States, 24, 29

Confucianism, 78

"Conquest of probability," 251, 253

Consolidation company, 302

Consolidation plans, 201

Consolidation propaganda, 46

Continental Congress, 158

Contingency plans, 202

Conversion, process of, 13

Conversionary propaganda, 46

Coordination, 201

Coordination of U.S. facilities, 272

Coordinator of Information, 90

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 182

Cortéz, Hernán, 17, 252

Counterespionage, 85, 225

Counterfeiting, 209

Countermeasures to black, 60

Counterpropaganda, 46 defensive, 146 instructions, 144 initiative, 60

Countersubversion, 225

Covert operations, 255 in peacetime, 297

Covert propaganda, 44

_Credenda_, 186

Creel Committee, 67

Creel, George, 64

Crisol, José, 259

Cromwell, Oliver, 16

Crow, Carl, 103

Czechoslovakia, 41, 64, 81

Dalai Lama, 168

Davidson, Philip, 21

Davis, Elmer, 93, 178

Davis, Jefferson, 30

D-day, 202

Decision-making, factors of, 284

Defeat, psychological, 194

"Democratic," 74

Desertion, 211, 237

Developmental research, 287_ff_ in PsyWar, 288

Dien Bien Phu, 261

Diplomacy, 36 dramatic intimidation, 41

Directives, 97

Distribution, artillery, 192

District Information Services Control Commands, 202

Doenitz, Adm. Karl, 30, 88

Doihara, Gen. Kenji, 187

Domei Agency, 105

Domestic Operations Branch, 179

Donovan, Gen. William J., 90

Doob, Leonard W., 38, 39, 97

Doolittle flyers, 99

Door gods, 188

Doriot, Jacques, 157

Dunkirk, 164

Dutch in Indonesia, 257-259

East India Company, 17

Economic Cooperation Administration, 273

Ed and Joe, 205

Education, 32

Edwards, A. L., 39

_Ei Sörrender_, 235

Eighth Army in Korea, 266-267, 303, 305

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 168, 189

Ellis, Havelock, 291

Enemy definition, 50 lifeline, 215 propaganda situation, 127

England, 68

Environmental stimuli, 110

Espionage, 15

Estimate of the situation, 150

Estimates, written, 161

European Defense Community, 253

European Theater, 191

Ezekiel, Mordecai, 139

Fact, slanting, 117

Falsification, radio, 84

Farago, Ladislas, 41

_Fascismo_, 32

Fascist Italian Social Republic, 163

Fascists, 78

Federal Communications Commission, 115

Feis, Herbert, 257

_Feldpostkarte_, 70

Field maneuvers using PsyWar, 301

Field Manual, 241

Field operations, 151

Fifth Army, 228

Files, propaganda, 115

Films, 210

First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 303, 305-306

First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group assisting stations, 306 work in Far East Command, 304

Fischer, Louis, 79

Fisher, F. M., 182, 189

Flensburg, 88

Flexibility in PsyWar, 285-286

Food appeals, 232

Food propaganda, 152

Force short of war, 1

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, 115

Foreign Information Service, 91

Foreign Operations Administration, 273, 276

"Four-Minute Men," 68

Fourteen Points, 62

Fourteenth Air Force, 168, 186, 231

Fox, Ralph, 15

France, 68 as a future ally, 282

Frederick the Great, 28

Free India, 185

Free India Army, 8, 212

French Foreign Office, 297

French in Indochina, 260-262

French Revolution, 23

French revolutionaries, 20

Freud, Sigmund, 26

Friedrich, Carl J., 78

Friendship in PsyWar, 281_ff_

Fromm, Erich, 290

_Führer_, 78

Future of PsyWar, 298_ff_

Fuzes, 170

_Gaimusho_, 204

Galahad Operation, 226

Gallup, Dr. George, 290

Gallup poll, 141

General Staff, 183

Geneva, 261

Geneva Convention, 203

Genghis Khan, 14

George III, 158

German failure in Ukraine, 293-294

_German Psychological Warfare_, 41

Germany, 184 black operations, 212 Imperial Government, 67 naval radio, 88 pastoralization of, 103 U.S. zone, 202 World War II accomplishments, 81

Gideon, 3

Gifts, 207

Giles, Herbert A., 110

Goals of PsyWar, 299 definition, 151 enemy goals, 127 specific propaganda goals, 151

Göbbels, Paul Josef, 90

Gorer, Geoffrey, 3, 154

Gray, Gordon, 274

Great Patriotic War, 104

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 186

Greene, Carleton, 264

Greene, Col. J. Woodall, 266, 301

Grenades, rifle, 228

Grew, Joseph C., 42

Guam, 187

Guerrilla warfare, 262

Guidance, 194 examples, 196

Gurney, Sir Henry, 264

_Gustav Siegfried Eins_, 205

Guthrie, Edwin, 39, 91

Hague Convention, 203

Hall, Col. Donald, 267

Han, 7

Han Military Emperor, 5

Han River, 265

Harvard College, 297

Haushofer, Gen. Karl, 31

Haw Haw, Lord, 59, 83

Hawaii, 203

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 302

Hegelian philosophy, 25

Henry, George W., 27

Herodotus, 7

Herz, Major Martin, 212

Hindustani, 11

Hiroshima, 202

Historical materialism, 32

Hitler, Adolf, 77, 202, 225

_Hitlerjugend_, 57

_Hitlermädel_, 57

Ho Chi-minh, 263

Holland, 13, 52, 68

Holy Roman Empire, 15

Homeland facilities, 204

Honesty as basis of U.S. policy, 282

Howitzers, 228

Huks (Hukbong Mapagpalaya Bayan), 259-260

Huns, 63

Hunter, Edward, 295

Hymn of Hate, 63

Identification of propaganda, 116

Identity cards, 209

Ideology, 8, 31, 79 and plans, 201

India, 264

Indian-Pakistani fighting, 255

Indochina, 185, 245

Indochinese war, 255

Indonesia, 47, 52, 185

Indonesia, fighting in, 255, 257-259

Indonesia, Republic of, 185

Information activities of State Department, 269

Information agencies, chart, 95

Information Control Commands, 270

Information Control Service, 189

Information, Department of, 64

Information and Education Section, 270

Inner Mongolia, 168, 185

Inquisition, 20

Insanity as a Communist technique, 295-296

Intelligence Director of, 64 propanal in, 129 propaganda intelligence, 132, 197

Inter-Allied cooperation, 163

Interest, enemy, 48

Interim Intelligence Information Service, 184

International Information Service, 269

International propaganda, 46

International "realities," 245

_Internationale_, 104

Interpretation vs. truth, 117

Interrogation, 145 of prisoners, 147

Iron Curtain, 244

Irregular warfare, 287

Islam, 10

Isolationism, 140

Israel, 255

Italy, 68, 214 landings in, 239 surrender, 202

Jackson, C. D., 276

Jackson Report, 268, 275, 289

Jackson, William, 275

Jacobite broadcast, 18

Japan, 184 Board of Information, 184-185 black book, 208 black propaganda, 105 cultural propaganda, 206 Emperor, 49, 214 Foreign Office, 204 nostalgic white, 135 peso note, 23 PsyWar in World War II, 105 Sad Sack, 213, 216 surrender, 104

Japan's East Asia, 255

Jenks, Edward, 3

_Jisei_, 168

Johnson, Louis, 269

Johnston, Col. Dana W., 97

_Joho Kyoku_, 34, 184, 204

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 93, 194, 277

Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, 93

Josey, Alex, 264

Joyce, James, 119

Joyce, William. _See_ Haw Haw, Lord

Kachins, 224

Kafka, Franz, 119

Kaiserist propaganda, 66

Kaltenbach, Fred, 83

_Kempeitai_, 187

Kinsey reports, 291

Kiska, 214

Kjellen, Rudolf, 31

Koestler, Arthur, 79

Koop, Theodore, 53

Korea, 184

Korean conflict, 255, 263, 265-266, 269, 280, 286, 294, 301, 303 leaflet deliveries, 306-307 loudspeaker sections, 306 opsearch, 288 propaganda policies, 305 PsyWar in, 301 PsyWar officers, 305 radio operations, 306 radio propaganda, 289

Krum, 132

Kublai Khan, 14, 106

_Kultur_, 63

Kuomintang, 75, 186, 204

Kyes, Roger M., 276

Labor recruitment, 224

Lamb, Harold, 15

Laos, 262

Larson, Cedric, 103

Lasswell, Harold, 38, 97

Latin-America, 68

Lattimore, Owen, 15, 183

Laurel, José P., 157

Laval, Pierre, 157

Leadership, defamation of, 155

Leaflets action leaflets, 231 anti-exhibit leaflet, 96 anti-radio leaflet, 86 artillery, delivery by, 307 B-29 raids, 168 on Berlin, 57 bombs, 307 bundles, 228 Bunker Hill leaflet, 21 civilian-action leaflets, 222 civilian-morale leaflet, 215 for civilians, 207 direct-reply leaflet, 120 dispensers, 265 distribution, 170, 171 dropping procedures, 192 field procedure, 228 French Communist leaflet, 121 ground-distributed leaflets, 86 informational leaflet, 142 loading, 172 map leaflets, 235 morale leaflets, 213 news leaflets, 216 packaged leaflets, 170 Philippine leaflet, 2 production, 190 radio-program leaflet, 82 rolling, 169 spot-news leaflets, 221 start-of-war leaflet, 198 surrender leaflets, 230, 236 surrender leaflet, AEF, 70 surrender leaflet, improved, 239 surrender form, radio, 83 surrender, tactical, leaflets, 235 troop-morale leaflet, 212 troop-morale leaflet, gray, 214 troop-morale leaflet, Nazi, 4 World War I leaflets, 68

Legion of St. George, 84

Leighton, Lt. Com. Alexander, 97

Leites, Nathan, 290

Lenin, Nikolai (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), 71, 263

Lenin Old Guard, 205

Leninism, 71

Letters, prisoner, 232

Lewis, Wyndham, 77

Leyte campaign, 123, 169

Lhasa, 168

Liaison field liaison, 226 mechanics of, 227

Liaison officers, PsyWar, 192, 226

Library of Congress, 137

Lienta University, 35

Limitations on American PsyWar, 278_ff_

Lippmann, Walter, 38, 103, 149

Listening, prevention of, 159

Literary personalities in propaganda, 290

Lo Kuan-chung, 8

"Localism," 295

Long, Huey, 38

Lorient, 227

Loudspeaker units, 237, 302-303

Loudspeakers airborne, 307 emplacement, 307 vehicle-mounted, 239, 307

_Luftpost_, 220

Luxembourg, 168

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 157, 189, 257, 266, 301

MacDonald, Malcolm, 264

Mackall, Lt. Col. Samuel T., 7

MacLeish, Archibald, 279

Maginot Line, 213

Magsaysay, Ramón, 259

Mails, 206 civilian personal, 219

Malai, 185

Malaya, 185, 209, 262 Chinese in, 262_ff_ government of, 263 High Commissioner of, 264 war in, 255

Malayan Races Liberation Army, 262, 295

Malingerer's black, 125

Manchukuo, 185

Manchus in China, 20

Mannheim, Karl, 3

Mao Tse-tung, 252, 263

Marx, Karl, 263, 297

Marxism, 70-71

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 297

Materials, 194 basic materials, 195 enemy information materials, 122-123

McClure, Gen. Robert B., 266

McEvoy, Dennis, 208

Media, 56 limitations, 48, 55 prescription of, 27

Medical conditions, 36

Mediterranean Theater, 191

_Mein Kampf_, 65, 101

Merat, Edward K., 183

Merriam, Charles E., 186

Merrill's Marauders, 226

Mexican War, 23

Mexico, 68

Midianites, 3

Mikhailovich, Draja, 87, 89

Military goals, 199

Military Intelligence Division, 91

Military Intelligence Reserve, 301

Military Intelligence Service, 182

Military Propaganda School, 304

Military PsyWar since World War II, 299_ff_

Military Secretary, 189

Milton, George Fort, 21

Milton, John, 16

Ministry of Information, 64, 87

_Miranda_, 186

Mission, 125 sense of, 26

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, 302

Mock, James R., 103

Mockery, 118

Money, 23, 209

Mongol secret weapons, 14

Monitor, submarine, 97

Monitoring, 111

Morale analysis chart, 70 enemy situation, 127 general morale, 215 German morale, 220 index, 147 operations, 211 services, 34 wartime morale, 156

Morgan, Dr. George, 289

Mortars, 69, 228

Moscow, 71

Moscow-Peking Axis, 294

Moscow trials, 79

Motion pictures, 210 American, 90 propaganda movies, 68, 81

Motive, 155 attribution of, 155

Movie van, 175

Mutiny, 211

Mutual Security Administration, 273

Nagasaki, 106

National-level plans, 200

National Security Council, 269, 276

National Socialist German Workers' Party. _See_ Naziism

National War Aims Commission, 64

Nationalism and Communism, 295

Nationalists, Chinese, 75, 106

Naziism, 77 and Communism, 77 fifth column, 81

Nazi-Soviet struggle, 293-294

Netherlands and Indonesia, 257-259

"New British Broadcasting Company," 83

"New Democracy," 32

New York, radio facilities, 179

News as intelligence, 135 bad news, 136 classified news, 136 commercial facilities, 136 good news, 136 palatability, 136 planted news, 84 pre-action news, 232 private facilities, 136 procurement of, 137 sources, 136

Newspapers, 220 air-format newspapers, 207 airborne newspapers, 13 in American Revolution, 21

Nicolai, Col. Walther, 64

Nimitz, Adm. Chester W., 187

XIX Corps, 239

Normalcy, effects, 73

Normandy, 239

North Africa, 47, 202

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 254

North Burma, 213, 226

North Korea, 263 Communist army of, 295

Northrop, F. S. C., 290

Norway, 13

Nostalgic black, 133

Nostalgic white, 134

Novelty materials, 207

_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_, 82

Obscene black, 141

Oestrous black, 137

Oestrous gray, 138

Offensive propaganda, 46

Office of Censorship, 53

Office of Chief of PsyWar, 266, 304

Office of Facts and Figures, 91

Office of Intelligence, Information, and Cultural Affairs, 184

Office of Inter-American Affairs, 184

Office of Strategic Services, 93, 273, 297 in SWPA, 98

Office of War Information, 93, 269, 271, 297 organization, 178 outposts, 179 quarrels with OSS, 94

Okinawa, 239, 263

Operations, clandestine, 192

Operations Coordination Board, 275_ff_ functions and members, 276

Operations Division, GS, 94

Operations Research, 287ff

Operators needs, 194 qualifications of, 99

Opinion analysis, 110, 141 enemy opinion, 26 enemy opinion profile, 145 generalized opinion, 143 opinion groups, 143 sampling, 141

Order of battle, 192

Outer Mongolia, 168

Outpost Service Bureau, 182

Overclassification, 268

Overseas offices, 97

Overseas Operations Branch, 179

Overt act, 211

Overt propaganda, 44

Paine, Thomas, 23

Palestine, 38

Palmerston, Lord (Henry John Temple, 3d Viscount), 297

Pamphlets, 208

Panmunjom, 261

Parachute News. See Rakkasan

Pareto, Vilfredo, 13

Parsons, Talcott, 3

Passierschein, 6

Pavlovian psychology, 26, 296

Pearl Harbor, 42

Peasant revolts, 20

Peck, Graham, 189

Percentage analyses, 145

Pershing's headquarters, 67-68

Persians, 8

Personnel limitations, 48

Persuasion, 25

Phase planning, 202

Philippines, 137, 185 Communist war in, 255

Philosophy in propaganda development, 289

Photo exhibit, 176

Pictures, prisoners, 238

PK units, 223

Plain-clothes troops, 164

Planning, 194 enemy plans and situations, 126 failure of West, 264 general plans, 199 in research and development, 287_ff_ pre-belligerent planning, 197

Point Four administration, 273

Poland, 13

Policy meetings, 97

Political Adviser, 187

Political background, 43

Political goals, 199

Political limitations, 48

Political officers, 159

Political warfare, 47 in Indochina, 260

Political Warfare Executive, 87

Politics, home-front, 49

Polly planes, 239

Polo, Marco, 14

Postal propaganda, 206

Poster propaganda, 111, 176

Pre-belligerent stages, 80

President's Committee on International Information Activities, 276

Press analysis, 112

Presses, military, 169

Price, Byron, 53

Printing, 111, 230

Prisoners of war, 36 propaganda value, 105

Private use of PsyWar techniques, 296-297

Problems, future tactical, 229

Projection in propaganda, 292

Promises, 52

Propaganda analysis, 110, 128 analysis procedure, 126 choice in, 162 commitment, 50 conditions for effectiveness, 280 defensive propaganda, 46, 101 divisive propaganda, 46 history of, 3 organizations, national, 174 propaganda addict, 78 propaganda against propaganda, 100 purposefulness in, 40 re-use of, 102 in seven small wars, 265

Propaganda Branch, 182

Propaganda Man, 153, 200, 205-206

Propaganda Platoon, 303

Propaganda Section, AEF, 67

_Propagandakompanie_, 223

Propagandists as spokesmen, 281

Propanal. See Propaganda analysis

Proust, Marcel, 119

Prussia, 15

Psychological research in PsyWar, 292

Psychological Strategy Board, 271, 274, 276, 289

Psychological warfare American agencies, 175 definitions, 37, 276-277 defensive, 216 in Intelligence (G2), 304 limitations, 48, 266 in Military Government, 302 Nazi PsyWar, 41 new establishment in Army, 266 organization for, 168 personnel, 99 in Plans and Operations (G3), 304 policy, dissension over, 270 tactical planning, 164 training, 304_ff_

Psychological Warfare Board, 304

Psychological Warfare Branch, 93, 187

Psychological Warfare Center, 304

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 187

Psychological Warfare Facility, 177

Psychological Warfare School, 304

Psychological Warfare Section, 301, 304-305

Psychological Warfare Staff in FEC, 304

Psychologist, role of, 26

Psychology, 25 new developments, 285 relation to propaganda, 291

Psychology Section, AEF, 67

Public Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for, 269-270

Public Affairs Officer, 272

_Public Opinion Quarterly_, 110

Public relations, 33

Publications Platoon, 303

Pushtu, 37

Quakers, 17

Quality as opposed to quantity in PsyWar, 307

Quantification, 291

Quasi-private operations, 273_ff_

Quisling, Vidkun, 32, 157

Quislings, 88, 157

Quotations, falsified, 84

Radek, Karl, 79

Radio American operations, 91 jamming, 159 materials, 113 short-wave, 203 standard wave relay, 203 support, 227 suppression, 114 tactical radio, 192 wired radio, 113

Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 301-302

Radio Free Asia, 273_ff_

Radio Free Europe, 273_ff_

Radio in the American Sector, 270

Radio Luxembourg, 56

Radio Malaya, 264

Radio Saipan, 45, 203

Radio Tokyo, 113

Radio war, 81

Raids, B-29, 237

_Rakkasan News_, 168, 220

RAND Corporation, 297

Ration cards, 209

_Reader's Digest_, 90

Readiness, national, 251

Rearrangements in U.S. Government, 269

Recognition and delay, 244_ff_

Recruiting of Anti-Communist forces, 265

Red Army, 113

Red scare, 72

Reformation, Wars of the, 10

Religious black, 124

Reproduction Company, 302

Requirements, guidance, 195

Research and Analysis Branch, 90

Reserve groups, use in PsyWar, 304

Responsibility of propagandists, 135

Reston, James, 273

Results of PsyWar, 307

Revision of U.S. laws, 298

Revolution and Development of International Relations Project, 297

Revolution as opposed to living, 277

Revolutionary propaganda, 46

"Rockefeller Office," 91

Rockets, 21

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 168, 175, 225

Roper, Elmo, 290

Rowe, David, 111

Royall, Kenneth C., 269

"Rum, Romanism and Rebellion," 49

Rumors, Mongol, 15

Russian Army of Liberation, 88

Russian combat propaganda, 105, 165

Russian Revolution, 71

Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, 273

Ryukyus. _See_ Okinawa

Sabine, G. H., 3

Saipan, 98

Salesmanship, 32

Samuel, Czar, 132

San Francisco, 203 OWI in, 55 radio facilities, 179

_San Kuo_, 8

Sargeant, Howland, 271

Saumaise, Claude de, 16

Scandinavia, 68

Schenke, Wolf, 81

Secret weapons, 129

Security excessive security, 54 security liaison, 55 limitations, 48, 53 security officers, 53 procedures, 54 supervision, 55 unit security, 54

Selling, Lowell S., 27

Sex propaganda, 137

SHAEF, 176, 187, 212

Shans, 224

Shantung guerrillas, 204

Shells artillery, 228 chemical warfare, 228 leaflet shells, 228 smoke shells, 228

Sherwood, Robert, 93, 178

Shonan, 8

Siam, 47, 186

_Sicherheitsdienst_, 85

Singapore, 8

Small wars, seven, 255

Smearing, 157

Smith, Bruce Lannes, 38

Smith, Nicol, 182

Smith, Walter Bedell, 274, 276

Social groups, 143

Social sciences in PsyWar, 290

Socialists, Russian, 70

Solbert, Gen. Oscar N., 94

Source, 44, 122

South-East Asia, 186

Southwest Pacific, 187, 213

Soviet-German front, 214

Soviet propaganda, 1941-45, 51 development of techniques, 294

Soviet PsyWar, 104

Soviet Union, 80 policies, 282

Spain, 31, 68, 280

Spanish Empire, 20

Special Study Group, 91

Specificity in propaganda, 147

"Stab in the back," 65

Staff functions, 191

Stalin, Joseph, 51

Stanford University, 297

Stanley, Lt. Col. John B., 97

STASM, formula, 43-44, 120

Stassen, Harold E., 276

State Department, 184

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 175

Statistical propanal, 131

Stein, Gertrude, 119

_Sterber, Der_, 214

Stewart, James, 189

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., 189

Stoddard, Lothrop, 186

_Strafe_, 63

Strategic operations in international information, 268

Strategic plans, 201

Strategic propaganda, 45

Strategic propaganda unit, 301

Streibert, Theodore C., 276

Strengths of U.S. propaganda, 279_ff_

Subject, 124

Submarine operations, 186

Subversive material, black, 121

Subversive operations, 88, 209

Subversive operations units, 173

Sultan, Gen. Daniel I., 189

Sung Dynasty, 15

Sun-Tzu, 28

Sunyatsenism, 75

Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, 189, 270

Surprise attacks, 129

Surrender, 211 goal of PsyWar, 288-289 procedure, 230 surrender passes, 7 psychology of, 212

Switzerland, 68

Symeon, 132

Tactical Information Detachment, 301, 303

Tactical propaganda, 45

Tactical propaganda unit, 301

"Target" leaflet, 256

Tartars, 15

Tatars, 14

Taylor, Edmond, 17, 41

Taylor, George, 182

Technical Cooperation Administration, 273

Technical Manual, 241

Teilhet, Darwin, 182

_Temps, Le_, 38

Tension causes, 285 in decision-making, 284 in war, 284_ff_ research on, 284_ff_

Terrain of propaganda, 150

Terror, strategy of, 41

Teutoburger Wald, 239

Theater Psychological Warfare, 187

Theater Psychological Warfare Officer, 187

Thompson, Dorothy, 273

Thomson, Col. Charles A. H., 39

Tibet, 168

Time, 123

_Time-Life-Fortune_, 90

Timeliness, 140

Timing, 1

Tito. _See_ Broz-Tito

Toilet training, 154

Tokugawa shoguns, 17

Total war and constitutional law, 42

Totalitarian parties, 78

Toynbee, Arnold J., 78

Traitors, 59

Troop indoctrination, 224

Trotzky, Leon, 71

Truth, 116

Turkish PsyWar, 17

Ukraine, 13, 88, 293_ff_

"Unconditional surrender" doctrine, 47, 103, 305

Unconscious mind, 26

Undercover organizations, 173

Underground Railway, 297

Understanding of the enemy, 292-294

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 292-293

United Nations Command in Korea, 305

United Service Organizations, 224

United States Information Agency, 269 Director of, 269, 271

United States Information Service, 269, 276

Use of all government activities in PsyWar, 275

Uses of PsyWar, 299

Utley, Freda, 257

Vegetius, 28

Venezia-Giulia, 184

Victory and defeat, alternatives to, 252

Victory, psychological, 194

Viereck, George S., 66

Viet Minh, 295

Viet Minh vs. Viet Nam, 260_ff_

Viet Nam, 185, 262

Vladimirtsov, B., 15

Vlassov, Gen. Andrei A., 88, 157

Voice of America, 271

Voice of the United Nations Command, 306

Voices, ghost, 84

Voices, amplified, 237

_Volk_, 32

_Vorwärts_, 38

_Vozhd_, 11

Vyshinsky, Andrei, 79

Wallace, Henry A., 87

Wang An-shih, 7

Wang Ching-wei, 157

Wang Mang, 5

War as chronic state, 283 concepts of, 1 definition, 28 between dissimilar states, 283-284 force short of war, 1 between similar states, 283

War College, 77

War Department participation, 182

War Propaganda Bureau, 64

Warburg, James P., 52

"Warfare psychologically waged," 40-41, 79

Wartime skills, use of in peace, 297

Washburn, Abbott, 275

Washington, George, 157

Washington-theater liaison, 182

Watts, Richard, Jr., 189

Weapons leaflet-discharging, 228 Mongol secret weapons, 14

Weber, Max, 3

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C., 257

West Germany, 282

White House assistant in charge of informational policies, 271

White propaganda, 44

Wieger, Leon, 7

William Jackson Report, 268, 275, 289

William of Orange, 18

Witchit Witchit Watakan, 186

Women, 207

Working-class revolution, 71

World revolution, 23

World War I, 62

_Yamato-damashii_, 32

Yenan, 106, 215

Yüan Shih-k'ai, 63

Zacharias, Adm. Ellis, 177, 204

Zilboorg, Gregory, 27

Zionist Organization, 38

ALSO BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER:

_The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937)

_Government in Republican China_ (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938)

_The China of Chiang Kai-shek_ (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941)

_A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare_ (Washington: War Department General Staff, 1946)

_Psychological Warfare in ROTC Senior Manual_ (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948)

_Far Eastern Governments and Politics_ (with Djang Chu and Ardath Burks; New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954)

Transcriber's notes:

In the context of "the unprofessional guttersnipe Hitler was ruining the wonderful German Army in amateurish campaigns" stood "raining" instead of "ruining".

In the index, the reference for the entry "Indonesia, fighting in," was changed from 257-258 to 257-259, and reference for the entry "Results of PsyWar," from 327 to 307.

Markup in diagrams was not rendered in the transcription where it did not carry any meaning and would have made reading difficult.

The list of other books by Paul M. A. Linebarger was moved from the beginning of the book to its end.

End of Project Gutenberg's Psychological Warfare, by Paul M. A. Linebarger