ill. He says therefore that the virtues are extremes as to honour, but

means as to substance.[119] For there is nothing more honourable than virtue; but that which goes beyond or falls short of these virtues ends in vice. For instance, he says that these are the four virtues, to wit, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude, and that there follow on each of these two vices of excess and deficiency respectively. Thus on Prudence follow thoughtlessness by deficiency and cunning by excess; on Temperance, intemperance by deficiency and sluggishness by excess; on Justice, over-modesty by deficiency and greediness by excess; and on Fortitude, [Sidenote: p. 37.] cowardice by deficiency and foolhardiness by excess.[120] And these virtues when inborn in a man operate for his perfection and give him happiness. But he says that happiness is likeness to God as far as possible. And that any one is like God when he becomes holy and just with intention. For this he supposes to be the aim of the highest wisdom and virtue.[121] But he says that the virtues follow one another in turn and are of one kind, and never oppose one another; but that the vices are many-shaped and sometimes follow and sometimes oppose one another.[122]

He says, again, that there is destiny, not indeed that all things are according to destiny, but that we have some choice, as he says in these words: “The blame is on the chooser: God is blameless,” and again, “This is a law of Adrasteia.” And if he thus affirms the part of destiny, he knew also that something was in our choice.[123] But he says that transgressions are involuntary. For to the most beautiful thing in us, which is the soul, none would admit something evil, that is, injustice; but that by ignorance and mistaking the good, thinking to do something fine, they [Sidenote: p. 38.] arrive at the evil.[124] And his explanation on this is most clear in the _Republic_, where he says: “And again do you dare to say that vice is disgraceful and hateful to God? How then does any one choose such an evil? He does it, you would say, who is overcome by the pleasures (of sense). Therefore this also is an involuntary action, if to overcome be a voluntary one. So that from all reasoning, reason proves injustice to be involuntary.” But some one objects to him about this: “Why then are men punished if they transgress involuntarily?” He answers: “So that they may be the more speedily freed from vice by undergoing correction.”[125] For that to undergo correction is not bad but good, if thereby comes purification from vices, and that the rest of mankind hearing of it will not transgress, but will be on their guard against such error.[126] He says, however, that the nature of evil comes not by God nor has it any special nature of its own; but it comes into being by contrariety and by following upon the good, either as excess or deficiency as we have before said about the virtues.[127] Now Plato, as [Sidenote: p. 39.] we have said above, bringing together the three divisions of general philosophy, thus philosophized.

17. _About Aristotle._

Aristotle, who was a hearer of this last, turned philosophy into a science and reasoned more strictly, affirming that the elements of all things are substance and accident.[128] He said that there is one substance underlying all things, but nine accidents, which are Quantity, Quality, Relation, the Where, the When, Possession, Position, Action and Passion. And that therefore Substance was such as God, man and every one of the things which can fall under the like definition: but that as regards the accidents, Quality is seen in expressions like white or black; Quantity in “2 cubits or 3 cubits long or broad”; Relation in “father” or “son”; the Where in such as “Athens” or “Megara”; the When in such as “in the Xth Olympiad”; for Possession in such as “to have acquired wealth”; Action in such as “to write and generally to do anything”; and Passion in such as “to be struck.” He also assumes that some things have means and that others have not, as we have said also about Plato. [Sidenote: p. 40.] And he is in accord with Plato about most things save in the opinion about the soul. For Plato thinks it immortal; but Aristotle that it remains behind after this life and that it is lost in the fifth Body which is assumed to exist along with the other four, to wit, fire, earth, water and air, but is more subtle than they and like a spirit.[129] Again whereas Plato said that the only good things were those which concerned the soul and that these sufficed for happiness, Aristotle brings in a triad of benefits and says that the sage is not perfect unless there are at his command the good things of the body and those external to it. Which things are Beauty, Strength, Keenness of Sense and Completeness; while the externals are Wealth, High Birth, Glory, Power, Peace, and Friendship; but that the inner things about the soul are, as Plato thought: Prudence, Temperance, Justice and Fortitude.[130] Also Aristotle says that evil things exist, and come by contrariety to the good, and are below the place about the moon, but not above it.

Again, he says that the soul of the whole ordered world is eternal, but that the soul of man vanishes as we have said [Sidenote: p. 41.] above. Now, he philosophized while delivering discourses in the Lyceum; but Zeno in the Painted Porch. And Zeno’s followers got their name from the place, _i. e._ they were called Stoics from the Stoa; but those of Aristotle from their mode of study. For their enquiries were conducted while walking about in the Lyceum, wherefore they were called Peripatetics. This then Aristotle.[131]

18. _About the Stoics._

The Stoics themselves also added to philosophy by the increased use of syllogisms,[132] and included it nearly all in definitions, Chrysippus and Zeno being here agreed in opinion. Who also supposed that God was the beginning of all things, and was the purest body, and that His providence extends through all things.[133] They say positively, however, that existence is everywhere according to destiny using some such simile as this: viz. that, as a dog tied to a cart, if he wishes to follow it, is both drawn along by it and follows of his own accord, doing at the same time [Sidenote: p. 42.] what he wills and what he must by a compulsion like that of destiny.[134] But if he does not wish to follow he is wholly compelled. And they say that it is the same indeed with men. For even if they do not wish to follow, they will be wholly compelled to come to what has been foredoomed. And they say that the soul remains after death, and that it is a body[135] and is born from the cooling of the air of the ambient, whence it is called Psyche.[136] But they admit that there is a change of bodies for Souls which have been marked out for it.[137] And they expect that there will be a conflagration and purification of this cosmos, some saying that it will be total but others partial, and that it will be purified part by part. And they call this approximate destruction and the birth of another cosmos therefrom, _catharsis_.[138] And they suppose that all things are bodies, and that one body passes through another; but that there is a resurrection[139] and that all things are filled full and that there is no void. Thus also the Stoics.

19. _About Epicurus._

[Sidenote: p. 43.] But Epicurus held an opinion almost the opposite of all others. He supposed that the beginnings of the universals were atoms and a void; that the void was as it were the place of the things that will be; but that the atoms were matter, from which all things are. And that from the concourse of the atoms both God and all the elements came into being and that in them were all animals and other things, so that nothing is produced or constructed unless it be from the atoms. And he said that the atoms were the most subtle of things, and that in them there could be no point, nor mark nor any division whatever; wherefore he called them atoms.[140] And although he admits God to be eternal and imperishable, he says that he cares for no one and that in short there is no providence nor destiny, but all things come into being automatically. For God is seated in the metacosmic spaces, as he calls them. For he held that there was a certain dwelling-place of God outside the cosmos called the metacosmia, and that He [Sidenote: p. 44] took His pleasure and rested in supreme delight; and that He neither had anything to do Himself nor provided for others. In consequence of which Epicurus made a theory about wise men, saying that the end of all wisdom is pleasure. But different people take the name of pleasure differently. For some understood by it the desires, but others the pleasure that comes by virtue. But he held that the souls of men were destroyed with their bodies as they are born with them. For that these souls are blood, which having come forth or being changed, the whole man is destroyed. Whence it follows that there are no judgments nor courts of justice in the House of Hades, so that whatever any one may do in this life and escapes notice, he is in no way called to account for it.[141] Thus then Epicurus.

20. _About (the) Academics._

But another sect of philosophers was called Academic, [Sidenote: p. 45.] from their holding their discussions in the Academy, whose founder was Pyrrho, after whom they were called Pyrrhonian philosophers. He first introduced the dogma of the incomprehensibility of all things, so that he might argue on either side of the question, but assert nothing dogmatically. For he said that there is nothing grasped by the mind or perceived by the senses which is true, but that it only appears to men to be so. And that all substance is flowing and changing and never remains in the same state. Now some of the Academics say that we ought not to make dogmatic assertions about the principle of anything, but simply argue about it and let it be; while others favoured more the “no preference”[142] adage, saying that fire was not fire rather than anything else. For they did not assert what it is, but only what sort of a thing it is.[143]

21. _About (the) Brachmans among the Indians._

The Indians have also a sect of philosophizers in the Brachmans[144] who propose to themselves an independent life and abstain from all things which have had life and from [Sidenote: p. 46.] meats prepared by fire. They are content with fruits[145] but do not gather even these, but live on those fallen on the earth and drink the water of the river Tagabena.[146] But they spend their lives naked, saying that the body has been made by God as a garment to the soul. They say that God is light; not such light as one sees, nor like the sun and fire, but that it is to them the Divine Word, not that which is articulated, but that which comes from knowledge, whereby the hidden mysteries of nature are seen by the wise. But this light which they say is (the) Word, the God, they declare that they themselves as Brachmans alone know, because they alone put away vain thinking which is the last tunic of the soul. They scorn death; but are ever naming God in their own tongue, as we have said above, and send up hymns to Him. But neither are there women among them, nor do they beget children.[147] Those, however, who have desired a life like theirs, after they [Sidenote: p. 47.] have crossed over to the opposite bank of the river,[148] remain there always and never return; but they also are called Brachmans. Yet they do not pass their life in the same way; for there are women in the country, from whom those dwelling there are begotten and beget. But they say that this Word, which they style God, is corporeal, girt with the body outside Himself, as if one should wear a garment of sheepskins; but that the body which is worn, when taken off, appears visible to the eye.[149] But the Brachmans declare that there is war in the body worn by them [and they consider their body full of warring elements] against which body as if arrayed against foes, they fight as we have before made plain. And they say that all men are captives to their own congenital enemies, to wit, the belly and genitals, greediness, wrath, joy, grief, desire and the like. But that he alone goes to God who has triumphed[150] over these. Wherefore the Brachmans make Dandamis, to whom Alexander of Macedon paid a visit, divine[151] as one who had won the war in the body. But they accuse Calanus of having impiously fallen away from their philosophy. But the Brachmans putting away the body, like [Sidenote: p. 48.] fish who have leaped from the water into pure air, behold the Sun.[152]

22. _About the Druids among the Celts._

The Druids among the Celts enquired with the greatest minuteness into the Pythagorean philosophy, Zamolxis, Pythagoras’ slave, a Thracian by race, being for them the author of this discipline. He after Pythagoras’ death travelled into their country and became as far as they were concerned the founder of this philosophy.[153] The Celts glorify the Druids as prophets and as knowing the future because they foretell to them some things by the ciphers and numbers of the Pythagoric art. On the principles of which same art we shall not be silent, since some men have ventured to introduce heresies constructed from them. Druids, however, also make use of magic arts.

[Sidenote: p. 49.] 23. _About Hesiod._[154]

But Hesiod the poet says that he, too, heard thus from the Muses about Nature. The Muses, however, are the daughters of Zeus. For Zeus having from excess of desire companied with Mnemosyne for nine days and nights consecutively, she conceived these nine in her single womb, receiving one every night. Now Hesiod invokes the nine Muses from Pieria, that is from Olympus, and prays them to teach him:[155]

“How first the gods and earth became; The rivers and th’ immeasureable sea High-raging in its foam: the glittering stars; The wide-impending heaven; ... Say how their treasures,[156] how their honours each Allotted shared: how first they held abode On many-caved Olympus:--this declare [Sidenote: p. 50.] Ye Muses! dwellers of the heavenly mount From the beginning; say who first arose?

“First Chaos was, next ample-bosomed Earth, The seat eternal and immoveable Of deathless gods, who still the Olympian height Snow-topt inhabit. Third in hollow depth Of the vast ground, expanded wide above The gloomy Tartarus, Love then arose Most beauteous of immortals: he at once Of every god and every mortal man Unnerves the limbs; dissolves the wiser breast By reason steel’d, and quells the very soul.

“From Chaos, Erebus and sable Night... From Night arose the Sunshine and the Day[157] Whom she with dark embrace of Erebus Commingling bore.

“Her first-born Earth produced Of like immensity,[158] the starry Heaven: That he might sheltering compass her around On every side, and be for evermore To the blest gods a mansion unremoved.

“Next the high hills arose, the pleasant haunts Of goddess-nymphs, who dwell among the glens Of mountains. With no aid of tender love [Sidenote: p. 51.] Gave she to birth the sterile Sea, high-swol’n In raging foam; and Heaven-embraced, anon She teemed with Ocean, rolling in deep whirls His vast abyss of waters

“Crœus then, Cœus, Hyperion and Iäpetus, Themis and Thea rose; Mnemosyne And Rhea; Phœbe diademed with gold, And love-inspiring Tethys; and of these, Youngest in birth, the wily Kronos came, The sternest of her sons; and he abhorred The sire that gave him life

“Then brought she forth The Cyclops haughty of spirit.”

And he enumerates all the other Giants descended from Kronos. But last he tells how Zeus was born from Rhea.

All these men, then, declared, as we have set forth, their opinions about the nature and birth of the universe. But they all, departing from the Divine for lower things, busied themselves about the substance of the things that are. So that when struck with the grandeurs of creation and thinking that these were the Divine, each of them preferred before the rest a different part of what was created. But they discovered not the God and fashioner of them.

The opinions therefore of those among the Greeks who [Sidenote: p. 52.] have undertaken to philosophize, I think I have sufficiently set forth. Starting from which opinions the heretics have made the attempts we shall shortly narrate. It seems fitting, however, that we, first making public the mystic rites,[159] should also declare whatever things certain men have superfluously fancied about stars or magnitudes; for truly those who have taken their starting-points from these notions are deemed by the many to speak prodigies. Thereafter, we shall make plain consecutively the vain opinions[160] invented by them.[161]

END OF BOOK I

FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 1: As has been said in the Introduction (p. 1 _supra_) four early codices of the First Book exist, the texts being known from the libraries where they are to be found as the Medicean, the Turin, the Ottobonian and the Barberine respectively. That published by Miller was a copy of the Medicean codex already put into print by Fabricius, but was carefully worked over by Roeper, Scott and others who like Gronovius, Wolf and Delarue, collated it with the other three codices. The different readings are, I think, all noted by Cruice in his edition of 1860, but are not of great importance, and I have only noticed them here when they make any serious change in the meaning of the passage. Hermann Diels has again revised the text in his _Doxographi Græci_, Berlin, 1879, with a result that Salmon (_D.C.B._ s. v. “Hippolytus Romanus”) declares to be “thoroughly satisfactory,” and the reading of this part of our text may now, perhaps, be regarded as settled. Only the opening and concluding paragraphs are of much value for our present purpose, the account of philosophic opinions which lies between being, as has been already said, a compilation of compilations, and not distinguished by any special insight into the ideas of the authors summarized, with the works of most of whom Hippolytus had probably but slight acquaintance. An exception should perhaps be made in the case of Aristotle, as it is probable that Hippolytus, like other students of his time, was trained in Aristotle’s dialectic and analytic system for the purpose of disputation. But this will be better discussed in connection with Book VII.]

[Footnote 2: τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ κατὰ πασῶν αἰρέσεων ἐλέγχου. This formula is repeated at the head of Books V-X with the alteration of the number only.]

[Footnote 3: The word missing after πρώτῃ was probably μερίδι, the only likely word which would agree with the feminine adjective. It would be appropriate enough if the theory of the division of the work into spoken lectures be correct. The French and German editors alike translate _in libro primo_.]

[Footnote 4: There seems no reason for numbering Pyrrho of Elis among the members of the Academy, Old or New. Diogenes Laertius, from whose account of his doctrines Hippolytus seems to have derived the dogma of incomprehensibility which he here attributes to Pyrrho, makes him the founder of the Sceptics. He was a contemporary of Alexander the Great, and probably died before Arcesilaus founded the New Academy in 280 B.C.]

[Footnote 5: Mr. Macmahon here reads “Brahmins.” Their habits appear more like those of Yogis or Sanyasis.]

[Footnote 6: ἁδρομερῶς: in contradistinction to κατὰ λεπτὸν just above.]

[Footnote 7: ἀλογίστου γνώμης καὶ ἀθεμίτου ἐπιχειρήσεως. The Turin MS. transposes the adjectives.]

[Footnote 8: πρὸς το͂ν ὄντως Θεὸν. The phrase is used frequently hereafter, particularly in Book X.]

[Footnote 9: Cf. the “bond of iniquity” in St. Peter’s speech to Simon Magus, Acts viii. 23.]

[Footnote 10: τὸ τέλειον τῶν κακῶν. τέλειον being a mystic word for final or complete initiation.]

[Footnote 11: ἃ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα κ. τ. λ. Schneidewin and Cruice both read εἰ καὶ, Roeper εἰ simply, others εἰ ὅτι. The first seems the best reading; but none of the suggestions is quite satisfactory. The promise to say what it was that even the dumb animals would not have done is unfulfilled. It cannot have involved any theological question, but probably refers to the obscene sacrament of the _Pistis Sophia_, the Bruce Papyrus and Huysmans’ _Là-Bas_. Yet Hippolytus does not again refer to it, and of all the heretics in our text, the Simonians are the only ones accused of celebrating it, even by Epiphanius.]

[Footnote 12: Ἀρχιερατεία. A neologism. This is the passage relied upon to show that our author was a bishop].

[Footnote 13: ἀλλότρια = foreign. Cruice has _aliena_. But it is here evidently contrasted with the “things of the truth” in the next sentence.]

[Footnote 14: κηρύσσομεν.]

[Footnote 15: τὰ δοξαζόμενα, lit., “matters of opinion.”]

[Footnote 16: ἐκ δογμάτων φιλοσοφουμένων. The context shows that here, and probably elsewhere in the book, the phrase is used contemptuously.]

[Footnote 17: τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν. As in Polybius, the word can be translated in this sense throughout. Yet as meaning “those who fall in with this” it is as applicable to spoken as to written words.]

[Footnote 18: τὸ θεῖον. Both here and in Book X our author shows a preference for this phrase instead of the more usual ὁ Θεός.]

[Footnote 19: συμβάλλω.]

[Footnote 20: δόγμα.]

[Footnote 21: τὰ λαληθέντα ἀποβαίνοντα. Note the piling up of similes natural in a _spoken_ peroration.]

[Footnote 22: γυμνοὺς καὶ ἀσχήμονας, _nudos et turpes_, Cr. Stripped of originality seems to be the threat intended.]

[Footnote 23: φιλοσοφίαν φυσικήν. What we should now call Physics.]

[Footnote 24: τὸ πᾶν is the phrase here and elsewhere used for the universe or “whole” of Nature, and includes Chaos or unformed Matter. The κόσμος or ordered world is only part of the universe. Diog. Laert., I, _vit. Thales_, c. 6, says merely that Thales thought water to be the ἀρχή or beginning of all things. As this is confirmed by all other Greek writers who have quoted him, we may take the further statement here attributed to him as the mistake of Hippolytus or of the compiler he is copying.]

[Footnote 25: ἀέρων in text. Roeper suggests ἄστρων, “stars.”]

[Footnote 26: So Clement of Alexandria, _Stromateis_, V, c. 14, and Diog. Laert., I. _vit. cit._, c. 9.]

[Footnote 27: Diog. Laert., I, _vit. cit._, c. 8, makes his derider an old woman. Θρᾶττα is not a proper name, but means a Thracian woman, as Hippolytus should have known.]

[Footnote 28: Roeper adds καὶ ἀριθμετικήν, apparently in view of the speculations about the monad.]

[Footnote 29: Aristotle in his _Metaphysica_, Bk. I, c. 5, attributes the first use of this dogma to Xenophanes.]

[Footnote 30: By these are meant the planets, including therein the Sun and Moon. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, _Adversus Astrologos_, p. 343 (Cod.) _passim_.]

[Footnote 31: τὰ ὅλα = entities which must needs differ from one another in kind. The phrase is thus used by Plato, Aristotle and all the neo-Platonic writers.]

[Footnote 32: ἐφήψατο, _attigit_, Cr. Frequent in Pindar.]

[Footnote 33: So Timon in the _Silli_, as quoted by Diog. Laert., VIII, _vit. Pyth._, c. 20.]

[Footnote 34: φυσιογονικὴν. The Barberine MS. has φυσιογνωμονικὴν, evidently inserted by some scribe who connected it with the absurd system of metoposcopy described in Book IV.]

[Footnote 35: κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος, _multitudine_, Cr.]

[Footnote 36: For definitions and examples of this term see Aristot., _Metaphys._, IV. c. 28.]

[Footnote 37: I cannot trace Hippolytus’ authority for attributing these neo-Pythagorean puerilities to Pythagoras himself. Diog. Laert., Aristotle and the rest represent him as saying only that the monad was the beginning of everything, and that from this and the undefined dyad numbers proceed. The general reader may be recommended to Mr. Alfred Williams Benn’s statement in _The Philosophy of Greece_ (Lond., 1898), pp. 78 ff. that “the Greeks did not think of numbers as pure abstractions, but in the most literal sense as figures, that is to say, limited portions of space.”]

[Footnote 38: Macmahon thinks “number” and “monad” should here be transposed, as Pythagoras considered according to him the monad as “the highest generalization of number and a conception in abstraction.” Yet the monad was not the highest abstraction of current (Greek) philosophy. See Edwin Hatch, _Influence of Greek Ideas upon the Christian Church_ (Hibbert Lectures), Lond., 1890, p. 255.]

[Footnote 39: δύναμις is here used like our own mathematical expression “power.” Why Hippolytus should associate it especially with the power of 2 does not appear. By Greek mathematicians it seems rather to be applied to the square root.]

[Footnote 40: κυβισθῇ, _involvit_, Cr. It cannot here mean “cubed.” Another mistake occurs in the same sentence, where it is said that the square multiplied by the cube is a cube. The sentence is fortunately repeated with the needful correction in Book IV, p. 116 _infra_. Macmahon gives the proper notation as (a²)² = a⁴, (a²)³ = a⁶, (a³)³ = a⁹.]

[Footnote 41: μετενσωμάτωσις. The phrase which is here correctly used throughout, but which has somehow slipped into English as metempsychosis.]

[Footnote 42: So Diog. Laert., VIII, _vit. Pyth._, c. 4.]

[Footnote 43: Diodorus of Eretria is not otherwise known, Aristoxenus is mentioned by Cicero, _Quæst. Tusculan._, I, 18, as a writer on music.]

[Footnote 44: That is, of course, Zoroaster. The account here given of his doctrines does not agree with what we know of them from other sources. The minimum date for his activity (700 B.C.) makes it impossible for him to have been a contemporary of Pythagoras. See the translator’s _Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity_, I, p. 126; II, p. 232.]

[Footnote 45: Reading with Roeper τὴν κόσμου φύσιν καὶ. Cruice has τὸν κόσμον φύσιν κατὰ, “that the cosmos is a nature according to,” etc.]

[Footnote 46: δαίμονες, spirits or dæmons in the Greek sense, not necessarily evil. But Aetius, _de Placit. Philosoph. ap._ Diels _Doxogr._ 306, makes Pythagoras use the word as equivalent to τὸ κακόν. Cf. pp. 52, 92 _infra_.]

[Footnote 47: Hippolytus like nearly every other writer of his time here confuses the Egyptians with the Alexandrian Greeks. It was these last and not the subjects of the Pharaohs who were given to mathematics and geometry, of which sciences they laid the foundations on which we have since built. Certain devotees of the Alexandrian god Serapis also shut themselves up in cells of the Serapeum, which they could hardly have done in any temple in Pharaonic times. See _Forerunners_, I, 79. Hippolytus gives a much more elaborate and detailed account of Pythagorean teaching in Book VI, II, pp. 20 ff. _infra_.]

[Footnote 48: Diog. Laert., VIII, _vit. Heraclit._, c. 6, attributes this opinion to Heraclitus.]

[Footnote 49: This verse appears in Diog. Laert., VIII, _vit. Empedocles_, c. 6.]

[Footnote 50: So Diog. Laert., _ubi. cit._]

[Footnote 51: This sentence seems to have got out of place. It should probably follow that on Lysis and Archippus, etc., on the last page. The story of the shield is told by Diog. Laert., VIII, _vit. Pyth._, c. 4, and by Ovid, _Metamorph._, XV, 162 ff. For more about Empedocles see