CHAPTER XV. FINAL CAUSES; UNIVERSAL ORDER.

106. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE, THE MECHANICAL AND THE TELEOLOGICAL.—We have seen that all change in the universe demands for its explanation certain real principles, _viz._ passive potentiality, actualization, and active power or efficiency; in other words that it points to material, formal and efficient causes. Do these principles suffice to explain the course of nature to the inquiring mind? Mechanists say, Yes; these principles explain it so far as it is capable of explanation. Teleologists say, No; these principles do not of themselves account for the universe of our experience: this universe reveals itself as a _cosmos_: hence it demands for its explanation real principles or causes of another sort, _final causes_, the existence of which implies purpose, plan or design, and therefore also intelligence.

The problem whether or not the universe manifests the existence and influence of final causes has been sometimes formulated in this striking fashion: Is it that birds have wings in order to fly, or is it merely that they fly because they have wings? Such a graphic statement of the problem is misleading, for it suggests that the alternatives are mutually exclusive, that we must vote either for final causes or for efficient causes. As a matter of fact we accept both. Efficient causes account for the course of nature; but they need to be determined by the influence of final causes. Moreover, the question how far this influence of final causes extends—_finality_ (_finalitas_), as it is technically termed—is a secondary question; nor does the advocate of final causality in the universe undertake to decide its nature and scope in every instance and detail, any more than the physical scientist does to point out all the physical laws embodied in an individual natural event, or the biologist to say whether a doubtful specimen of matter is organic or inorganic, or whether a certain sort of living cell is animal or vegetable. The teleologist’s thesis, as against that of mechanism, is simply that _there are final causes in the universe, that the universe does really manifest the presence and influence of final causes_.(501)

There are two ways, however, of conceiving this influence as permeating the universe. The conception of final causality in general is, as we shall see, the conception of acting _for an end_, from a _motive_, with a _purpose_, _plan_ or _design_ for the attainment of something. It implies arrangement, ordination, adaptation of means to ends (55). Now at least there _appears_ to be, pervading the universe everywhere and directing its activities, such an adaptation. The admirable equilibrium of forces which secures the regular motions of the heavenly bodies; the exact mixture of gases which makes our atmosphere suitable for organic life; the distance and relative positions of the sun and the earth, which secure conditions favourable to organic life; the chemical transformations whereby inorganic elements and compounds go to form the living substance of plants and are thus prepared for assimilation as food by animal organisms; the wonderfully graded hierarchy of living species in the animate world, and the mutual interdependence of plants and animals; the endless variety of instincts which secure the preservation and well-being of living individuals and species; most notably the adaptability and adaptation of other mundane creatures to human uses by man himself,—innumerable facts such as these convince us that the things of the universe are _useful to one another_, that they are constituted and disposed in relation to one another _as if they had been deliberately chosen_ to suit one another, to fit in harmoniously together in mutual co-ordination and subordination so that by their interaction and interdependence they work out a plan or design and _subserve as means to definite ends_. This suitability of things _relatively to one another_, this harmony of the nature and activity of each with the nature and activity of every other, we may designate as _extrinsic_ finality. The Creator has willed so to arrange and dispose all creatures in conditions of space and time that such harmonious but purely extrinsic relations of mutual adaptation do _de facto_ obtain and continue to prevail between them under His guidance.

But are these creatures themselves, in their own individual natures, equally indifferent to any definite mode of action, so that the orderly concurrence of their activities is due to an initial collocation and impulse divinely impressed upon them from without, and not to any purposive principle intrinsic to themselves individually? Descartes, Leibniz and certain supporters of the theory of atomic dynamism regarding the constitution of matter, while recognizing a relative and extrinsic finality in the universe in the sense explained, seem to regard the individual agencies of the universe as mere efficient causes, not of themselves endowed with any immanent, intrinsic directive principle of their activities, and so contributing by mere extrinsic arrangement to the order of the universe. Scholastic philosophers, on the contrary, following the thought of Aristotle,(502) consider that every agency in the universe is endowed with an _intrinsic principle of finality_ which constantly directs its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is proper to it and which constitutes its intrinsic end (45-46). And while each thus tends to its own proper perfection by the natural play of its activities, each is so related to all others that they simultaneously realize the extrinsic purpose which consists in the order and harmony of the whole universe. Thus the extrinsic and relative finality whereby all conspire to constitute the universe a _cosmos_ is secondary and posterior and subordinate to the deeper, intrinsic, immanent and absolute finality whereby each individual created nature moves by a tendency or law of its being towards the realization of a _good_ which _perfects_ it as its natural end.

In order to understand the nature of this intrinsic and extrinsic finality in the universe, and to vindicate its existence against the philosophy of Mechanism, we must next analyse the concept, and investigate the influence, of what are called _final causes_.

107. THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE; ITS OBJECTIVE VALIDITY IN ALL NATURE. CLASSIFICATION OF FINAL CAUSES.—When we speak of the _end_ of the year, or the _end_ of a wall, we mean the extreme limit or ultimate point; and the term conveys no notion of a cause. Similarly, were a person to say “I have got to the _end_ of my work,” we should understand him to mean simply that he had finished it. But when people act deliberately and as intelligent beings, they usually act for some _conscious purpose_, with some _object in view_, for the achievement or attainment of something; they continue to act until they have attained this object; when they have attained it they cease to act; its attainment synchronizes with the _end_ of their action, taking this term in the sense just illustrated. Probably this is the reason why the term _end_ has been extended from its original sense to signify the _object_ for the attainment of which an intelligent agent acts. This object of conscious desire _induces_ the agent to seek it; and because it thus influences the agent to act it verifies the notion of a _cause_: it is a _final cause_, an _end_ in the causal sense. For instance, a young man wishes to become a medical doctor: the _art of healing_ is the _end_ he wishes to secure. For this purpose he pursues a course of studies and passes certain examinations; these acts whereby he qualifies himself by obtaining a certain fund of knowledge and skill are _means_ to the end intended by him. He need not desire these preparatory labours _for their own sake_; but he does desire them as _useful for his purpose_, as _means_ to his end: in so far as he wills them as means he wills them not for their own sake but because of the end, _propter finem_. He _apprehends_ the end as a _good_; he _intends_ its attainment; he _elects_ or _selects_ certain acts or lines of action as means suitable for this purpose. An end or final cause, therefore, may be defined as _something apprehended as a good, and which, because desired as such, influences the will to choose some action or line of action judged necessary or useful for the attainment of this good_. Hence Aristotle’s definition of end as τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα: id cujus gratia aliquid fit: _that for the sake of which an agent acts_.

The end understood in this sense is a _motive_ of action; not only would the action not take place without the agent’s intending the end, showing the latter to be a _conditio sine qua non_; but, more than this, the end as a good, apprehended and willed, _has a positive influence_ on the ultimate effect or issue, so that it is really a _cause_.

Man is conscious of this “finality,” or influence of final causes on his own deliberate actions. As an intelligent being he acts “for ends,” and orders or regulates his actions as means to those ends; so much so that when we see a man’s acts, his whole conduct, utterly unrelated to rational ends, wholly at variance and out of joint with the usual ends of intelligent human activity, we take it as an indication of loss of reason, insanity. Furthermore, man is free; he _chooses_ the ends for which he acts; he acts _electivé propter fines_.

But in the domain of animal life and activity is there any evidence of the influence of final causes? Most undoubtedly. Watch the movements of animals seeking their prey; observe the wide domain of animal instincts; study the elaborate and intricate lines of action whereby they protect and foster and preserve their lives, and rear their young and propagate their species: could there be clearer or more abundant evidence that in all this conduct they are _influenced_ by objects which they _apprehend_ and seek as _sensible goods_? Not that they can conceive in the abstract the _ratio bonitatis_ in these things, or freely choose them as good, for they are incapable of abstract thought and consequent free choice; but that these sensible objects, apprehended by them in the concrete, do really influence or move their sense appetites to desire and seek them; and the influence of an object on sense appetite springs from the goodness of this object (44, 45). They tend towards _apprehended_ goods; they act _apprehensivé propter fines_.(503)

Finally, even in the domains of unconscious agencies, of plant life and inorganic nature, we have evidence of the influence of final causes. For here too we witness innumerable varied, complex, ever-renewed activities, constantly issuing in results useful to, and good for, the agents which elicit them: operations which contribute to the _development_ and _perfection_ of the natures of these agents (46). Now if similar effects demand similar causes how can we refuse to recognize even in these activities of physical nature the influence of final causes? Whenever and wherever we find a great and complex variety of active powers, forces, energies, issuing invariably in effects which suit and develop and perfect the agents in question,—in a word, which are _good_ for these agents,—whether the latter be conscious or unconscious, does not reason itself dictate to us that all such domains of action must be subject to the influence of final causes? Of course it would be mere unreflecting anthropomorphism to attribute to _unconscious_ agencies a _conscious_ subjection to the attracting and directing influence of such causes. But the recognition of such influence in this domain implies no naïve supposition of that sort. It does, however, imply this very reasonable view: that there must be some reason or ground in the nature or constitution of even an inanimate agent for its acting always in a uniform manner, conducive to its own development and perfection; that there must be in the nature of each and every one of the vast multitude of such agents which make up the whole physical universe a reason or ground for each co-operating constantly and harmoniously with all the others to secure and preserve that general order and regularity which enables us to pronounce the universe not a _chaos_ but a _cosmos_. Now that ground or reason in things, whereby they act in such a manner—not indifferently, chaotically, capriciously, aimlessly, _unintelligibly_, but definitely, regularly, reliably, purposively, _intelligibly_—is a real principle of their natures, impressing on their natures a definite tendency, directive of their activities towards results which, as being suited to these natures, bear to these latter the relation of final causes. A directive principle need not itself be conscious; the inner directive principle of inanimate agents towards what is _good_ for them, what _perfects_ them, what is therefore in a true and real sense their end (45, 46), is not conscious. But in virtue of it they act as if they were conscious, nay intelligent, _i.e._ they act _executivé propter fines_.

Of course the existence of this principle in inanimate agencies necessarily _implies_ intelligence: this indeed is our very contention against the whole philosophy of mechanism, positivism and agnosticism. But is this intelligence really identical with the agencies of nature, so that all the phenomena of experience, which constitute the _cosmos_ or universe, are but phases in the evolution of One Sole Reality which is continually manifesting itself under the distinct aspects of nature and mind? Or is this intelligence, though _virtually immanent_ in the universe, really distinct from it—_really transcendent_,—a Supreme Intelligence which has created and continues to conserve this universe and govern all its activities? This is a distinct question: it is the question of Monism or Theism as an ultimate interpretation of human experience.

We conclude then that what we call _finality_, or the influence of final causes, pervades the whole universe; that in the domain of conscious agents it is _conscious_, _instinctive_ when it solicits _sense appetite_, _voluntary_ when it solicits _intelligent will_; that in the domain of unconscious agencies it is not conscious but “_natural_” or “_physical_” soliciting the “_nature_” or “_appetitus naturalis_” of these agencies.

Before inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate briefly the main divisions of final causes: some of these concern the domain of human activity and are of importance to Ethics rather than to Ontology.

(_a_) We have already distinguished between _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_ finality. An intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the nature itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for instance, is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism. An extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent immediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is _de facto_ realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic end. Thus, the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in relation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended by the Creator and _de facto_ realized by each individual agency acting in accordance with its own particular nature.

(_b_) Very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the _finis operis_ and the _finis operantis_. The former is the end necessarily and _de facto_ realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently of any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means of it. The latter is the end expressly intended by the agent, and which may vary for one and the same kind of act. For instance, the _finis operis_ of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant; the _finis operantis_ may be charity, or self-denial, or vanity, or whatever other motive influences the giver.

(_c_) Akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious, or physical, or “natural” end, and a conscious, or mental, or “intentional” end. The former is that towards which the nature or “_appetitus naturalis_” of unconscious agencies tends; the latter is an end apprehended by a conscious agent.

(_d_) An end may be either _ultimate_ or _proximate_ or _intermediate_. An ultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake, as contrasted with an intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former, and with a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to realizing the others. It should be noted that proximate and intermediate ends, in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end, are not ends at all but rather means; only in so far as they present some good desirable for its own sake, are they properly ends, or final causes. Furthermore, an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively: absolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any ulterior or higher good; relatively if, though ultimate in a particular order as compared with means leading up to it, it is nevertheless capable of being subordinated to a higher good, though not actually referred to this latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it.

(_e_) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either _objectively_,—_finis_ “_objectivus_,”—or _formally_,—_finis_ “_formalis_”. The former is the objective good itself which the agent wishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the agent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective good. Thus, God Himself is the objective happiness (_beatitudo objectiva_) of man, while man’s actual possession of, or union with, God, by knowledge and love, is man’s formal happiness (_beatitudo formalis_).

(_f_) We may distinguish also between the _real_ end (_finis_ “_qui_” or “_cujus_”, and the _personal_ end (_finis_ “_cui_”). The former is the good _which_ the agent desires, the good for the sake of _which_ “_cujus_” _gratia_) he acts. The latter is the subject or person _to whom_ he wishes this good, or _for whom_ he wishes to procure it. Thus, a labourer may work to earn _a sustenance_ for _himself_ or also for _his family_. The real and the personal end are never willed separately, but always as one concrete good.

(_g_) The distinction between a _principal_ end and an _accessory_ end (motivum “_impulsivum_”) is obvious. The former can move to act of itself without the latter, but the latter strengthens the influence of the former. A really charitable person, while efficaciously moved to give alms by sympathy with the poor, may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others know of his charity.

(_h_) Finally we may note the theological distinction between the _natural_ end, and the _supernatural_ end, of man as a rational and moral agent. The former is the end _due_ to man’s nature, the latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature. God might not have created the world or man, and in this sense even the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of God; but granted that God did decree to create the world and man, an end corresponding to man’s nature and powers was due to him: the knowledge, service and love of God as known to man by the light of natural reason. But as a matter of fact God, in His actual providence, has decreed for man an incomparably higher and purely gratuitous end, an end revealed to man by God Himself, an end entirely undue not only to man but to any and every possible creature: the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence for ever in heaven.

108. CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE; RELATION OF THE LATTER TO EFFICIENT, FORMAL, AND MATERIAL CAUSES.—We can best analyse the influence of the final cause by studying this influence as exerted on conscious and intelligent agents. The final cause has a positive influence of some sort on the production, happening, actualization of effects. What is the nature of this influence? The final cause exerts its influence by being _a __ good_, an apprehended good; it exerts this influence on the appetite of the agent, soliciting the latter to perform certain acts for the realization, attainment, possession, or enjoyment of this good. But it must not be conceived as the _efficient cause_ of this movement of the appetite, nor may its influence be conceived as _action_. An efficient cause must actually exist in order to act; but when the final cause, as an apprehended good, exerts its influence on the appetite _it is not yet actual_: not until the agent, by his action, has realized the end and actually attained it, does the end, as a good, actually exist. We must distinguish between the end _as attained_ and the end _as intended_, between the _finis in executione_ and the _finis in intentione_. It is not the end as attained that is a final cause; as attained it is an effect pure and simple. It is the end as intended that is a final cause; and as intended it does not yet actually exist: hence its influence cannot be by way of _action_. Perhaps it is the _idea_ or _cognition_ of the intended end that exerts the peculiar influence of final cause? No; the _idea_ or _cognition_ of the end actually exists, no doubt, in the conscious agent, but this is only a condition, a _conditio sine qua non_, for the apprehended good, the final cause, to exert its influence: _nil volitum nisi praecognitum_. It is not the cognition of the good, however, that moves the agent to act, it is not the idea of the good that the agent desires or strives for, but the good itself. It is the good itself, the known good, that exerts the influence, and this influence consists in the _passive inclination_ or _attraction_ or _tendency_ of the appetite towards the good: a tendency which necessarily results from the very presence of the good (not really or physically of course, but representatively, mentally, “_intentionally_,” by “_esse intentionale_”; cf. 4) in the agent’s consciousness, and which is formally the actualization of the causal power or influence of the final cause. “Just as the efficient cause influences by acting,” says St. Thomas,(504) “so the final cause influences by being yearned for and desired”.

Looked at from the side of the agent that undergoes it, this influence is a _passive yielding_: this next becomes an _active_ motion of appetite; and in the case of free will a deliberate act of intending the end, followed by acts of choosing means, and finally by acts commanding the executive faculties to employ these means.

Looked at from the side of the final cause, the influence consists in an _attraction_ of appetite towards union with itself as a good. The matter cannot be analysed much further; nor will imagination images help us here any more than in the case of efficient causality. It must be noted, however, that the influence of the final cause is the influence not of a reality as actual, or in its _esse actuale_, but of a reality as present to a perceiving mind, or in its _esse intentionale_. At the same time it would be a mistake to infer from this that the influence of the final cause is not _real_. It is sometimes described as “intentional” causality, “_causalitas intentionalis_”; but this must not be taken to mean that it is not real: for it is not the “_esse intentionale_” of the good, _i.e._ the cognition of the good, its presence in the mind or consciousness of the agent, that moves the latter’s appetite: it is the apprehended good, apprehended _as real_, as possible of actual attainment, that moves the agent to act. The influence may not be _physical_ in the sense of being productive of, or interchangeable with, or measurable by, corporeal energy, or in terms of mechanical work; nor is it; but it is none the less real.

But if the influence of a final cause really reaches to the effect of the agent’s actions only through the medium of the latter’s appetite, and therefore through a link of “intentional” causality, does it not at once follow that the attribution of final causality to the domain of unconscious and inorganic activities, can be at best merely metaphorical? The attribution to such agencies of an “_appetitus naturalis_” is intelligible indeed as a striking and perhaps not unpoetic metaphor. But to contend that it is anything more than a metaphor, to claim seriously that inanimate agencies are swayed and influenced by “ends,”—is not this really to substitute mysticism and mystery for rational speculation and analysis?

Mechanists are wont to dismiss the doctrine of final causes in the physical universe with offhand charges of this kind. They are but too ready to attribute it to a mystical attitude of mind. Final causes, they say, are not discovered in inanimate nature by the cold, calculating, unemotional analysis to which reason submits its activities, but are read into it by minds which allow themselves to be prompted by the imagination and emotions to personify and anthropomorphize inanimate agencies. The accusation is as plausible as it is unjust. It is plausible because the attribution of final causes to inanimate nature, and of an “appetitus _naturalis_” to its agencies, _seems_ to imply the recognition of conscious, mental, “intentional” influence in this domain. But it really implies nothing of the sort; and hence the injustice of the charge. What it does imply is the existence of a genuine _analogy_ between the nature and natural activities of physical agencies on the one hand and the appetite and appetitive activities of conscious agencies on the other. The existence of this analogy is absolutely undeniable. The orderly, invariable and uniformly suitable character of physical activities, simply forces our reason to recognize in physical agencies _natures_ which tend towards their development, and which by their activities attain to what is _good_ for them, to what _perfects_ them. In other words we have to recognize that each by its natural line of activity attains to results that are good and useful to it _just as if_ it apprehended them as such and consciously tended towards them. The analogy is there; and the recognition of it, so far from being a “mystic” interpretation of facts, is an elementary logical exercise of our reasoning faculty. The scholastics emphasized their recognition of the analogy by calling the _nature_ of an unconscious agent,—the principle of its active tendencies towards the realization of its own perfection—an “_appetitus naturalis_”: an expression into which no one familiar with scholastic terminology would venture to read any element of mysticism.(505)

Every separate agency in nature has a uniform mode of activity; by following out this line of action each co-operates with all the others in maintaining the orderly course of nature. These are facts which call for explanation. They are not explained by the supposition of mechanists that these agencies are mere efficient causes: efficient causality does not account for order, it has got simply nothing to do with order or regularity. Consequently the last word of the mechanical philosophy on the fact of order in the universe is—Agnosticism. In opposition to this attitude we are far from contending that there is no mystery, or that all is clear either in regard to the fact of _change_ or the fact of _regularity_. Just as we cannot explain everything in _efficient_ causality, so neither can we explain everything in _final_ causality. But we do contend that the element of order, development, evolution, even in the physical universe, can be partially explained by recognizing in its several agencies a _nature_, a principle of development, a passive inclination implanted in the very being of these agencies by the Intelligent Author of their being.

In conscious agencies this inclination or tendency to actions conformable or _connatural_ to their being is not always in act; it is aroused by conscious cognition, perception, or imagination of a _good_, and operates intermittently. In unconscious agencies it is congenital and constantly in act, _i.e._ as a tendency, not as actually operative: for its actual development due conditions of environment are required: the seed will not grow without a suitable soil, temperature, moisture, etc. In conscious agencies the tendency, considered entitatively or as a reality in them, is an _accidental form_; in unconscious agencies it is their _forma substantialis_, the formative substantial principle, which determines the specific type to which their nature belongs.(506)

In all agencies the inclination or appetite or tendency to action arises from a form; an elicited appetite from an “intentional” form, a natural appetite from a “natural” form: _Omnis inclinatio seu appetitus consequitur formam; appetitus elicitus formam intentionalem, appetitus naturalis formam naturalem_. The scholastic view that final causality pervades all things is expressed in the aphorism, _Omne agens agit propter finem_: Every agency acts for an end.

From our analysis of final causality it will be seen that the “end” becomes a cause by exercising its influence on the agent or efficient cause, and thus initiating the action of the latter. We have seen already that material and formal causes exercise their causality dependently on the efficient cause of the change or effect produced by the latter. We now see that the final cause, the end as _intended_, determines the action of the efficient cause; hence its causality holds the primacy as compared with that of the other causes: it is in this sense the cause of causes, _causa causarum_.(507) But while the end _as intended_ is the starting point of the whole process, the end _as attained_ is the ultimate term of the latter. Hence the scholastic aphorism: _Finis est primus in intentione et ultimus in executione_. And this is true where the process involves a series of acts attaining to means subordinate to an end: this latter is the first thing intended and the last attained.

The final cause, the end as intended, is extrinsic to the effect. It is intrinsic to the efficient cause. It is a “_forma_” or determinative principle of the latter: a _forma intentionalis_ in conscious agents, a _forma naturalis_ in unconscious agents.

109. NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE. CHARACTER AND GROUNDS OF THEIR NECESSITY AND UNIVERSALITY. SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM AND PHILOSOPHIC FATALISM.—By the term _nature_ we have seen that Aristotle and the scholastics meant the essence or substance of an agent regarded as inner principle of the latter’s normal activities, as determining the bent or inclination of these, and therefore as in a real sense their final cause. Hence Aristotle’s definition of _nature_ as _a certain principle or cause of the motion and rest of the thing in which that principle is rooted fundamentally and essentially and not merely accidentally_.(508) The scholastics, recognizing that this _intentio naturae_, this subjection to finality, in _unconscious_ agencies must be the work and the index of intelligence, in other words that this _analogical_ finality in inanimate things must connote a _proper_ finality, a properly purposive mode of action, in the author of these things, conceived this _nature_ or _intentio naturae_ as the impression of a divine art or plan upon the very being of all creatures by the Creator Himself. Hence St. Thomas’s profound and well-known description of _nature_ as “_the principle of a divine art impressed upon things, in virtue of which they move towards determinate ends_”. Defining _art_ as _the just conception __ of external works to be accomplished_,(509) he observes that nature is a sort of art: “as if a ship-builder were to endow his materials with the power of moving and adapting themselves so as to form or construct a ship”.(510) And elsewhere he remarks that nature differs from art only in this that the former is an intrinsic, the latter an extrinsic, principle of the work which is accomplished through its influence: so that if the art whereby a ship is constructed were intrinsic to the materials, the ship would be constructed by nature as it actually is by art.(511)

Such, then, is the teleological conception of the nature of each individual agency in the universe. When we speak of “universal _nature_,” “external _nature_,” “physical _nature_,” “the course of _nature_,” “the laws of _nature_,” etc. we are using the term in a collective sense to signify the sum-total of all the agencies which constitute the whole physical universe; and furthermore in all such contexts we usually understand by _nature_ the world of _corporeal_ things as distinct from the domain of _mind_ or _spirit_.

The proof of this view,—that the agencies of the physical universe are not merely efficient causes, but that they act under the influence of ends; that they have definite lines of action which are natural to them, and whereby they realize their own individual development and the maintenance of the universe as a _cosmos_; that by doing so they reveal the influence of _intelligent purpose_,—the proof of this view lies, as we have seen, in the fact that their activities are regular, uniform, and mutually useful, or, in other words, that they are productive of _order_ (110). Bearing this in mind let us inquire into the various meanings discernible in the very familiar expressions, “laws of nature,” “physical laws,” “natural laws”.(512)

We may understand firstly by a law of nature this innate tendency we have been describing as impressed upon the very being of all created things by the Creator. It is in this sense we speak of a thing acting “naturally,” or “according to the _law_ of its nature,” or “according to its nature,” when we see it acting according to what we conceive to be the end intended for it, acting in a manner conducive to the development of its own individuality, the preservation of its specific type or kind, and the fulfilment of its rôle in the general scheme of things. What this “natural” mode of action is for this particular kind of thing, we gather from our experience of the regular or normal activity of things of its kind. Thus, we say it is a _law_ of oxygen and hydrogen to combine in definite proportions, under suitable conditions, to form water; a _law_ of all particles of matter in the universe to tend to move towards one another with a definite acceleration; a _law_ of living organisms to reproduce their kind. This usage comes nearest to the original meaning of the term _law_: a precept or command imposed on intelligent agents by a superior. For we conceive this natural tendency impressed on physical agencies by the Creator after the analogy of a precept or command. And we have good reason to do so: because _uniformity of conduct_ in intelligent agents is the normal result of their obedience to a law imposed upon them; and we see in the activities of the physical universe an _all-pervading feature of regularity_.

Secondly, we transfer the term _law_ to _this result itself_ of the natural tendency of the being, of the convergence of its activities towards its end. That is to say, we call _the uniform mode of action_ of an agent a _law of nature_, a _natural_ or _physical law_. This usage, which is common in the positive sciences, implies a less profound, a more superficial, but a perfectly legitimate mode of apprehending and studying the changes and phenomena of the physical universe.

Thirdly, since the several agencies of the universe co-exist in time and space, since they constantly interact on one another, since for the exercise of the natural activities of each _certain extrinsic conditions of relationship with its environment_ must be fulfilled, an accurate knowledge and exact formulation of these relations are obviously requisite for a scientific and practical insight into the mode of activity of any natural agency. In fact the physical scientist may and does take for granted the natural tendency and the uniformity of action resulting therefrom, and confines himself to _discovering and formulating the relations between any given kind of action and the extrinsic conditions requisite for its exercise_. Such, for instance, would be any chemical “law” setting forth the measure, and the conditions of temperature, pressure, etc., in which certain chemical elements combine to form a certain chemical compound. To all such formulae scientists give the title of _physical laws_, or _laws of physical nature_. These formulae, descriptive of the manner in which a phenomenon takes place, setting forth with the greatest possible quantitative exactness the phenomenal factors(513) that enter into and precede and accompany it, are laws in a still more superficial and still less philosophical sense, but a sense which is most commonly—and justly—accepted in the positive or physical sciences.

Before examining the feature and characteristic of _necessity and universality_ which enters into all these various conceptions of a “physical law” we have here to observe that it would make for clearness, and for a better understanding between physics and metaphysics, between science and philosophy, between the investigator who seeks by observation and experiment for the proximate phenomenal conditions and “physical” causes of phenomena, and the investigator who seeks for the ultimate real ground and explanation of these latter by speculative analysis of them, and by reasoning from the scientist’s discoveries about them,—if it were understood and agreed that investigation into the scope and significance and ultimate ground of this feature of stability in the laws of physical nature belongs to the philosopher rather than to the scientist. We have already called attention to the fact that the propriety of such an obviously reasonable and intelligible division of labour is almost universally admitted in theory both by scientists and by philosophers; though, unfortunately, it is not always remembered in practice (100).

In theory the scientist assumes, and very properly assumes, that the agencies with which he deals are not capricious, unreliable, irregular, but stable, reliable, regular in their mode of action, that in similar sets of conditions and circumstances they will act uniformly. Without inquiring into the ultimate grounds of this assumption he premises that all his conclusions, all his inductive generalizations about the activity of these agencies, will hold good of these latter just in so far as they do act according to his general postulate as to their regularity. He then proceeds, by the inductive processes of hypothesis and experimental verification, to determine what agencies produce such or such an event, under what conditions they bring this about, what are all the phenomenal conditions, positive and negative, antecedent and concomitant, in the absence of any one of which this event will not happen, and in the presence of all of which it will happen. These are, in accordance with his assumption, _determining_ causes of the event; the knowledge of them is from the speculative point of view extremely important, and from the practical standpoint of invention and applied science extremely useful. As a scientist he has no other knowledge in view: he aims at discovering the “how,” the _quomodo_, of natural phenomena,—how, for instance, under what conditions and in what measure, water is produced from oxygen and hydrogen. When he has discovered all these positive and negative conditions his _scientific_ knowledge of the formation of water is complete.

But there are other questions in regard to natural phenomena to which the experimental methods of the positive sciences can offer no reply. They can tell us nothing about the _wider_ “how” which resolves itself into a “why.” They can give no information about the ultimate causes, origins, reasons, or essences, of those phenomena. As Pasteur and other equally illustrious scientists have proclaimed, experimental science is essentially positive, _i.e._ confined to the proximate phenomenal conditions and causes of things; it has nothing to say, nor has it any need or any right to say anything, about the ultimate nature, or first origin, or final destiny, of the things and events of the universe.

Yet such questions arise, and clamour insistently for solution. _How_ is it, or _why_ is it, that natural phenomena are uniformly linked to certain other phenomenal antecedents or “physical” causes? Is it absolutely impossible, inconceivable, that this sequence should be found not to obtain in even a single individual instance? Why should there be such uniform “sequences” or “laws” at all? Are there exceptions, or can there be exceptions to these “laws of physical nature”? What is the character and what are the grounds of the _necessity_ of these laws? Every living organism comes from a living cell—not from _any_ living cell, but from _some particular kind_ of living cell. But _why_ are there such kinds of cells? Why are there living cells at all? Whence their first origin? Again, granted that there are different kinds or types of living cells, _why_ should a particular kind of cell give rise, by division and evolution, to an organism of the same kind or type as the parent organisms? Why does it not _always_ do so? Why are what biologists describe as “monsters” in the organic kingdom possible? And why, since they are possible, are they not as numerous as what are recognized as the normal types or kinds of living organisms?

Now these are questions in regard to which not only every professing physical scientist and every professing metaphysician, but every thinking man, _must_ take up some attitude or other. A refusal to consider them, on the plea that they are insoluble, is just as definite an attitude as any other; nor by assuming this attitude does any man, even though he be a specialist in some department of the positive or physical sciences, escape being a “metaphysician” or a “philosopher,” however much he may deprecate such titles; for he is taking up a reasoned attitude—we presume it is such, and not the outcome of mere prejudice—on ultimate questions. And this is philosophy; this is metaphysics. When, therefore, a physical scientist either avows or insinuates that _because_ the methods of physical science, which are suitable for the discovery of the _proximate_ causes of phenomena, can tell him nothing about _ultimate_ questions concerning these phenomena, _therefore_ there is nothing to be known about these questions, he is not only committing himself, _nolens volens_, to definite philosophical views, but he is doing a serious disservice to physical science itself by misconceiving and mis-stating its rightful scope and limits. He has just an equal right with any other man to utilize the established truths of physical science to help him in answering ultimate questions. Nay, he may even use the unverified hypotheses and systematic conceptions(514) of physical science for what they are worth in helping him to determine his general world-view. But his competence as a specialist in physical science does not confer upon him any _special_ qualification for estimating the value of these truths and hypotheses as evidence in the domain of ultimate problems. Nor can he, because he is a scientist, or even because he may go so far as to assert the right of speaking in the name of “science,” claim for his particular interpretation the privilege of exemption from criticism; and this is true no matter what his interpretation may be—whether it be agnosticism, mechanism, teleologism, monism, or theism. These observations may appear elementary and obvious; but the insinuation of positivism and phenomenism, that whatever is not itself phenomenal and verifiable by the experimental methods of the physical sciences is in no wise knowable, and the insinuation of mechanists that their world-view is the only one compatible with the truths of science and therefore the only “scientific” philosophy, justify us in reiterating and emphasizing even such obvious methodological considerations. Bearing them in mind, let us now examine the uniformity and necessity of the laws of physical nature.

Understanding by natural law the natural inclination or tendency of the creature to a definite line of activity, this law is of itself determining or necessitating. Moreover, it is absolutely inseparable from the essence of the creature. Granted that the creature exists, it has this tendency to exert and direct all its forces and energies in a definite, normal way, for the realization of its end. This _nisus naturae_ is never absent; it is observable even where, as in the generation of “monsters” by living organisms, it partially fails to attain its end. A law of nature, taken in this sense, is absolutely necessary to, and inseparable from, the created agent; it admits of no exceptions; no agent can exist without it; for it is identical with the very being of the agent

But the uniformity of action resulting from this natural tendency, the uniform series of normal operations whereby it realizes its end, is not absolutely necessary, inviolable, unexceptional. In the first place the Author of Nature can, for a higher or moral purpose, prevent any created agency supernaturally, miraculously, from actually exercising its active powers in accordance with its nature for the prosecution of its natural end. But apart altogether from this, abstracting from all special interference of the First Cause, and confining our attention to the natural order itself, we have to consider that for any physical agency to act in its natural or normal manner certain extrinsic conditions are always requisite: oxygen and hydrogen, for instance, will combine to produce water, but only under certain conditions of contact, pressure, temperature, etc. This general requirement arises from the fact already mentioned, that physical agencies co-exist in time and space and are constantly interacting. These extrinsic conditions are, of course, not expressly stated in the formulation of those uniformities and quantitative descriptions called “laws of nature” in the second and third interpretations of this expression as explained above. It is taken as understood that the law applies only if and when and where all such conditions are verified. The law, therefore, as stated categorically, does not express an absolutely necessary, universal, and unexceptional truth. It may admit of exceptions.

In the next place, when we come to examine these exceptions to uniformity, these failures or frustrations of the normal or natural activities of physical agencies, we find it possible to distinguish roughly, with Aristotle, between two groups of such “uniformities” or “laws”. There are firstly those which, so far as our experience goes, seem to prevail _always_ (ἀεὶ), unexceptionally; and secondly, those which seem to prevail _generally_, _for the most part_ (ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), though not unexceptionally. The former would be the outcome of active powers, energies, forces, _de facto_ present and prevalent always and everywhere in all physical agencies, and of such a character that the conditions requisite for their actual operation would be always verified. Such, for instance, would be the force of gravity in all ponderable matter; and hence the law of gravitation is regarded as all-pervading, universal, unexceptional. But there are other natural or normal effects which are the outcome of powers, forces, energies, not all-pervading, but restricted to special groups of agencies, dependent for their actual production on the presence of a great and complex variety of extrinsic conditions, and liable therefore to be impeded by the interfering action of numerous other natural agencies. Such, for instance, would be the natural powers and processes whereby living organisms propagate their kind. The law, therefore, which states it to be a uniformity of nature that living organisms reproduce offspring similar to themselves in kind, is a general law, admitting exceptions.

Operations and effects which follow from the nature of their causes are called natural (καθ᾽ ἁυτό, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός).(515) Some causes produce their natural effects _always_ (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάνκης καὶ ἀεὶ γιγνομένα), others produce their natural effects _usually_, _as a general rule_ (τὰ ὡς ἐπι πολὺ γιγνόμενα).(516) Operations and effects which are produced by the interfering influence of extrinsic agencies (τὸ βίαιον “violent,” as opposed to natural), and not in accordance with the nature of their principal cause, are called by Aristotle _accidental_ (τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα γυγνέσθαι); and these, he remarks, people commonly describe as due to chance (καὶ ταῦτα πάντες φασὶν εἰναι ἀπο τύχης).(517)

All are familiar with events or happenings described as “fortuitous,” “accidental,” “exceptional,” “unexpected,” with things happening by “chance,” by (good or bad) “luck” or “fortune”.(518) There are terms in all languages expressive of this experience—_casus_, _sors_, _fortuna_, τύχη, etc. The notion underlying all of them is that of something occurring unintentionally, _praeter intentionem agentis_. Whether chance effects result from the action of intelligent agents or from the operation of physical causes they are not “intended,”—by the deliberate purpose of the intelligent agent in the one case, or by the natural tendency, the _intentio naturae_, of the mere physical agency in the other. Such an effect, therefore, has not a _natural_ cause; hence it is considered _exceptional_, and is always more or less unexpected. _Nature_, as Aristotle rightly observes,(519) never produces a chance effect. His meaning is, that whenever such an effect occurs it is not brought about in accordance with the natural tendency of any physical agency. It results from a collision or coincidence of two or more such agencies, each acting according to its nature. The hunter’s act of firing at a wild fowl is an intentional act. The boy’s act of coming into the thicket to gather wild flowers is an intentional act. The accidental shooting of the boy is the result of a coincidence of the two intentional acts. Similarly, each of all the various agencies which bring about the development of an embryo in the maternal womb has its own immediate and particular natural effect, and only mediately contributes to the general effect of bringing the embryo to maturity. As a rule these particular effects are favourable to the general effect. But sometimes the immediate ends do not subserve this ulterior purpose. The result is accidental, exceptional, a deviation from the normal type, an anomaly, a “monster” in the domain of living organisms.

Aristotle’s analysis, correct so far, is incomplete. It assigns no ultimate explanation of the fact that there are such encounters of individual natural tendencies in the universe, such failures in the subordination of particular ends to wider ulterior ends. As a matter of fact these chance effects, although not “intended” by the natures of individual created agencies, are not wholly and entirely unintended. They are not wholly aimless. They enter into the general plan and scheme of things as known and willed by the Author of Nature. They are known to His Intelligence, and willed and ruled by His Providence. For Him there can be no such thing as chance. Effects that are accidental in relation to created causes, effects that run counter to the nature or _intentio naturae_ of these, are foreseen and willed by Him and made to subserve that wider and more general end which is the universal order of the world that He has actually willed to create. It is only in relation to the natures of individual agencies, and to the limited horizon of our finite intelligences, that such phenomena can present the aspect of fortuitous or chance occurrences.

Before passing on to deal, in our concluding section, with the great fact of order, let us briefly compare with the foregoing explanation of nature and its laws the attempt of mechanists to explain these without recognizing in the physical universe any influence of final causes, or any indication of a purposive intelligence. We have ventured to describe their attitude as philosophic fatalism.(520) According to their view there is no ground for the distinction between phenomena that happen “naturally” and phenomena that happen “accidentally” or “by chance”. All alike happen by the same kind of general necessity: the generation of a “monster” is as “natural” as the generation of normal offspring; the former, when it occurs, is just as inevitably the outcome of the physical forces at work in the particular case as the latter is the outcome of the particular set of efficient causes which do actually produce the normal result: the only difference is that the former, occurring less frequently and as the result of a rarer and less known conjunction of “physical” causes than the latter, is not expected by us to occur, and is consequently regarded, when it does occur, as exceptional. Now it is quite true that what we call “chance” effects, or “exceptional” effects, result just as inevitably from the set of forces operative in their case, as normal effects result from the forces operative in theirs. But this leaves for explanation something which the mechanist cannot explain. He regards a physical law merely as a generalization, beyond experience, of some experienced uniformity; and he holds that all our physical laws are provisional in the sense that a wider and deeper knowledge of the actual conditions of interaction among the physical forces of the universe would enable us to eliminate exceptions—which are all apparent, not real—by restating our laws in such a comprehensive way as to include all such cases. We may, indeed, admit that our physical laws are open to revision and restatement in this sense, and are _de facto_ often modified in this sense by the progress of science. But the important point is this, that the mechanist does not admit the existence, in physical agencies, of any law in the sense of a _natural inclination towards an end_, or in any sense in which it would imply intelligence, design, or purpose. On the contrary, claiming as he does that all physical phenomena are _reducible to mechanical motions of inert masses, atoms, or particles of matter in space_, he is obliged to regard all physical agencies as being, so far as their nature is concerned, wholly _indifferent_ to any particular form of activity.(521) Committed to the indefensible view that all qualitative change is reducible to quantitative (11), and all material differences to differences in the location of material particles and in the velocity and direction of the spatial motion impressed upon each by others extrinsic to itself, he has left himself no factors wherewith to explain the actual order and course of the universe, other than the purely _indifferent_ factors of essentially or naturally homogeneous particles of inert matter endowed with local motion. We emphasize this feature of indifference; for the conception of an inert particle of matter subject to mechanical motion impressed upon it from without, is the very type of an indifferent agency. What such an entity will do, whether or not it will move, with what velocity and in what direction it will move—in a word, its entire conduct, its rôle in the universe, the sum-total of its functions—nothing of all this is dependent on itself; everything depends on agencies extrinsic to it, and on its extrinsic time-and-space relations to these agencies; and these latter in turn are in the same condition as itself. Now is it conceivable that agencies of this kind, of themselves absolutely indifferent to any particular kind of effect, suitable or unsuitable, regular or irregular, orderly or disorderly, could actually produce and maintain the existing order of the universe? If they were themselves _produced by an All-Wise and All-Powerful Being_, and _definitely arranged_ in spatial relations to one another, and _initial mechanical motion in definite directions and velocities_ impressed on the different parts of the system, there is no denying that Infinite Wisdom and Power could, by Divine concurrence even with such indifferent agencies, realize and maintain a _cosmos_, or _orderly_ universe. Such _purely extrinsic finality_ (106) could, absolutely speaking, account for the existence of order, uniformity, regularity, system; though all the evidence furnished by the universe of our actual experience points to the existence of _intrinsic finality_ also as understood by Aristotle and the scholastics. But the mechanist will not allow even extrinsic finality; he will not recognize in the actual universe of our experience any evidence of a Ruling Intelligence realizing a plan or design for an intelligent purpose; he denies the necessity of the inference from the data of human experience to the existence of a Guiding Intelligence. And what are his alternatives? He may choose one or other of two.

He may restate in the more scientific and imposing terminology of modern mechanics the crude conception of the ancient Greek atomists: that the actual order of the universe is the absolutely inevitable and fatal outcome of a certain collocation of the moving masses of the physical universe, a collocation favourable to order, a collocation which _just happened to occur_ by some happy chance from the essentially aimless, purposeless, indifferent and _chaotic_ motions of those material masses and particles. We say “chaotic,” for _chaos_ is the absence of _cosmos_; and _order_ is the fact that has got to be explained. In the concept of _indifferent, inert_ atoms of matter moving through space there is emphatically no principle of order;(522) and hence the mechanist who will not admit the necessity of inferring an Intelligence to give these moving masses or atoms the collocation _favourable to order_ is forced to “explain” this supposed collocation by attributing it to pure chance—the _concursus fortuitus atomorum_ of the ancient Greeks. When, however, we reflect that the more numerous these atoms and the more varied and complex their motions, the smaller is the chance of a collocation favourable to order; that the atoms and motions are supposed actually to surpass any assignable number; that therefore the chance of any such favourable collocation occurring is indefinitely smaller than any measurable proportion,—we can draw our own conclusions about the value of such a speculation as a rational “explanation” of the existing _cosmos_. And this apart altogether from the consideration that the fact to be explained is not merely the _momentary_ occurrence of an orderly collocation, but the _maintenance_ of an orderly system of cosmic phenomena _throughout the lapse of all time_. No orderly finite system of mechanical motions arranged by human skill can preserve its orderly motions indefinitely without intelligent human supervision: the neglected machine will get out of order, run down, wear out, if left to itself; and we are asked to believe that the whole universe is one vast machine which not only goes on without intelligent supervision, but which actually made itself by chance!(523)

Naturally such an “explanation” of the universe does not commend itself to any man of serious thought, whatever his difficulties may be against the argument from the fact of order in the universe to the existence of an Intelligent Designer. Add to this the consideration that the mechanist theory does not even claim to account for the first origin of the universe: it postulates the existence of matter in motion. In regard to this supreme problem of the _first origin_ of the universe the attitude of the mechanist is avowedly _agnostic_; and in view of what we have just remarked about the “chance” theory as an “explanation” of the _existing order_ of the universe, it is no matter for surprise that most mechanists reject this theory and embrace the agnostic attitude in regard to this latter problem also. Whether the agnostic attitude they assume be negative or positive, _i.e._ whether they are content to say that they themselves at least fail to find any satisfactory rational explanation of the _origin_ and _nature_ of the _cosmos_, or contend further that no rational solution of these problems is within the reach of the human mind, their teaching is refuted in Natural Theology, where the theistic solution of these problems is set forth and vindicated.

110. THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE; A FACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.—The considerations so far submitted in this chapter, as pointing to the existence and influence of final causes in the universe, will be strengthened and completed by a brief analysis of _order_ and its implications.

We have seen already (55) that the apprehension of order in things implies the recognition of _some unifying principle in what is manifold_. What, in general, is the nature of this principle? It is the _point of view_, the _standpoint_ from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the manifold is carried out; in other words it is the _end_, _object_, or _purpose_, of the orderly arrangement. The arrangement, and the order resulting from it, will vary according to the end in view—whether, for instance, it be an arrangement of books in a library, of pictures in a gallery, of materials in an edifice, of parts in a machine. Hence St. Thomas’s definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends: _recta ratio rerum ad finem_. When this adaptation is the work of human intelligence the order realized is _artificial_, when it is the work of nature the order realized is _natural_. Art is an extrinsic principle of order, nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of order, but is itself an intrinsic principle of order: the works of nature and those of art have this feature in common, that they manifest adaptation of means to ends.(524)

The _subordination_ of means to ends realizes an order which has for its unifying principle the influence of an _end_, a _final cause_. The group of _dynamic_ relations thus revealed constitutes what is called _teleological_ order, the order of _purpose_ or _finality_. The realization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous existence of _co-ordinated_ parts or members in a system, a realized whole with complex, co-ordinated, orderly parts, the principle of unity in this system being the _form_ of the whole. This realized, disposed, or constituted order, is called the _esthetic_ order (55), the order of co-ordination, composition, constitution. In ultimate analysis, however, these two orders, the _teleological_ and the _esthetic_, having as respective unifying principles the _final_ cause and the _formal_ cause, are not two really distinct orders, but rather two aspects of one and the same order: we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or final cause of each is identical with its _forma substantialis_ or formal cause (108). But the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause, and consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the esthetic.

St. Augustine’s definition of order as “the arrangement of a multiplicity of things, similar and dissimilar, according its proper place to each,”(525) reveals the _material_ cause of order in the multiplicity of varied elements, the _formal_ cause of order in the group of relations resulting from the arrangement or _dispositio_, and the _efficient_ cause of order in the agent that disposes or arranges them. The _final_ cause, though not directly mentioned, is implied in the fact that the place of each factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has to fulfil, the part it is suited by its nature to play, in contributing to the realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement.

If, then, order is _the right arrangement or disposition of things according to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by their ends_, it necessarily follows that the very existence of _natural_ order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of _chance_ but a _purposive_ work, just as the existence of _artificial_ order in products of human art implies that these products are not the result of chance but of activity influenced by final causes.(526)

It is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the influence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent, undetermined and aimless physical agencies.(527) If we find in the actual physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals the influence of final causes, such difficulties do not arise from the fact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so far forth as there is natural order there is _cogent_ evidence of the influence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final cause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity, mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any group of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary collocations and concurrences of _indifferent_ agencies, acting aimlessly and without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds, accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive appearance of order.

Order, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence of final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with equal necessity the existence of _Intelligent Purpose_. If, then, there is natural order in the universe, there must exist an _Intelligent Will_ to account for this natural order.

Leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in Natural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the physical universe a _cosmos_? Does it reveal order—a natural order distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the mechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human mind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such order superabound. We have already referred to some of them (106), nor is there any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a brief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties against the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the theistic argument from order is based.

In accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the order which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not _really in_ the universe of our experience, but is as it were _projected into_ this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition itself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only phenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying, systematizing activity of our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or mental product, _i.e._ of the noumenal _datum_ as _invested with a category of thought_. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the real universe itself man’s speculative reason is by its very constitution essentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous. For a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works on Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or demerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the exact _location_ of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an undeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out just as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing adjectives “noumenal” or “phenomenal” a philosopher may choose to qualify it; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.

The other difficulty arises from the existence of _disorder_ in the universe. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures of adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality and penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature—not to speak of moral evil,—that they become blind to all evidences of order, and proclaim all belief in order an illusion.

The picture of

Nature, red in tooth and claw With ravine(528)

is, however, the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather than a sane view of the facts. The undeniable existence of disorder, of physical evils, defects, failures, frustrations of natural tendency in the universe, does not obscure or conceal from the normal, unbiassed mind the equally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing order. Nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of order in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan or design, and therefore of intelligent purpose also. Inferring from this fact of order the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, and inferring by other lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the universe on this Intelligence as Creator, Conserver and Ruler, the theist is confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil (52), _i.e._ of _disorder_ in the universe. But he does not see in this disorder anything essentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe is a finite creation of Infinite Wisdom, and a free manifestation of the latter to man. If the actual universe is imperfect, he knows that God created it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect one. Knowing that God is All-Powerful as He is All-Wise, he knows that the actual universe, though imperfect _absolutely_, is perfect _relatively_, in that it infallibly reveals the Divine Wisdom and Goodness exactly in the measure in which God has willed to reveal Himself in His works. Conscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all the purposes of God in nature, or assign to all individual events their divinely appointed ends, he is confident on the other hand that the whole universe is intelligible only as the working out of a Divine plan, and not otherwise. To his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of rationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who penned them:—

I trust in nature for the stable laws Of beauty and utility. Spring shall plant And Autumn garner to the end of time. I trust in God—the right shall be the right And other than the wrong, while He endures; I trust in my own soul, that can perceive The outward and the inward, Nature’s good And God’s.(529)

We have seen that the agencies which constitute the universal order have each its own inner principle of finality; that these agencies are not isolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve an extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order whereby we recognize the world as a _cosmos_. The maintenance of this order is the _intrinsic_ end of the universe as a whole: an end which is _immanent_ in the universe, an end which is of course _a good_. But this universal order itself is _for an end_, an _extrinsic_, _transcendent_ end, distinct from itself; and this end, too, must be _a good_. “The universe,” says St. Thomas,(530) “has the good of order and another distinct good.” The universal order, says Aristotle, has itself an end, a _good_, which is _one_, and to which all else is ordained: “πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντέτακται”.(531) What can this Supreme Good be, this absolutely Ultimate End, this Transcendent Principle of all nature, and of all nature’s tendencies and activities? Whence comes this universal tendency of all nature, if not from the Being who is the One, Eternal, Immutable Prime Mover,(532) and whose moving influence is Love?(533) Such is the profound thought of Aristotle, a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal poet of Christian philosophy in the closing line of the _Paradiso_:—

L’amor che muove il Sole e l’altre stelle.

The immediate factors of the universal order of nature, themselves devoid of intelligence, must therefore be the work of Intelligent Will. To arrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole, as members of one orderly system, Supreme Wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the means to realize it. The manifestation of God’s glory by the realization of this plan, such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created universe. “The whole order of the universe,” writes St. Thomas, developing the thought of Aristotle,(534) “is for the Prime Mover thereof; this order has for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan conceived and willed by the Prime Mover. And hence the Prime Mover is the principle of this universal order.”

The truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and purpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid philosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the Angel of the Christian Schools; nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a more felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the immortal epic of the Poet of the Christian Schools:—

... Le cose tutte quante Hann’ ordine tra lora; e questa è forma Che l’universo a Dio fa simigliante.

Qui veggion l’alte creature l’orma Dell’eterno Valore, il quale è fine Al quale è fatta la toccata norma.

Nell’ ordine ch’io dico sono accline Tutte nature per diverse sorti Più al Principio loro e men vicine;

Onde si muovono a diversi porti Per lo gran mar dell’essere, e ciascuna Con instinto a lei dato che la porti.

Questi ne porta il fuoco inver la Luna: Questi ne’ cuor mortali è permotore; Questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna.

Nè pur le creature, che son fuore D’intelligenza, quest’ arco saetta Ma quelle ch’ hanno intelletto ed amore.

La Providenza, che cotanto assetta, Del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto, Nel qual si volge quel ch’ha maggior fretta:

Ed ora li, com’ a sito decreto, Cen porta la virtù di quella corda, Che ciò che scocca drizzo in segno lieto.(535)

INDEX.

Absolute, the, 47 _sq._; and relative, 332 _sqq._

Accidents, individuation of, 133 _sqq._; causes of, 235-6; divisions of, 237 _sqq._; existence and relation to substance, 232 _sqq._, 240 _sqq._, 243, 247 _n._, 249, 313.

_Actio et passio_, _v._ causality, causes.

_Actio intentionalis_, 378.

_Actio in distans_, 395-6.

Action, immanent and transitive, 73, 369, 391-2.

Actual and potential, 52 _sqq._ and _passim_.

Actuality, goodness and perfection, 173 _sqq._

_Actus Purus_, 54, 58.

AEGIDIUS, 108 _n._

_Aeveternitas_, _aevum_, 230.

Agnosticism, 96, 97, 335, 383, 409, 414, 427.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 108 _n._, 201 _n._, 288.

ALEXANDER OF HALES, 110 _n._, 112 _n._

Analogy, analogical predication, 36 _sqq._, 122 _n._, 212, 240, 272, 330; a. inference, 386-7, 391.

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES, 17.

_Anima mundi_, 284.

ANSELM, ST., 353 _n._

Anthropology, 19.

Appetite, 167 _sqq._

_Appetitus naturalis_, 409-10, 413-15.

ARISTOTLE, on philosophy, 5; on esthetics, 13; on theology, 15, 16; on special sciences, 16; on analogy, 40; on change, 51, 56, 68 _sqq._; on essence, 75; on individual, 120-1; on the good, 167 _sqq._; on beauty, 200 _n._, 201 _n._; on substance and accident, 209, 249; on “first” and “second” substances, 252-3; on quality, 287, 290-2; on habits, 293-6; on quantity, 311 _n._; on place, 318; on time, 342; on relation, 337 _n._, 346-8; on principles, 358 _n._; on causes, 361 _sqq._, 367; on final causes, 406 _sqq._; on “nature,” 416 _sqq._, 422-4, 426; on order of the universe, 433.

Art, and nature, 416-17.

Arts, fine and mechanical, 13, 14, 430; and science, 194-5; scope of, 204 _sqq._; and morals, 205-6.

Atomism, _v._ Mechanism.

AUGUSTINE, ST., on basis of possible essences, 89 _n._, 94; on evil, 185 _n._; on beauty, 198, 200 _n._, 202 _n._; on time, 322; on order, 429.

AUREOLUS, 110 _n._

AVERROÏSM, 284.

BALMES, 89 _n._, 90 _n._, 93.

BAÑEZ, D., 108 _n._, 350 _n._

BAUMGARTEN, 192 _n._

_Beatitudo_, 175 _n._, 411.

Beauty, the Beautiful, 13, 14; analysis of, 192 _sqq._; definitions of, 201 _sqq._

Being, concept analysed, 32 _sqq._; real being and logical being, 10, 42 _sqq._, 85, 140.

— and Ideal Being, 45 _sqq._, 85.

— fundamental distinction in, 46 _sqq._

— metaphysical grades of, 123 _sqq._

— potential and actual, 51 _sqq._

BERGSON, 30, 289 _n._, 303.

BERKELEY, 215, 221, 350 _n._, 400.

BIEL, G., 110 _n._

BILLOT, 266 _n._

Bilocation, 322.

BOËTIUS, 329.

BOIRAC, 343.

BONAVENTURE, ST., on distinction of soul and faculties, 247-8.

BOSSUET, 196, 360.

BROWNING, 432.

BRUNETIÈRE, 196.

BULLIAT, 130 _n._

CAJETAN, 24, 38 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CAPREOLUS, 87 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CARY, 434 _n._

Categories, ultimate, analysis of, 208 _sqq._; not adequately distinct as modes, 210-11, 350; but exhaustive, 211-12.

_Causa exemplaris_, 362.

_Causalitas_ “_intentionalis_,” 413.

Causality, causes, notion analysed, 357 _sqq._; classification, 361 _sqq._; principle of C., 369 _sqq._, 384-5; “plurality” of causes, 380; causality and uniformity, 377, 381, 382; “physical” cause, 382, 419; phenomenist view of, 382 _sqq._; and inductive science, 359, 379, 381, 382 _n._; and determinism, 377; and creation, 391, 400-1.

Causality, efficient, as index of real distinction, 148; classification of efficient causes, 372 _sqq._; instrumental, 373-6; objective validity of concept, 382 _sqq._; origin of concept, 385 _sqq._; analysis of, 366 _sqq._, 388 _sqq._; erroneous theories of, 392-6; and occasionalism, 396 _sqq._, 400 _sqq._

— final (_v._ purpose), 361, 368; intrinsic and extrinsic finality, 404 _sqq._, 426; all-pervading influence of, 409; divisions of, 409 _sqq._; analysis of, 411_sqq._; as implying intelligence, 409, 414-15, 426.

— formal, 361, 364-5.

— material, 361, 364-6.

Chance, 423 _sqq._

Change, 61 _sqq._, 302-5; and time, 323; and causality, 367, 389-96.

CICERO, 1.

CLARKE, 135.

_Cognitio_ “_vulgaris_,” 2.

Composition, logical and metaphysical, 34; essential and integral, 311, 314-16; as index of finiteness, 248.

COMTE, 30, 334.

Conceptualism, 24, 125.

_Concursus Divinus_,66, 329, 348, 375 _n._, 388 _sqq._; necessity of, 389-91, 401-3.

Condition, and cause, 358-9, 419.

Consciousness, and personality, 273, 277 _sqq._; “subliminal,” 282 sqq.

Constitutive or constructive factors in thought, 45, 74, 340, 355-6.

Contingent and necessary Being, 47.

Co-operation, in philosophical studies, 30.

Correlatives, 388.

_Corruptio et generatio_, 71, 186.

Cosmology, 16, 19, 285, 309, 364, 388, 393.

COUSIN, 301, 387.

_Creatio ab aeterno_, 89, 328.

Criteriology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

DANTE, 434 n.

DAVID OF DINANT, 125 _n._

DE MUNNYNCK, 84 _n._, 89 _n._, 91 _n._, 94 _n._, 95 _n._

DE SAN, 241 _n._, 327 _n._, 331 _n._

DESCARTES, on basis of essences, 96, 97; on substance, 214, 226-8, 230, 241 _n._; on accidents, 244; on corporeal substance, 312-13, 315, 397.

Design, _v._ purpose and final cause.

DE WULF, 6 _n._, 27 _n._, 29 _n._, 156 _n._, 195 _n._, 284.

Disposition, _v._ habit.

_Dispositiones ad formam_, 295 n.

Disorder, fact of, 431-2.

Distinctions, doctrine of, 105 _sqq._, 139 _sqq._, 242-3, 249-51, 301-5.

DOMET DE VORGES, 387 _n._

“Double law” in man, 176.

“Double personality,” 282-4.

DRISCOLL, 89 _n._

DUPASQUIER, 99 _n._

DURANDUS, 110 _n._

Duration, 322, 325 _n._, 328 _sqq._

Education, and habits, 298.

Efficiency, concept of, _v._ cause (efficient).

Ego, _v._ person.

ELEATICS, 51, 125, 303.

End (_v._ purpose), 406.

Energies, equivalence of, 395.

_Ens a se_, _ab alio_, 47; and _ens in se_, 230-1, 334.

_Ens rationis_, _v._ Being.

Entitative habit, 292 _n._

Epistemology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

_Esse_ “_intentionale_,” 45, 46, 412.

Essence, analysis of, 75 _sqq._; and nature and substance, 79, 258.

Esthetics, 13, 14, 192 sqq.

Eternity, 328 _sqq._; of essences, 80 _sqq._

Ether, hypothesis of, 317, 395.

Ethics, 11-12, 296-7, 428-9.

Eucharist, and substance and accidents, 223 _n._, 233, 243 _n._; and quantity, 312-16; 319 _n._, 322, 345 _n._

EUCKEN, 28.

Evil, analysis of, 182 _sqq._

Exemplarism, 98, 100, 161-2.

Existence, and essence, 101-13; of accidents, 243-61; and subsistence, 266, 269; and action, 301.

Extension, _v._ quantity.

Extrinsic denominations, 238, 239.

Faculties, 298 _sqq._; and substance, 300 _sqq._

Faith and reason, 5.

Fatalism, 424 _n._

Figure, or form, as indicative of nature, 292-3.

_Finis_, finality, _v._ purpose and final causes.

Finite and Infinite, 47, 301-3.

FONSECA, 113 n.

“_Forma_” as essence or nature, 78-9, 130.

_Formae subsistentes_, 129.

“Formal” unity, 156.

_Formalitates_, 154.

Formative principles, simplicity of, 317-18; plurality in the individual, 365 (_n._ 4).

FRANCIS OF VITTORIA, 113 _n._

FRANZELIN, 110 _n._, 267 _n._

Free causes, 376-7; and occasionalism, 398.

Freedom of thought, 6.

_Generatio_, _v._ _corruptio_.

Genuensis, 98 _n._

“_Genus_” and “_differentia_” as “_materia_” and “_forma_,” 79 _n._, 365 (_n._ 4).

GEULINCX, 397.

GIOBERTI, 94.

Good, analysis of the, 167 _sqq._; divisions of the, 175 _sqq._; and being, 177 _sqq._; and beauty, 193.

GOUDIN, 108 _n._

Graceful, elegant, the, 199 _n._

GREGORY OF VALENTIA, 110 _n._

Habit, analysis of, 292 _sqq._

_Haecceitas_, 125, 132.

HARPER, 99 _n._

HEGEL, Hegelianism, 30, 33, 46, 49, 67-8, 97, 208, 335.

HENRY OF GHENT, 87 _n._, 113 _n._

HERACLITUS, 51, 303.

HICKEY, 89 _n._

HOBBES, 334.

HÖFFDING, 230 _n._

HUME, 213; on substance, 215, 217, 221; on cause, 370 _n._, 385.

HUNLEY, 219 _n._

_Hypostasis_, 265.

Hypostatic Union, 267-71.

Idealism, 214, 334-6, 341, 343, 400.

Identity, 135 _sqq._; and change, 139, 226, 241, 278; personal, 276, 277 _sqq._

Immaterial, positively and negatively, 16.

Immensity, Divine, 319.

Impenetrability, 309, 322.

_Incommutabilia vera_, 89 _n._

Indiscernibles, identity of, 135.

Individuation, 120, 123 _sqq._, 148, 261.

Infinite and Finite, 47; and categories, 212.

Infinite regress in causation, 373.

Inherence, _v._ accident.

_Intentio mentis_, 10, 43, 144 _n._, 145, 211, 339.

“_Intentio naturae_,” 414 _n._, 416, 423.

“Intentional” causality, 413.

JAMES, 30; on personal identity, 283-4.

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

JOSEPH, on meanings of “cause,” 379-80.

JOUFFROY, 275.

KANT, 21, 30, 121, 145, 201, 208, 228, 334, 335, 343, 385, 393, 394, 430.

KAPPES, M., 75 _n._

KLEUTGEN, 38, 39, 40, 43, 87 _n._, 103 _n._, 142 _n._; on accidents, 242, 247 _n._, 267 _n._, 330 _n._

KLIMKE, 67 _n._

Knowledge, relativity of, 335 _sqq._

—scientific, 2.

—theory of, 11, 20, 23, 45, 46, 70, 108; and doctrine of distinctions, 143-6, 151-3; and categories of being, 207 _sqq._, 285, 289; and category of relation, 332 _sqq._, 385; and causality, 393; and order, 430-1.

_Lacensis, Philosophia_, 21.

LACORDAIRE, 89 _n._

LADD, 24, 27.

LAHOUSSE, 99 _n._

LAMINNE, 60 _n._, 371 _n._

Law, of nature, 418 _sqq._

LEIBNIZ, 21, 98 _n._, 135, 182, 227, 298, 387, 406.

LEO XIII, 7, 26.

LIBERATORE, 99 _n._

LITTRÉ, 213.

LOCKE, on substance, 214, 221; on personality, 277-84, 334.

Logic, 10.

MAHER, 223 _n._, 230 _n._, 273 _n._; on consciousness of self, 274-6, 282 _n._; on theories of self, 283-4, 289 _n._; on perception of time, 324 _n._, 326-7; on relativity of knowledge, 336 _n._; on cause, 386 _n._

MALEBRANCHE, 397-400.

Manicheism, 182, 189-91.

MASTRIUS, 99 _n._

_Materia prima_, Aristotle on, 71-2.

_Materia signata_, 127, 129, 131, 135.

Mathematical unity, 116, 119.

Mathematics, philosophy of, 17, 25.

Matter, and evil, 190.

— divisibility of (_v._ individuation), 317; continuity of, 317-18.

Measurement, relativity of, 325-7.

Mechanism, mechanical conception of universe, 69, 265, 289, 393-6, 404, 409, 413, 414, 424-9.

Memory, and personality, 276-84.

MENDIVE, 99 _n._

MERCIER, on division of metaphysics, 21; on scholasticism, 26-7; on characteristics of essences, 83, 93-4; on analogical concept of God, 97; on distinction, 107; on phenomenism, 213, 224 _n._, 269 _n._; on faculty and substance, 305 _n._; on interaction, 391; on efficient cause, 393 _n._; on occasionalism, 398 _n._; on mechanism, 426 _n._, 429 _n._

Metaphor, and analogy, 39.

Metaphysics, division of, 15 _sqq._; etymology of, 17, 18; scope of, 24, 25, 27; and physics, _v._ physics.

MILL, 213, 220, 334, 343; on causes, 382.

Modal distinction, 150, 245 _sqq._

Modes, accidental and substantial, 150-1, 239, 245 _sqq._, 270, 325 _n._, 330-1.

MOLINA, 113 _n._

Monadology, of Leibniz, 227.

Monism, 46, 97, 103, 125, 230, 284, 350 _n._, 399. 409.

Monophysites, 268.

Monopsychism, 284.

Moral cause, 377-8.

Morality and art, 205-6.

Motion (_v._ change), and efficient causality, 392-6.

Multitude, actually infinite, 321-2.

Nature and substance, 257 _sqq._; and person, 261 _sqq._; analysis of notion of, 461 _sqq._

Necessary and Contingent Being, 47.

Necessity of essences, 81 _sqq._

— of physical laws, 419-28.

NEWMAN, on scope of philosophy, 22, 31; on causality, 377, 387.

NIETZSCHE, 431.

_Nisus naturae_, 421.

Nominalism, 125.

_Notas individuantes_, 124, 131.

NYS, 309 _n._, 311 _n._, 321 _n._, 327 _n._, 328 _n._, 395 _n._

Occasion, and cause, 359.

Occasionalism, 226, 387, 388; examined, 396-403.

Ontology, 21, 23.

Ontologism, 95, 350 _n._

Optimism, 181-2, 432.

Older, static and dynamic, 199, 428; and beauty, 194, 199, 428; natural and artificial, 428; and relation, 342; and final cause, 428; and formal cause, 429; and intelligent purpose, 417, 429-30, 433.

Panpsychism, 250.

Pantheism, _v._ monism.

PAULSEN, 213, 226-7.

Perfection, analysis of, 171 _sqq._; and beauty, 201; grades of, 59, 172-3; in substances, 134, 255; and distinction, 142 _n._; and habit, 297; and relation, 342.

Person, personality, 262 _sqq._; definition of, 265, 270 _n._; distinction from individual nature, 266 _sqq._; false theories of, 276 _sqq._; “subconscious,” 283-4.

PESCH, 99 _n._

Pessimism, 181-2, 431.

Phenomenism, and substance, 213 _sqq._, 223; substantializes accidents, 215; substantializes consciousness, 281, 282-4; and causality, 382 _sqq._, 398, 421.

Philosophy, notion of, 2 _sqq._; divisions of, 7 _sqq._; and special sciences, 28-9.

Place, analysis of, 318 _sqq._

PLATO, 93, 94, 95, 167, 200 _n._, 201.

Pleasure, sensible and esthetic, 196-7, 205-6.

POINCARÉ, 199 _n._

Positivism, 214, 334, 383, 409, 421.

Possible, the, 52 _sqq._, 82 _sqq._; and intelligible, 97; and passive potentiality, 109.

_Potentia obediantialis_, 372.

Potential, _v._ actual.

Power, operative, 55; and passive potentiality, 298 _sqq._; as index of perfection, 202 _n._; classification of, 305.

_Praescisio objectiva et formalis_, 34, 146-7.

Prime mover, necessity of, 65-7.

Principle, notion of, 357-8.

_Privatio_, 62, 358.

Providence, and chance, 424.

Psychology, 19, 296.

Purpose, and the good, 169, 405 _sqq._; and perfection, 408; and order, 429.

PYTHAGORAS, 1.

QUALITY, analysis of, 286 _sqq._; divisions of, 288 _sqq._; characteristics of, 305 _sqq._; grades of intensity in, 307.

Quantity, and individuation, 133; analysis of, 309 _sqq._; and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._; internal and external, 309-10, 314.

Rate, notion of, 325 _n._, 327 _n._

RADA, 99 _n._

Realism, moderate, 23, 125, 133, 242-3, 320.

— extreme, 46, 156-7.

Reason, and cause, 359-60.

— “sufficient,” 135, 182, 360.

REINSTADLER, 106 _n._

Relation, analysis of, 336 _sqq._; logical, 338 _sqq._; real, 341 _sqq._; transcendental, 345; predicamental, 346 _sqq._ ; reality of the “_esse ad_,” 350-6.

Relative, the, 47 _sqq._, 332 _sqq._

RENOUVIER, 335.

Revelation, 4 _sqq._, 12, 25, 189, 233, 247, 252, 263, 265, 267, 312-15, 328, 358 _n._

RICKABY, 276 _n._

ROSCOE, 83 _n._

ROYCE, 25.

SCHIFFINI, 99 _n._

Scholasticism, 26, 30; on substance, 218 _sqq._

SCHOPENHAUER, 431.

Science, _v._ knowledge.

Sciences, special, 16, 27; at Louvain and Maynooth, 29 _n._

SCOTUS, 34, 39 _sqq._, 99, 113, 125, 132, 153 _sqq._, 247, 267 _n._

Self, consciousness of, 274 _sqq._ (_v._ person.)

SENECA, 424 _n._

_Sensibilia propria et communia_, objectivity of, 70; _per se et per accidens_, 218, 260.

Sensism, 334, 383 _n._, 394 _n._

Similarity, and identity, 137, 306; and distinction, 153.

Simplicity, and quantity, 307 _n._

_Situs_, category of, 309, 319 _n._

SOCRATES, 167.

Solipsism, 86.

SONCINAS, 108 _n._

SOTO, D. DE, 113 _n._

Space, analysis of, 319 _sqq._; problems on, 321-2.

Specialists, scientific, and metaphysics, 27-28.

_Species expressa_, 46; _sensibilis_, 313.

SPENCER, 30, 213, 228, 229, 335.

SPINOZA, on substance, 230-2, 334, 399.

Spirits, individuation of, 129, 131.

STORCHENAU, 98 _n._

SUAREZ, 41, 44, 110 _n._, 111 _n._, 267 _n._

Sublime, the, 199 _n._

_Subsistentia_, 131, 261 _sqq._ (_v._ person), 271-3.

Substance, category of, undeniable in thought, 209, 215, 220, 281, 282-4; reality of, 213 _sqq._; cognoscibility of, 213 _sqq._, 219 _sqq._; plurality of, 221; distinction from accidents, 224 _sqq._, 301-5; erroneous notions of, 225 _sqq._; permanence of, 229, 277; divisions of, 252 _sqq._; complete and incomplete, 254 _sqq._; corporeal and spiritual, 253-4, 315-6; relation to space, 319.

Substantial change, 71.

SULLY-PRUDHOMME, 203 _n._

Supernatural theology, 5, 12, 13.

— end, 411.

_Suppositum, suppositalitas_, _v._ person, personality.

TAINE, 213.

Taste, esthetic, 197.

Teleology, _v._ purpose and final cause.

TENNYSON, 31, 431.

Theodicy, 21.

Theology, natural, 15, 19, 182, 189, 285, 334, 438, 430.

THOMAS, ST., on division of philosophy, 9, 18, 26; on analogy, 36; on absolute being, 49; on action, 60, 64; on essences, 76, 79, 92; on existence and essences, 102 _n._, 110 _n._, 112 _n._; on unity, 116 _n._, 117 _n._, 119 _n._, 120 _n._, 156 _n._, 250; on individuation, 127 _n._; on ontological truth, 162-3, and falsity, 165 _n._; on the good, 169 _n._, 174 _n._, 176 _n._, 180 _n._; on evil, 183 _n._, 184 _n._; on the beautiful, 193 _n._, 194 _n._, 200 _n._; on Aristotle’s categories, 210, 211 _n._; on substance and accident, 209 _n._, 223 _n._, 231 _n._, 232 _n._, 234 _n._, 241 _n._, 243 _n._, 248; on essence as nature, 258-61; on subsistence and personality, 263 _n._, 266 _n._, 269; on quality, 283, 290, 293; on habits, 294-6; on power and substance, 300 _sqq._; on grades in quality, 307-8; on quantity and corporeal substance, 311 _sqq._; on body and spirit, 314-6; on time, 323-4; on _creatio ab aeterno_, 328; on duration, 330 _n._; on relations, 339-40, 341 _n._, 342 _n._, 344 _n._, 347, 348 _n._, 351 _n._, 353 _n._, 354 _n._, 355 _n._, 356 _n._; on classification of causes, 362 _n._; on material and formal causes, 365 _n._; on action, 367-8; on instrumental cause, 375; on created causes, 388 _n._, 389 _n._; on occasionalism, 400 _n._; on final causality, 408 _n._, 412 _n._, 415 _n._; on nature and art, 417, 428 _n._; on order, 428, 432 _n._, 433.

Thought and imagery, 392-6.

Time, analysis of, 322 _sqq._; problems on, 328.

Tradition, 31.

Transcendental and generic notions, 35; attributes of being, 114 _sqq._; relations, 345.

Transubstantiation, 233.

Truth, ontological, 158 _sqq._

TURNER, 21 _n._

_Ubi_, category of, 309, 319.

Ubiquity, Divine, 319.

Uniformity of Nature, 377; and law, 418; and inductive science, 419; degrees of, 422 _sqq._

Union, substantial and personal, 268.

Unity, doctrine of, 114 _sqq._, 242-3; “organic” and “mechanical,” 249-51, 260-1, 278; of living individual, 280-1, 301-5; conceptual, 337.

Universal and individual (_v._ individuation), 252-3.

Univocal, _v._ analogical.

URRABURU, 35, 87 _n._, 88 _n._, 99 _n._, 124 _n._; on modes, 245 _n._; on nature and person, 267-8, 270 _n._, 288 _n._, 345 _n._, 355 _n._; on instrumental causes, 374 _n._; on cause, 393 _n._

Vacuum, and motion, 321.

VALLET, 201.

Variety, and beauty, 200.

VASQUEZ, 110 _n._

VEITCH, 334 _n._

Vital change, 64-5.

— acts, 246 _n._

Voluntarism, 96-7.

Weltanschauung, World-view, 4, 29, 30.

WILLIAM OF OCKAM, 95.

WINDELBAND, 7, 208 _n._

WOLFF, 21, 98.

WUNDT, 213, 226, 267 _n._

ZIGLIARA, 64 _n._, 107 _n._, 156 _n._, 301 _n._, 320 _n._, 398 _n._

FOOTNOTES

1 2 vols. Longmans, 1912.

_ 2 Institutions Metaphysica, quas Roma, in Pontificia Universitate Gregoriana tradiderat_ P. JOANNES JOSEPHUS URRABURU, S.J. Volumen Secundum: _Ontologia_ (Rome, 1891).

3 French version by SIERP, 4 vols. Paris, Gaume, 1868.

_ 4 Ontologie, ou Métaphysique Générale_, par D. MERCIER. Louvain, 3me édit., 1902.

5 Τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες.—ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, I., 1. “Sapientia [philosophia] est scientia quae considerat primas et universales causas.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, I., I. 2.

_ 6 Cf._ DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_, pp. 59-61, 191-4; _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 311-13; also two articles in the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_ (March and May, 1906) on _Thoughts on Philosophy and Religion_, and an article in the _Irish Theological Quarterly_ (October, 1910) on _Philosophy and Sectarianism in Belfast University_, by the present writer.

_ 7 Cf._ Encyclical _Aeterni Patris_, on Philosophical Studies, by Pope Leo XIII., August 4,1880.

8 Introduction, § 1.

9 As a brief general statement of the matter this is sufficiently accurate and will not be misunderstood. Of course the general standpoint of ultimate causes and reasons admits within itself some variety of aspects. Thus Epistemology and Psychology deal with human thought, but under different aspects; Psychology and Ethics deal with human volition, but under different aspects, etc.

10 “Theoreticus sive speculativis intellectus, in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo differunt ab invicem fine; finis speculativae est veritas, finis operativae sive practicae actio.”—ST. THOMAS, _In lib. Boetii de Trinitate_.

11 Here is St. Thomas’ exposition and justification of the doctrine in the text: “Sapientis est ordinare. Cujus ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere ordinem.... Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatatur. Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos ad invicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae. Tertius autem est quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo. Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. Nam ad _philosophiam naturalem_ pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus _et metaphysicam_. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad _rationalem philosophiam_, cujus est considerare ordinem partium orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum ad invicem et ad conclusiones. Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem _moralis philosophiae_. Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad _artes mechanicas_.”—_In X. Ethic. ad Nichom._, i., lect. 1.

_ 12 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., Introduction, ch. ii. and iii.

13 ARISTOTLE and the scholastics distinguished between the domain of the practical (πρᾶσσω, πρᾶξις, _agere_, _agibilia_) and the operative or productive (ποιεῖν, ποίησις, _facere_, _factibilia_).

_ 14 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 8.

15 “Quædam igitur sunt _speculabilium_ quæ dependent a materia secundum esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt, et hæc distinguuntur quia dependent quædam a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut illa in quorum definitione ponitur materia sensibilis: unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt; ut in definitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa: et de his est _physica_ sive scientia naturalis. Quædam vero sunt quæ, quamvis dependeant a materia sensibili secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum definitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, ut linea et numerus: et de his est _mathematica_. Quædam vero sunt speculabilia quæ non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt: sive nunquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, potentia et actus, unum et multa, etc., de quibus omnibus est _theologia_, id est scientia divina, quia præcipuum cognitorum in ea est Deus. Alio nomine dicitur _metaphysica_, id est, transphysica, quia post physicam dicenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam _philosophia prima_, in quantum scientiae aliæ ab ea principia sua accipientes eam sequuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _In lib. Boetii de Trinitate_, q. 5, a. 1.

16 Ἐττιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἤ θεωοεῖ τὸ ὄν και τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ ἁυτό.—_Metaph._ III., I (ed. Didot).

_ 17 Metaph._ X., ch. vii., 5 and 6.

_ 18 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 251-5.

19 When the term “science” is used nowadays in contradistinction to “philosophy,” it usually signifies the knowledge embodied in what are called the special, or positive, or inductive sciences—a knowledge which Aristotle would not regard as strictly or fully scientific.

20 Aristotle’s conception of the close relation between _Physics_ (or the _Philosophy_ of Nature) and those analytic studies which we nowadays describe as the physical sciences, bears witness to the close alliance which he conceived to exist between sense observation on the one hand and rational speculation on the other. This sane view of the continuity of human knowledge, a view to which the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages were ever faithful, was supplanted at the dawn of modern philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the opposite view, which led to a divorce between physics and metaphysics, and to a series of misunderstandings which still prevail with equal detriment to science and philosophy alike.

_ 21 Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 28-9, 66; MERCIER, _Ontologie_, Introd., p. v., n.

22 “Dicitur metaphysica [scientia] id est, transphysica, quia post physicam dicenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia devenire.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Lib. Boetii de Trinitate_, q. 5, a. 1.

23 This is also the title of the social and ethnological study of the various races of men, their primitive habits, customs, institutions, etc.

24 Not entirely; for instance, what is perhaps the most comprehensive course of philosophy published in recent times, the _Philosophia Lacensis_ (11 vols., Herder, 1888-1900) apparently follows the arrangement of metaphysics outlined above. The fundamental questions on _knowing_ and _being_, which usually constitute distinct departments under the respective titles of _Epistemology_ and _Ontology_, are here treated under the comprehensive title of _Institutiones Logicales_ (3 vols.). However, they are really metaphysical problems, problems of speculative philosophy, wherever they be treated; and the fact that the questions usually treated in Ontology are here treated in a volume apart (vol. iii. of the _Institutiones Logicales_: under the peculiar title of _Logica Realis_), and not in the volumes assigned to general metaphysics, shows the necessity and convenience of the more modern arrangement. General metaphysics are dealt with in 2 vols. of _Institutiones Philosophiae Naturalis_ and 3 vols. of _Institutiones Psychologicae_; special metaphysics in the _Institutiones Theodicœae_ (1 vol.); ethics in 2 vols. of _Institutiones Juris Naturae_.

_ 25 Cf._ TURNER, _History of Philosophy_, p. 525.

26 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., § 9.

27 pp. 45, 51.

_ 28 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 17.

_ 29 Cf._ _ibid._ i., Introd., ch. i.

30 CAJETAN, _In 2 Post Anal._, ch. xiii.

_ 31 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, §§ 6-13; LADD, _A Theory of Reality_, ch. i.

_ 32 infra_, ch. viii.; _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., Part IV., ch. iii.-vi.; Part V., ch. i.

33 p. 18—in which context will be found a masterly analysis and criticism of current prejudices and objections against systematic metaphysics.

_ 34 ibid._ pp. 19-20.

35 ROYCE, _The Conception of God_, p. 207.

36 MERCIER, _Logique_, Introd., § 14.

37 Encyclical, _Aeterni Patris_, on philosophical studies.

_ 38 Summa Theologica_, 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad. 2.

_ 39 Cf._ MERCIER, _Origines de la psychologie contemporaine_, ch. viii.; DE WULF, _Scholasticism Old and New_ (_passim_).

_ 40 Cf._ LADD, _op. cit._, pp. 9, 10.

41 EUCKEN, _Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Philosophie und Lebensanschauung_, § 157 (Leipzig, 1903).

_ 42 Cf._ art. _Philosophy and the Sciences at Louvain_, in the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_, May, 1905, reprinted as Appendix in DE WULF’S _Scholasticism Old and New_.

43 Hence the necessity of equipping the student of philosophy with a knowledge of the main conclusions and theories of the sciences that have an immediate bearing on philosophy: chemistry, physics, geology, astronomy, mechanics, the axioms and postulates of pure and applied mathematics, cellular biology, embryology, the physiology of the nervous system, botany and zoology, political economy, sociology and ethnology. Nowhere is the system of combining the scientific with the philosophical formation of mind more thoroughly carried out at the present time than in the curriculum of the Philosophical Institute at the University of Louvain. In the College of Maynooth not only is the study of philosophy completed by a fuller course of Christian Theology,—both disciplines thus combining to give the student all the essential elements of a complete _Philosophy of Life_ (ii.),—but it is preceded by an elementary training in the physical sciences and accompanied by courses on the history of scientific theories in chemistry, physics, physiology, and general biology.

44 “We may mention it in passing,” writes Mercier in his general introduction to philosophy (_Logique_, § 1, p. 6)—“it was this feeling of individual impotence in face of the task confronting the philosopher at the present day, that inspired the foundation of the Philosophical Institute at the University of Louvain”. He had previously outlined the project in his _Rapport sur les études philosophiques_ at the Congress of Mechlin in 1891. Here are a few brief extracts from that memorable document: “Since individual effort feels itself well nigh powerless in the presence of the field of observation which goes on widening day by day, association must make up for the insufficiency of the isolated worker; men of analysis and men of synthesis must come together and form, by their daily intercourse and united action, an atmosphere suited to the harmonious development of science and philosophy alike....” “Man has multiplied his power of vision; he enters the world of the infinitely small; he fixes his scrutinizing gaze upon regions where our most powerful telescopes discern no limits. Physics and Chemistry progress with giant strides in the study of the properties of matter and of the combinations of its elements. Geology and Astronomy reconstruct the history of the origin and formation of our planet. Biology and the natural sciences study the minute structure of living organisms, their distribution in space and succession in time; and Embryology explores their origin. The archæological, philological and social sciences reconstruct the past ages of our history and civilizations. What an inexhaustible mine is here to exploit, what regions to explore and materials to analyse and interpret; finally what pioneers we must engage in the work if we are to have a share in garnering those treasures!”

_ 45 Grammar of Assent_, p. 229.

46 Lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum, et lumen semitis meis.—Ps. cxviii., 105.

47 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_.

_ 48 Cf._ _Logic_, i., § 123.

_ 49 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 204-6.

_ 50 Cf._ SCOTUS, _Summa Theologica_, edit. by Montefortino (Rome, 1900), i., p. 106, _Ad tertium_.

_ 51 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 119-20.

_ 52 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 104, 129; also URRABURU, _Ontologia_, Disp. III., Cap. II., Art. III., p. 155.

53 Hence St. Thomas calls the things about which a generic or specific concept is predicated “analoga secundum esse et non secundum intentionem” (_In 1 Sent._, Dist. xix., q. 5, a. 2, ad a am): we bring them under the same notion or “intentio” (_e.g._ “living being”), but the content of this notion is realized in the various things (_e.g._ in Socrates, this horse, that rose-tree, etc.) in varying and unequal degrees of perfection. Hence, too, this univocal relation of the genus to its subordinate subjects is sometimes (improperly) called “analogy of inequality”.

_ 54 Cf._ _infra_, ch. viii.

_ 55 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, §§ 599, 600.

56 This, of course, is the proper sort of analogical predication: the predication based upon similarity of proportions or relations. Etymologically, analogy means equality of proportions (_Cf._ _Logic_, ii., p. 160). On the whole subject the student may consult with profit Cajetan’s _Opusculum de Nominum Analogia_, published as an appendix to vol. iv. of St. Thomas’ _Quæstiones Disputatæ_ in De Maria’s edition (1883).

_ 57 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 40-42.

_ 58 Cf._ SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 318-22, 125-131, 102-7 (especially p. 128, _Ad tertium_); p. 131, _Ad sextum_; p. 321, _Ad tertium_.

59 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 599.

_ 60 ibid._, § 600.

61 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. xxviii., § 3; Dist. xxxii., § 2.

62 SCOTUS, _op. cit._, i., pp. 106-7, 128-9.

_ 63 ibid._, p. 107.

_ 64 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _La philosophie scolastique_ (“_Die Philosophie der Vorzeit_”). Fr. trans. by Sierp (Paris, 1868), vol. i., p. 66, § 35.

65 The logical copula, which expresses this relation and asserts the truth of the judgment, expresses, of course, a logical entity, an _ens rationis_. True judgments may be stated about logical entities as well as about realities. But since the former can be conceived only after the manner of the latter, the appropriateness of using the verb which expresses existence or reality, as the logical copula, will be at once apparent. _Cf._ _Logic_, i., p. 249, n. 1.

66 SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Dist. 54, § i., 6.

_ 67 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 28-9.

_ 68 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 551-2.

_ 69 Cf._ _Logic_, i., pp. 70-1.

70 “Esse actum quondam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc, quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc, quod est in actu.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gent._ i., c. xxii., 4.

71 Certain medieval philosophers had made the same mistake. St. Thomas points out their error frequently. _Cf._ _Contra Gentes_, i., c. xxvi: “Quia id, quod commune est, per additionem specificatur vel individuatur, æstimaverunt, divinum esse, cui nulla fit additio, non esse aliquid proprium, sed esse commune omnium: non considerantes, quod id, quod commune est, vel universale, sine additione esse non potest, sed sine additione consideratur. Non enim animal potest esse absque rationali vel irrationali differentia, quamvis sine his differentiis consideretur; licet enim cogitetur universale absque additione, non tamen absque receptibilitate additionis est. Nam si animali nulla differentia addi posset, genus non esset; et similiter est de omnibus aliis nominibus. Divinum autem esse est absque additione, non solum cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura; et non solum absque additione, sed absque receptibilitate additionis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod additionem non recipit, nec recipere potest, magis concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune, sed esse proprium. Etenim ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus aliis distinguitur, quia nihil ei addi potest.”

_ 72 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, QQ. DD. _De Potentia_, q. i. art. 1, ad. 18.

73 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, c. iv., v., _apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, iii., p. 60.

_ 74 Contra Gentes_, II., c. vii.

_ 75 Cf._ LAMINNE, _Cause et Effet_—_Revue neo-scolastique_, February, 1914, p. 38.

76 St. Thomas uses what is for him strong language when he describes such a view as ridiculous: “Ridiculum est dicere quod ideo corpus non agat, quia accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum; non enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere, quod idem numero calor, qui est in calefaciente corpore, transeat ad corpus calefactum; sed quia virtute caloris, qui est in calefaciente corpore, alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto, qui prior erat in eo in potentia. Agens enim naturale non est traducens propriam formam in alterum subjectum, sed reducens subjectum quod patitur de potentia in actum.”—_Contra Gentes_, L. III., c. lxix.

_ 77 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (8), ix., _Quintum_. _Cf._ also ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._ v., ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., § 14, and _Contra Gentes_, i., c. xvi., where he emphasizes the truth that potential being presupposes actual being: “Quamvis id quod quandoque est in potentia, quandoque in actu, prius sit tempore in potentia quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia; quia potentia non educit se in actum, sed opportet quod educatur in actum per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in potentia, habet aliquid prius se”.

78 KLIMKE, _Der Monismus und seine philosophischen Grundlagen_, p. 185. _Cf._ _Irish Theological Quarterly_, vol. vii. (April, 1912), p. 157 _sqq._, art. _Reflections on Some Forms of Monism_.

79 For relations of _potentia_ and _actus_, _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 214.

_ 80 Cf._ _Physics_, v., 1; _De Anima_, i., 3.

81 Λεγώ δ᾽ ὕλην, ἢ καθ᾽ ἁυτὴν μήτε τὶ, μήτε ποσὸν, μήτε ποίον, μήτε ἄλλο μεδὲν λέγεται οἶς ὤρισται τὸ ὄν.—_Metaph._ vi., c. iii.

82 “Decepit antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia: et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quæ sunt sensibilia propria vel communia. Hujusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et hujusmodi. Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens, et ideo ad ejus cognitionem non bervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam materiam distinguere.”—_In Metaph._ vii., 2.

83 “Esse actum quemdam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid, ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex hoc quod est in actu.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, i., ch. xxii., 4.

84 The etymology of Aristotle’s description of the essence as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is not easy to explain. The expression τὸ εἶναι supposes a dative understood, _e.g._ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, the being proper to man. To the question τὶ ἐστι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι; what is the being or essence proper to man? the answer is: that which gives the definition of man, that which explains what he is—τί ἦν. Is the imperfect, τὶ ἦν, an archaic form for the present, τὶ ἐστι; or is it a deliberate suggestion of the profound doctrine that the essence as ideal, or possible, is anterior to its actual, physical realization? Commentators are not agreed. _Cf._ MATTHIAS KAPPES, Aristoteles-Lexicon, p. 25 (Paderborn, 1894); MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 30 n.

85 Essentia est illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, et quod significamus per definitionem indicantem quid est res.—_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. i.

86 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, v., 4; ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. ix., art. 1.

87 Sometimes, however, the expression “metaphysical essence” is used to signify those objective concepts, and those only, _without which the thing cannot be conceived_, (or sometimes, even the one which is considered most fundamental among these), and therefore as not explicitly involving the concepts of properties which follow necessarily from the former; while the “physical essence” is understood to signify all those real elements _without which the thing cannot actually exist_, including, therefore, all such necessary properties. Taken in this sense the physical essence of man would include not merely soul and body, but also such properties as the capacity of speech, of laughter, of using tools, of cooking food, etc.

88 Et ex hoc patet ratio, writes St. Thomas, quare genus et species et differentia se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam, formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem cum illis; quia neque genus est materia, sed sumitur a materia ut significans totum; nec differentia est forma, sed sumitur a forma ut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse _animal rationale_, et non _ex animali et rationali_; sicut dicimus eum esse ex corpore et anima. Ex corpore enim et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quædam tertia res constituta, quæ neutra illarum est: homo enim nec est anima neque corpus; sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali dicatur esse, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus sed sicut intellectus [conceptus] tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim _animalis_ est sine determinatione formae specialis naturam exprimens rei, ex eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. Intellectus autem hujus differentiae, _rationalis_, consistit in determinatione formae specialis: ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel definitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit prædicationem earum rerum ex quibus constituitur; ita nec intellectus recipit prædicationem eorum intellectuum ex quibus constituitur; non enim dicimus, quod definitio sit genus vel differentia.—_De Ente et Essentia_, cap. iii.

_ 89 Cf._ MERCIER, _Psychologie_, vol. ii., § 169 (6th edit., 1903, pp. 24-5).

_ 90 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, L. viii., 10; ST. THOMAS, _In_ viii., _Metaph._, Lect. iii., par. i.

_ 91 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 42-3. How do we know that not only water (H2O) is a possible essence but also hydrogen di-oxide (H2O2)? Because the latter substance has been _actually formed_ by chemists (_Cf._ ROSCOE, _Elementary Chemistry_, Lesson VI.). Is hydrogen tri-oxyde (H2O3) a possible substance? We may ask chemists,—and they may not be able to tell us with any certainty whether it is or not.

92 The actual existence of a thinking mind is of course a necessary condition, in the actual order, for the apprehension of objects in this abstract way. But such existence is no part of the apprehended object. That the human mind, which is itself finite, contingent, allied with matter, and dependent on the activity of corporeal sense organs for the objects of its knowledge, should nevertheless have the power to apprehend contingent realities apart from their contingent actual existence in time and space,—is a fact of the greatest significance as regards the nature of the mind itself. But if we try to prove the existence of God from a consideration of the nature and powers of the human mind, our argument proceeds from the actual, and is distinct from any argument based exclusively on the nature and properties of possible essences as such. St. Augustine’s argument assumes as a fact that the human mind represents to itself possible essences as having reality independently both of its own thought and of any actual existence of such essences (_Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei Existentia_, p. 23). But _is_ this a fact? This is the really debatable point.

93 Among others Henry of GHENT († 1293; _Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 364-6; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, Dissert, vi., cap. ii., 2 §§ 581-5), Capreolus (1380-1444), certain Scotists, and certain theosophists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, are credited with this peculiar view. For numerous references, _Cf._ URRABURU, _Ontologia_, Disp. iii., cap. ii., art. v. pp. 650-63.

_ 94 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, pp. 652-3, for references; among others, to ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. 3, art. 1, ad 2um; art. 7, ad 10um; art. 5, argum. 2o; _ibid._, ad 2um. _Summa Theol._, i., q. 14, art. 9; q. 45, art. 1; _ibid._ , art. 2, ad 2um; q. 61, art. 2, corp.

95 Among others, BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.), LEPIDI (_Ontologia_, quoted by DE MUNYNCK, _Praelectiones de Dei Existentia_, Louvain, 1904, p. 19); DE MUNYNCK (_ibid._, pp. 19-23, 46-7, 75); HICKEY (_Theologia Naturalis_, pp. 31-4); DRISCOLL (_God_, pp. 72 sqq.); LACORDAIRE (_God_, p. 21); KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie der Vorzeit_, Dissert. iv., § 476.

96 Truth is not the work of any human intelligence, says St. Augustine, nor can any one arrogate to himself the right to say “_my_ truth,” or “_thy_ truth,” but all must say simply “_the_ truth”: “Quapropter, nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia, quae incommutabiliter vera sunt, continentem, quam non possis dicere vel tuam vel meam, vel cujuscumque hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter: omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam pertinere quis dixerit?”—_De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. xii. _Cf._ his striking expression of the same thought in his Commentary, _Super Genesim ad Litteram_, lib. ii., cap. vii.: “We may conceive the heavens and the earth, that were created in six days, ceasing to exist; but can we conceive the number ‘six’ ceasing to be the sum of six units?”: “Facilius coelum et terra transire possunt, quae secundum numerum senarium fabricata sunt, quam effici possit ut senarius numerus suis partibus non compleatur” (_apud_ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 35-6).

_ 97 Cf._ BALMES (_Fundamental Philosophy_, bk. iv., ch. xxvi.), who, analysing the truth of the proposition “Two circles of equal diameters are equal,” as an example of the necessary, eternal, immutable characteristics of possible essences, goes so far as to write (italics ours): “What would happen, if, withdrawing all bodies, all sensible representations, _and even all intelligences_, we should imagine absolute and universal nothing? We see the truth of the proposition even on this supposition: for it is impossible for us to hold it to be false. On every supposition, our understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy: the condition once established, the result will infallibly follow.

“An absolutely necessary connection, founded neither on us, nor on the external world, which exists before anything we can imagine, and subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our understanding, must be based upon something, it cannot have nothing for its origin: to say this would be to assert a necessary fact without a sufficient reason.

“It is true that in the proposition now before us nothing real is affirmed, but if we reflect carefully we find even here the greatest difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility. What is remarkable in this phenomenon, is precisely this, that our understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a proposition which affirms an absolutely necessary connection _without any relation to an existing object_. It is conceivable that an intelligence affected by other beings may know their nature and relations; but it is not so easy of comprehension how it can discover their nature and relations in an absolutely necessary manner, when it abstracts all existence, when the ground upon which the eyes of the understanding are fixed, is the abyss of nothing.

“We deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract all existence. Even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of every thing, a very easy supposition, granting that we find in our consciousness the contingency of our being, the understanding still perceives a possible order, and imagines it to be all occupied with pure possibility, _independent of a being upon which it is based_. We repeat, that this is an illusion, which disappears so soon as we reflect upon it. In pure nothing, nothing is possible; there are no relations, no connections of any kind; in nothing there are no combinations, it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured.

“The objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary relations in a possible order, reveal _a communication of our understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility_. This possibility can be explained on no supposition except that which makes the communication consist in _the action of God giving to our mind faculties_ perceptive of the necessary relation of certain ideas, based upon necessary being, and representative of His infinite essence.”

Balmes, therefore, does not mean that we could continue to see essences as possible were we to imagine withdrawn not merely finite minds but even the Divine Mind. In such an absurd hypothesis, nothing would appear true or false, possible or impossible. But he contends that even when we _try_ to think away _all_ minds, even the Divine Mind, we still see possible essences to be possible. And from this he argues that, since we have successfully thought away finite minds and the actuality of essences, while the possibility of these latter still persists, these must be grounded in the Mind of God, the Actual, Eternal, Necessary Being, where they have eternal ideal being.

_Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK (_op. cit._, pp. 22-3): “Ponamus mundum non esse, nec supponamus Dei existentiam. In nihilo illo, omne ens actuale excludens, remanet intacta—hoc certissime scimus ex objectivo valore intellectus nostri—realitas aeterna, immutabilis, ordinis idealis. [Illa realitas essentiarum, he adds (_ibid._, n. 2), independens ab omni actuali existentia, atque ab omni actu intellectus, est fundamentum metaphysicum realismi platonici.—Habet praeterea mirum hoc systema, ut omnes sciunt, fundamentum criteriologicum.] Essentiae _sunt_, nec tamen existunt. Illa realitas, praeter mundum totum, praeter entia rationis, indestructibilis perseverat, nec tamen actualis est. Haec quomodo intelligi possit nescimus, nisi ponatur illam fundari in plenitudine aeterna, infinita, absoluta τοῦ Esse absoluti. Hoc ente supremo posito, omnia lucidissima se praebent intellectui; illo Deo optimo—quem non possumus, perspectis illis altissimis, non adorare—sublato, admittendae sunt essentiae rerum ab aeterno reales sine actuali existentia; atque proinde quid non-individuale est reale in se, quod tamen concipi non potest nisi objective in mente.”

_ 98 Cf._ ST. AUGUSTINE, _De Libero Arbitrio_, lib. ii., ch. viii.

_ 99 Cf._ especially MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 40-49.

100 It is, for example, just as necessarily and immutably true of any actually existing man that he cannot be at the same time existing and not existing as it is that a man cannot be an irrational animal.

101 “Unde, etiamsi intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. ii.

_ 102 Phædo_, 100, C. ff.

103 MERCIER, _Ontologie_, pp. 45-7.

_ 104 Cf_. DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.

_ 105 Cf._ DE MUNNYNCK, _op. cit._, pp. 24-5.

_ 106 ibid._, pp. 22, 24.

107 “Quæ objecta non divina esse, luce clarius apparet. Attamen ilia ponderando, _modumque inspiciendo quo representantur a mente humana_, atque praesupponendo valorem objectivum intellectus, concludimus ex ideis ad realitates illas quæ in Esse divino fundantur ... ratione horum [objectorum _scil._ idearum nostrarum] percipimus, ope ratiocinii, illa positive aeterna et immutabilia, quæ reapse in Deitate fundantur, atque sunt ipse Deus quatenus imitabilis.”—_ibid._, pp. 24-5. _Cf._ extract quoted above, p. 91 n.

108 “Non ideo voluit Deus mundum creare in tempore, quia vidit melius sic fore, quam si creasset ab æterno; _nec voluit tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse_. Sed contra, quia voluit creare mundum in tempore, ideo sic melius est, quam si creatus fuisset ab æterno, _et quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario æquales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam verum est, et aliter fieri non potest_, atque ita de reliquis.”—DESCARTES, in _Resp. ad Sext. Objectiones_, ad 6um scrupulum.

109 MERCIER, _op. cit._, pp. 58-60.

110 URRABURU (_op. cit._ Disp. iii., cap. ii., § iii., p. 671) mentions Wolff, Leibniz, Genuensis and Storchenau as holding this view.

111 Among others, Liberatore, Lahousse, Pesch, Harper. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._

112 Dupasquier, Mastrius and Rada, _apud_ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._, pp. 679-81.

113 Urraburu, Schiffini, Mendive. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._, p. 671.

114 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

115 “Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia_, q. iii., art. v., ad 2 um.

116 “Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam: esse enim Dei est ejus substantia, ut ostensum est (_C. G._, Lib. i., c. 22). Quod autem competit alicui secundum naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne [_i.e._ as caused or produced in them. _Cf._ Kleutgen, _op. cit._, Dissert., i., c. iii., § 61]. Ipsum igitur esse competit aliis omnibus a primo agente per participationem quamdam. Quod autem alicui competit per participationem, non est substantia ejus. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis praeter agens primum sit ipsum esse. Hinc est quod Exod. iii., proprium nomen Dei ponitur esse _qui est_, quia ejus solius proprium est, quod sua substantia non sit aliud quam suum esse.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 52, n. 7.

“Quod inest alicui ab agente, oportet esse actum ejus; agentis enim est facere aliquid actu. Ostensum est autem supra, quod omnes aliae substantiæ habent esse a primo agente, et per hoc ipsæ substantiæ creatæ sunt, quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum igitur esse inest substantiis creatis ut quidam actus earum. Id autem, cui actus inest, potentia est: nam actus in quantum hujusmodi ad potentiam refertur. In qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et actus.”—_ibid._, cap. 53, n. 2.

“Omne quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia respectu illius: et hoc quod receptum est in eo, est actus ejus; ergo oportet, quod ipsa forma vel quidditas, quæ est intelligentia [_i.e._ a pure spirit], sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus, et ita invenitur actus et potentia in intelligentiis [_i.e._ pure spirits], non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce.”—_De Ente et Essentia_, cap. v. _Cf._ also _Summa Theol._, P. i., q. iii., art. 4; q. xiii., art. 11; q. lxxv., art. 5, ad 4 um. _Quodlibeta_, ii., art. 3; ix., art. 6. _De Potentia_, q. vii., art. 2. _In Metaph._, iii., Dist. vi., q. 2, art. 2. _Contra Gentes_, L. ii., cap. 54, 68. St. Thomas is usually interpreted as teaching that the distinction between essence and existence in created things is a real distinction. But there are some who have been unable to convince themselves that the Angelic Doctor has made his mind entirely clear on the subject. Kleutgen, for instance, writes (_op. cit._, Dissert. vi., c. ii., § 574, n. 2): “In the extracts quoted above St. Thomas clearly states that the distinction made by our thought is based on the nature of created things, but not that this distinction is that which exists between different parts, dependent on one another, each having its own proper being or reality.”

_ 117 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 249, 5o.

_ 118 Cf._ REINSTADLER, _Ontologia_, lib. ii., cap. i., art. ii., § 2.

119 Zigliara (_Ontologia_ (14), iii. iv.) gives the virtual distinction as a sub-class of the real distinction; adding, however (according to Goudin, _Metaph._, Disp. i., q. iii. art. ii., § i) that “this virtual distinction is not so much a [real] distinction as the basis of a [mental] distinction”.

_ 120 op. cit._, p. 110.

121 These may be seen in abundance in the works of any of the scholastic writers, medieval or modern, who discuss the question. _Cf._, _e.g._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 251-4.

122 Besides St. Thomas (_cf._ _supra_, p. 102, n. 2), Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), Aegidius Romanus († _circa_ 1300), Capreolus (1380-1444), Soncinas († 1494), Cajetan (1468-1534), Sylvester Ferrariensis (1474-1528), Dominicus Bañez (1528-1604), John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), Goudin (1639-95), are among the most noted scholastics to hold this view. It is supported by the members of the Dominican Order generally; and by not a few Jesuits among recent scholastic writers; also by MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 48-51.

_ 123 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 575.

_ 124 ibid._, § 577.

_ 125 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap. i., art. 2, pp. 730-31.

126 “Esse rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est intelligendum, quod sit aliquod superadditum, ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen, quod imponitur ab esse (ens) significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. iv., l. 2.

127 Among the advocates of this view are Alexander of Hales († 1245), Aureolus († 1322), Durandus († 1332), Gabriel Biel († 1495), Suarez (1548-1617), Toletus (1532-1596), Vasquez (1551-1604), Gregory of Valentia († _circa_ 1600), and the Jesuits generally: some few regarding the distinction as _purely_ logical, _e.g._ Franzelin (_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 47, p. 110, n. 2). For details and arguments on both sides, _cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. iv., cap. i., art. 2.

128 “Compositum ex esse et essentia dicitur de ratione entis creati secundum fundamentum, quod in ipso ente creato habet; hoc autem fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet ex se actu existere, sed tantum est ens potentiale, quod ab alio potest esse participare: nam hinc fit, ut essentia creaturae concipiatur a nobis ut potentiale quid, esse vero ut modus seu actus, quo talis essentia ens in actu constituitur.”—SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxi., § 13.

129 When we speak of an essence as _receiving_ existence, we do not necessarily imply a real distinction between receiver and received: “Non est imaginandum quod una res sit, quae participat sicut essentia, et alia quae participatur sicut esse, sed quia una et eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius sicut per vim agentis: haec enim realitas de se non est nisi sub modo possibili; quod autem sit et vocari possit actus, hoc habet per vim agentis.”—ALEXANDER OF HALES, _In Metaph._, L. vii., text 22. “Non omne acceptum,” writes St. Thomas, “est receptum in aliquo subjecto; alioquin non posset dici quod tota substantia rei creatae sit accepta a Deo, cum totius substantiae non sit aliquod subjectum receptivum”—_Summa Theol._, I., q. xxvii., art. ii., ad. 3um.

_ 130 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 49. Some of these doctrines we shall examine later, by way of illustration, in connexion with the _Unity_ of being.

_ 131 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, art. iii., Obj. 9, Resp.

132 This view is advocated by, among others, Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Henry of Ghent († 1293), Francis de Vittoria (1480-1566), Dominicus de Soto (1496-1560), Molina (1535-1600), Fonseca (1548-97), and Scotists generally.

133 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, lib. 5, text ii., cap. 6; ST. THOMAS, _in loc._ et alibi.

134 “Si ... modus entis accipiatur ... secundum divisionem unius ab altero, ... hoc exprimit hoc nomen _aliquid_, dicitur enim aliquid quasi _aliud quid_. Unde sicut ens dicitur _unum_ inquantum est _indivisum in se_, ita dicitur _aliquid_ inquantum est _ab aliis diversum_.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 1, a. 1.

135 “Nam omne ens est aut simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet esse, quamdiu partes ejus sint divisae, sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est, quod unumquodque sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xi., a. 1.

136 “Unum vero quod est principium numeri, addit supra substantiam _rationem mensurae_, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. _Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur._”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, lib. 4, lect. 2, par. _b_.

137 Those who regard the distinction between the essence and the existence of an actually existing substance as real consider the latter as an _ens unum per se_. The existence of a real distinction between the essential constitutive factors of a composite substance is universally regarded by scholastics as compatible with essential unity—unitas _per se_—in the latter. Such factors are really distinct, and separable or divisible, but actually undivided. So also, the union of an individual nature and its subsistence (73) forms a _unum per se_ (unum _compositionis_) in the view of those who place a real distinction between these factors.

138 Of course essential unity of composition is also “natural”. _Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 631-8.

139 “Unum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit, nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quæ dicuntur multæ, quod unaquæque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera.... Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem, secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se, multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum, et unum eorum non esse alterum.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potent._, q. 9, a. 7.

140 “Sic ergo primo in intellectu nostro cadit _ens_, et deinde _divisio_, et post hoc _unum_ quod divisionem privat, et ultimo _multitudo_ quæ ex unitatibus constituitur.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, lib. 10, lect. 4, par. _c_.

141 Omnis pluralitas consequitur aliquam divisionem. Est autem duplex divisio: una materialis quæ fit secundum divisionem continui, et hanc sequitur numerus, qui est species quantitatis. Unde talis numerus, non est nisi in rebus materialibus habentibus quantitatem. Alia est divisio formalis, quæ fit per oppositas vel diversas formas: et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo quæ non est in aliquo genere, sed est de transcendentibus, secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa. Et talem multitudinem solam contingit esse in rebus immaterialibus.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxx., art. 3.

142 We may confine our attention here to substances, assuming for the present that accidents are individuated by the individual substances in which they inhere. We may note further that it is only corporeal individuals that fall directly within our experience. We can, of course, infer from the latter the actual existence of individual spiritual realities subsisting apart from matter, _viz._ human souls after death, and also the possibility of purely spiritual individual beings such as angels. But when we conceive these as individuals we must conceive them after the analogy of individuals in the domain of corporeal reality: it is only through concepts derived from this domain, and finding their _proper_ application within it, that we can have any knowledge of suprasensible or spiritual realities, _viz._ by applying those concepts _analogically_ to the latter.

143 The “_formal-actual_” distinction, which Scotists advocate between these grades of being, we shall examine later.

_ 144 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 280: “Principium ... intrinsicum vel formale est aliquid insitum rei, pertinensque ad intrinsecam et ultimam individui constitutionem, et fundans formalitatem illam, quae _individitatio_ dicitur. Sicut enim materia est in homine, v.g. principium et fundamentum propter quod est, ac praedicatur _materialis_, et forma fundat in eodem praedicatum _rationalis_, totaque natura composita, _humanitas_, praedicatum _hominis_; ita quaerimus quid sit illud primum principium, unde existit in quovis individuo sua peculiaris ac propria individuatio.”

145 In ancient Greece the Eleatics argued against the possibility of real plurality somewhat in this wise: If there were really different beings any two of them would differ from each other only by some third reality, and this again from each of the former by a fourth and a fifth reality, and so on _ad infinitum_: which would involve the absurdities of infinite number and infinite regress. A similar argument was used by the medieval pantheist, David of Dinant, to identify God with the material principle of corporeal reality: God and primary matter exist and do not differ; therefore they are identical: for if they differed they should differ by something distinct from either, and this again should differ from both by something distinct from all three, and so on _ad infinitum_: which is absurd. Such sophisms arise from accepting the purely abstract view of reality as adequate. We have seen already, in dealing with the abstract notion of being, that from this point of view it must be recognized and admitted that the reality whereby things differ (_viz._ being) is also the reality wherein they agree (_viz._ being, also). The paradox is restated below in regard to individuation.

146 Materia ... dupliciter accipitur, scilicet, ut signata et non signata. Et dicitur signata, secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione dimensionum harum scilicet vel illarum; non signata autem, quæ sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur. Secundum hoc igitur est sciendum, quod materia signata est individuationis principium.—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. ii., art. 6, ad. 7am.

_ 147 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, § iii., pp. 271-3.

148 These will easily be found in any of the fuller scholastic treatises. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. 2, art. 4. _Philosophia Lacencis, Logica_, §§ 1282 _sqq._; MERCIER, _Ontologie_, §§ 36-42; KLEUTGEN, _Philosophie Scolastique_, §§ 610 _sqq._; BULLIAT, _Thæsaurus Philosophiae Thomisticae_ (Nantes, 1899), pp. 171 _sqq._—a useful book of reference for the teaching of St. Thomas.

149 A kindred view to this is the view that subsistence (“_subsistentia_,” “_suppositalitas_”) or personality (“_personalitas_”) is the principle of individuation. We shall see later in what subsistence or personality is supposed to consist. Here it is sufficient to observe that the individual nature as such has not necessarily subsistence or personality; hence it cannot be individuated by this latter.

150 The consistent attitude for the Thomist here would, however, appear to be a denial that such a thing would be intrinsically possible.

151 Hujusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine, quem ratio adinvenit alicujus ad seipsum secundum aliquas ejus duas considerationes.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxviii., art. 3, ad. 2am.

_ 152 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, vol. i., § 59.

153 It is only the concrete and individual that as such can exist actually; the abstract and universal as such cannot exist actually: abstractness and universality are mental modes—_entia rationis_—annexed by the mind to the real content of its concepts: considered as thought-objects they are themselves not real entities: they do not affect reality as given to us in our experience. But perhaps concreteness and individuality are also mere mental modes, affecting reality not as given to us in our experience but only as subjected to the process of intellectual conception, or at least as subjected to the process of sense perception? This would appear to be part of the general Kantian theory of knowledge: that we can apprehend reality as concrete and individual only because space and time, which characterize the concrete and individual mode of being, are mental modes which must be applied to reality as a prerequisite condition for rendering the latter capable of apprehension in our experience. This contention is examined in another context. _Cf._ _infra_, pp. 145, 147, 151.

154 Thus the recognition of a virtual distinction in a being is a sign of the _relative perfection_ of the latter: the being involves in its higher sort of unity perfections elsewhere dispersed and separate. The being is of a higher order than if the principles of these perfections in it were really distinct from one another. But the virtual distinction also seems to imply a _relative imperfection_ when it is found in creatures, inasmuch as here the thought-objects so distinguished are always principles of a plurality of really distinct accidental perfections: and real plurality in a being is less perfect than unity.—_Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 633.

155 “Omnis cognitio est a potentia et objecto, sive a cognoscente et cognito. Ratio a priori est, quia omnis cognitio saltem creata est expressio et imitatio atque imago vitalis objecti. Inquantum igitur est vitalis, procedit a cognoscente; implicat enim cognoscentem vivere per aliquid, quod ab ipso non est, sed pure illud recipit ab alio mere passive se habendo; inquantum vero cognitio est expressio, imitatio et imago objecti, procedit ab objecto”—SILVESTER MAURUS, _Quaest. Philos._, q. 2. This is the common scholastic distinction: cognition as a product representative or expressive of reality is a product determined by the influence of reality (as active) on the mind (as passive); cognition as a vital process is active, a reaction of mind to the influence of reality. It may be remarked, however, that the cognitive process, as vital, has always a positive term. Our cognitive processes are partly at least processes of abstracting, comparing, relating, universalizing: processes which produce “_intentiones logicas_” or “_entia rationis_,” such as the “_intentio universalitatis_” the relation of subject to predicate, and other logical relations and logical distinctions: and hence arises the difficulty, when we come to reflect on our cognitive experience, of discriminating between these “logical entities” and the reality which we interpret by means of them: of discriminating, in other words, between logical and real distinctions.

156 It is not necessary of course that this implicit embodiment of all the others, by any one of them, be seen to be _mutual_. It is sufficient, for instance, that of the concepts _a_, _b_, _c_ and _d_, _a_ be seen implicitly to involve _b_, _b_ to involve _c_, etc., though not _vice versa_. However, it must be remarked that in the exercise of _thought_ upon its _abstract_ objects we feel something wanting to our intellectual insight as long as the relations we apprehend are not _reciprocal_. In the sciences of abstract quantity we approximate to the ideal of establishing reciprocal relations throughout the whole system of the concepts analysed. But abstract thought does not give us an adequate apprehension of the real: it represents reality only under the _static_ aspect, and as _abstract_, _i.e._ apart from the individualizing conditions of time and space which affect its _concrete, actual existence_ as revealed in sense experience. Were we to neglect the latter, and consider merely what abstract thought gives us, we should regard as _really one_ what is _one for thought_. But what is one for thought is _the universal_; and the logical issue of holding the universal as such to be real is monism. Or again, to put the matter in another way, in so far as intellect sees the objects of its various abstract concepts to involve one another necessarily, it has no reason—as long as it ignores the verdict of sense experience on the real manifoldness of actually existing being—to abstain from attributing a _real unity_ to the whole system of abstract thought-objects which it contemplates as reciprocally and necessarily interrelated. On the contrary, it should pronounce that whatever plurality can be unified by the dialectically necessary relations discovered by thought, is _really one_, and must be regarded as _one reality_: which, again, is monism. But a philosophy which thus ignores sense experience must be one-sided and misleading.

_ 157 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, Disp. ii., cap. ii., art. 5 (p. 319).

_ 158 Cf._ _infra_, § 83.

_ 159 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, _ibid._ p. 322.

160 ST. THOMAS, _De Ente et Essentia_, cap. iv.: “Ideo, si quaeratur utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est: quia utrumque est extra intellectum [conceptum] humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de ratione ejus, nunquam posset esse una: cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Sorte. Similiter si unitas esset de intellectu et ratione ejus, tunc esset una et eadem natura Sortis et Platonis, nec posset in pluribus plurificari.” _Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Summa Philos._, _Ontologia_ (1), iv., v.; (3) iv.

161 “Licet enim (natura) nunquam sit sine aliquo istorum, non tamen est de se aliquod istorum, ita etiam in rerum natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum ‘esse’ extra animam reale: et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionabilem, quae est indifferens ad singularitatem, ita quod non, repugnat illi unitati de se, quod cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur.”—SCOTUS, _In L. Sent._, 2, dist. iii., q. 7.—_Cf._ DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, p. 372.

_ 162 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 248. _Moral_ truth or veracity—the conformity of language with thought—is treated in Ethics.

_ 163 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, P. ii., § 4, i.

_ 164 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 252-4.

165 “Si omnis intellectus (quod est impossibile) intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art 1, 2 in fine.

_ 166 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., and _passim_.

167 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.

168 ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 4; _Summa Theol._, i., q. 16, art. 6.

169 “Si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur veræ in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 2.

170 “Si ergo accipiatur veritas _rei_ secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum, tunc quidem mutatur veritas rei mutablis in aliam veritatem, non in falsitatem.”—ST. THOMAS, _ibid._ q. i., art. 6.

_ 171 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _De Anima_, iii.; ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 1.

172 “Res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim occasionem falsitatis; eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt quorum non habent existentiam.... Res notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent ... et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res illa esse falsa.... Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causat.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 17, art. 1, ad. 2; _De Veritate_, q. i., art. 10, c.

173 Καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὖ πάντα ἐφίεται.—ARISTOTLE, _Eth._, i.

_ 174 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

175 “Bonum autem, cum habeat notionem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causæ finalis.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 1.

176 “Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causæ per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit (Aristoteles) quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.”—ST. THOMAS, _Comment. in Eth. Nich._, i., lect. 1a.

177 The “end,” which is last in the order of actual attainment, is first as the ideal term of the aim or tendency of the nature: _finis est ultimus in executione, sed primus in intentione_: it is that for the sake of which, and with a view to which, the whole process of actualization or “perfecting” goes on. _Cf._ _infra_, § 108.

178 “Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter. Nam, cum ens dicat aliquid esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur esse ens secundum quod primo secernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum; hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid.... Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, id est, inquantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 1, ad. 1.

179 “Respectus ... qui importatur nomine boni est _habitudo perfectivi_ secundum quodaliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem speciei [_i.e._ the abstract essence], sed secundum esse quod habet in rebus; hoc enim modo finis perficit ea quae sunt ad finem.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 26, art. 6.

_ 180 Cf._ the familiar ethical distinction between objective, and formal or subjective happiness, _beatitudo objectiva_ and _beatitudo formalis seu subjectiva_.

181 “In motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur _utile_. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter motum appetitus sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur _honestum_; quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus, ut quies in se desiderata, est _delectabile_.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 3.

182 Excellentia hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quae est dis positio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in 6 Physic. Et ideo, honestum, _proprie loquendo_, in idem refertur cum virtute.—_ibid._, 2a 2ae, q. 145, art. I, c.

183 “Eorum quae propter se apprehenduntur, quaedam apprehenduntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis; quaedam vero apprehenduntur et propter se, in quantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiamsi nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, in quantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius: et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se apprehendendae.”—_ibid._, ad I.

_ 184 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, p. 236.

185 “Omnia ... quae jam habent esse, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsam tota virtute conservant.... Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse, ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod habet esse.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Veritate_, q. 21, art. 2, c.

186 “Non-esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet ablatio alicujus mali est appetibilis; quod malum quidem aufertur per non-esse; ablatio vero mali non est appetibilis, nisi inquantum per malum privatur quoddam esse. Illud igitur, quod per se est appetibile, est esse; non-esse vero, per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo homo non sustinet privari; et sic etiam per accidens non-esse dicitur bonum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 2, ad. 3.

187 “Malum est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.

_ 188 ibid._

189 “Causam formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio formae.”—St. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 49, art. 1, c.

190 “Nec causam finalem habet malum, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad debitum finem.”—_ibid._

191 “Non est causa efficiens sed _deficiens_ mali, quia malum non est effectio sed _defectio_.”—_De Civ. Dei_, xii., 7.

192 “O, altitudo divitiarum sapientiae, et scientiae Dei! Quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viae ejus!”—Rom. xi., 33.

193 Connected with the transcendental notion of unity is another concept, that of _order_, which will be more fully examined when we come to treat of causes.

194 BAUMGARTEN, a German philosopher of the eighteenth century, was the first to use the term _Aesthetica_ in this sense.

195 “Dicendum est quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est, quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri attinet quod _in ejus aspectu seu cognitione_ quietetur appetitus; unde et illi sensus præcipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos; in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros sapores, aut odores.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. iiæ., q. 27, art. 1, ad. 3.

196 “Ad rationem pulchri pertinet, quod in ejus aspectu seu _cognitione_ quietetur appetitus ... ita quod pulchrum dicatur id, cujus ipsa _apprehensio_ placet.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia. iiæ., q. 27, art. 1, ad. 3. And the Angelic Doctor justifies the extended use of the term _vision_: “De aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo secundum ejus primam impositionem, alio modo secundum usum nominis, sicut patet in nomine _visionis_, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem hujus sensus extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem _cognitionem aliorum_ sensuum; dicimus enim: Vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum; et ulterius etiam ad _cognitionem intellectus_, secundum illud Matt. v. 8: Beati mundi corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt.”—i., q. 67, art. 1, c.

197 “Pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc bonum laudatur ut pulchrum: sed ratione differunt: nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum: ... et ideo habet rationem finis.... Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam: pulchra enim dicuntur quæ visa placent.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1.

_ 198 Cf._ DE WULF, _La Valeur esthétique de la moralité dans l’art_, pp. 28-9.

_ 199 L’Art et la Morale_, p. 29.

_ 200 De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même_, ch. i., § 8.

_ 201 De Vera Religione_, c. 32.

_ 202 Cf._ POINCARÉ, _Conférence sur les rapports de l’analyse et de la physique mathematique_.—_apud_ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 274, pp. 546-7 n.

203 When the object so excels in greatness or grandeur as to exceed more or less our capacity to realize it we speak of it as _sublime_. The sublime calls forth emotions of self-abasement, reverence, and even fear. If an object possessing the other requisites of beauty is wanting in due magnitude, we describe it as _pretty_ or _elegant_. The terms _grace_, _graceful_, apply especially to gait, gesture, movement.

204 On this point all the great philosophers are unanimous. For Plato, beauty whether of soul or of body, whether of animate or of inanimate things, results not from chance, but from order, rectitude, art: οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῆ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται ἀλλὰ τάξει και ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν (Plato, _Gorg._ 506D). Aristotle places beauty in grandeur and order: Τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί (_Poetics_, ch. viii., n. 8). Τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα ἐίδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον (_Metaph._, xii., ch. iii., n. 11). “Nihil,” writes St. Augustine, “est ordinatum quod non sit pulchrum.” “Pulchra,” says St. Thomas, “dicuntur quae visa placent; unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit” (_Summa Theol._, i., q. 5, art. 4, ad. 1).

205 “Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur; primo quidem integritas sive perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt; et debita proportio sive consonantia; et iterum claritas.”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. 39, art. 8, c. Elsewhere he omits integrity, supposing it implied in order: “ad rationem pulchri sive decori concurrit et claritas et debita proportio”. And elsewhere again he omits clarity, this being a necessary effect of order: “pulchrum in debita proportione consistit”.

206 By “natural perfection” is meant the perfection which a nature acquires by the realization of its end (5): Τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἔχον τέλος (Aristotle).

207 This definition coincides with that found in a medieval scholastic treatise _De Pulchro et Bono_, attributed to St. Thomas or Albertus Magnas: “Ratio pulchri in universali consistit in resplendentia formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas vires vel actiones.” _Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 554.

_ 208 L’Idée du beau dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d’Aquin_, p. 2.

_ 209 Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_, viie leçon.

_ 210 Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, Th. i., Abschn. 1, B. 1, passim.

211 “Omnis corporea creatura ... bonum est infimum, _et in genere suo pulchrum_ quoniam forma et specie continetur.”—ST. AUGUSTINE, _De Vera Relig._, c. 20.

212 At the same time it must be borne in mind that many of the judgments by which things are pronounced “ugly” or “commonplace” are erroneous. This is partly because they are based on first and superficial sense impressions: beauty must be apprehended and judged by the _intellect_, and by the intellect “informed” with genuine knowledge; to the eye of enlightened intelligence there are beauties of structure and organization in the beetle or the tadpole as well as in the peacock or the spaniel. It is partly, too, because we unconsciously or semi-consciously apply standards of human beauty to beings that are merely animal: “To know really whether there are ugly monkeys we should have to consult a monkey; for the beauty we unconsciously look for, and certainly do not find, in the monkey, is the beauty of the human form; and when we declare the monkey ugly what we really mean is that it would be ugly if it were a human being; which is undeniable.”—SULLY-PRUDHOMME, _L’Expression dans les beaux arts_, p. 104.

213 Proverbs, xxxi. 30.

214 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 57, art. 3, c.

_ 215 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §§ 70 _sqq._

_ 216 Cf._ WINDELBAND, _History of Philosophy_ (tr. Tufts), _Introduction_.

_ 217 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii. P. iv., ch. v.

_ 218 Metaph._, vi., 1.

_ 219 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 90, art. 2: “Illud proprie dicitur esse quod ipsum habet esse quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde _solæ substantiæ proprie et vere dicuntur entia_; accidens vero non habet esse sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur ... accidens dicitur _magis entis quam ens_.”

_ 220 In Metaph._, L. v., lect. 9; cf. _In Physic._, L. iii., lect. 5.

_ 221 Science of Logic_, i., §§ 71, 73-76.

_ 222 ibid._, §§ 74, 76.

_ 223 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 268 (p. 668); MERCIER, _Logique_, § 33 (4th edit., p. 99).

_ 224 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, L. xi., lect. 9: “Sed sciendum est quod prædicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos prædicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis prædicatur, ad diversa prædicamenta pertinet.... Similiter motus secundum quod prædicatur de subjecto in quo est, constituit prædicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod prædicatur de eo a quo est, constituit prædicamentum actionis.”

_ 225 Ontologie_, § 138 (3rd edit., p. 263).

_ 226 Cf._ _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, book iv., ch. vi., § 11: “Had we such ideas of substances, as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how these qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their properties, and discover what properties they had or had not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that the triangle should exist in any matter; the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as the other.”

227 “Sensation convinces us that there are solid, extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings.”—_ibid._, book ii., ch. xxiii., § 29. Locke protested repeatedly against the charge that he denied the existence of substances.

228 The notion one has of pure substance is “only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents.... The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, ‘sine re substante,’ without something to support them, we call that support _substantia_.”—book ii., ch. xxiii., § 2. In the following passage we may detect the idealistic insinuation that knowledge reaches only to “ideas” or mental states, not to the extramental reality, the “secret, abstract nature of substance”: “Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself”. It belongs, of course, to the Theory of Knowledge, not to the Theory of Being, to show how groundless the idealistic assumption is.

229 Inquiring into the causes of our “impressions” and “ideas,” he admits the existence of “bodies” which cause them and “minds” which experience them: “We may well ask, _What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body_? but ’tis vain to ask, _Whether there be body or not_? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.”—_A Treatise on Human Nature_, Part iv., § ii.

230 Of the definition of a substance as _something which may exist by itself_, he says: “this definition agrees to everything that can possibly be conceiv’d; and will never serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from its perceptions.... Since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance.”—_ibid._, § v. “We have no perfect idea of substance, but ... taking it for _something that can exist by itself_, ’tis evident every perception is a substance, and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance.”—_ibid._

_ 231 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 142 (p. 272).

_ 232 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, Dissert. vi., ch. iii., li, § 592.

233 Assuming for the moment that we can know substance to be not _one_ but _manifold_: that experience reveals to us a plurality of numerically or _really_, and even specifically and generically, distinct substances. _Cf._ _infra_, p. 221.

_ 234 Cf._ HUXLEY, _Hume_, bk. ii., ch. ii. TAINE, _De L’Intelligence_, t. i., Preface, and _passim_.

_ 235 Cf._ § 65, _infra_.

236 Such terms as “corruptible,” “destructible,” etc., imply certain attributes _of a thing_ which can be corrupted, destroyed. Conceiving this attribute in the abstract we form the terms “corruptibility,” “destructibility,” etc. So, too, the term “possibility” formed from the adjective “possible,” simply implies in the abstract what the latter implies in the concrete—an active or passive power _of a thing_ to cause or to become something; or else the mind’s conception of the non-repugnance of this something. To substantialize a possibility, therefore, is sufficiently absurd; but to speak of a possibility as real and at the same time to deny the reality of any subject in which it would have its reality, is no less so.

237 except in the Blessed Eucharist: here we know from Divine Revelation that the accidents of bread and wine exist apart from their connatural substance. We cannot, by the light of reason, prove _positively_ the possibility of such separate existence of accidents; at the most, men of the supreme genius of an Aristotle may have strongly suspected such possibility, and may have convinced themselves of the futility of all attempts to prove in any way the impossibility of such a condition of things. Nor can we, even with the light of Revelation, do any more than show the futility of such attempts, thus _negatively_ defending the possibility of what we know from Revelation to be a fact.

_ 238 Cf._ n. 1.

_ 239 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii., for a full analysis and refutation of phenomenist theories that would deny the substantiality of the human person.

240 “Substantia est res, cujus naturae debetur esse non in alio; accidens vero est res, cujus naturae debetur esse in alio.”—_Quodlib._, ix., a. 5, ad. 2.

_ 241 Cf._ DESCARTES, _Oeuvres_, edit. Cousin, tome ix., p. 166—_apud_ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, p. 280.

242 PAULSEN, _Einleitung in die Philosophie_, Berlin, 1896, S. 135—_apud_ MERCIER, _loc. cit._

243 and also _appetitive_; as in mental life appetition is a natural consequent of perception. It is in accordance with this latter idea that Wundt conceives all reality as being in its ultimate nature appetitive activity: the _Ego_ is a “volitional unit” and the universe a “collection of volitional units”.—_Cf._ WUNDT, _System der Philosophie_, Leipzig, 1889, S. 415-421.

_ 244 Principles of Psychology_, Pt. ii., ch. i., § 59.

245 But from Descartes’ doctrine of two passive substances so antithetically opposed to each other the transition to Spinozism was easy and obvious. If mind and matter are so absolutely opposed as thought and extension, how can they unite to form one human individual in man? If both are purely passive, and if God alone puts into them their conscious states and their mechanical movements respectively, what remains proper to each but a pure passivity that would really be common to both? Would it not be more consistent then to refer this thought-essence or receptivity of conscious activities, and this extension-essence or receptivity of mechanical movements, to God as their proper source, to regard them as two attributes of His unique and self-existent substance, and thus to regard God as substantially immanent in all phenomena, and these as only different expressions of His all-pervading essence? This is what Spinoza did; and his monism in one form or other is the last word of many contemporary philosophers on the nature of the universe which constitutes the totality of human experience.—_Cf._ HÖFFDING, _Outlines of Psychology_, ch. ii., and criticism of same _apud_ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxiii.

246 “Esse substantiæ non dependet ab esse alterius sicut ei inhærens, licet omnia dependeant a Deo sicut a causa prima.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Causa Materiæ_, cap. viii.

_ 247 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._ § 594.

_ 248 Ibid._, §§ 597-600.

249 “Illud proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens. Unde solæ substantiæ proprie et vere dicuntur entia; accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur: sicut albedo dicitur ens quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in _Metaph._, l. 7 [al. 6], c. i. [Arist.], quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i. q. 90, art. 2. “Illud cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum consistens in suo esse, quod quidem esse naturaliter præcedit accidens, quod supervenit: et ideo accidens superveniens, ex conjunctione sui cum eo, cui supervenit, non causat illud esse in quo res subsistit per quod res est ens per se: sed causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo, vel prædicatum sine subjecto. Unde ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum per se, sed unum per accidens, et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non resultat essentia quædam, sicut ex conjunctione formæ cum materia: propter quod accidens neque rationem completæ essentiæ habet, neque pars completæ essentiæ est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet.”—_De Ente et Essentia_, ch. vii.

250 “Non est definitio substantiæ, ens per se sine subjecto, nec definitio accidentis, ens in subjecto; sed quidditati seu essentiæ substantiæ _competit_ habere _esse_ non in subjecto; quidditati autem sive essentiæ accidentis _competit_ habere _esse_ in subjecto.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art. 1, ad. 2.

_ 251 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 595-596.

_ 252 ibid._, § 619.

_ 253 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 320-325.

254 KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 618, 624.

255 This logical usage is applied equally to attributes of a logical subject which is not itself a substance but an accident; it turns solely on the point whether the concept of the logical predicate of a judgment is or is not connected by an absolute logical connexion, a connexion of thought, with the concept of the logical subject.

_ 256 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp._, _De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad. 7.

_ 257 Cf._, however, § 68, p. 246, n. 2, _infra_.

258 St. Thomas, whose language is usually so moderate, thus expresses his view of the doctrine afterwards propounded by Descartes when the latter declared the essence of the soul to be thought: “Quidquid dicatur de potentiis animae, tamen nullus unquam opinatur, nisi insanus, quod habitus et actus animae sint ipsa ejus essentia.”—_Quaest. Disp., De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad 1. For a very convincing treatment of this question, _cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 625-626.

259 DE SAN, _Cosmologia_, § 323, _apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 158.

_ 260 op. cit._, § 625.

261 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 17, art. 2, c.

262 Hence St. Thomas says, in regard to the Blessed Eucharist, that the accidents of bread and wine had not an existence of their own as long as the substance of bread and wine was there; that this is true of accidents generally; that it is not they that exist, but rather their subjects; that their function is to determine these subjects to exist as characterized in a certain way, as whiteness gives snow a white existence: “Dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, manente substantia panis et vini non habebant ipsa _esse_ sicut nec alia accidentia, sed subjecta eorum habebant hujusmodi _esse_ per ea, sicut nix est alba per albedinem.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art. 1, ad. 4.

263 For the arguments on both sides _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 156 (pp. 308 _sqq._). The indirect argument which the author derives from the fact that the Divine _Concursus_ is necessary for the activity of creatures, while offering an intelligible explanation of this necessity on Thomistic principles, does not touch the probability of other explanations.

_ 264 Cf._ URRABURU’S definition: “entitas vel realitas a subjecto realiter distincta, cujus totum esse consistit in ultima determinatione rei ad aliquod munus obeundum, vel ad aliquam realem denominationem actu habendam, sine qua, saltem in individuo sumpta, res eadem potest existere absolute”.—_op. cit._, § 120 (p. 380).

_ 265 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p. 854, _quarta opinio_), p. 854.

266 Whether immanent vital acts—especially of the spiritual faculties in man: thoughts, volitions, etc.—are mere modes, or whether they are absolute accidents, having their own proper and positive reality which perfects their subject by affecting it, is a disputed question. Habits, acquired by repetition of such acts, _e.g._ knowledge and virtue, belonging as they do to the category of quality, are more than mere modalities of the human subject: they have an absolute, positive entity, whereby they add to the total perfection of the latter.

_ 267 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 121 (pp. 386 _sqq._).

268 The fact that Aristotle [_Metaph._, lib. vii. (al. vi.), ch. iii.] seems to have placed a _real distinction_ between extension and corporeal substance, while he could not have suspected the absolute _separability_ of the former from the latter, would go to show that he did not regard separability as the only test of a real distinction. _Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, _ibid._

269 Obviously we are not concerned herewith _all_ the attributes which by a necessity of thought we ascribe to an essence, _e.g._ the _corruptibility_ of a corporeal substance, or the _immortality_ of a spiritual substance. These are not entities really distinct from the substance, but only aspects which we recognize to be necessary corollaries of its nature. We are concerned only with properties which are real powers, faculties, forces, aptitudes of things.—_Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 627.

_ 270 op. cit._, § 628.

271 “Tertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae, sicut sunt ejus principia intrinsica et essentialia, nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia; sed in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem ... et ideo quasi medium tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia: non tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversa instrumenta ejusdem substantiae.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1, art. 2, q. 1.

In the same context he explains what we are to understand by referring anything to a certain category _per reductionem_: “Sunt enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere _per se_, aliqua _per reductionem_ ad idem genus. Illa per se sunt in genere, quae participant essentiam completam generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per reductionem, quae nan dicunt completam essentiam.... Quaedam reducuntur sicut principia ... aut essentialia, sicut sunt materia et forma in genere substantiae; aut integrantia, sicut partes substantiae.... Quaedam reducuntur sicut _viae_ ... aut sicut _viae ad res_, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio, reducuntur ad substantiam; aut sicut _viae a rebus_, et sic habent reduci potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur, quae non adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam completam.”—_ibid._, ad. 8.

272 “Quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea potentiarum multitudo, ex quarum collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius, resultaret unum posse completum, sicut manifeste animadverti potest in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute alterius adjuvari.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1, art. 2, q. 8.

273 The student will find in MAHER’S _Psychology_ (ch. iii.) a clear and well-reasoned exposition of the inconsistency and groundlessness of such attacks on the doctrine of faculties.

_ 274 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 636-637.

275 “Cum corpus hominis aut cujuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam totum naturale, dicit unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut accidit in domo et in aliis hujusmodi. Unde opportet quod quaelibet pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse [_i.e._ sibi proprium] et speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit (l. ii. de anima, text. 9), quod recedente anima neque oculus neque caro neque aliqua pars manet nisi aequivoce.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp. de anima_, art. 10—_apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 632.

276 The most perfect real unity is of course that which includes all perfection in the simplicity of its actual essence, without any dispersion or plurality of its being, without any admixture of accident or potentiality. Such is the unity of the Infinite Being alone. No finite being possesses its actuality _tota simul_. And the creature falls short of perfect unity in proportion as it attains to this actuality only by a multiplicity of real changes, by a variety of really distinct principles and powers, essential and accidental, in its concrete mode of being. In proportion as created things are higher or lower in the scale of being (47), they realize a higher or a lower grade of unity in their mode of individual existence.

277 We are concerned here only with finite, created substances, as distinct from the Divine Uncreated Substance on whom these depend (64).

278 ARISTOTLE, _Categ._ ch. iii., _passim_; _Metaph._, l. v. (al. vi.), ch. viii.; ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, l. v. lect. 10; KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 589-591.

_ 279 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 587, 602-603.

_ 280 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 277, 279.

_ 281 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217 (pp. 66 _sqq._).

282 Sciendum est quod nomen naturae significat quodlibet principium intrinsicum motus; secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod _natura est principium motus in eo in quo est per se, et non secundum accidens_.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 2, art. 1 in c.

283 And here we are reminded of the view of many medieval scholastics of high authority, that the same material entity can have at the same time a plurality of formative principles or _substantial forms_ of different grades of perfection.

_ 284 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 282 (p. 825).

285 For want of a more appropriate rendering we translate the Latin term _suppositum_ (Gr. ὑπόστασις) by the phrase “subsisting thing”; though the classical terms are really generic: _suppositum_ being a genus of which there are two species, _suppositum irrationale_ (“_thing_” or “subsisting _thing_”) and _suppositum rationale_ (“_person_”).—_Cf._ _infra_, pp. 265-6.

286 Complete in every way: in _substantial_ and in _specific_ perfections. The separated soul, though it is an existing individual substance, retains its essential communicability to its connatural material principle, the body. Hence it has not “subsistence,” it is not a “person”.—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 264.

287 “Per se agere _convenit per se existenti_. Sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid, si non sit inhærens ut accidens, vel ut forma materialis, etiamsi sit pars. Sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhærens neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non potest dici per se subsistens, et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 75, art. 2, ad. 2.

_ 288 Cf._ preceding note. St. Thomas continues: “Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam” (ibid.); and elsewhere he writes: “Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei [_i.e._ naturae]. Et ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel substantia prima, sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium hominis; et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque nomen.”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. 29, art. 1, ad. 5.

_ 289 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §§ 54-5.

290 All _created_ subsisting things and persons depend, of course, essentially on the Necessary Being for their existence and for their activity. This Necessary Being we know from Revelation to be _Triune_, Three in Persons, One in Nature. The subsistence of each Divine Person of the Blessed Trinity excludes _all_ modes of dependence.

291 “Hoc ... quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agunt. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut substantia individua _rationalis_ naturae speciale nomen haberet.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp. de Potentia_, q. ix., art. 1, ad. 3.

_ 292 Cf._ BILLOT, _De Verbo Incarnato_, q. ii.—_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 151 (pp. 299-300).

_ 293 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291, for an exhaustive list of the authorities in favour of each of the various views propounded in this present context.

294 “Natura singularis et integra per se consituitur in sua independentia, non aliquo positivo addito ultra illam entitatem positivam, qua est haec natura.”—SCOTUS, iii., Dist. i. q. 1, n. 9 and n. 11, ad. 3. _Cf._ SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxiv. § 2; KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 616; FRANZELIN, _De verbo Incarnato_, Th. xxix.

_ 295 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).

296 Neither is it a _natural_ union in the sense of being _due_ to the human nature; it is wholly _undue_ to the latter, and is in this sense _supernatural_.

_ 297 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).

_ 298 ibid._ Farther on (p. 863) he says it is certain that the Divine Nature of the Word is _substantially_ united with humanity in a unity of person or subsistence: “certum est eamdem [naturam divinam] substantialiter uniri cum humanitate in unitate suppositi;” and for this he considers that the human nature must be incomplete “in ratione personae”. But this proves nothing; for of course the human nature must be wanting in personality. But it is complete _as a nature_. Nor does the aphorism he quotes—“Quidquid substantiae in sua specie completae accedit, accidens est,”—apply to subsistence or personality supervening on a complete substance.

299 “Humanitas illa [_scil._ Christi], quamvis completa in _esse_ naturae, non tamen habet ultimum complementum in genere substantiae cum in se non subsistat.”—_ibid._, § 296 (p. 866).

300 This view, which has many supporters, is clearly explained and ably defended by MERCIER in his _Ontologie_, § 151 (pp. 298-302), § 52 (pp. 134-5), § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).

_ 301 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).

302 Hence Urraburu gives this _real_ definition of subsistence: _ultimus naturae terminus in ordine substantiali_ sive in ratione existentis per se: the ultimate term (or determination) of a nature in the order of substantiality or of “existing by itself”—_op. cit._, § 296 (p. 866).

303 “Sicut enim modus accidentalis figurae terminat quantitatem, et modus ubicationis constituit rem hic et non alibi, ita modus substantialis personalitatis terminans naturam reddit illam incommunicabilem alieno supposito.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p. 854).

304 The terms “Self,” “_Ego_,” and “Person” we take to be identical in reference to the human individual. The _mind_ is not the _Ego_, self, or person, but only a part of it.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. vi., p. 104.

_ 305 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.

_ 306 ibid._, p. 365.

_ 307 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 363.

_ 308 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 365 (italics in last sentence ours).

_ 309 Cf._ RICKABY, _First Principles_, p. 370.

_ 310 Cf._ MAHER, _ibid._, pp. 487-92; MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., pp. 197-224 (6th edit.); _Ontologie_, § 153 (p. 304).

311 There are cogent theological reasons also against the view that consciousness constitutes personality. For instance, the human nature of our Divine Lord has its own proper consciousness, which, nevertheless, does not constitute this nature a person.

_ 312 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii.

313 “That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it continues to partake of the same life, though that life be communicated to different particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants....

“The case is not so much different in brutes, but that anyone may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same....

“This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists: _viz._ in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.... For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may be united [_i.e._ successively] to different bodies, it will be possible that ... men living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man....”—_Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii. ch. xxvii. § 4-6. Yet though “identity of soul” does not make “the same man,” Locke goes on immediately to assert that identity of _consciousness_, which is but a function of the soul, makes _the same person_.

_ 314 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 7. Names do not stand for ideas or concepts but for _conceived_ realities; and the question here is: What is the conceived reality (in the existing human individual) for which the term “person” stands?

_ 315 ibid._, § 9.

_ 316 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., §§ 13, 14.

_ 317 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 13.

318 For a searching criticism of such theories of the Ego or human person, _cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii.

_ 319 ibid._, § 19.

320 p. 276.

_ 321 Cf._ MAHER’S criticism of Professor James’ theory on double personality (_op. cit._, ch. xxii., pp. 491-2): “Professor James devotes much space to these ’mutations’ of the Ego, yet overlooks the fact that they are peculiarly fatal, not to his adversaries, but to his own theory that ‘the present thought is the only thinker,’ and that seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought ’appropriating’ and ‘inheriting’ the contents of its predecessor. The difficulties presented to this process of inheritance by such facts as sleep and swooning have been already dwelt upon [_cf._ _ibid._, p. 480 (c)]; but here they are if possible increased. The last conscious thought of, say, Felida 2 has to transmit its gathered experience not to its _proximate_ conscious successor, which is Felida 1, but across seven months of vacuum until on the extinction of Felida 1 the next conscious thought which constitutes Felida 2 is born into existence. If the single personality is hard for Mr. James to explain, ‘double-personality’ at least doubles his difficulties.”

_ 322 Cf._ _infra_, § 82.

323 Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω, καθ᾽ ἤν ποιοί τινες εἰναι λέγονται.—_Categ._, ch. iv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Haec est ratio formalis qualitatis, per quam respondemus interroganti qualis res sit.”

324 The other accidents, _e.g._ _actio_ and _passio_, in so far as they change the perfection of the substance, do so only by producing qualities in it. Quantity, which is the connatural accident of all corporeal substance, adds of itself no special complement or degree of accidental perfection to the latter, in the sense of disposing (or indisposing) the latter for the attainment of the full and final perfection due to its specific nature; but only in the sense that it supposes more or less of that kind of substance to exist, or in the sense in which it is understood to include the _qualities_ of which it may be the _immediate_ subject.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 326.

_ 325 In Praedicamenta_, ch. i.

_ 326 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xii, xiii, xxiii, xxv. BERGSON rightly recognizes the irreducibility of quality to quantity (_Essai sur les données immediates de la conscience, passim_). But he wrongly infers from this “fundamental antinomy,” as he calls it, the existence, in each human individual, of a two-fold _Ego_, a deeper self where all is quality, and a superficial self which projects conscious states, in static and numerical isolation from one another, into a homogeneous space where all is quantitative, mathematical. The reasonable inference is merely that the human mind recognizes in the data of its experience a certain richness and variety of modes of real being.

_ 327 Metaph._ V., ch. xiv., where the four groups are finally reduced to two.

_ 328 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 49, art. 2.

329 To be distinguished from the _passio_ which is correlative of _actio_ and which consists in the actual undergoing of the latter, the actual reception of the accidental form which is the term of the latter.

330 “Inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime sequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori indicio diversitas specierum dijudicari potest, quam diversitate figurae.”—ST. THOMAS, _In_ VII. _Physic_, lect. 5.

331 Every natural habit, as we have just seen, has an essential relation to _activity_. Every such habit inheres immediately in some operative faculty, as science in the intellect, or justice in the will. All natural habits are _operative_. There is, however, as we know from Divine Revelation, an “entitative” habit, a _habitus entitativus_, which affects the substance itself of the human soul, ennobling its natural mode of being and so perfecting it as to raise it to a higher or supernatural plane of being, to an order of existence altogether undue to its nature: the _supernaturally infused_ habit of _sanctifying grace_.

_ 332 Eth. Eud._, ii., 2.

333 “Vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum.”—_Summa Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 4, ad 2.

334 “Intellectus ... est subjectum habitus. Illi enim competit esse subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui....”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iie, q. 50, art. 4, ad. 1. “Omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum, indiget habitu, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas autem cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari: et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum ...,”—_ibid._ art. 5, in c.

335 “Habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus; unde ex similibus actibus similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic., cap. 1 et 2; in corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae.”—_Summa Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 1, in c.

_ 336 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 50, art. 1.—MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 164.

337 According to the scholastic theory of matter and form the matter must be predisposed by certain qualities for the reception of a given substantial form. The chemical elements which form a compound will not do so in any and every condition, but only when definitely disposed and brought together under favourable conditions. These elementary qualities, considered in themselves, are not habits or dispositions: “Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus _dispositiones_ vel _habitus_, sed _simplices qualitates_.”—ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 49, art. 4, in C. They are natural qualities and not dispositions produced by disposing causes.

338 St. Thomas regards the distinction between _habits_ and mere dispositions as a distinction not of _degree_ but of _kind_: “Dispositio et habitus possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur _dispositiones_ illae qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas mutabiles, ut aegritudo et sanitas; _habitus_ vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur quia habent causas immobiles; sicut scientia et virtutes; et secundum hoc disposito non fit habitus.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiæ, q. 49, art. 2, ad. 3.

339 “Vires sensitivae _dupliciter_ possunt considerari: _uno modo_, secundum quod operanter ex instinctu naturae; _alio modo_, secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura; et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ta etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt: et sic possunt esse in eis aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 50, art. 3, in c. In this context the angelic doctor, following Aristotle, places the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sense _appetite_ as controlled by the rational will. For the same reason he admits the possibility of habits in the faculties of _internal_ sense perception, though not in the _external_ senses (_ibid._, ad. 3).

340 “Quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic, vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt.... Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere; et ideo, proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.”—_ibid._, ad. 2.

341 It must not be forgotten that habit is an _accident_, an accidental perfection of the substance or nature of an individual agent; it immediately affects the operative power of the agent, which operative power is itself an accident of this agent’s nature (constituting the second sub-class of the accident, _Quality_). Habit is thus at once an _actuality_ or actualization of the operative power and a _potentiality_ of further and more perfect acts. It is intermediate between the operative power and the complete actualization which the power receives by the acts that spring from the latter as perfected by the habit. Faculty and habit form one complete proximate principle of those acts: a principle which is at once a partial actualization of the individual agent’s nature and a potentiality of further actualization of this nature.

342 “Si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis, quæ dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis.”—_Q. Disp. de Spir. Creat._, art. 11, in c.

_ 343 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 76, art. 1, in c.—“Cum potentia et actus dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, opportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus; et ideo si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia, quæ dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae, sed in solo Deo, cujus operatio est ejus substantia.”—_Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (9), xi.: “Actus et potentia essentialiter ad illum actum ordinata sunt in eodem genere supremo.”

344 “Nec in angelo, nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia.... Actus ad quem comparatur potentia operativa est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse; nec aliqua alia operatio, aut in ipso aut in quocunque alio creato, est idem quod ejus esse. Unde essentia angeli non est ejus potentia intellectiva, nec alicujus creati essentia est ejus operativa potentia.”—_ibid._, q. 54, art 3.

345 As we shall see later, action as such does not perfect or change the _agens_, unless when, as in immanent action, the _agens_ is identical with the _patiens_. Action formally actualizes or perfects the _patiens_: _actio fit in passo_. But the exercise of any activity by an agent undoubtedly connotes or implies a perfection of this agent. It is not, however, that the actual operation as such (unless it is immanent) adds a new perfection to the agent. Rather the agent’s _power_ of acting, revealed to us in its exercise, is for us a measure of the actual perfection of the agent. But the question remains: Is this power or perfection, so far as we know it, a _substantial_ perfection? Is it _the very perfection itself of the agent’s substance or nature_ as known to us? Or is it an _accidental_ perfection which is for us an index of a corresponding degree of substantial perfection? In getting our knowledge of the nature of a substance from a consideration of its _sensible_ accidents, its _phenomena_, its _operations_—according to the rule, _Operari sequitur esse: qualis est operatio talis est natura_—can we use a _single_ inference, from _action_ to _nature_, or must we use a _double_ inference, from action to power, and from power to nature? But even if we have to make the double inference, this _of itself_ does not prove any more than a conceptual distinction between _power_ and _nature_.

_ 346 Cf._. ST. THOMAS, _Q. Disp. de spir. creat._, art. 11, in c.—MAHER, _Psychology_ ch. iii.

_ 347 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 168.

_ 348 Cf._ _ibid._, _op. cit._, § 169; MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. iii. (p. 29, n. 3.)

349 Of course all accidents are “forms” in the sense of being _determining principles_ of their subjects, these being considered as _determinable_ or _receptive_ principles. Even quantity is a form in this sense. But quantity itself does not appear to be a “simple” principle in the sense of being “indivisible”: its very function is to make the corporeal substance divisible into integral parts. What then of all those qualities which inhere _immediately_ in the quantity of corporeal substances? They are determinations or affections of a composite, extended, divisible subject. Conceived in the abstract they have, of course, the attributes of indivisibility, immutability, etc., characteristic of all _abstract_ essences (14). But in their physical actuality in what intelligible sense can they be said to be simple, indivisible entities?

_ 350 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 52, art. 2; iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4, 5.—_Q. Disp. de Virtutibus in communi_, q. i, art. 11, in c.—I. _In Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 329-332, for arguments and authorities. The author himself defends the former view, according to which alteration takes place by a real addition or substraction of grades of the same quality.

351 I. _In Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.

352 iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4, ad. 3.

_ 353 Q. Disp. de Virtut._, q. 1, art. 11, in c.

354 The scientific concept of “volume” is identical with the common and philosophical concept of “external, actual, local, or spatial extension”. The functions ascribed by physics and mechanics to the “mass” of a body have no other source, in the body, than what philosophers understand by the “internal extension” or “quantity” of the body.—_Cf._ Nys, _Cosmologie_ (Louvain, 1903), §§ 192-203.

355 The terms _quantity_ and _extension_ are commonly taken as synonymous; but _quantity_ is more properly applied to the internal plurality of integral parts of the substance itself, _extension_ to the dispersion of these parts outside one another in space.

356 Hence Aristotle’s definition in _Metaph._, iv.: “Quantum dicitur, quod [est] in insita divisibile, quorum utrumque aut singula unum quid et hoc quid apta sunt esse”: a quantified substance is one which is divisible into parts that are really in it [_i.e._ _partes integrantes_], parts each of which is capable of becoming a distinct subsisting individual thing.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, § 154.

357 “Longitudo, latitudo et profunditas quantitates quaedam, sed non substantiae sunt. Quantitas enim non est substantia, sed magis cui haec ipsa primo insunt illud est substantia.”—_Metaph._, L. vii., ch. iii.

_ 358 Physic_, L. i., ch. ii.

359 L. ii., ch. iv.

_ 360 Cf._ § 62 _supra_.

361 “Propria ... totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva vel magna quantitate; sicut ... tota natura hominis in magno, vel parvo homine.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 76, art. 1, ad. 3.

362 No argument in favour of this view can be based on the use of the term _species_ (“_manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini_”) by the Fathers of the Council of Trent. For them, as for all Catholic philosophers and theologians of the time, the scholastic term _species_, used in such a context, meant simply the objective, perceptible accidents of the substance. _Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, § 175.

363 Hence the significance of the lines in ST. THOMAS’ hymn, _Adoro Te devote_:—

_Visus, tactus, gustus_ in te fallitur, Sed _auditu_ solo tuto creditur.

364 and neither does Revelation. The Body of our Blessed Lord exists in the Eucharist without its connatural external extension and consequent impenetrability. But according to the common teaching of Catholic theologians it has its _internal quantity_, its distinct integral parts, organs and members—really distinct from one another, though interpenetrating and not spatially external to one another. Its mode of existence in the space occupied by the sacramental species is thus analogous to the mode in which the soul is in the body, or a pure spirit in space.

365 We know from Revelation that the Body of our Lord exists in this way in the Eucharist. We know, too, from Revelation that after the general resurrection the glorified bodies of the just will be _real_ bodies, real _corporeal substances_, and nevertheless that they will be endowed with properties very different from those which they possess in the present state: that they will be immortal, incorruptible, impassible, “spiritual” (_cf._ 1 Cor. xv.). The Catholic philosopher who adds those scattered rays of revealed light to what his own rational analysis of experience tells him about matter and spirit, will understand the possibility of such a kinship between the latter as will make the fact of their union in his own nature and person not perhaps any less wonderful, but at any rate a little less surprising and inscrutable: and this without committing himself to the objective idealism whereby Berkeley, while endeavouring to show the utter unreality of matter, only succeeded in persuading himself that its reality was not independent of all mind.

366 “Ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τουτ᾽ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.”—_Physic_, L. iv., ch. iv. (6).

367 The category _Situs_ is commonly interpreted to signify the _mutual_ spatial relations or dispositions of the various parts of a body in the place actually occupied by the latter.

368 A body deprived of its connatural extension exists in space in a manner analogous to that in which the soul is in the body. The Body of our Divine Lord is in the Eucharist in this manner—“_sacramentaliter_”.

_ 369 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.

_ 370 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (35), iv.

_ 371 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion d’Espace_ (Louvain, 1901), pp. 95 _sqq._—_La Notion de Temps_ (Louvain, 1898), pp. 123 _sqq._

372 “Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.”—_Confess_. L. xi., ch. xiv.

373 “Cum enim intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii, et anima dicat, illa esse duo _nunc_, hoc _prius_, illud _posterius_ quasi numerando _prius_ et _posterius_ in motu, tunc hoc dicimus esse tempus.”—ST. THOMAS, in _Phys._, L. iv. lect. 17a.

_ 374 Sentent._, Dist. xix., q. ii., art. 1.—_Cf._ Lect. xxiii. in iv. _Physic._

_ 375 Physic._, iv., ch. xi.—_Cf._ ST. THOMAS _in loc_.

376 “The conception of variation united with sameness is not, however, the whole cognition of time. For this the mind must be able to combine in thought two different movements or pulsations of consciousness, so as to represent an interval between them. It must hold together two _nows_, conceiving them, in succession, yet uniting them through that intellectual synthetic activity by which we _enumerate_ a collection of objects—a process or act which carries concomitantly the consciousness of its own continuous unity.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.

377 That is, provided we abstract from all comparison of this internal time duration with that of any other current of conscious experiences in the estimating mind. As a matter of fact we always and necessarily compare the time duration of any particular experienced change with that of the remaining portion of the whole current of successive conscious states which make up our mental life. And thus we feel, not that the four-mile walk had a longer time duration than the three-mile walk, but rather that it took place at a quicker _rate_, more rapidly, than the latter. But if a mind which had no other consciousness of change whatsoever than, _e.g._ that of the two walks experienced successively, no other standard change with which to compare each of them as it occurred—if such a mind experienced each in this way, would it pronounce the four-mile walk to have occupied a longer time than the three-mile walk?—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 327.

378 This is true on the assumption that the intrinsic _time-duration_ of a successive, continuous change, its divisibility into distinct “nows” related as “before” and “after,” is _really identical with_ the continuous, successive _states constituting the change_ itself, and is not _a really distinct mode_ superadded to this change, a continuous series of “_quandocationes_,” distinct from the change, and giving the latter its temporal duration. But many philosophers hold that in all creatures _duration_ is a mode of their existence really distinct from the creatures themselves that have this duration or continued existence.—_Cf._ _infra_, § 86.

_ 379 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 246, pp. 201 _sqq._

_ 380 op. cit._, c. xvii.

_ 381 op. cit._, c. xvii.

_ 382 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_ (Lovain, 1898), p. 104.

383 The fact that we can perceive and estimate temporal duration only _extrinsically_, and in ultimate analysis by comparison with the flow of our own conscious states, and that therefore we can have no perception or conception of the intrinsic time duration of any change, seems to have been overlooked by DE SAN _(Cosmologia_, pp. 528-9) when he argues from our perception of different _rates_ of motion, in favour of the view that time _duration_ is not really identical with motion or change, but a superadded mode, really distinct from the latter.

_ 384 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_, pp. 85 _sqq._

_ 385 Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, pp. 120 _sqq._, for a defence of the view that an actually infinite multitude involves no contradiction.

_ 386 ibid._, pp. 162-9.

_ 387 De Consolatione_, L. v., _pr. ult._

_ 388 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.

389 “Est ergo dicendum, quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse permanentis secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatiose consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur _tempore_, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia ... patet de angelis, quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet, et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum, et affectionum, et locorum suo modo. Et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur _aevo_, quod est medium inter aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat _aeternitas_, nec est mutabile nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius, aevum non habet in se prius et posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. x., art. 5, in c.

390 pp. 517-57.

_ 391 Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas, ita ut [qui veritatem Dei in injustitia detinent] sint inexcusabiles._—Rom. ii. 20 [18].

_ 392 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_ (4th edit.), pp. 90-2.

393 For a clear and trenchant criticism of modern relativist theories, _cf._ VEITCH, _Knowing and Being_, especially ch. iv., “Relation,” pp. 129 _sqq._

_ 394 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 179-80.

_ 395 Principles of Psychology_, P. ii., ch. iii., § 88.

_ 396 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, pp. 157-9.

397 “We cannot of course _perceive_ an _unperceived_ world, nor can we conceive a world the conception of which is not in the mind; but there is no contradiction or absurdity in the proposition: ‘A material world of three dimensions has existed for a time unperceived and unthought of by any created being, and then revealed itself to human minds’.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, p. iii, n.

398 “I do not pretend to demonstrate anything, nor do I feel much concern, about any unknowable _noumenon_ which never reveals itself in my consciousness. If there be in existence an inscrutable ‘transcendental Ego,’ eternally screened from my ken by this self-asserting ‘empirical Ego,’ I confess I feel very little interest in the nature or the welfare of the former. _The only soul about which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its acts, which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and hopes._”—MAHER, _op. cit._, p. 475. _Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 180, pp. 363.

399 Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτά, ἄπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον.—_Categ._ v. 1.

400 I _Sentent._, Dist. xxvi., q. 2, art. 1.

401 “Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum [ordination of concepts]; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei, quod relative dicitur; et hujusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei; has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem ejus, quod est in intellectu ad res, quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod hujusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et hujusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei, quod est in intellectu, sed ei, quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligit ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens; sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicit alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine; sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi: et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo; sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subjecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii., art. 11; _cf._ _ibid._ art. 10.

“Cum relatio requirit duo extrema, tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod sit res naturae aut rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem intellectus tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens, quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus, species, et hujusmodi....”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.

_ 402 Summa Theol._,1. q. xiii. art. 7. Elsewhere he points the distinction in these terms: “Respectus ad aliud aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum, utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et ad invicem inclinationem habent; et hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales.... Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea, quae dicuntur _Ad aliquid_, est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et tunc est relatio rationis tantum, sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, ut speciem ad genus.”—_ibid._, q. xxviii., art. 1.

403 St. Thomas gives expression to it in these sentences: “Perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenduntur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus [Aristot., xii. (x.) _Metaph._, Comment. 52 _sqq._] ordinem universi. Oportet, ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est.... Sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio.”—_QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. vii., art. 9.

_ 404 Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, bk. i., Hauptst. ii., Abschn. ii., § 26.

_ 405 Logic_, bk. i., ch. iii., § 10.

_ 406 L’Idée du phénomène_, p. 181—_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 173.

407 “Quaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique; sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et hujusmodi; nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum: et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.

408 “Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocunque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis; sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile; quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturale existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis. Et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, inquantum ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi; unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit in 5 Metaph., text. 20, quod non dicuntur relative, eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia, sed quia alia referantur ad ipsa.”—_ibid._

409 Being really and adequately identical with its foundation, which is the essence of its subject, this relation does not necessarily need the _actual_ existence of its term. Thus actual knowledge or science, which is a habit of the mind, has a transcendental relation to its object even though this latter be not actual but only a pure possibility. Similarly the accident of quantity sustained without its connatural substance in the Eucharist, retains its transcendental relation to the latter.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 335 (p. 997).

_ 410 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 990).

_ 411 Metaph._, L. v., ch. xv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _in loc._, lect. 17, where, approving of this triple division, he writes: “Cum enim relatio quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine unius rei ad aliam, oportet tot modis hujusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.”

_ 412 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175. For transcendental and predicamental unity, _cf._ _supra_, §§ 26, 28.

_ 413 Cf._ _infra_, p. 355. Some authors hold that the relation in question is predicamental. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 987. The nature or essence of any individual would seem to imply in its very concept a transcendental relation of specific identity with all other actual and possible individual embodiments of this essence. The point is one of secondary importance.

414 Even virtually, though not formally. The creative act is not formally transitive; it is virtually so: and in the creature it grounds the latter’s relation of real dependence on the Creator.

415 Cf. URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 989), § 341 (p. 1011); ST. THOMAS, iii. _Sentent._, Dist., viii., q. i., art. 5.

416 MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175.

417 MERCIER, _ibid._

418 “Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum et non e converso; manifestum est quod creaturae realiter, referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referantur ad ipsum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.

419 Among others Cajetan, Ferriariensis, Capreolus, Bañez, Joannes a St. Thoma. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 338 (p. 994); MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 174. It would be interesting to know how precisely those authors conceived this “relative” entity, this “_esse ad_” as a reality independent of their own thought-activity. _Cf._ art. by the present writer in the _Irish Theological Quarterly_ (vol. vii., April, 1912: “Reflections on some Forms of Monism,” pp. 167-8): “The whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or design which pervades it through and through; it is a revelation of intelligent purpose. Now a _Cosmos_, an orderly universe—which is intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose, and not otherwise—is a system of _interrelated_ factors. But _relating_ is unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or spirit, that is, of something at least analogous to our mental activity of comparing and judging. Scholastic philosophers, as we know, discuss the question whether or how far the exact object of our ‘relation’ concept is real; that is, whether this object is, in itself and apart from the terms related [and the foundation], a mere _ens rationis_, a product of our thought, or whether it is in itself something more than this; and some of them hold that there are relations which, in themselves and formally as relations, _are_ something more than mere products of our thought. Now if there be such relations, since they are not products of _our_ thought, we may fairly ask: Must they be the product of _some_ thought? And from our analysis of our very notion of what a relation is, it would seem that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of some thought-activity: even relations between _material_ things. It is in determining how precisely this is, or can be, that the theist and the monist differ. The theist regards all material things, with their real relations—and all our finite human minds, which apprehend the material world and its relations and themselves and one another—as being indeed in a true sense terms or objects of the Thought of God; not, however, as therefore identical or consubstantial with the Divine Spirit, but as distinct from It though dependent on It: inasmuch as he holds the Divine Thought to be creative, and regards all these things as its _created_ terms. The kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in this, that matter is for him a created term of the Divine Thought. For him too, therefore, matter can have no existence except as a term of thought—the creative Thought of God.” Not that “the intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter are ... identical in reality with the thought-activity of the Divine Mind,” as Ontologists have taught [_cf._ _supra_, 14, 18, 19]; nor that we can directly infer the existence of a Supreme Spirit from the existence of matter, as Berkeley tried to do by erroneously regarding the latter merely as an essentially mind-dependent phenomenon; because “for the orthodox theist matter is in its own proper nature not spiritual, mental, psychical; not anything after the manner of a thought-process, or endowed with the spirit-mode of being”. If predicamental relations, such as _quality_ or _similarity_ of material things, are, as those medieval scholastics contended, real entities, “relative” in their nature, and really distinct from their extremes and foundations, did those scholastics conceive such “relative entities” as essentially mind-dependent entities? If they did they would probably have conceived them in the sense of Berkeley, as created terms of the Divine Thought, rather than in the Ontologist sense which would identify them with the Divine Thought itself. But it is not likely that they conceived such relative entities as essentially thought-dependent, any more than the absolute material realities related to one another by means of these relative entities. On the other hand it is not easy to see how such relative entities can be anything more than mere products of some thought-activity or other.

420 They rely especially on this text from the _De Potentia_ (q. vii., art. 9): “Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta; ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Secundum ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res praeter animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta.... Si autem relatio non est in rebus extra animam non poneretur _ad aliquid_ unum genus praedicamenti.”

_ 421 Cf._ ST. ANSELM, _Monolog._, ch. xxvi.

422 “Relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram.”—_Quodl._ 1, art. 2.

423 “In hoc differt _Ad Aliquid_ [_i.e._ Relation] ab aliis generibus; quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent, quod aliquid sint, sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit: et similiter est de aliis. Sed _Ad Aliquid_ ex propria sui generis ratione non habet, quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid.... Habet autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale ex eo, quod relationem causat.”—_Quodl._ 9, art. 4. _Cf._ _De Potentia_, q. ii., art. 5.

424 “Relatio est aliquid inhaerens _licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio_.... Et ideo nihil prohibet, _quod esse desinat hujusmodi accidens sine mutatione ejus in quo est_.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii., art. 9, ad. 7.

425 “Et utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui relationem: vel per destructionem quantitatis [or other foundation], unde ad hanc mutationem quantitatis sequitur per accidens mutatio relationis: vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum, _remoto illo ad quod referebatur_; et tunc _relatio cessat, nulla mutatione facta in ipsa_. Unde in illis in quibus non est relatio nisi secundum hunc respectum, _veniunt et recedunt relationes sine aliqua mutatione ejus, quod refertur_.”—In i. _Sent._, Dist. xxvi., q. ii., art. 1, ad. 3.

426 “Relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent, quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis. Sed relationes non habent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum.... Sed relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram, qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est ipsis ipsa relatio.”—_Quodl._, 1, art. 2.

_ 427 Cf._ _supra_, p. 351, n. 1; in which context we may reasonably suppose him to be arguing that relation _considered adequately_ is not a _mere logical entity_, “ex secundis intellectibus,” inasmuch as, having _a real foundation_ in things outside the mind, it is in this respect real, independently of our thought.

_ 428 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 341 (p. 1008).

_ 429 ibid._, p. 1007; _cf._ _supra_, p. 347.

430 In i. _Sentent._, Dist. iv., q. 1, art. 1, ad. 3.

_ 431 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, pp. 1006-7: “Deinde _nullam relationem esse substantiam_ scripsit [S. Thomas] vel quia plerumque ratio fundandi non est substantia ... vel potius quia semper relatio, etiam cum in substantia fundatur, aliquid addit supra substantiam cujuslibet extremi relati singillatim sumpti, quia non identificatur cum fundamento prout se tenet ex parte solius subjecti, vel solius termini, sed prout se tenet ea parte utriusque. Quare relatio ... semper exprimit denominationem contingentem et accidentaliter supervenientem subjecto, utpote quae adesse vel abesse potest, prout adsit vel deficiat terminus.”

432 “Illi enim [the reference is to certain medieval idealists] quamvis agnoscerent duo alba existentia negabant dari actu in rebus formalem similaritatem [_i.e._ even after the comparative activity of thought], sed formalem similitudinem, et aliam quamvis relationem, reponebant in actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis; nos vero ante actum intellectus agnoscimus in rebus, quidquid sufficit ad constituendam relationem similitudinis, diversitatis, paternitatis, etc., ita ut hujusmodi denominationes non verificentur de actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis, sed plenam habeant in rebus ipsis verificationem.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 1010.

433 In what sense “extramental”?—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 350, n. 1 (end).

_ 434 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 218. For the concepts of “cause” and “causality” in the inductive sciences, as well as for much that cannot be repeated here, the student may consult with advantage vol. ii., p. iv., ch. iii., iv. and vi. of the work referred to.

435 “Id a quo aliquid procedit quocunque modo.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xxxiii., art. 1.

436 Hence Aristotle’s definition of principle, including both logical and real principles: Πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἡ ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται.—_Metaph._ IV., ch. i.

437 A _cause_ must be prior _in nature_ to its effect, but not necessarily prior _in time_. In fact the _action_ of the cause and the _production_ of the effect must be simultaneous. _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 220. Considered formally as correlatives they are _simul natura_. A _principle_ must likewise be in some sense _prior_ to what proceeds from it, not necessarily, however, by priority of time, nor by priority of nature involving real dependence. The Christian Revelation regarding the Blessed Trinity involves that the First Divine Person is the “principle” from which the Second proceeds, and the First and the Second the “principle” from which the Third proceeds; yet here there is no dependence or inequality, or any priority except the “relation of origin” be called priority.

_ 438 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 216.

_ 439 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 16; ii., §§ 214, 224 (p. 113).

_ 440 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 252.

_ 441 Cf._ _Physic._, Lib. ii., cap. 3; _Metaph._, Lib. i., cap. 3; v., cap. 2.

_ 442 i.e._ from the effect considered _formally_ as a term of the activity; in the case of _immanent_ activity, as, _e.g._ thought or volition, where the effect remains within the agent (as a _verbum mentale_ or other mental term), uniting with the concrete reality of the latter, the effect is not adequately distinct from the agent as affected by this term or product.

_ 443 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Physic._, ii., lect. 10: “Necesse est quatuor esse causas: quia cum causa sit, ad quam sequitur esse alterius, esse ejus quod habet causam potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est ens in actu; alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens: et quia omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu ens, ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, scilicet materiam, et agentem quod reducit materiam de potentia in actum. Actio autem agentis ad aliquod determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato principio procedit; nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens. Id autem ad quod intendit actio agentis dicitur causa finalis. Sic igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor.”

_ 444 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 247-8.

445 Certain medieval scholastics, especially of the Franciscan School, regarded spiritual substances as having in their constitution a certain potential, determinable principle, which they called “_materia_”. St. Thomas, without objecting to the designation, insisted that such potential principle cannot be the same as the _materia prima_ of corporeal substances (_cf._ _De Substantis Separatis_, ch. vii.).

_ 446 Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Actio est actus activi _et passio est actus passivi_” (iii. _Physic._, l. 5); “_Materia_ non fit _causa in actu_ nisi _secundum quod alteratur et mutatur_” (i. _Contra Gentes_, xvii.); “Materia est causa formae, inquantum forma non est nisi in materia” (_De Princip. Naturae_).

_ 447 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Princip. Naturae_, _ibid._: “... et similiter forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam; materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem; dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum, sicut pars ad totum”.

448 “Materia cum sit infinitarum formarum determinatur per formam, et per eam consequitur aliquam speciem.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. vii., art. 1.

449 To Special Metaphysics also belongs the controverted question whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance. When we classify corporeal things into _genera_ and _species_ according to their _natural kinds_ (_cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 67), these latter are determined by the _formae substantiales_ of the things classified, and are called _infimæ species_. Numerically distinct individuals which have (conceptually) the same _forma substantialis_, fall into the same _infima species_; while if such individuals have (conceptually and numerically) distinct _formae substanialis_ they fall into distinct _infimae species_ of some higher common genus. The wider the generic concept the larger the group of individuals which it unifies: it is a principle of conceptual unity, _i.e._ of universality. The objects of our _generic_, _differential_, and _specific_ concepts, throughout this process of classification, are only virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being in the individuals. Now if the _forma substantialis_ which yields the unifying concept of the _species infima_ for the individuals, and the material principle which is the ground of the numerical distinction between these latter, were likewise regarded by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being, in each individual, then the question of a plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual would have no meaning: all “forms” in the latter would be only virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle. But the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for grouping individuals into _species infimae_ was the same as that for grouping these latter into wider genera. They regarded the relation between the _forma substantialis_ and the _materia prima_ in the individual as quite different from that between the generic and specific grades of being in the individual (_cf._ _supra_, § 38; _Science of Logic_, i., § 44; JOSEPH, _Introduction to Logic_, pp. 93-6). While they considered the latter a relation of virtual distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction. And while they recognized the concept of the _species infima_ to be a principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together mentally, St. Thomas emphasized especially the rôle of the _forma substantialis_ (on which that concept was founded) as a principle of _real unity_ in the individual: “Ab eodam habet res _esse_ et _unitatem_. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam. Unde et per formam res habet unitatem” (_Quodlib._ i., art. 6). If we accept this doctrine of St. Thomas the arguments which he bases on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable (_Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 215).

450 “Idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem: agentis quidem, secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem, secundum quod est in ipso.... Ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non sequitur quod actio et passio, vel doctio et doctrina, sint idem; sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam rationem est passio; alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus, ut _in hoc_, et esse actus hujus, ut _ab hoc_; motus autem dicitur actio secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc; dicitur autem passio secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc. Et sic patet quod licet motus sit idem moventis et moti, propter hoc quod abstrahit ab utraque ratione: tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod diversas rationes in sua significatione habent.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Phys._, iii. 1. 5.

451 “Solet dubium esse apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente, aut in mobili.... Sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus est actus; actus autem motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis, causatus tamen in eo a movente ... cum motus sit actus existentis in potentia, sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est movens, sed inquantum est mobile.”—_ibid._, 1. 4.

452 Some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of action: “Differt autem _facere_ et _agere_: quia _factio_ est actio transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare et hujusmodi; _agere_ autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut videre, velle et hujusmodi.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._ iae iia, q. lxvii., art. 4, c.

453 Hume went even farther, at least in language; for he alleged (whether he really believed is another question) that he could overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty, that he could easily—and, presumably, without doing violence to his rational nature—conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence without a cause! He proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be unthinkable: _an absolute beginning of being from nothingness_. “The knowledge of this relation (causality) is not,” he writes, “in any instance attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are _constantly conjoined_ with each other ”(_Works_, ed. Green and Grose, iv., 24). “All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and, as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ’twill be easy for us (!) to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or producing principle” (_Treatise on Human Nature_, p. 381). On this argument (?) even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as Huxley was, is forced to remark that “it is of the circular sort, for the major premise, that all distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue” (HUXLEY’S _Hume_, p. 122).

454 Thus, for instance, man, elevated by sanctifying grace, can perform acts which merit the supernatural reward of the Beatific Vision.

_ 455 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 231.

_ 456 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, ii., cap. 2.

_ 457 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 392 (p. 1123): “Unde adaequata virtus instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter addita, docente S. Thoma: _Instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum_ (_Summa Theol._, iii., q. xix., art. 3, ad. 2).”

458 “Ad aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a se, sive ab alio.... Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem instrumentaliter, quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam sibi inhaerentem, sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente. Haec est ratio instrumenti, inquantum est instrumentum, ut moveat motum; unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se habet motus, quo movetur a principale agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere; tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit, nisi inquantum est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et convenientem formae artis: et sic instrumentum habet duas operationes; unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam; aliam quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente, quae transcendit virtutem propriae formae.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxvii., art. 4. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas regarded these two “_operationes_” of the instrumental cause as really distinct, for he says that it acts as an instrument (_i.e._ modifies the efficiency of the principal cause) only by exercising its own proper function: “Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam operationem propriam, et connaturalem sibi, sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad factionem scamni secando” (_Contra Gentes_, ii., ch. xxi.): from which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an instrumental cause _in creating_.—_Cf._ iv. _Sent._, Dist. i., q. i., art. 4, sol. 2.—_De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7.—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. lxii., art. 1, ad. 2.

459 St. Thomas, proving the necessity of the Divine _concursus_ for all created causes, illustrates the general distinction between a _principal_ and an _instrumental_ cause: “Virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis _ut quaedem forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura_. Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo ... virtus artis [est] in instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit quod _vis artis_ esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, _nisi haberet intellectum_; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem _vis qua agit ad esse_ ut instrumentum primae causae, _nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium_; nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret seipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina.”—_QQ. DD. De. Pot._, q. iii., art. 7.

_ 460 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xix.—MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., ch. i. § 2.

461 For a fuller treatment of this whole subject, _cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., Part iv., chs. iii., iv.; Part v., ch. i.—MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xix., pp. 423-4.

_ 462 Cf._ NEWMAN, _Grammar of Assent_, Part i., ch. iv., § 1 (5), (6); § 2, remark 1.

_ 463 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 216, 218, 219.

_ 464 ibid._, § 216.

_ 465 ibid._, § 220.

_ 466 Introduction to Logic_, pp. 64-5.

_ 467 Cf._ what was said above (32) about the causal or extrinsic, as distinct from the intrinsic, principle of individuation.

468 “Whenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event, such as the French Revolution (whose cause must be as unique as that event itself is), but of an event of a kind, such as consumption, or commercial crises, it looks in the last resort for a _commensurate_ cause. What is that exact state or condition of the body, given which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption? What are those conditions in a commercial community, given which there must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis?”—JOSEPH, _op. cit._, p. 65. _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 221.

_ 469 System of Logic_, iii., v., § 2.

470 For instance: (_a_) The “ontological” or “true” cause, which “actually produces” the effect, need not necessarily be the “ultimate” cause of the latter. (_b_) A “physical fact” can be the cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent (or _physical_ cause) of the latter, but not “in that sense alone”; it may also be an _efficient_ cause of the latter by exerting an active influence on the happening of this latter. (_c_) Whether or not efficiency is “a mysterious and most powerful tie,” at any rate it does exist between “physical facts” in the universe. (_d_) Its analysis reveals not a “supposed necessity of ascending ... to ... the true cause, ... which ... produces the effect,” as if the proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter; but a real necessity of ascending to a First Cause as the source and support and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes. (_e_) A merely _logical_ theory of Induction does not indeed demand any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies, or into the nature and grounds of the “invariability” or “necessity” or “law” whereby these are connected with their effects. But a _philosophical_ theory of Induction does imply such inquiries. And here phenomenist writers like Mill have laid themselves open to two accusations. For while professing merely to abstract from the problem of _efficiency_ they have tried equivalently to deny its existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble, besides consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it. And similarly, in dealing with the _invariability_ of causal sequences in the universe, with the _necessary_ character of its physical laws, they have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical, fatal, absolutely inviolable; and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate grounds to be unknowable (Agnosticism). Cf. _infra_, § 104; _Science of Logic_, ii., Part IV., chs. iii., iv., and v.; Part V., ch. i. Thus, while eschewing the genuine Metaphysics, which seeks the real nature and causes of the world of our experience, as superfluous and futile, they have substituted for it a masked and spurious metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on Physical Science: a mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even the merit of consistency. No philosopher, starting with their views on the nature of the human mind, can consistently claim for the latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of _laws_, any more than of causes. For the knowledge of a _law_, even as a _generalized_ fact, is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the limits of the individual’s present and remembered experiences. But there can be no rational justification, whether psychological or ontological, for the certain reliability of such a step, in the philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute the total content of the individual consciousness and the total reality of human experience.

_ 471 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii., pp. 368-70.—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 229.

472 “When an _effort_ of attention combines two ideas, when one billiard ball moves another, when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid iron, when a blow on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases there is something more than, and essentially different from, the mere _sequence_ of two phenomena: there is _effective force_—_causal action_ of an agent endowed with _real energy_.”—MAHER, _op. cit._, _ibid._, p. 370.

_ 473 Grammar of Assent_, p. 66.

_ 474 Cf._ DOMET DE VORGES, _Cause efficiente et cause finale_, p. 39. Volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient causality in our mental life. But it is not the only type; we have direct conscious experience of intellectual effort, of the work of the imagination, of the exercise of organic and muscular energy. There is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or energy, after the model of will-power, as Newman among others appears to have done when he wrote in these terms: “Starting, then, from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will: and by the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle, that all things come of effective will” (_ibid._, p. 68). No doubt, all things do come ultimately from the effective will of God. This, however, is not a first principle, but a remote philosophical conclusion.

_ 475 ibid._, p. 66.

476 ST. THOMAS, _QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7, in c.

477 “Nulla res per seipsam movet vel agit, nisi sit movens non motum.... Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota ... et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum, sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis, ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. iii., art. 7.

478 This is the principle repeatedly expressed by ST. THOMAS: “Unde quarto modo unum est causa alterius, sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti: et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus _quod est ens_ et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae. Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie, nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae _quae respicit totam speciem_ et ulterius _totum esse_ naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit in speciem in istis inferioribus ... nec aliquid agit _ad esse_ nisi per virtutem Dei. _Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus, primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus_: unde etiam, ut dicitur in _Lib. de Causis_ (prop. 9), intelligentia non dat esse, nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis operantis.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. iii. art 7.—_Cf._ _supra_, 99 (_c_), p. 375, n. 2.

479 Why, then, is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly? why are its powers, forces, energies, fatigued, lessened, exhausted by exercise? Simply because its action is proportionate to its powers, and these to its _finite_ nature.

480 “Creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius.... Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et differant solum secundum habitudines diveras ... oportet quod subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi ... creatio significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; quia facere et fieri important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed mutationem ex consequenti.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xlv., art. 2, ad. 2.

481 “Remoto motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis [effectus] secundum quod [effectus] a causa aliqua procedit.”—_op. cit._, i. q. xli., art. 1, ad 2.

482 The act of the will is, of course, virtually transitive when it wills or determines bodily movements.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, chs. x., xxiii. (pp. 517-24).

483 At the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts upon itself, but only on other parts, in the production of the local, quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition. It is subject to the inductively established law which seems to regulate all _corporeal_ action: that all such action involves _reaction_ of the _patiens_ on the _agens_. Mental activity is outside this law. Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their immanent activity.—_Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 227.

_ 484 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._

_ 485 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, chs. xiii. and xiv.

_ 486 Cf._ URRABURU: “Vel, si mavis, dic causam efficientem esse causam, a qua fit aliquid, vel a quo proprie oritur actio, intelligendo per actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a causa.”—_op. cit._, § 389 (p. 1112).

_ 487 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 229: “L’action, l’efficience, qu’est elle, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Est-ce une sorte d’écoulement de la cause dans l’effet? Évidemment non. Lorsque nous voulons nous élever à une conception métaphysique, nous nous raccrochons à une image sensible, et nous nous persuadons volontiers, que la netteté de la première répond à la facilité avec laquelle nous nous figurons la seconde. Il faut se défier de cette illusion. Puisque l’action, même corporelle, ne modifie point l’agent, la causalité efficiente ne peut consister dans un influx physique, qui passerait de la cause dans l’effet.”

_ 488 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 228-9.

489 We might add this other fact: that _all_ kinds of corporeal activity and change (11) seem to involve _motion_ or local change. This does not prove that they all _are_ motion or local change. The significance of the fact lies probably in this, that local motion is necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the interacting physical agencies.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, §§ 227-9.

_ 490 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iii., 69.

491 “Une cause véritable est une cause, entre laquelle et son effet l’esprit aperçoit une liaison nécessaire: c’est ainsi que je l’entendes. [This is ambiguous.] Or il n’y a que l’être infiniment parfait entre la volonté duquel et les effets l’esprit aperçoive une liaison nécessaire. Il n’y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause, et il semble même qu’il y ait contradiction à dire que les hommes puissent l’être”—_De la récherche de la vérité_, Liv. 6me, 2e partie, ch. iii.

492 “Si l’on vient à considérer attentivement l’idée que l’on a de cause ou de puissance d’agir, on ne peut en douter que cette idée ne présente quelque chose de divin.”—_ibid._

493 “Il n’y a point d’homme qui sache seulement ce qu’il faut faire pour remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux.”—_ibid._

494 “J’ai toujours soutenue que l’âme était l’unique cause de ses actes, c’est à dire de ses déterminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou mauvais.... J’ai toujours soutenu que l’âme était active, mais que ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique.”—_Réflexions sur la prémotion physique_. “Je crois que la volonté est une _puissance active_, qu’elle a un véritable pouvoir de se déterminer; mais son action est _immanente_; c’est une action qui ne produit rien par son efficace propre, pas même le mouvement de son bras.”—_Réponse à la 3__me__ lettre d’Arnauld_.

_ 495 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 230-2; ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (45); URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 393 _sqq._

496 We may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us what better proof of it could he demand, or what better proof could be forthcoming, than this proof from consciousness.

497 MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. x., p. 220.

498 Should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact, we may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the mental state and the bodily movement: “I will to move my arm, it moves; I will that it remain at rest, it does not move; I will that its movement be more or less strong and rapid, the strength and rapidity vary with the determination of my will. What more complete inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on the external world?”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 231.

499 “Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur virtus alicujus causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus, quae naturam consequitur. Si igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum, sequitur, quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum sequuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, L. iii., cap. 69.

500 “Je demeure d’accord que la foi oblige à croire qu’il y a des corps; mais, pour l’évidence, il me semble qu’elle n’est point entière, et que nous ne sommes point invinciblement portés à croire qu’il y ait quelqu’autre chose que Dieu et notre esprit.”—_Récherche de la vérite_, 6me éclaircissement.

_ 501 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

_ 502 Metaph._, v., 17.

503 “Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare.... Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus _sensitivus_. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem; et haec inclinatio dicitur _voluntas_.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xlix., art. 1.

504 “Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art. 2.

505 In its modern usage the term “intention” is inseparable from the notion of _conscious_ direction. The scholastics used the term “_intentio_” in a _wider_ and _deeper_ sense to connote the natural tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities and lines of development. And in unconscious agencies they did not hesitate to refer to it as “_intentio naturae_” or “_appetitus naturalis_”.

506 “Res naturalis per _formam_ qua perficitur in sua specie, habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per operationes consequitur; quale enim unumquodque est, talia operatur, et in sibi convenientia tendit.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iv., 19.

“Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata; et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. xlix., art. 1.

507 “Causa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse, quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc, quod _sit_ finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse sed quantum ad _rationem causalitatis_. Nam efficiens est causa in quantum agit; non autem agit nisi causa [gratia] finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens.”—ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., 2.

“Sciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper, unde dicitur _causa causarum_, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.”—_ibid._, lect. 3.

508 Φύσις ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τὶς καὶ αἰτία του κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ῷ ὑπάχει πρώτως καθ᾽ αὑτο, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Natura est principium quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat, in quo inest primum, per se et non secundum accidens.—_Physic._, L. ii., cap. 1.

509 “Ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum faciendorum.”—_Summa Theol._ ia iiae, q. lvii., art. 3.—_Cf._ _In Post. Anal._, l. 1.

510 “Natura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum; sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.”—_In II Phys._, lect. 14.

“Omnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata, habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus eorum inclinatio naturalis est, _ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et non solum ducantur in fines debitos_.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art. 7.

511 “In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium extrinsicum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte.”—_In II. Phys._, lect. 13.

_ 512 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.

_ 513 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii, § 227.

_ 514 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 226-31.

515 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, iv., ch. v.

_ 516 Physic._, ii., ch. v.

_ 517 ibid._

_ 518 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 264, 268-9.

519 Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὤς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φυσις.—_De Coelo_, ii., 8.

520 Fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind, inevitable, eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity. Thus SENECA (_Nat. Quaest._, L. III., cap. 36) describes _fatum_ as _necessitas omnium rerum actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat_. This _necessitas ineluctabilis_ is totally different from the conditional physical necessity of the course of Nature dependently on the _Fiat_ of a Supreme Free Will guided by Supreme Intelligence (_Cf._ _Science of Logic_, §§ 224, 249, 253, 257). If the necessity of actual occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the _Fiat_ of an Intelligent Will—and mechanists deny that it can be so traced—it is rightly described as fatalistic, blind, purposeless, unintelligible.

_ 521 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 259, 260.

522 “Expliquer par une rencontre fortuite, la convergence d’éléments, dont chacun a sa poussée propre, c’est rendre raison de la _convergence_ par des principes de _divergence_.... Il est donc contradictoire d’attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de l’ordre.”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 260.

_ 523 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 224, 250, and _passim_.

524 “Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in natura: unde si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem: scilicet prius institueretur fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur tectum.... Et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte, hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura; ut patet in sanitate, quam contigit fieri, et ab arte et a natura.... Unde manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, scilicet priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte.”—ST. THOMAS, _In II. Phys._, lect. 13.—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 417, n. 3.

525 “Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.”—_De Civ. Dei_, xix., 13.

_ 526 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 257-61.

527 “_La convergence de causes indifférentes qui réalisent d’une manière harmonieuse et persistante un même objet ordonné, ne s’explique point par des coincidences fortuites; elle réclame un principe interne de convergence._”—_Ibid._, § 260.

528 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_, lvi.

529 BROWNING, _A Soul’s Tragedy_, Act. 1.

530 “Universum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum.”—_In Metaph._, xii., l. 12.

531 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, xi., 10. Does Aristotle teach that God moves the universe only as its Final Cause, as the Supreme Good towards which it tends, or also as Efficient Cause? His thought is here obscure, and has given rise to much controversy among his interpreters.

532 Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ ἁυτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν.—_Ibid._, xi., 8.

533 Κινεῖ δὲ (οὐ ἕνεκα) ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινει.—_ibid._, 7.

534 “Totus ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi.”—_Ibid._, xii., l. 12.

535 ... Among themselves all things Have order; and from hence the form, which makes The universe resemble God. In this The higher creatures see the printed steps Of that eternal worth, which is the end Whither the line is drawn. All natures lean In this their order, diversely, some more, Some less approaching to their primal source. Thus they to different havens are moved on Through the vast sea of being, and each one With instinct giv’n, that bears it in its course; This to the lunar sphere directs the fire, This prompts the hearts of mortal animals, This the brute earth together knits and binds. Nor only creatures, void of intellect, Are aim’d at by this bow; but even those That have intelligence and love, are pierced. That Providence, who so well orders all, With her own light makes ever calm the heaven, In which the substance that hath greatest speed Is turned: and thither now, as to our seat Predestin’d, we are carried by the force Of that strong cord, that never looses dart, But at fair aim and glad ...

—DANTE, _Paradiso_, Cant. i. (tr. by CARY).