CHAPTER XXIX.

SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.

Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 185

Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 187

Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose 188

Method of logical Definition and Division _ib._

Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division 189

Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 190

Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art 191

The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision 192

Also, by a third 193

The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art 194

In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification 195

The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 197

Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier _ib._

The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms off falsehood for truth 198

Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? 199

He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions _ib._

The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens 200

The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens _ib._

Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 201

Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them 201

Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof 202

1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia _ib._

Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference--But Justice is not a body 203

At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality 204

Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses _ib._

Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable 205

Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both? 206

Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens _ib._

Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other _ib._

No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 207

Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible _ib._

Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables _ib._

Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 208

He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different _ib._

Form of Diversum pervades all the others 209

Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 210

By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens _ib._

The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is 211

The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject 212

Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 213

Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject _ib._

Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 214

It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it _ib._

Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others 215

Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself--the Sophist 215

Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist 216

These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself _ib._

The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 217

The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense 218

Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c. 219

Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible 220

Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical 221

Misconception of the function of the copula in predication _ib._

No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle 222

Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c. 223

Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes _ib._

Plato's argument against the Materialists 224

Reply open to the Materialists _ib._

Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him 225

Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity 226

Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both _ib._

The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative 227

Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus _ib._

The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable 228

Plato's reasoning against the Materialists _ib._

Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of Conception besides 229

Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato _ib._

Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the Idealists 231

Plato's views about Non-Ens examined _ib._

His review of the select Five Forms 233

Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens _ib._

Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable 235

Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the predicate _ib._

Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to it 236

Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction 239

Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false? _ib._

Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 240

Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day 241

Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues 242

The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c. 246

The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian 247

Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false 249

Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_ false propositions _ib._

What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 251

Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded 252

Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês 253

Recommendation of logical bipartition 254

Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus _ib._

Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense 255

Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus 256

Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 257

Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 258

Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato 259