CHAPTER XXXII

PHILEBUS.

The Philêbus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition, accompanied with more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative opinion--maintaining it against Philêbus and Protarchus--and closing with a result assumed to be positively established.[1]

[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher says, about the Philêbus (Einleit. p. 136)--"Das Ganze liegt fertig in dem Haupte des Sokrates, und tritt mit der ganzen Persönlichkeit und Willkühr einer zusammenhängenden Rede heraus," &c.]

[Side-note: Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus.]

The question is, Wherein consists the Good--The Supreme Good--Summum Bonum. Three persons stand before us: the youthful Philêbus: Protarchus, somewhat older, yet still a young man: and Sokrates. Philêbus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or enjoyment; and Protarchus his friend advocates the same thesis, though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or intelligence. He presently however recedes from this doctrine, so far as to admit that wisdom, alone and _per se_, is not sufficient to constitute the Supreme Good: and that a certain combination of pleasure along with it is required. Though the compound total thus formed is superior both to wisdom and to pleasure taken separately, yet comparing the two elements of which it is compounded, wisdom (Sokrates contends) is the most important of the two, and pleasure the least important. Neither wisdom nor pleasure can pretend to claim the first prize; but wisdom is fully entitled to the second, as being far more cognate than pleasure is, with the nature of Good.

[Side-note: Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure.]

Such is the general purpose of the dialogue. As to the method of enquiry, Plato not only assigns to Sokrates a distinct affirmative opinion from the beginning, instead of that profession of ignorance which is his more usual characteristic--but he also places in the mouth of Protarchus an explicit protest against the negative cross-examination and Elenchus. "We shall not let you off" (says Protarchus to Sokrates) "until the two sides of this question shall have been so discriminated as to elicit a sufficient conclusion. In meeting us on the present question, pray desist from that ordinary manner of yours--desist from throwing us into embarrassment, and putting interrogations to which we cannot at the moment give suitable answers. We must not be content to close the discussion by finding ourselves in one common puzzle and confusion. If _we_ cannot solve the difficulty, you must solve it for us."[2]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 19 E--20 A. [Greek: pau=sai dê\ to\n tro/pon ê(mi=n a)pantô=n tou=ton e)pi\ ta\ nu=n lego/mena . . . ei)s a)pori/an e)mba/llôn kai\ a)nerôtô=n ô(=n mê\ dunai/meth' a)\n i(kanê\n a)po/krisin e)n tô=| paro/nti dido/nai soi. mê\ ga\r oi)ô/metha te/los ê(mi=n ei)=nai tô=n nu=n tê\n pa/ntôn ê(mô=n a)pori/an, a)ll' ei) dra=|n tou=th' ê(mei=s a)dunatou=men, soi\ draste/on.]

There is a remarkable contrast between the method here proclaimed and that followed in the Theætêtus, though some eminent commentators have represented the Philêbus as a sequel of the Theætêtus.]

[Side-note: Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence.]

Conformably to this requisition, Sokrates, while applying his cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of Philêbus, sets against it a counter-doctrine of his own, and prescribes, farther, a positive method of enquiry. "You and I" (he says) "will each try to assign what permanent habit of mind, and what particular mental condition, is calculated to ensure to all men a happy life."[3] Good and Happiness are used in this dialogue as correlative and co-extensive terms. Happiness is that which a man feels when he possesses Good: Good is that which a man must possess in order to feel Happiness. The same fact or condition, looked at objectively, is denominated Good: looked at subjectively, is denominated Happiness.

[Footnote 3: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 D.]

[Side-note: Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires.]

Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a Tertium Quid, distinct from both? Good, or The Good must be perfect and all-sufficient in itself: the object of desire, aspiration, choice, and attachment, by all men, and even by all animals and plants, who are capable of attaining it. Every man who has it, is satisfied, desiring nothing else. If he neglects it, and chooses any thing else, this is contrary to nature: he does so involuntarily, either from ignorance or some other untoward constraint.[4] Thus, the characteristic mark of Good or Happiness is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human nature.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 C. 20 C-D: [Greek: Tê\n ta)gathou= moi=ran po/teron a)na/gkê te/leon ê)\ mê\ te/leon ei)=nai? Pa/ntôn dê/pou teleô/taton. Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/n? Pô=s ga\r ou)/? kai\ pa/ntôn ge ei)s tou=to diaphe/rein tô=n o)/ntô=n. To/de ge mê\n, ô(s oi)=mai, peri\ au)tou= a)nagkaio/taton ei)=nai le/gein, ô(s pa=n to\ gignô=skon au)to\ thêreu/ei kai\ e)phi/etai boulo/menon e(lei=n kai\ peri\ au(to\ ktê/sasthai, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)de\n phronti/zei plê\n tô=n a)poteloume/nôn a)/ma a)gathoi=s.]

22 B: [Greek: i(kano\s kai\ te/leos kai\ pa=si phutoi=s kai\ zô/ois ai(reto/s, oi(=sper dunato\n ê)=n ou(/tôs a)ei\ dia\ bi/ou zê=n; ei) de/ tis a)/lla ê(|rei=th' ê(mô=n, para\ phu/sin a)\n tê\n tou= a)lêthou=s ai(retou= e)la/mbanen a)/kôn e)x a)gnoi/as ê)/ tinos a)na/gkês ou)k eu)dai/monos.]

60 C, 61 A. 61 E: [Greek: to\n a)gapêto/taton bi/on]. 64 C: [Greek: tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilê= tê\n toiau/tên dia/thesin.] 67 A.

"Omnibus naturæ humanæ desideriis prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum ad Philêb. p. 18 D-E, page 139).]

[Side-note: Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise.]

Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and diverse: and that under that same word, different forms and varieties are signified, very unlike to each other, and sometimes even opposite to each other. Thus the intemperate man has his pleasures, while the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also, attached to his own mode of life: so too the simpleton has pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even opposite.--Protarchus replies--That they proceed from dissimilar and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to pleasure--itself to itself.--So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is like to colour: in that respect there is no difference between them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to, white colour.[5] You will go wrong if you make things altogether opposite, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name _pleasures_: but you must not affirm between them any other point of resemblance, nor call them all _good_. I maintain that some are bad, others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name _good_? As different pleasures are unlike to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of intelligence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree in being _cognitions_. To this Protarchus accedes.[6]--We must enter upon our enquiry after The Good with this mutual concession: That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good--and Intelligence, which I declare to be so--is at once both Unum, and Multa et Diversa.[7]

[Footnote 5: Plat. Philêb. p. 12 D-E.]

[Footnote 6: Plat. Philêb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.]

[Footnote 7: Plat. Philêb. p. 14 B.]

[Side-note: Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice.]

In determining between the two competing doctrines--pleasure on one side and intelligence on the other--Sokrates makes appeal to individual choice. "Would _you_ be satisfied (he asks Protarchus) to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Would _any one of us_ be satisfied to live, possessing the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory--but having no sense, great or small, either of pleasure or pain?" And Protarchus replies, in reference to the joint life of intelligence and pleasure combined, "Every man will choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately. It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject it: but every man will choose it alike."[8]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 A. [Greek: de/xai' a)\n su/, Prô/tarche, zê=n to\n bi/on a(/panta ê(do/menos ê(dona\s ta\s megi/stas?] 21 D-E: [Greek: ei)/ tis de/xait' a)\n au)= zê=n ê(mô=n], &c. 22 A: [Greek: Pa=s dê/pou tou=to/n ge ai(rê/setai pro/teron ê)\ e)kei/nôn o(poteronou=n, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ge ou)ch o( me/n, o( d' ou)/.] 60 D: [Greek: ei)/ tis a)/neu tou/tôn de/xait' a)/n], &c.

Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theætêtus and other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and endeavouring to confute--the Protagorean canon or measure. Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or disbelief, to Protarchus himself: every other man is so _to himself_. Sokrates may be a wiser man, in the estimation of the public, than Protarchus; and if Protarchus believes him to be such, that very belief may amount to an authority, determining Protarchus to accept or reject various opinions propounded by Sokrates: but the ultimate verdict must emanate from the bosom of the acceptor or rejector. I have already observed elsewhere, that a large part of the conversation which the Platonic dialogues put into the mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to individualities and specialties of the other interlocutors: that this very power of discriminating between one mind and another, forms the great superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written treatise or rhetorical discourse--both of which address the same terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each. (See above, ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54, on Phædrus.)]

[Side-note: First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it.]

The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of Protarchus, is--"Would _you_ be satisfied to pass your life in the enjoyment of the most intense pleasures, and would you desire nothing farther?" The reply is in the affirmative. "But recollect (adds Sokrates) that you are to have nothing else. The question assumes that you are to be without thought, intelligence, reason, sight, and memory: you are neither to have opinion of present enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future: you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present pleasure?" The question being put with these additions, Protarchus alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.[9]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21.

Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization. A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of Philêbus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.

If the Summum Bonum is to fulfil the conditions postulated--that is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to comprise all these varieties of pleasure. It ought, _e.g._, to comprise the pleasures of self-esteem, and conscious self-protecting power, affording security for the future; it ought to comprise exemption from the pains of self-reproach, self-contempt, and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by association. Now the alternative tendered by Sokrates neither includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of Philêbus.]

[Side-note: Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_.]

Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will accept a life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence purely and simply, without any taste either of pleasure or pain. To which Protarchus answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a life.[10] Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought to be sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but in both combined.

[Footnote 10: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 21-22.

It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one Grecian philosopher who described the Summum Bonum as consisting in absence of pain ([Greek: a)lupi/a]); even without the large measure of intelligence which Sokrates here promises, and without any positive pleasure. These men would of course have accepted the second alternative put by Sokrates, which Protarchus here refuses. They took their standard of comparison from the actualities of human life around them, which exhibited pain and suffering universal, frequent, and unavoidable. They conceived that if painlessness could be obtained, it was as much as could reasonably be demanded, and that pleasure might be dispensed with. In laying down any theory about the Summum Bonum, the preliminary question ought always to be settled--What are the conditions of human life which are to be assumed as peremptory and unalterable? What circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed, modified, or reversed? According as these fundamental postulates are given in a larger or narrower sense, the ideal Summum Bonum will be shaped differently. This preliminary requisite to the investigation was little considered by the ancient philosophers.]

[Side-note: It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure.]

[Side-note: Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals.]

Sokrates then undertakes to show, that of these two elements, intelligence is the most efficacious and the most contributory to the Summum Bonum--pleasure the least so. But as a preparation for this enquiry, he adverts to that which has just been agreed between them respecting both Pleasure and Intelligence--That each of them is Unum, and each of them at the same time Multa et Diversa. Here (argues Sokrates) we find opened before us the embarrassing question respecting the One and the Many. Enquirers often ask--"How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? How can the same thing be both One and Many?" They find it difficult to understand how you, Protarchus, being One person, are called by different names--tall, heavy, white, just, &c.: or how you are affirmed to consist of many different parts and members. To this difficulty, however (says Sokrates), the reply is easy. You, and other particular men, belong to the generated and the perishable. You partake of many different Ideas or Essences, and your partaking of one among them does not exclude you from partaking also of another distinct and even opposite. You partake of the Idea or Essence of Unity--also of Multitude--of tallness, heaviness, whiteness, humanity, greatness, littleness, &c. You are both great and little, heavy and light, &c. In regard to generated and perishable things, we may understand this. But in regard to the ungenerated, imperishable, absolute Essences, the difficulty is more serious. The Self-existent or Universal Man, Bull, Animal--the Self-existent Beautiful, Good--in regard to these Unities or Monads there is room for great controversy. First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particulars, infinite in number? Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (The Self-Beautiful--Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One?[11]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 B.]

[Side-note: Active disputes upon this question at the time.]

These (says Sokrates) are the really grave difficulties respecting the identity of the One and the Many: difficulties which have occasioned numerous controversies, and are likely to occasion many more. Youthful speculators, especially, are fond of trying their first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this paradox--How the One can be Many, and the Many One.[12]

[Footnote 12: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 15-16.

In reading the difficulties thus started by Sokrates, we perceive them to be the same as those which we have seen set forth in the dialogue called Parmenidês, where they are put into the mouth of the philosopher so-called; as objections requiring to be removed by Sokrates, before the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas, universal, eternal and unchangeable, can be admitted. We might expect that Plato having so emphatically and repeatedly announced his own sense of the difficulty, would proceed to suggest some mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the Parmenidês, he does not even promise any explanation; in the Philêbus, he seems to promise one, but all the explanation which he gives ignores or jumps over the difficulty, enjoining us to proceed as if no such difficulty existed.]

[Side-note: Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many.]

It is a primæval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed down to us as a tradition from that heroic race who were in nearer kindred with the Gods--That all things said to exist are composed of Unity and Multitude, and include in them a natural coalescence of Finiteness and Infinity.[13] This is the fundamental order of Nature, which we must assume and proceed upon in our investigations. We shall find everywhere the Form of Unity conjoined with the Form of Infinity. But we must not be satisfied simply to find these two forms. We must look farther for those intermediate Forms which lie between the two. Having found the Form of One, we must next search for the Form of Two, Three, Four, or some definite number: and we must not permit ourselves to acquiesce in the Form of Infinite, until no farther definite number can be detected. In other words, we must not be satisfied with knowing only one comprehensive Genus, and individuals comprised under it. We must distribute the Genus into two, three, or more Species: and each of those Species again into two or more sub-species, each characterised by some specific mark: until no more characteristic marks can be discovered upon which to found the establishment of a distinct species. When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals.[14] The whole scheme will thus comprise--The One, the Summum Genus, or Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or sub-Species or subordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of Individuals.

[Footnote 13: Plato, Philêbus, p. 16 C. [Greek: ô(s e)x e(no\s me\n kai\ e)k pollô=n o)/ntôn tô=n a)ei\ legome/nôn ei)=nai, pe/ras de\ kai\ a)peiri/an e(n au(toi=s xu/mphuton e)cho/ntôn.]]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Philêbus, p. 16 D. [Greek: dei=n ou)=n ê(ma=s _tou/tôn ou(/tô diakerosmême/nôn_, a)ei\ _mi/an i)de/an_ peri\ panto\s e(ka/stote _theme/nous zêtei=n; eu(rê/sein ga\r e)nou=san_; e)a\n ou)=n metala/bômen, meta\ mi/an du/o, ei)/ pôs ei)si/, skopei=n, ei) de\ mê/, trei=s ê)/ tina a)/llon a)rithmo/n, kai\ to\ e(\n e)kei/nôn e(/kaston pa/lin ô(sau/tôs, me/chri per a)\n to\ kat' a)rcha\s e(\n mê\ o(/ti e(\n kai\ polla\ kai\ a)/peira/ e)sti mo/non i)/dê| tis a)lla\ kai\ o(/posa; _tê\n de\ tou= a)pei/rou i)de/an_ pro\s to\ plê=thos mê\ prosphe/rein, pri\n a)/n tis to\n a)rithmo\n au)tou= pa/nta kati/dê| to\n metaxu\ tou= a)pei/rou te kai\ tou= e(no/s; to/te d' ê)/dê to\ e(\n e(/kaston tô=n pa/ntôn ei)s to\ a)/peiron methe/nta chai/rein e)a=|n.]

Plato here recognises a Form of the Infinite, [Greek: a)pei/rou i)de/an]; again, p. 18 A, [Greek: a)pei/rou phu/sin].]

[Side-note: Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions.]

The mistake commonly made (continues Sokrates) by clever men of the present day, is, that they look for nothing beyond the One and the Infinite Many: one comprehensive class, and countless individuals included in it. They take up carelessly any class which strikes them,[15] and are satisfied to have got an indefinite number of individuals under one name. But they never seek for intermediate sub-divisions between the two, so as to be able to discriminate one portion of the class from other by some definite mark, and thus to constitute a sub-class. They do not feel the want of such intermediate sub-divisions, nor the necessity of distinguishing one portion of this immense group of individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine dialectical argument and controversy without result.[16]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tô=n a)nthrô/pôn sophoi\ _e(\n me/n, o(/pôs a)\n tu/chôsi_, kai\ polla\ tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, _meta\ de\ to\ e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s_, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei], &c.

Stallbaum conjectures that the words [Greek: kai\ polla\] after [Greek: tu/chôsi] ought not to be in the text. He proposes to expunge them. The meaning of the passage certainly seems clearer without them.]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi(=s diakechô/ristai to/ te dialektikô=s pa/lin kai\ to\ e)ristikô=s ê(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llê/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]

[Side-note: Illustration from Speech and Music.]

This general doctrine is illustrated by two particular cases--Speech and Music. The voice (or Vocal Utterance) is One--the voice is also Infinite: to know only thus much is to know very little. Even when you know, in addition to this, the general distinction of sounds into acute and grave, you are still far short of the knowledge of music. You must learn farthermore to distinguish all the intermediate gradations, and specific varieties of sound, into which the infinity of separate sounds admits of being distributed: what and how many these gradations are? what are the numerical ratios upon which they depend--the rhythmical and harmonic systems? When you have learnt to know the One Genus, the infinite diversity of individual sounds, and the number of subordinate specific varieties by which these two extremes are connected with each other--then you know the science of music. So too, in speech: when you can distinguish the infinite diversity of articulate utterance into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, each in definite number and with known properties--you are master of grammatical science. You must neither descend at once from the One to the Infinite Multitude, nor ascend at once from the Infinite Multitude to the One: you must pass through the intermediate stages of subordinate Forms, in determinate number. All three together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion separately, without knowing the remainder: all of them being connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.[17]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Philêbus, p. 18 C-D. [Greek: kathorô=n de\ ô(s ou)dei\s ê(mô=n ou)d' a)\n e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to\ a)/neu pa/ntôn au)tô=n ma/thoi, tou=ton to\n desmo\n au)= logisa/menos ô(s o)/nta e(/na kai\ pa/nta tau=ta e(\n pôs poiou=nta, mi/an e)p' au)toi=s ô(s ou)=san grammatikê\n te/chnên e)pephthe/gxato proseipô/n.]]

[Side-note: Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing.]

Such is the explanation which Plato gives as to the identity of One and Many. Considered as a reply to his own previous doubts and difficulties, it is altogether insufficient. It leaves all those doubts unsolved. The first point of enquiry which he had started, was, Whether any Universal or Generic Monads really existed: the second point was, assuming that they did exist, how each of them, being essentially eternal and unchangeable, could so multiply itself or divide itself as to be at the same time in an infinite variety of particulars.[18] Both points are left untouched by the explanation. No proof is furnished that Universal Monads exist--still less that they multiply or divide their one and unchangeable essence among infinite particulars--least of all is it shown, how such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with the fundamental and eternal sameness of the Universal Monad. The explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philêbus, like the Parmenidês, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they attach are the cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to theorize as if they did not exist. In a remarkable passage of this very dialogue, he intimates pretty clearly that he considered the difficulty of these questions to be insuperable, and never likely to be set at rest. This identification of the One with the Many, in verbal propositions (he says) has begun with the beginning of dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of youth.[19]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 B-C.]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 D. [Greek: phame/n pou tau)to\n e(\n kai\ polla\ u(po\ lo/gôn gigno/mena peritre/chein pa/ntê| kath' e(/kaston tô=n legome/nôn a)ei\ kai\ pa/lai kai\ nu=n. kai\ tou=to ou)/te mê\ pau/sêtai/ pote ou)/te ê)/rxato nu=n, a)ll' e)/sti to\ toiou=ton, ô(s e)moi\ phai/netai, tô=n lo/gôn au)tô=n a)tha/nato/n ti kai\ a)gê/rôn pa/thos e)n ê(mi=n.]

The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this passage (setting forth the manner in which this apparent paradox worked upon the imagination of youthful students) is very interesting to read, and shows (in my opinion) that Stallbaum's interpretation of it in his note is not the right one. Plato is here talking (in my judgment) about the puzzle and paradox itself: Stallbaum represents Plato as talking about his pretended solution of it, which has not as yet been at all alluded to.

Plato seems to give his own explanation without full certainty or confidence: see p. 16 B. And when we turn to pp. 18-19, we shall see that he forgets the original difficulty which had been proposed (compare p. 15 B), introducing in place of it another totally distinct difficulty, as if _that_ had been in contemplation.]

[Side-note: It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification.]

But though the difficulties started by Plato remain unexplained, still his manner of stating them is in itself valuable and instructive. It proclaims--1. The necessity of a systematic classification, or subordinate scale of species and sub-species, between the highest Genus and the group of individuals beneath. 2. That each of these subordinate grades in the scale must be founded upon some characteristic mark. 3. That the number of sub-divisions is definite and assignable, there being a limit beyond which it cannot be carried. 4. That full knowledge is not attainable until we know all three--The highest Genus--The intermediate species and sub-species; both what they are, how many there are, and how each is characterised--The infinite group of individuals. These three elements must all be known in conjunction: we are not to pass either from the first to the third, or from the third to the first, except through the second.

[Side-note: At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process.]

The general necessity of systematic classification--of generalisation and specification, or subordination of species and sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive group of individuals--requires no advocate at the present day. But it was otherwise in the time of Plato. There existed then no body of knowledge, distributed and classified, to which he could appeal as an example. The illustrations to which he himself refers here, of language and music as systematic arrangements of vocal sounds, were both of them the product of empirical analogy and unconscious growth, involving little of predetermined principle or theory. All the classification then employed was merely that which is included in the structure of language: in the framing of general names, each designating a multitude of individuals. All that men knew of classification was, that which is involved in calling many individuals by the same common name. This is the defect pointed out by Plato, when he remarks that the clever men of his time took no heed except of the One and the Infinite (Genus and Individuals): neglecting all the intermediate distinctions. Upon the knowledge of these _media_ (he says) rests the difference between true dialectic debate, and mere polemic.[20] That is--when you have only an infinite multitude of individuals, called by the same generic name, it is not even certain that they have a single property in common: and even if they have, it is not safe to reason from one to another as to the possession of any other property beyond the one generic property--so that the debate ends in mere perplexity. All pleasures agree in being pleasures (Sokrates had before observed to Protarchus), and all cognitions agree in being cognitions. But you cannot from hence infer that there is any other property belonging in common to all.[21] That is a point which you cannot determine without farther observation of individuals, and discrimination of the great multitude into appropriate subdivisions. You will thus bring the whole under that triple point of view which Plato requires:--the highest Genus,--the definite number of species and sub-species,--the undefined number of individuals.

[Footnote 20: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tô=n a)nthrô/pôn sophoi\ e(\n me/n, o(/pôs a)\n tu/chôsi, kai\ polla\ tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, meta\ de\ to\ e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei, oi(=s diakechôristai to/ te dialektikô=s pa/lon kai\ to\ e)ristikô=s ê(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llê/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 13 B, 14 A.]

[Side-note: Classification--unconscious and conscious.]

Here we have set before us one important branch of logical method--the necessity of classification, not simply arising as an incidental and unconscious effect of the transitive employment of a common name, but undertaken consciously and intentionally as a deliberate process, and framed upon principles predetermined as essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the Philêbus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the Sophistês and Politikus) elaborate examples of systematic logical subdivision applied to given subjects.

[Side-note: Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas.]

We may here remark that Plato's views as to the necessity of systematic classification, or of connecting the Summum Genus with individuals by intermediate stages of gradually decreasing generality--are not necessarily connected with his peculiar theory of Ideas as Self-existent objects, eternal and unchangeable. The two are indeed blended together in his own mind and language: but the one is quite separable from the other; and his remarks on classification are more perspicuous without his theory of Ideas than with it. Classification does not depend upon his hypothesis--That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but absolute existences apart from the Reason (Entia Rationis apart from the Ratio)--and that these Ideas correspond to the words _Unum_, _Multa definité_, _Multa indefinité_, which are put together to compose the totality of what we see and feel in the Kosmos.

Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of establishing subordinate classes as intermediate between the Genus and Individuals) to the particular subject debated between Sokrates and Protarchus--the next step in the procedure would naturally be, to distinguish the subordinate classes comprised first under the Genus Pleasure--next, under the Genus Intelligence (or Cognition). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise[22] in tolerably explicit terms.

[Footnote 22: Plato, Philêbus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A.]

[Side-note: Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency.]

But such promise is not realised. The dialogue takes a different turn, and recurs to the general distinction already brought to view between the Finient (Determinans) and the Infinite (Indeterminatum). We have it laid down that all existences in the universe are divided into four Genera: 1. The Infinite or Indeterminate. 2. The Finient or the Determinans. 3. The product of these two, mixed or compounded together Determinatum. 4. The Cause or Agency whereby they become mixed together.--Of these four, the first is a Genus, or is both One and Many, having numerous varieties, all agreeing in the possession of a perpetual More and Less (without any limit or positive quantity): that which is perpetually increasing or diminishing, more or less hot, cold, moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second, or the Determinans, is also a Genus, or One and Many: including equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.[23]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 24-25.]

The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or combination of these two first--the Infinite and the Determinans. The varieties of this third or compound Genus comprise all that is good and desirable in nature--health, strength, beauty, virtue, fine weather, good temperature:[24] all agreeing, each in its respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as opposed to excess or deficiency.

[Footnote 24: Plato, Philêbus, p. 26 A-B.]

Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infinite, or banishment and supersession of the latter by the former.

[Side-note: Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth.]

We now approach the application of these generalities to the question in hand--the comparative estimate of pleasure and intelligence in reference to Good. It has been granted that neither of them separately is sufficient, and that both must be combined to compose the result Good: but the question remains, which of the two elements is the most important in the compound? To which of the four above-mentioned Genera (says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? It belongs to the Infinite or Indeterminate: so also does Pain. To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are brought about.[25]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.]

[Side-note: In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents.]

Hence we see (Sokrates argues) that pleasure is a less important element than Intelligence, in the compound called Good. For pleasure belongs to the Infinite: but pain belongs to the Infinite also: the Infinite therefore, being common to both, cannot be the circumstance which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good: they must derive that affinity from some one of the other elements.[26] It is Intelligence which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good: for Intelligence belongs to the more efficacious Genus called Cause. In the combination of Intelligence with Pleasure, indispensable to constitute Good, Intelligence is the primary element, Pleasure only the secondary element. Intelligence or Reason is the ruling cause which pervades and directs both the smaller body called Man, and the greater body called the Kosmos. The body of man consists of a combination of the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire: deriving its supply of all these elements from the vast stock of them which constitutes the Kosmos. So too the mind of man, with its limited reason and intelligence, is derived from the vast stock of mind, reason, and intelligence, diffused throughout the Kosmos, and governing its great elemental body. The Kosmos is animated and intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can derive his supply of mind and intelligence.[27]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28.

The argument of Plato is here very obscure and difficult to follow. Stallbaum in his note even intimates that Plato uses the word [Greek: a)/peiron] in a sense different from that in which he had used it before: which I think doubtful.]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Philêbus, p. 29 C. 30 A: [Greek: To\ par' ê(mi=n sô=ma a)=r' ou) psuchê\n phê/somen e)/chein? . . . Po/then labo/n, ei)/per mê\ to/ ge tou= panto\s sô=ma e)/mpsuchon o)\n e)tu/gchane, tau)ta/ ge e)/chon tou/tô| kai\ e)/ti pa/ntê kalli/ona?]]

[Side-note: Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated.]

Sokrates thus arrives at the conclusion, that in the combination constituting Good, Reason or Intelligence is the regulating principle: and that Pleasure is the Infinite or Indeterminate which requires regulation from without, having no fixed measure or regulating power in itself.[28] He now proceeds to investigate pleasure and intelligence as phenomena: to enquire in what each of them resides, and through what affection they are generated.[29]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 A.]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 B. [Greek: dei= dê\ to\ meta\ tou=to, e)n ô(=| te/ e)stin e(ka/teron au)toi=n kai\ dia\ ti/ pa/thos gi/gnesthon, o(po/tan gi/gnêsthon, i)dei=n ê(ma=s.]]

[Side-note: Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure from the restoration.]

We cannot investigate pleasure (Sokrates continues) apart from pain: both must be studied together. Both pleasure and pain reside in the third out of the four above-mentioned Genera:[30] that is, in the compound Genus formed out of that union (of the Infinite with the Determinans or Finient) which includes all animated bodies. Health and Harmony reside in these animated bodies: and pleasure as well as pain proceed from modifications of such fundamental harmony. When the fundamental harmony is disturbed or dissolved, pain is the consequence: when the disturbance is rectified and the harmony restored, pleasure ensues.[31] Thus hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold, are painful, because they break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating, drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme cold, are pleasurable, because they restore the disturbed harmony.

[Footnote 30: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 C. [Greek: _e)n tô=| koinô=| moi ge/nei_ a(/ma phai/nesthon lu/pê te kai\ ê(donê\ _gi/gnesthai_ kata\ phu/sin . . . koino\n toi/nun u(pakou/ômen o(\ dê\ tô=n tetta/rôn tri/ton e)le/gomen.] Compare p. 32 A-B: [Greek: to\ e)k tou= a)pei/rou kai\ pe/ratos kata\ phu/sin e)/mpsuchon gegono\s ei)=dos.]

Plato had before said that [Greek: ê(donê\] belonged to the Infinite (compare p. 41 D), or to the _first_ of the four above-mentioned genera, not to the third.]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 D.]

[Side-note: Pleasure presupposes Pain.]

This is the primary conception, or original class, of pleasures and pains, embracing body and mind in one and the same fact. Pleasure cannot be had without antecedent pain: it is in fact a mere reaction against pain, or a restoration from pain.

[Side-note: Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain.]

But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and derivative from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The expectation of future pleasures is itself pleasurable,[32] the expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without pleasure: so that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good, welcome and desirable,--or whether pleasure and pain be not, like heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to circumstances--_i.e._ not good in their own nature, but sometimes good and sometimes not.[33]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 C. [Greek: ê(donê=s kai\ lu/pês e(/teron ei)=dos, to\ chôri\s tou= sô/matos au)tê=s tê=s psuchê=s dia\ prosdoki/as gigno/menon.]]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 D.]

[Side-note: A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best.]

In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if there be no pain, there can be no pleasure: and that a state of life is therefore conceivable which shall be without both--without pain and without pleasure. The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this third mode of life. It would be the most divine and the most akin to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.[34] At any rate, if not the best life of all, it will be the second-best.

[Footnote 34: Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)ko/s ge ou)/te chai/rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/on? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n ou)k ei)ko/s; a)/schêmon gou=n au)tôn e(ka/teron gigno/meno/n e)stin.]]

[Side-note: Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein.]

Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the body, arise through memory and by means of reminiscence. When the body receives a shock which does not go through to the mind, we call the fact insensibility. In sensation, the body and mind are both affected:[35] such sensation is treasured up in the memory, and the mental part of it is recalled (without the bodily part) by reminiscence.[36] Memory and reminiscence are the foundations of desire or appetite. When the body suffers the pain of hunger or thirst, the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction, desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or drink. Here the body and the mind are not moved in the same way, but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone, and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness: that which the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because it will have nothing, neither sensation nor memory, through which to touch replenishment: it can only do so after replenishment has been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon memory.[37] Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory of past replenishment, or expectation of future replenishment, which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant, it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and pleasure: and it may perhaps be a state of pain only, under two distinct forms.[38] Life composed of a succession of these states can afford no true or pure pleasure.

[Footnote 35: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 33 E--34 A. [Greek: a)naisthêsi/an e)pono/mason . . . to\ de\ e)n e(ni\ pa/thei tê\n psuchê\n kai\ to\ sô=ma koinê=| gigno/menon koinê=| kai\ kinei=sthai, tau/tên d' au)= tê\n ki/nêsin o)noma/zôn _ai)/sthêsin_ ou)k a)po\ tro/pou phthe/ggoi' a)/n.]]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Philêbus, p. 34 A-B. [Greek: sôtêri/an ai)sthê/seôs tê\n mnê/mên.]

[Greek: Mnê/mê] and [Greek: a)na/mnêsis] are pronounced to be different.]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Philêbus, p. 35 C. [Greek: tê\n psuchê\n a)/ra tê=s plêrô/seôs e)pha/ptesthai loipo/n, tê=| mnê/mê| dê=lon o(/ti; tô=| ga\r a)\n e)/t' a)/llô| e)pha/psaito?]

35 D. [Greek: tê\n a)/r' e)pa/gousan e)pi\ ta\ e)pithumou/mena a)podei/xas mnê/mên, o( lo/gos psuchê=s xu/mpasan tê/n te o(rmê\n kai\ e)pithumi/an kai\ tê\n a)rchê\n tou= zô/ou panto\s a)pe/phê|nen.]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 A-B.

This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the uneasiness to form the complex mental state called _desire_.

But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we desire the continuance of it: and if the expectation of its continuance be assured, this is an additional pleasure: two sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no such conjunction of opposite states, pain and pleasure, as Plato pointed out in the former case.]

[Side-note: Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so.]

What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How can pleasures or pains be either true or false? Opinions and expectations may be true or false; but not pleasures, nor pains.

That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely pleasures may be so likewise. When a man holds an opinion, there is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or falsely: so also when a man takes delight, there must always be some Object in which he takes delight, truly or falsely. Pleasure and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various attributes; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good. Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion, sometimes along with a true one.

Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call _the opinion_ true or false--not _the pleasure_.[39]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Philêbus, p. 37.]

[Side-note: Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him.]

You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion, and that which accompanies a false opinion. Wherein does the difference consist? Our opinions, and our comparisons of opinion, arise from sensation and memory:[40] which write words and impress images upon our mind (as upon a book or canvas), sometimes truly, sometimes falsely,[41] not only respecting the past and present, but also respecting the future. To these opinions respecting the future are attached the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,--anticipations of bodily pleasures or pains to come--hopes and fears. As our opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes false, so also are our hopes and fears: but throughout our lives we are always full of hopes and fears.[42] Now the just and good man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately: the bad man on the contrary will have them presented to him falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former, and false to the latter:[43] his false pleasures will be a ludicrous parody on the true ones.[44] Good or bad opinions are identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures: there is no other ground for their being good or bad.

[Footnote 40: Plato, Philêbus, p. 38 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)k mnê/mês te kai\ ai)sthê/seôs do/xa ê(mi=n kai\ to\ diadoxa/zein e)gcheirei=n gi/gneth' e(ka/stote?]]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 38 E, 39. [Greek: dokei= moi to/te ê(mô=n ê( psuchê\ bibli/ô| tini\ proseoike/nai . . . ê( mnê/mê tai=s ai)sthê/sesi xumpi/ptousa ei)s tau)to/n, ka)kei=na a)\ peri\ tau=ta/ e)sti ta\ pathê/mata, phai/nontai/ moi schedo\n oi(=on gra/phein ê(mô=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s to/te lo/gous. . .

A)pode/chou dê\ kai\ e(/teron dêmiourgo\n ê(mô=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s e)n tô=| to/te chro/nô| gigno/menon . . . Zôgra/phon, o(\s meta\ to\n grammatistê\n tô=n legome/nôn ei)ko/nas e)n tê=| psuchê=| tou/tôn gra/phei.]

It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter _after_ the scribe, and not _before_ him. The images or phantasm of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it if we are to adopt both these metaphors).

The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins with the poets (Æschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy with Plato.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Philêbus, p. 39 E. [Greek: ê(mei=s d' au)= dia\ panto\s tou= bi/ou a)ei\ ge/momen e)lpi/dôn.] 40 E. [Greek: ou)kou=n o( au)to\s lo/gos a)\n ei)/ê peri\ pho/bôn** te kai\ thumô=n], &c. Also 40 D.]

[Footnote 43: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 A-B.

Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.]

[Footnote 44: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 C. [Greek: memimême/nai me/ntoi ta\s a)lêthei=s e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera.]]

[Side-note: Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question.]

I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to opinions, but not in regard to pleasures. I think there are other grounds, and stronger grounds, for pronouncing pleasures to be bad--independently of their being false. We will reserve that question (says Sokrates) for the present--whether there are or are not pleasures bad on other grounds.[45] I am now endeavouring to show that there are some pleasures which are _false_: and I proceed to another way of viewing the subject.

[Footnote 45: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 40 E-41 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)d' ê(dona/s g', oi)=mai, katanoou=men ô(s a)/llon tina\ tro/pon ei)si\ ponêrai\ plê\n tô=| pseudei=s ei)=nai.] _Protarch._ [Greek: Pa/nu me\n ou)=n tou)nanti/on ei)/rêkas], &c.]

[Side-note: No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures.]

We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire, was a mixed state comprehending body and mind: the state of body affecting the mind with a pain of emptiness,--the state of mind apart from body being either a pleasure of expected replenishment, or a pain arising from our regarding replenishment as distant or unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is sometimes mixed pleasure and pain; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of performing the process. We not only cannot perform it well, but we are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation: pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really are: in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.[46]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42.]

[Side-note: Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure.]

We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is called pleasure is false and unreal[47]--either no pleasure at all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed with pain and relief from pain. According to our previous definition of pain and pleasure--that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our nature, and pleasure from the correction of such derangement, or from the re-establishment of harmony--there may be and are states which are neither painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains the same: it is always undergoing change: but the gentle and gradual changes (such as growth, &c.) escape our consciousness, producing neither pain nor pleasure: none but the marked, sudden changes force themselves upon our consciousness, thus producing pain and pleasure.[48] A life of gentle changes would be a life without pain as well as without pleasure. There are thus three states of life[49]--painful--pleasurable--neither painful nor pleasurable. But _no pain_ (absence of pain) is not identical with pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.[50]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Philêbus, p. 42 C. [Greek: Tou/tôn toi/nun e(xê=s o)pso/metha, e)a\n tê=|de a)pantô=men ê(dona\s kai\ lu/pas pseudei=s e(/ti ma=llon ê)\ tau/tas phainome/nas te kai\ ou)/sas e)n toi=s zô/ois.]

This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and difficult to follow, down to p. 51 A: [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s ê(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)sas d' ou)damô=s; kai\ mega/las e(te/ras tina\s a)/ma kai\ polla\s phantasthei/sas, ei)=nai d' au)ta\s sumpephurme/nas o(mou= lu/pais te kai\ a)napau/sesin o)dunô=n tô=n megi/stôn peri/ te sô/matos kai\ psuchê=s a)pori/as.]]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 42-43.]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: trittou\s bi/ous, e(/na me\n ê(du/n, to\n d' au)= lupêro/n, to\n d' e(/na mêde/tera.]]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: ou)k a)\n ei)/ê to\ mê\ lupei=sthai/ pote tau)to\n tô=| chai/rein.]]

[Side-note: Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle--no reality except pain, and the relief from pain.]

Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:[51] Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the very name of pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state _per se_, and maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in prospect to be a mere juggle--a promise never realised. Often the expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does, there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail, its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil--removal or mitigation of pain as the good--of human life.

[Footnote 51: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan ê(dona\s ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupô=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lêbon ê(dona\s e)ponoma/zousin.]]

[Side-note: Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.]

These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but not universally.[52] It is true of a large portion of what are called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures), correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there are some pleasures of which this cannot be said--which are really true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates), I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.

[Footnote 52: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C. [Greek: ô(/sper ma/ntesi proschrê=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chnê|, a)lla/ tini duscherei/a phu/seôs ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]

[Side-note: Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with distempered body and mind.]

When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine especially those cases in which it appears most fully and prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely hard at all.[53] So in enquiring into pleasure generally, we must investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense than if he had no such disorder.[54] The most vehement bodily pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit of happiness.[55] In like manner the violent and insane man, under the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The like is true of all the vehement passions--love, hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[56]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. [Greek: ô(s ei) boulê/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous tê\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on tê\n tou= sklêrou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklêro/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tôs a)\n ma=llon sunnoê/saimen ê)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklêro/têti?] Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ prô=ta mege/thei.]]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces, at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and comedy--especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/sô| skoteino/tero/n e)sti], p. 48 B). But his explanation is not clear, and the sense which he gives to the word [Greek: phtho/nos] is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, [Greek: doxosophi/a, doxokali/a] &c. (49 E). But how the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can be said to feel [Greek: phtho/nos], I do not clearly see. At least [Greek: phtho/nos] is here used in the very unusual sense (to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor.