Nazi conspiracy and aggression, Volume 04 (of 11)
Chapter 4
Work Abroad [pp. 154-162]
The Reich Youth leadership does not pursue foreign politics.
The Fuehrer created the Office of Foreign Affairs for the foreign activities of the National Socialism. What is done within the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership never means an overcrossing of Party offices and State offices. The HJ deals with the youth and not with big politics. And even where the youth contacts the youth of other nations to exchange young people for study trips or camps, contact is made outside the political sphere. It is the purely human agreement of youth among themselves which in this way the Reich Youth leadership attempts to achieve.
During the last year the most important meetings between German and foreign youth were:
The visit of the HJ in Hungary.
The counter visit of the Levente youth in Germany.
The German-English Youth Camp near Hamburg.
The trip of Department Leader Nabersberg to England and Turkey.
A lecture of Karl Nabersberg in Paris on the occasion of a meeting of the “Sohlbergkreis”.
The visit of a Finnish Study Group [Studiengesellschaft].
Also on the occasion of the visits of foreign youth leaders (i.e. Greek, Chinese and Japanese) to the Reich Youth leadership, contacts were made with foreign youth organizations.
Every nation has the interest that its youth has a political outlook reaching as far as possible. Especially the National Socialist Germany is strongly interested that her youth knows and respects other nations as early as possible. The better the youth of Europe understands each other, the nicer for the future. A basic principle of the youth exchange is: no propaganda. Hitler boys who go abroad do not travel as propagandists of National Socialism; their task is not to teach, but to learn. They should see the beauty of the foreign landscape and explore the national characteristic of the host-country. I believe in a cooperation of the European youth at the basis of an agreement; its only program point should be: to know each other. It would be an utopian idea to believe that such a cooperation would improve the world. Probably the world would not improve but the people could become juster. In this connection we welcome the international exchange of pupils and only desire that it might be extended beyond the circle of pupils to the youth of all professions. The activity of the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership is not only concerned with the relationship of the HJ to the youth of other nations, although this field is most clearly in evidence. It cares, in close cooperation with the League for Germandom Abroad [Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im Ausland], for the youth of the German settlements abroad, in Europe and South America, and awakens in the Reich German Youth the understanding for the brothers and sisters abroad.
In a special main branch, the Central Office for Volksdeutsche Youth Work [Mittelstelle fuer Volksdeutsche Jugendarbeit], which took over the main tasks of the Central Office of German Youth in Europe, which in 1933 was attached to the organization of the Reich Youth leadership, the following fields are being worked on:
1. Borderland trips and trips abroad of the entire German youth.
2. “Volksdeutscher” labor service.
3. Schooling in the Reich of German youths living abroad.
The borderland trips and trips abroad offer the possibility to give the young Germans abroad the contact with the new Germany by Reich German Youth hiking groups in form of performances (folk songs, folk dances and plays performed by laymen). At the same time, a selection by these youth hiking groups should be made in the German settlements abroad among those who appear suitable as youth leaders and therefore are to be called to the Reich for schooling.
All borderland trips and trips abroad of youth hiking groups and individual youth hikers have to be authorized by the hike office of the central office. Thereby the hikes of the “wild hikers” should finally be prevented which were not always to the good of the German reputation abroad. On the other side the hikes should be arranged according to a certain plan, so that they can be directed into certain sections where a visit seems really appropriate.
A special task of the central office is the so-called Volksdeutsche Labor Service which has the task of a systematic schooling of German Youth leaders living abroad. In four specially suited labor camps the sense of the labor service is clearly demonstrated to the Germans living abroad by special schooling methods, in order that they can apply what they learned in their home organization.
Another branch of the Foreign Department has the task to combine the Reich German boys and girls inasmuch as is possible in youth groups in which National Socialist ideas are conveyed to them. To this effect the groups receive books and youth literature free of charge and especially such which establish the spiritual contact with the Reich German HJ. The work program provides the establishment of schooling camps of several weeks duration for German youths from abroad who above all should convey to the future leaders the experience of the present fatherland. Through our own press service, the Foreign Department tries to protect the rights of the German youth abroad in the Reich German Press. The daily appearing press service “Space of the East” [Ostraum] brings short news about the movement of the German youth organizations abroad and the German school abroad for Lithuania, Letland, Esthonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Another paper “The School Review for Germans Abroad” [Die Auslandsdeutsche Schulschaù] is delivered to a great number of German schools of higher learning. Furthermore the branch participates in the youth periodicals published by the Reich Youth leadership or in cooperation with it, and furnishes the German daily newspapers with articles of a principle nature about questions of the youth abroad, as well as the German newspapers abroad with news from the Reich and the German groups beyond the frontier. The branch “Press” in the Foreign Department is thereby the rallying point for the news on the movement of the German Youth abroad and the schools in the Reich for the Germans abroad.
The branch “School” of the Foreign Department is of special importance. Its task is essentially to communicate to the HJ sufficient knowledge about the Germandom of the borders abroad and of foreign politics. To carry through the schooling in the units, borderland and foreign lecturers were appointed who on central instruction of the chief lecturer had to carry out the schooling in the individual units. The first instruction week for lecturers abroad on a systematic execution of the training program, was held from 4 to 10 December 1933 in Potsdam. The training program uses the following aides:
1. A regularly appearing schooling-letter with a publication of 65,000
2. Literature on the subject in general which is distributed to the lecturers abroad
3. The periodical “People and Reich”
4. Contributions in newspapers and periodicals
The training of the co-workers staff is to be extended by a number of additional training weeks and by supply of training material and establishment of competent libraries in the Oberbanne. Furthermore, special attention for the localities less than 100 km from the frontier is intended.
The colonial branch keeps awake the memory of the cultural, scientific, economic and military achievements in the former German colonial territory within the organizations under the order of the Reich Youth leadership. Beyond this, the German youth shall be informed about the importance of colonial possession for the supply of the home economy with colonial products and raw materials. It will be taken into consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of the German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space in the East will not be violated. In the historical schooling the “colonial-guilt-lie” and the thereby intended defamation of the German people--also in regard before the colored nations--will be emphasized and it will be pointed out that equal terms for the German people are only obtained when these parts of the Versailles shame dictate are also rectified.
Special colonial lecturers who are assigned to the headquarters of the HJ and BDM down to the Bann and Unterbann will attend to the carrying out of these tasks. These lecturers also will be prepared for the solution of their tasks in courses in the Reich Leader School in Potsdam and within the districts and subdistricts. The literature at present on hand about colonial questions which, however, is only for limited use for the schooling within the HJ since it was written under different political conditions, will be put at the disposal as work material. New material, in accordance with timely requirements, is in preparation and will serve in the future as basis for all work. The youth should be informed every three months by a “schooling-letter” about everything worth while in the field of the colonial question which should come down to the sub-leaders of the whole HJ and BDM. In this direction, friendly cooperation with the biggest society, the German Colonial Society, takes place; material is exchanged. As much as the promised shipping space is available, members of the HJ (colonial lecturers) should be sent to the former German colonial territories so that they can learn at the spot the present-day conditions and give the Germans there a sign of our attachment. Supported by what they have seen and lived, they should after their return work here to enlighten the HJ in the country.
It would lead us astray to go into the details of the activities of the Foreign Department. Generalobergebietsfuehrer Karl Nabersberg devoted much energy to these duties and gave up even the leadership of the staff of the Reich Youth leadership with which he was charged for a time in favor of this task which had his particular interest. The thought that every Hitler boy and every BDM girl regardless in which part of the world they are, form a great comradeship and march together in spite of local separation in one direction and live and work in the same spirit was realized by the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth leadership.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1462-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 709
First execution order to the law for the HITLER YOUTH (General Regulation) of 25 March 1939
Based on Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 993), I Order:
Article 1
1. The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all missions of the physical, ideological and moral education of the entire German youth of the Reich area outside of the house of the parents and the school. The competence of the Reichminister for science, education and public orientation remains unaffected as far as private education and social education are concerned.
2. The following problems are transferred from the sphere of action of the Reich and Prussian Minister for science, education and public orientation to the sphere of action of the youth leader of the German Reich:
All affairs of youth care, the youth hostel system as well as of the accident and liability insurance in the interest of youth care.
The question of competence for the year’s service on farms [LandJahr] is left to a special regulation.
3. The youth leader of the German Reich with the Hitler youth is subordinated to the Financial authority of the NSDAP.
Article 2
1. The Cadre Hitler Youth [Stamm HJ] exists within the Hitler Youth.
2. Whoever was a member of the Hitler Youth since 20 April 1938, is a member of the Cadre Hitler Youth.
3. Juveniles, who have had at least one year of good conduct in the Hitler Youth, and fulfill the conditions of ancestry for the acceptance into the NSDAP, may be accepted into the Cadre Hitler Youth. More specific regulations will be issued by the Reich Youth leader of the NSDAP in agreement with the Fuehrer’s deputy.
4. The acceptance into the Cadre Hitler Youth of persons over 18 years of age, who are to be used in the leadership and administration of the Hitler Youth, can take place immediately.
5. Only the Cadre Hitler Youth is an affiliate of the NSDAP.
6. Membership in the Cadre Hitler Youth is voluntary.
Article 3
The Reichminister of the Interior will appoint the national agencies, subordinated to the youth leader of the German Reich, in agreement with Fuehrer’s deputy and the Reichminister of Finance.
Article 4
The members of the Hitler Youth are entitled, and are obliged, if ordered, to wear the prescribed uniform.
Berlin, 25 March 1939
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler
The Deputy of the Fuehrer R. Hess
The Reichsminister and Chief of Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1463-PS
Diary of the Navy 1944
The Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz.
“This war is a naval war and it will be decided on the High Seas.”--Admiral Doenitz.
Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Gruenau on 16 September 1891, the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar. He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet on 1 April 1910 and was promoted to Lieutenant on 27 September 1913. As an ensign he was ordered to the light cruiser “Breslau”. There he witnessed the outbreak of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His experiences while on this cruiser which later became the “Midilli” of the Turkish Navy he described in a little book published during the last war while he was a lieutenant (jg). The title of the book was “The cruises of the ‘Breslau’ in the Black Sea”. Doenitz who served as watch officer and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 7 January 1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano. On 5 May 1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of that year returned to Germany.
For a long time it had been the young officer’s burning desire to become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant (jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 2 December 1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz became at first watch officer on the Submarine “U-39” whose commanding officer, Lt (sg) Forstmann was one of the most successful submarine officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an officer who knew how to train aggressive and responsible commanders. Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence of his former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 1 March 1918 became Commander of “UC-25” and later “UB-68”. With these boats he carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
Lt. (jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy, dishonorably mutilated by the Versailles dictate, and aided in its reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he took over, during the attempted coup d’etat of Kaff, the command of the torpedo boat V5 which was usable but without a commander. For three years then he was commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge of torpedo inspection and for another three years filled a responsible position with the Naval High Command. After one year’s sea duty as navigation officer on the light cruiser “Nymphe” Doenitz became chief of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy. In the fall of 1928 Doenitz was promoted to lieutenant commander. While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave him the opportunity to put down his experiences and suggestions in the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential personalities. During this time, the organizational plans and other prerequisites were already formulated which made possible the subsequent rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed by another period during which he attended service schools and undertook sea duty. On one of his trips he went to India for several months. In 1934, he became Commanding officer of the Light cruiser “Emden” which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean.
When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of the German Navy during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven told him to his surprise that he was appointed Chief of the “Weddigen” U-boat flotilla. From this date, 27 September 1935, started the ceaseless construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250-ton boats were built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, devoted himself to his new duties with passionate zeal and after untiring day and night work he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the reorganization of U-boat warfare. Again Doenitz donned his working clothes to drill and train his young officers, personally and with pitiless pace. He succeeded in closing a gap of 17 years, during which no training took place, with a few months of tireless work. Day after day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one of his U-boats indoctrinating the men in his charge, by hard thorough training, with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experience and new improvements in the development of different submarine types. Doenitz knew no let-down for himself. Regardless of weather, season or time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews, and led them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea * * *
One must recall, that after World War I a skillfully directed British propaganda campaign created a world-wide general impression that the submarine as a naval weapon was a thing of the past since superior defensive measures had been instituted, namely the convoy system, and that in future naval engagements, submarines would be of only secondary importance. Commander Doenitz’ opinion was diametrically opposite; “The massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to attack the convoy.” This maxim became the basis of his whole training program. The wolf pack tactics which later became so famous were originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic maneuvers * * * Doenitz surrendered personal command over the U-Boat only after the number of flotillas increased, in order to devote himself to higher tasks of leadership. After the outbreak of the war, about 4 years after the first U-boats were commissioned, the new weapon was in excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was our ideal combination between commander and front-line officer. Doenitz on 28 January 1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately within the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success. On 18 September 1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross 1st class, for his success in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. When the position of “leader of U-boats” was changed into that of “Commander” Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 October 1939. * * * Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and said over and over: “I was only the paw of the Big Lion. What I did, I could do because I was his disciple.” All the “old guard” thought the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned to their bases with flags of victory flying. The crew likewise was inspired by the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy who controlled the sea, a control which they undermined, and brought again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of the whole world. In an endless chain, the U-boat Commanders reported success after success to their chief. In spite of the fact that his duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him. A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and aggressiveness are his main characteristics. In spite of all his duties he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.
Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case. They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions alone. Tiny, brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just as if he was with them, as if he stood on the bridge beside them * * *
On 21 April 1940 Doenitz received the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, a reward of the Fuehrer, which put the unique accomplishments of this battle-tested officer in its true light. On September 1940, he was promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 14 March 1942 he was promoted to Admiral, a reward for the heavy damages inflicted on the new enemy, the U.S.A. On 30 January 1943 Doenitz received the Supreme Command of the Germany Navy from the Fuehrer and concurrently was promoted to Gross Admiral.
For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 7 April 1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from the Fuehrer personally as the 223rd Soldier of the Wehrmacht, the Oak Wreath to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.
Even though the field of activity of the C in C of the German Navy has experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law of all his action. Confidence merits confidence. The navy of Greater Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1472-PS
[CABLE]
Date 16 December 1942
URGENT--SECRET
TEXT:
In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the following may be applied in the Jewish sector.
1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.
The Reichsbahn [German State owned railway] cannot make available special trains for the evacuation during the period 15 December 1942/10 January 1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed Forces.
4. Breakdown: The 45,000 Jews consist of 30,000 Jews from the Bialystock district, 10,000 Jews from the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Among those are 5,000 able-bodied Jews who, so far, have been utilized in the Ghetto for necessary minor jobs, and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapacitated; also Jews over sixty years of age, in order to reduce in the interest of the extension of the Ghetto the excessive number of inmates to slightly below 48,000. I request special permission for this. As heretofore, only the Jews who have no special connections and relations, and who have no important decorations, have been earmarked for deportation; 3,000 Jews from the occupied areas in the Netherlands, 2,000 Jews from Berlin which equals 45,000. In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped [underlined] and others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers [underlined], will be available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.
The Chief of the security police and the SD Dept. IV, Div. B, Sec. 4, a-2093/42 g (391)
By Order of MUELLER SS Gruppenfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1481-PS
3.2.28 [in pencil], Fi 6/25 1.
Secret State Police Munich State Police District Office B. No. 52401/37 11 B.
Munich, 20 January, 1938.
Decree
By virtue of par. 1 of the Reich President’s order for the protection of people and state of the 28.2.33 (RGBl 1 p. 83) the following decree is issued:
The Guild of the Virgin Mary [die Marianische Jungfrauenkongregation] of the Bavarian diocese, including the diocese of Speyer, together with its branches and associations and the Societies of Our Lady [Jungfrauenvereinen] attached to it, is by police order to be dissolved and forbidden with immediate effect.
The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be confiscated by the police. Not only is property in cash to be confiscated, but also any stock on hand and other objects of value. All further activity is forbidden the dissolved Guilds, particularly the foundation of any organization intended as a successor or as a cover. Incorporation as a body into other women’s societies is also to be looked on as a forbidden continuation of activity. Infringement against the above prohibition will be punished according to para. 4 of the order of 28.2.1933.
Reasons
In a parish in Nurnberg the Guild of the Virgin Mary, going outside the sphere of the work proper to it, has occupied itself for years, to a most far reaching degree, with arrangements of a worldly and popular sporting character. Furthermore the president of the society has continuously supplied the Guild of the Virgin Mary, from its committee-members down to the women in charge of its groups, with seditious material, which served for seditious discussions. Furthermore the Guild of the Virgin Mary, particularly its leading circles, were trained and mobilized for purely political and seditious tasks.
The whole behaviour of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had therefore to be objected to from various points of view. It could be repeatedly observed that the Guild engaged in purely worldly affairs, such as community games, and then in the holding of “Social Evenings”.
This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was active to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and therefore worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its proper religious task and entered a sphere of activity to which it has no statutory right. The organization has therefore to be dissolved and forbidden.
Signed. Beutel.
certified copy--[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1482-PS
Berlin, 20 July 1935
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior III P 3701/5
Secret Special Delivery Letter!
[Stamp]
The Reich Governor in Bavaria 22 July 1935--one enclosure Sign: Fi 6 July 22 [apparently signature, illegible]
SUBJECT: Confessional youth organizations.
A direct endangering of public security and order has resulted from the recently observed intensive activity of confessional, particularly Catholic youth organizations, which have in numerous cases considerably overstepped the limits imposed on them by political development and therefore in many places led to clashes with the organizations which stand behind the government, particularly the Hitler youth.
I therefore respectfully request that, on the basis of paragraph 1 of the decree of 28 February 1933, the confessional youth organizations be forbidden to wear uniforms or uniform-like clothing and to assemble publicly with pennants and flags and that the wearing of insignia and the wearing of uniform costume as a substitute for uniforms as well as any outdoor sport activity be prohibited.
I respectfully request that I be immediately informed of your disposition (of the matter).
Signed: Dr. FRICK certified: [signature illegible] Ministerial Chancellery Secretary [stamp] settled 1 August
To the provincial governments (for Prussia: to the deputy chief and inspector of the Prussian secret state police)
Munich M [signature illegible]
Copies
To Reich Minister Kerrl, Reich Minister for Science, Education, and Public Training, and the Reich governors with a request for cognizance.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1498-PS
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, VI 7770/3014
Berlin NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 6 Nov. 1934 [telephone numbers, cable address]
[Stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria 7 Nov 1934----enclosures GG 1/7 .m.
SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER
To the State Governments for Prussia:
_a._ The Prime Minister--office of Secret State Police. _b._ The Minister of Science, Art and Public Education. _c._ The provincial Presidents and District Presidents.
_For Information_
To The State Secretary and Head of the Praesidium Chancellery.
The State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery.
The Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.
Reich Governors (of the States).
Executive Board of the NSDAP, Division for the Cultural peace in Berlin.
The Reich Bishop in _Berlin-Charlottenburg_.
Subject: Evangelical Church Controversy.
Lately there is an increase in cases in which ill-timed reports regarding the Evangelical Church reach the public. I therefore forbid--till further notice--all publications in the daily newspapers, in pamphlets or handbills, which are concerned with questions of the Evangelical Church, except only official announcements of the Church Government of the Reich. My edicts of 17 August 1934--III 3033/3014--and of 1 November 1934--III 7570/3014--are to that extent abrogated.
[signed] FRICK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1514-PS
Command of Mil. District VI
Dept. of Prisoners of War V Az. K 3 Nr. 1417/44 secret.
Soest, Westphalia, 27 July 1944 Phone: 1455/140.
SECRET
Reference: 1. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b Chief of PW/general (Id) Nr. 1998/44 secret of 16.7.44
2. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b AWA/PW general I (VIb) Nr. 2339/42 secret of 27.8.42
3. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8/a Nr. 751/42 secret of 4.9.42
4. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V Az. K 18/VI Nr. 1948/44 of 11.7.44
5. OKW Az. 2f 24. 11 Chief of PW/general (VIa) Nr. 979/43 secret of 19.4.43--reported by decree Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Nr. 1015/43 secret.
6. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8 R Nr. 314/42 secret of 7.4.42
7. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V, Az. K 11 Nr. 1125/44 secret of 11.7.44
Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the secret state police.
Enclosed is the decree I referred to.
The following, summarizing ruling is issued with respect to the delivery to the secret state police:
1. _a._ According to the decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war in case of punishable offenses to the secret state police and to dismiss them from imprisonment of war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts is not necessary.
_b._ Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first to the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of the police office, Section A 6 of the decree referred to in No. 4 regarding the contraction of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz prisoners of war who have been recaptured and refuse to work.
_c._ Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the _Gestapo_ and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and under 5).
_d._ Soviet officer prisoners of war, who refuse to work and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and 5).
_e._ Soviet enlisted prisoners of war, refusing to work who are ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and therefore have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 2 of the decree, referred to in 4).
_f._ Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers), who with respect to their political attitude have been sifted out by the special purpose command [Einsatzkommando] of the security police and the security service, have to be delivered upon request by the camp commander to the special purpose command and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Decree referred to in 6).
_g._ Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered if acts of sabotage are proven, to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report of the deed is not necessary. (Decree referred to under 7).
2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of war in the cases mentioned under #1 of this decree, to the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners of war, is not necessary.
3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the secret state police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war, if a special order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, department for Prisoners of War, is issued.
4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participating in illegal organizations and resistance movements have to be left upon request to the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners of war.
In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian military personnel, approval of Mil. District command VI, dept. of prisoners of war, has to be obtained--if necessary by phone--before delivery to the Gestapo for the purposes of interrogation.
By order of the Mil. District Commander
The commander of prisoners of war
The deputy [signed] FLEMM
1 enclosure.
Distribution:
Oflag VI/A, B, C, D.6,
Stalag VI/A, C, D, F, G, J.326 (VI/K)
Construction work battalion of PW (BAB) 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 35, 39, 45, 46, 106.
PW Roof repair battalion VI, XVI
PW Glass installation Battalion VI, XVI
District commander rear area of PW/Z.V. Staff/Counter intelligence officer
file 5
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1517-PS
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM
About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941
To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Fuehrer about my speech in the Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for further discussion. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the speech was given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will remain under German protection. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, only to go so far that the provinces never would come under communism and now from the German side appear as secured.
I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination [Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Fuehrer affirmed this and said that they had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.
The Fuehrer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Fuehrer agreed throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict.
Following, I laid before the Fuehrer the outline of a religious tolerance decree, to which the Fuehrer consented after careful consideration.
Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Fuehrer thought that the authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century. Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I asked the Fuehrer for a general rule that if the Fuehrer had specific desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to insure a regulated working arrangement.
The Fuehrer replied to the question by the military commanders in the occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood relationship.
I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told the Fuehrer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Fuehrer and otherwise decided to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish that the Fuehrer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my presence. The Fuehrer agreed immediately.
Then I told the Fuehrer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived. Moreover, they took from him other units. The Fuehrer said that he would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large enough--the land even partly over-populated.
I further asked the Fuehrer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set up also. The Fuehrer affirmed the question, and I once more referred to the danger of a Panturanian movement. I reported further about the petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the Fuehrer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed. The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly. In conclusion, the Fuehrer once more emphasized that he later wished to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafen--this according to the instructions of the Fuehrer himself.
Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and Transnistry to the Fuehrer, because the way things are, the Rumanians can look into all the shipbuilding installations; just an insignificant regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to General Field Marshal Keitel. The Fuehrer looked at the map and agreed to such a boundary regulation.
Finally, I told the Fuehrer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the Fuehrer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in Holland. The Fuehrer thought this all right and agreed with my wish.
Thereupon I gave the Fuehrer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The Fuehrer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him.
Berlin, 16 December 1941
R/H
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1519-PS
The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery
Fuehrer Headquarters 30.9.1941
The Director of the Party Chancellery
[Stamp]
Gau Training Office, Franken No. 2131 Received 8 Oct. 41 Sent
CONFIDENTIAL
Circular No. 21/41 Confidential
(not for publication)
_Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War_
For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of War. This regulation is _confidential_!
Heil Hitler!
sgd. Bormann
One appendix overleaf
Certified:
Distribution:
Gauleiters Kreisleiters
# # # # #
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I) No. 3058 41 Confidential
Berlin--Schoeneberg, 8.9.1941
2 Appendices Badenschestrasse 51
CONFIDENTIAL
_Subject_: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
_Reference_: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government).
2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.
3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941.
4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941
Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By order of
Reinecke
# # # # #
Appendix to Diary--No. 3058/41 Confidential dated 8.9.1941.
CONFIDENTIAL
Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps.
I. _Treatment of Soviet PWs in general._
_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany._ For the first time, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious to the people. The fight against National-Socialism has become part of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German Armed Forces, that _every German soldier_ should hold himself severely aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be visible even in public.
The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of Bolshevic fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must _immediately_ be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply under the assumption that _conditions will be generally peaceful_. With Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.
PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in particular H. Dv. 38/11, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However, caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.
Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered impossible.
Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence, the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use of this kind of weapon by _German soldiers_ is absolutely forbidden. With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the work of the German guard personnel.
II. _Treatment of members of racial groups._
In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been divided up, according to their race, in the “Home Organisation” [heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are concerned:
Racial Germans Ukrainians White Russians Poles Lithuanians Latvians Esthonians Rumanians Finns Georgians.
In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces Commanders.
Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:
Racial Germans Ukrainians, White Ruthenians Latvians Esthonians Rumanians Finns Lithuanians
Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to be effected.
Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.
III. _Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken during the Eastern campaign._
1. _Intentions._ The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign demand _special measures_ which can be carried out on their own responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.
2. _The way to reach the appointed goal._ A. Apart from directing PWs into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be divided as follows:
_a._ those politically undesirable
_b._ those politically harmless
_c._ those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).
B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc., is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has assigned _Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security Service_ for the work of classifying PWs according to their political opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, have received special training for their special duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.
There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units.
3. _Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2._ A. _Military personnel._ The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as “politically undesirable elements”. Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be _unsuspicious_, they should be sent back to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. Officers will very often be liable for segregation as “political undesirables”. Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as military personnel.
B. _Civilians._ If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as under A.
C. _Reliable persons_ are to be separated from politically undesirable persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.
(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be considered as “politically undesirable”.)
Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from the point of view of defense.
IV. _Employment of Soviet PWs._
1. _General._ Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these where the PWs can work under the _constant_ supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of consideration for a third person.
2. _Special regulations for employment within the Reich._ The main principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the assured security of German life and German property.
The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.
Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.
In addition, the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished.
3. _Guard duties._ The best possible trained energetic and prudent guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des M. Stammlagers].
At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail consist of _no more than_ 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns.
Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried out to the letter.
The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for thorough and detailed perusal.
The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the supervising authorities.
V. _Final remarks._
PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the content of the regulations.
# # # # #
Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No. 3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!)
Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War.
_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany_
For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.
The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:
1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.
2. Any _conversation_--even on the march to and from the place of work--unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions, is _utterly forbidden_. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of work--as well as during work. In the same way, all conversation between PWs and _civilians_ is to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms--even against the civilians.
3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always _keep a sufficient distance_ from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons _without delay_. Never turn your back on a PW.
4. Slackness is out of place even with a _PW who is obedient and willing to work_. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions.
5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.
6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters on the 8th of May 1942.
Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and Rosenberg, the author of the notes].
I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.
Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the “information service” of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked about the “_Policy of Colonisation_” in the East.--Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.
As regards the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be resettled again. I told the Fuehrer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life.
At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called “Green Folder” of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans.
Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused me to grant _self-administration_ to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my _decree_ to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception has been made with _Riga_. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration.
We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.
Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges. Ost--Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the whole question examined once again.
Then the problem of _religious freedom_ for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann, who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under “religious freedom” was to be interpreted _by the Churches_, and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled _by myself_ in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the “Atheist Museum”. In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.
Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany’s wards was discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for the Orientals “the losing of face.” Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how _to keep silent_. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.
I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the _three delegations of farmers_ in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.
I then dealt with the _employment of foreign workers_ in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had travelled the Eastland with the General-Director Junker who was the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about 75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch, and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau. It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled. The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the building of concrete ships.
I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.
Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and _the policy of the AA_ [Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with us. According to my information received from the manager of chief section “Policy”, the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples “Asiatics”, had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.
I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise. I said that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government].
It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he said that he did not understand from this talk that _he_ was to arrange the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view.
I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities. The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example, had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions resulted, if the _entire_ administration of railroad traffic had not been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice. I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.
The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort. Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer the present general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be--to use their own phrase--deported. Those men would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation would worsen very decisively thereby. The Fuehrer listened to the report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the Fuehrer’s orders.
Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to myself for the duration of the war.
In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the exhibition “Fight for Europe”.
The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the Baltic nations--according to many utterances--looked upon an award as a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.
I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.
I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.
I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from 1943 on more than 100,000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic rubber production.
During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion that one could not start right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was it a question of appointing the _major_ Cranz, but of the journalist who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his support in this matter.
Signed: R.
Berlin, 13th May 1942. R/H.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1521-PS
BAVARIAN POLITICAL POLICE
Copy
Munich, Briennerstr. 50, August 24th, 1934
Telephone 28341-46
Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence. To the Bureau of Secret State Police--Central Office
_Berlin S.W. 11_ Prinz Albrecht St. 8.
Reference
National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; here--the carrying out of para. III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 2.8.34.
Enclosure
1 Copy
Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening of the 2nd of August, 1934, from offices of the Party and regional [Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports, caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office.
The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued from the responsible diocesan office, or dean’s office. Of the clergy involved, 32 in all are politically tainted--two of them read holy mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest.
When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow party members, every possible excuse was used--let us only call attention to the following ones, to show what type they were:
Alleged disturbance of the religious service.
Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities.
Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty.
Alleged state of decay of the belfry.
Alleged defectiveness of the bells.
Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government.
Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect to the ringing of church bells.
Alleged incompetency.
Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of war.
On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg, Matthias Ehrenfried, a _sufficiently well-known_ cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o’clock. [pencil note referring to underling] How so?
Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair.
From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles.
In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and order, and on account of the anger of the people.
The following clergy are in question:
The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA., Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He was released from custody on 10.8.34.
The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400 hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34, he said sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who had carried out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account, “Lord forgive them, for they know not what they do!”
The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA., Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his own safety.
The behaviour of the diocesan office of the _archbishopric of Munich and Freising_, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with the principle “Attack is the best defence” deserves special note. In two letters of the 10th and 11th of August 1934 a touching complaint is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum.
It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist State. It is not to be wondered at if here and there, in face of the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown.
Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising has announced that it will also “report” the incidents to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the above office with the contents of the present report.
By order
signed Brunner [Stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria 28 Aug. 1934 1/1 enclosures Mark Ge 2/28.8
(Above) _Copy_ to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted.
By order
Jenner [?]
Copy checked 24.9.34. [Several illegible initials]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS
Copy
Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch, Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.
Cracow, February 1943.
To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Your Excellency:
Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.
The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of re-privatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.
I. _Question of Re-privatisation._
Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished finally.
The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still and as if in the new social order there was no place for private property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East is to be expected.
Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska, Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow, etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).
It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.
The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.
_II. Measures for finding labor._
The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
_a._ During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another one was wounded (enclosure 2).
_b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of “Russian prisoners-of-war” and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz (enclosure 3).
_c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under distress (enclosure 4).
_d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).
_III. Question of Personal Security._
Treatment of human beings.
Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered, even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).
Wholesale shootings.
Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in Lwow and Czortkow.
In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including 31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7).
During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).
Arrests in December 1942.
In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life. (enclosure 9).
How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to 6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).
Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.
In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was carried out even in the St. George’s cathedral in Lwow. The fact itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.
Special action against the asocial elements.
Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult. This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee.
These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the Ukrainian population.
_IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of Lublin._
[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant].
_V. Collective responsibility._
General remarks.
The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however, is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power towards those members. Today they have no such means. For the reasons stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing persons.
Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such Ukrainians perished.
We mention but some of the most convincing instances:
Wholesale shootings.
On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).
In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942.
On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka) 19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years (encl. 16).
The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children, because the population is unable to understand that the German authorities could consent to or order such deeds.
The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).
Conclusion.
The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture of the General Government.
* * * * * * *
Cracow, 25 February 1943.
# # # # #
_Table of Enclosures._
1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.
2. The events at Sokal.
3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.
4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).
5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the Reich).
6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).
7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska.
8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942.
9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.
10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.
11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January 1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.
12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district of Sanok.
13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the district Biljoraj.
14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during the second half of the year 1942.
15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.
16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of Tarnowatka on 29 January 1943.
_Enclosure 1._
_The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow._
In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land [Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of the former District Surveyor [Kreislandinspektor].
Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany and Tarnaopol and some other German employees who were brought to Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943. Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these better farms.
_Enclosure 2._
_The Events at Sokal._
On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police on the street and together with other people were formed into one unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.
At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the schoolboys’ hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet that he had to be taken to hospital.
The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he fainted.
The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly.
It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other labor was available.
_Enclosure 3._
Copy
Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942
Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow. To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow. Department for food.
Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in Cracow towards our laborers.
We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk Lukas on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany.
He reports:
Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian civilian and brought to punitive camps.
Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the German language and their certificates and identification papers were destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.
Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:
[Follows a list of 19 names].
The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to report their condition to the Committee.
[signed] Procyk Lukas.
_Enclosure 4._
Minutes.
Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran (son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski, district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany on 12 January 1942.
They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow. With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first, they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.
In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration, and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast and supper and soup at dinner time.
They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible frost persisted throughout--to 58 centigrades (below zero), but the lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought with them. After arriving in Pskow the workers lived in unheated huts without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there; only after two weeks were they billeted in a hall with beds, but they were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them. Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours.
Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski escaped, three were arrested, and we know nothing about the others; they certainly did not return home.
5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home.
These workers received no pay.
Komarow, 22 April 1942.
Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran.
_Enclosure 5._
_Memorandum for the files._
In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age groups 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action was then stopped.
The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and even some students fled through the windows.
Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of which the schools were closed for some time.
_Enclosure 6._
_Memo for the files._ _Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians._
_a._ On 11 November 1942 Irene Malaschtschuk, a public school girl working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working (attending to German customers) hit in the face several times by a Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special attention to me.
_b._ In September 1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner, the District Farmer, the Chairman of the Delegation in Chodorow, and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the assembly.
_c._ The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the woman.
_d._ The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on duty on 30 July 1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the event caused great indignation in the whole area.
_e._ On 9 August 1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan Wowtschyschyn was beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he was fatally wounded with the bayonet.
Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians.
_Enclosure 7._
_Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska._
In the early morning on Sunday, 4 October 1942, some groups of the Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name 2 saboteurs within two minutes otherwise every fifth man would be shot. As, however, no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives, viz. in Lubycza, Koroliwska and Kubycza, Kniazi.
Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians.
The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have perished. Probably this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the stable-boys and was extinguished at once.
The community of Lubycza, Koroliwska has been known as one of the most loyal of the whole district. The very same day (4 October 1942) the Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow, especially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published (Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger Nachrichten 6 October 1942).
The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries of Lubycza, Koroliwska.
It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by the District Captain [Kreishauptmann] the injured families in Lubycza, Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation.
_Enclosure 8._
As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of November 1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the place of execution.
These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the so-called “Bandera” group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as for instance Dr. Olexa Kossak, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij Pjaseckyj, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost Pankiskyj, but by Reich Germans as well.
_Enclosure 9._
_Arrests in Galicia in December 1942._
In December 1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless elements.
In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for. On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake. Since then 2½ months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not certain of their lives.
A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to grant permission.
_Enclosure 10._
_Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students._
On 5 February 1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate.
The personal data of the arrested:
[follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date and place of birth].
_Enclosure 11._
_List_ of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and students who were arrested in January 1943 in the districts of Kolomea, Stryj, and Komionka, Strumilowa:
[follows names by localities.]
_Enclosure 12._
_Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of Sanok._
During the period from 18 to 24 January 1943 about 300 persons were arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the Jewish cemetery promise no good.
On 17 and 18 January 1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their fate. Thus, for instance 4 persons were arrested from the village of Losie, district Jaslo, viz.:
[follow 4 names and addresses.]
One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on business trips to Warsaw.
On 18 January 1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids, for instance from Lutswyska; Iwan Lesky, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army who worked as a tiler, Jurko Schkrabak and his wife, both about 70 years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky called “Haramsymka”. We do not know the names of the other people shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second Christmas evening on that day called “Schtschedryj Wetschir”.
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian “Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
_Enclosure 13._
_Anti-Ukrainian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj._
* * * * * * *
_Enclosure 14._
_Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the second half of 1942._
* * * * * * *
_Enclosure 15._
_Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala._
On 17 December 1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with the help of the representatives of the Ukrainian Aid Committee. This evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all.
Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding country as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians who were evacuated in an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz. Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms.
As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the village Przewale, near Zubowice, were carried out on 24 December 1942. This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda Onofer, and his 75 years old mother-in-law Marie Rewus were shot. The names of the other Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one of a person aged 80 years).
_Enclosure 16._
_List of the Ukrainians shot on 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumin community of Taranwatka._
[Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and remarks. Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No’s: 39 & 45: wounded, in hospital.]
Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children.
The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk.
# # # # #
_List of Ukrainians shot 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola._
[Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks. Remarks to No’s: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded].
Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot.
Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko. Delegate: Matwijtschuk.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1531-PS
I.
Reich Security Head Office Amt IV Bk. No. 409/39 Top Secret
Berlin, 26 October 1939
_Top Secret_
_a._ To all State Police District Offices.
_b._ To the Gestapo office (according to restricted distribution C.)
_For information_
_a._ To all inspectors of the Security police and the SD.
_b._ To the Inspector-General of the reinforced SS-Death’s Head Units (with 8 copies for the camps).
_Subject_: Execution of protective custody.
By order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, all prisoners under protective custody due for transference to a concentration camp will, during the war, be assigned to a special penal section. The only exceptions will be prisoners under protective custody, who are assigned to a camp as a preventative police measure, (particularly those under index A), or those who are expressly exempt on the nominal role.
* * * * * * *
In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following must, in future, be observed in each individual case.
* * * * * * *
3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made known_, even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has already fixed it.
The term of a commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly announced as “until further notice.”
In serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out _rumor propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.
4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In this case too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to add to the deterrent effect.
5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be chosen for the spreading of such news.
* * * * * * *
By Order
(signed) Mueller Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck Chancellery employee
# # # # #
II Chief of the Security Police and the SD Bk. No. IV--226/42 Top Secret
Berlin, 12th June 1942 120 Copies 110th Copy
TOP SECRET
_As Top Secret_
to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD
to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the Reich Security Head Office
to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD
to all Heads of the State Police District Offices
_For Information_
to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD
_Subject_: Third degree
_Enclosure: 1 receipt_
In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security police and the SD of 1.7.37 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the following new ruling, with immediate effect:
1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary investigation that the prisoner can give information on important facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by investigation.
2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.
3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner’s own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who are temporarily detained by law for further investigations.
My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases.
4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted).
I. V. (signed) Mueller Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth Registered Secretary (Female)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1534-PS
Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 30 January 37
My Fuehrer:
I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership however would mean that I should have to face without contradiction the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious convictions.
This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my life I have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.
I ask to be permitted to resign.
With German Greetings! Your very obedient, (signed) Baron v. Eltz.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1536-PS
TOP SECRET
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink]
12 August 1938
Draft
General Officers only 2 copies 2nd Copy Access only through officer
General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only (Ic)
Re: Freudenthal Affair
Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only.
A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G. Moericke on which the following comment is made:
1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them.
If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very near to the truth of the matter.
2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for the Fr. operation.
3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him skilfully and provided good evidence.
B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are recommended:
1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers [V-Leute].
2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the time of the year.
3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage.
4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily.
C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe:
1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3, 4.
2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are being undertaken.
Reconnoitring of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September, in the following areas:
_a._ Freudenthal--Spachendorf--Hof--Braunseifen--Freudenthal.
_b._ Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km).
_c._ Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km).
As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 × 500 m. and larger.
If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3 and 4 are brought along.
By order of
Schmidt
Distribution: Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices General Staff 5th Division (Ic), 2nd Copy 13/8 [signature illegible]
# # # # #
Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.
TOP SECRET
Berlin 4.8.1938 General Officers only Access through Officer only
Transaction
Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attaché at the German Legation, Prague, states:
I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities.
For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.
I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed.
The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M’s private car for the trip.
As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this--without actually saying so.
As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said “Aha, so you’re looking for airfields!” I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.
To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: “Always immediately after the harvest.”
I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even shortly after harvest.
Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he had seen.
From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M. and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute].
As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the leader of the F. S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau.
I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my reconnaissance be known.
Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a hearing beforehand.
Moericke, Major d. G.H.
g. w. o.
Schmidt, Maj. d. G.
# # # # #
Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force, General Staff 5th Division.
No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.
[Section of map]
General Officers only
Access through Officer only
Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc.
[photograph]
Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of Freudenthal looking west.
Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields _a_ and _b_ [4 photographs].
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1538-PS
SECRET
Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs III org)
May 24, 1941
[Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies
Staff I a, 2 copies
May 24, 41
No. 279.
[Stamp] TOP SECRET
(to be forwarded) By Officer only
To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
[Marginal note:]
The Military Attaché Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.
In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany. Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:
[Marginal note:]
To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign Intelligence (simultaneously for ZL).
1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.
2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on) Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk.
[Marginal note:]
(To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C.
3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of hostilities.
Signature: Bueckner
U R Ia
Schmid [in crayon]
May 24
Copy to:
L.
3 Skl
Sonderstb H.H.K.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
TOP MILITARY SECRET
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40
TOP SECRET
Matter of Chief Fuehrer #9 Only through Officer 13 December 1940 [illegible notations] 12 Copies, 9th Copy
Direction Number 20
Operation Marita
1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.
2. My plan therefore is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.
(_b_) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
3. For the _concentration of the task force_ in Rumania are necessary:
(_a_) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(_b_) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
(_c_) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
(_d_) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumanian soil.
4. The _Operation Marita_ itself is to be prepared on the following basis:
(_a_) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(_b_) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.
(_c_) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.
(_d_) It will be the mission of the _Air Force_ to support the drive of the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.
(_e_) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.
5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.
The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission in Rumania.
Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.
6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces used therein for a _new undertaking_.
7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of Furlough Divisions).
Signed: Adolf Hitler
Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff
Distribution:
Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy
Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy
Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy
Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy
_Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:_
Command Staff, 5th Copy
Section L, 6-9 Copies
UNV, 10th Copy
Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11th Copy
Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
File Memorandum
on my parting visit with the Chancellor
After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. I said to him that though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.
The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper “Wiener Zeitung” (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.
I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he had acted under “brutal pressure” in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: “To be honest, no!” It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.
Vienna, 26 Feb 1938
/s/ Papen
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1546-PS
N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940.
[RAEDER MEMORANDUM]
In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuehrer an oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The Fuehrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuehrer received reports on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were obviously carried to the Fuehrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec. 1939 the Fuehrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a question of an operation of _all three branches of the Armed Forces_ it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the special Naval adviser took the chief part and took the lead in working it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare Command and in close cooperation with the Sea Warfare Command.
I had left the _Danish Question_ open in my report to the Fuehrer supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High Command without function. However, the Fuehrer decided to occupy Denmark at the same time.
The Navy made the decision to transport the _first group_ of the occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and “rear echelon service” while a considerable limitation of their equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground organization for which no experience existed at all up till then. The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of “Naval Service Offices” in all large German ports which worked in close touch with the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport purposes was at their disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the experience of the Navy. Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields.
The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the effort to forestall the English in the occupation--their unneutral action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded--the date for the landing was fixed by the Fuehrer not earlier than on April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in Norwegian waters for April 8--it remained open whether mine-laying on occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was unfortunately not granted by the Fuehrer.
The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were embarked on the destroyers in Wesermmende in the night of April 7. The number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in general terms.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1551-PS
1936 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT i.V., PAGES 946-948
Assignment and Channels of the Chief of German Police within the Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936
(1) For your information, I publish in the enclosures my edicts, concerning the appointment of a chief of regular police and that of a chief of security police (enclosure (1)), and concerning the administrative divisions within the realm of the German police (enclosure (2)), effective today.
(2) Official communications in regards to police matters with Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior are to be handled as follows:
(_a_) Letters and communications for me personally, as well as letters and communications of fundamental importance, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
Berlin SW 11 Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
(_b_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled by the headquarters of the regular police according to my edict about the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German Police, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Chief of Regular Police)
Berlin NW 7 Unter den Linden 74
(_c_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled by the headquarters of the Security Police according to my edict about the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German Police, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Chief of Security Police)
Berlin SW 11 Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
Phone # Chief of German Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
Phone # Chief of Regular Police: A2 (Flora) 0034
Phone # Chief of Security Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
To the lower agencies, the communities and community organizations as well as bodies of public law.
To the highest Reich officials, the Prussian Prime Minister, the Prussian Minister of Finance, the General Manager of the German Railroad, the Directorate of the Reichsbank by copy.
# # # # #
Berlin, 26 June 1936
Inclosure #1
The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
Appointment of a Chief of Regular Police and a Chief of Security Police
(1) On the basis of the execution edict of the Reich Minister of the Interior to the edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, in reference to the appointment of a Chief of German Police, I herewith appoint General of Police Kurt Daluege as chief of the regular police and SS Gruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich as Chief of the Security Police.
(2) From the entire police force [Vollzugspolizei] the following come under:
The Chief of Regular Police: Safety Police [Schutzpolizei] Rural Police [Gendarmerie] Local Police [Gemeindepolizei]
The Chief of Security Police: The Political Police The Criminal Police
(3) The authority over fields of action of the Chief of German Police, not mentioned here, is explained in the plan of administrative division (Inclosure #2)
To the (a) General of Police Daluege, (b) SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
# # # # #
Inclosure #2 Berlin 26 June 1936
The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior O/S No 2/36
Administrative division within the realm of the Chief of German Police
On the basis of #1 of the edict of the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior of 25 June 1936 (not published), for the execution of the edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the appointment of a Chief of German Police, I therefore order (with permission of the Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior):
1. The functioning of the branches, under the jurisdiction of the Chief of German Police, will be handled by two (2) headquarters:
_a._ The regular police, which will include the following branches:
Household, pay, welfare, economy and police law.
General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as they concern the regular police.
Safety police.
Traffic police.
Rural police [Gendarmerie], local police [Gemeindepolizei], civil service legal affairs.
Medical and veterinary affairs.
National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under the jurisdiction of the regular police. Personnel affairs of officials of the regular police.
(The security police is to participate in all actions, which affect the security police).
The headquarters “Regular Police” is entrusted with the functioning of the following branches in conjunction with the headquarters “security police” if the latter are concerned:
Administrative police; and
Personnel affairs of police presidents and police directors.
_b._ The security police, which will include the following branches:
Political police,
Lodge affairs, freemasonry, fraternity affairs, criminal police,
Disciplinary affairs within the criminal police,
General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as the security police is concerned,
Press law,
Weapons law and traffic with arms,
Passports affairs: General cases. Special cases.
Agreements with foreign states about the free passage of the border [kleinen Grenzverkehr].
Foreign legionnaires (passport matters).
Immigration of Jews from the East.
National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under the jurisdiction of the security police.
Alien affairs: General cases. Police regulations for foreigners. Special cases. Fugitives [refractaere], deserters. Deportations. Reimbursement. Foreign workers. Border disputes. Extradition of foreigners. Registration of foreigners. Statistics of foreigners.
Border disputes; Foreign Legion.
Personnel affairs of all officials of the security police.
Personnel affairs of all officials of the political and criminal police.
(The regular police is to participate in all actions, which affect the regular police).
2. I confer the leadership of the headquarters Regular Police upon General of Police Daluege. I confer the leadership of the headquarters Security Police upon SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
3. The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police will sign:
For the Chief of the German Police “acting for”
For the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior “by order”
The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police in their offices, in which cases their department heads and assistants are to sign:
“by order”
* * * * * * *
To _a._ General of Police Daluege
_b._ SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich
Communication to ______________________
Report on Sterilization in Germany and occupied countries to be sent to the members of Committee I Submitted by Dr. B. Ecer ANNEX B
Detailed Statement on the murdering of ill and aged people in Germany
1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was released sometime in Summer 1940.
2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich Dr. L. Conti, the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick as well as other men, the following participate on the introduction of this secret law:
_a._ The Councillor of the Ministry Dr. Herbert Linden of the Reich’s Ministry of the Interior.
_b._ Dr. Staehle-Nagold, the Chief Physician of Wuerttemberg.
_c._ Councillor of Medicine /Obermedizinalrat/ Dr. Hermann Pfannmueller, Director of the Sanatorium and Nursing Institution Eglfing-Haar near Munich.
_d._ Professor Dr. Werner Heyde, Director of the Psychiatric and Neurological Clinic in Wuerzburg.
* * * * * * *
3. As I have already stated, there were / after careful calculation / at least 200,000 mainly mentally deficient, imbeciles, besides neurological cases and medically unfit people /these were not only incurable cases/, and at least 75,000 aged people.
4. The murders were mainly accomplished in Muensingen/Wuerttemberg and Linz o/Danube; several gas-chambers with cremation chambers directly attached were constructed there. As the gas-chambers are next to the training grounds of the troops in Muensingen, it is believed that the mentally deficient who were murdered there, were used for experimenting with new poison-gases.
5. The transport from the institutions to the gas-chambers is carried out by SS Kommandos. These call themselves “Gemeinnuetzige Transport A. G., Berlin, Luetzowufer.” This Limited Company also stores the individual medical case histories of the murdered inmates of the institutions.
6. The inmates of the many smaller and middle-sized institutions were murdered almost without exception. The larger institutions are partly--to keep up the pretence to the outside world--still at hand, but they now only have a fraction of the original number of their inmates; for example there are now only some 500 inmates instead of 2500 in Berlin-Buch; in Stadtroda/Thueringen only about 150 instead of 600; in Kaufbeuren/Bayern only 200 instead of 1000, etc. Of the larger Sanatoriums and Nursing Institutions the following were already closed down completely some time ago; Illenau/Baden 800 inmates; Berlin/Herzberge 2500 inmates, Kreutzburg/Oberschlesien 1500 inmates; Sonnenstein/Sachsen 800 inmates; Werneck/Unterfranken-Bayern 111 inmates; Steinhof/Wien 3000 inmates, and others, most probably now also Schleswig with 1000 beds. Guenzburg with 400 etc. etc.
* * * * * * *
Written in December 1941, /sgd/ Dr. T. Lang
This is to certify, that the above report by Dr. T. Lang dated Dec. 1941 is part of the original report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission.
Nurnberg 8. Dec. 1945 for Col. Dr. Ecer
Capt. Dr. Hochwald
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1573-PS
SECRET
Copy
The chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. IV D 3-3 B/41 g.Rs.-
Berlin, 18 Jun. 1941
TOP SECRET
Express letter
To all state police Administrative office
(To the State Police, attention SS Stubaf. RR. Nosske or representative at Aachen)
_Subject_: Measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian workers who came from the great Russian areas and against Foreign workers.
_Reference_: None
To prevent the unauthorized and arbitrary return of Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenians, Cossack and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers from the territory of the Reich to the East and to prevent attempts at disorder by foreign workers in the German production, I decide as follows:
1. The managers of the branch offices [Stuetzpunkt] of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasians trustee office [Vertrauensstellen] as well as the relief committee and the leading members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack and Caucasian emigration organisations are to be notified immediately that they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of the security police until further notice. Also they are to be told to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care. Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested because of unauthorized leaving of the place of work and domicile. I request you to have a check up of the attendance of branch office leaders if possible by daily requests in these concerns.
2. Emigrants and foreign workers are to be arrested if it seems necessary in the situation if there is no doubt of their guilt and if they are under the suspicion of having been active for the U.S.S.R. in transmitting news. The measure is to be in readiness, however, it should not be executed before the pass word “Fremdvoelker” has been transmitted by means of Urgent telegram.
3. In case of refusals to work or in making propaganda for the enemy or suspicion of sabotage among all foreign laborers arrests and protective custody should be applied most strictly.
4. Persons who violate issued decrees or who try to provoke disturbances in factories or meetings by inflammatory speeches to the emigrants or foreign workers are also to be arrested.
5. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of German production to its capacity that emigrants and foreign workers remain at their places of work. In case, conditions in certain communities require that special measures be taken to reach this objective. I ask for appropriate action and report.
The RSHA to be kept posted how these measures are carried out. The decree also is to be applied to emigrants who came from the Baltic states--Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.
By order
/s/ MUELLER Certified correct: /s/ Signature (L.S.) Chancellery clerk.
# # # # #
Aachen, 3 July 1941
_Note_: The original decree can be found under IIIc under File No. 20/41 top secret
Koernert Krim-Assistent
SECRET
Secret State Police, State Police Bldg.-Aachen II E br.-No. 6/41 top Secret
Aachen, 22 Jan. 1942
1. The written record of these proceedings was worked out and sent through as a secret matter under II E under No. 303/41.
2. R II deliver taken care of 22. Jan.
3. To the Top Secret File
By order
[illegible] Koer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1574-PS
SECRET STATE POLICE [Gestapo]
Secret Police Office, Reich Security Head Office. IV C 2--5719/ 4540/43 g
Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8. 19 January 1944 Warrant for “Protective Custody”
Christian Name & Surname: _James_, Cook Steele. Date and Place of birth: 29.20.1918 at Malseta, S. Rhodesia Occupation: Warrant Officer M or S: Married Nationality: British Subject Race (to be stated in case of non-Aryans) Address: Gresham Farm Marandellas, S. Rhodesia
is being taken in protective custody.
Reasons
It has been established by the State Police that he/she endangers the existence and the security of the people and the state by his/her conduct, in that he/she has been proved to be guilty of activities to the detriment of the German Reich and there is reason to suspect that he would, if released, commit acts prejudicial to the interests of the Reich.
received 23.1.44. 1400 hrs
[initials]
(Sgd) Dr. Kaltenbrunner Certified correct: (sgd) Kriminalrat
Steele should not know of the existence of this warrant [written in pencil; illegible initials follow].
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1582-PS
Bra/V SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, Trogerstr. 56
Dear Dr. Rascher:
Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter of 15 May, 1941, for partial reply.
I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch with you.
I want to use the opportunity to extend my cordial wishes to you on the birth of your son.
I shall refer as soon as possible to the second part of your letter.
Heil Hitler
By order [initials] R Br SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1583-PS
SECRET
Reichsfuehrer SS. RG/V
Field Command Post 16 November 1942
Personal Headquarters, Reichsfuehrer SS
1. To SS Lt. Gen OHL, BERLIN
Dear OHL,
The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov 1942 regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered through exposure [Unterkuhlung] in ice, snow or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or means:
I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of those who were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a danger of contagion. Among those four was a 21 year old girl named Ursula Kraus, who naturally was not to be set aside for this. Kraus was a person under the care of the State [Fuersorgezoegling] and has already been sick twice with venereal disease. Nevertheless she belongs to that type of girl upon whom the attempt must be made in order to save her for the German people and for her own later life.
In addition, I found during this opportunity that some madmen in the women’s Concentration Camp had told the feminine prisoners at the time of selection of prostitutes for the Camp brothel, that those who volunteered would be released after a half year.
I order:
1. Only such prostitutes are to be selected for the Camp brothel who from the beginning can be taken for granted as not being able to be saved for a later regulated life, judging from their previous living and bearing. Also, that we are not guilty of spoiling a person who could still be saved for the German people. Such women can only be released from the Concentration Camp if they according to their age, do not constitute a destruction to the youth, to health (by contagion), or to the public welfare and security. The money which they earn in the camp brothel shall be an old-age security for them.
2. Fundamentally, all youths who can still be saved are to be segregated from the older prostitutes in living quarters and work. A difference must be made between those who cannot be reformed,--who must remain isolated in the camps, and those who came into the camp to be reformed and can eventually be saved. The best and most ideologically inclined custodians are to be employed for the latter.
In addition, I refer to the fact that the whipping penalty as a whole but especially for women, is to be the last measure, it is only to be used
_a._ if all other punishment such as arrest, solitary confinement, diet of bread and water, hard labor, were of no avail.
_b._ in individual cases of desertion or in actual attacks, which must be inflicted for intimidating and especially exemplary reasons. The whipping penalty is no instrument for responsible commanders or supervising custodians who are too lazy or incompetent to reeducate. In all cases in which food was stolen, the guilty one is to be placed on bread and water from 3 to 5 days as punishment for first offense. The whipping penalty is only then to be inflicted upon repeated offenses.
I ask you to personally check the conditions in the women’s concentration camps. Otherwise we must feel guilty since girls who could still be saved will be ruined for always through false treatment and repeated bad company in which we placed them (exactly as is the case in the prisons and reform schools of the law).
Heil Hitler! Your (signed) H. Himmler
2. Inspector of the Concentration Camps, Oranienburg
Carbon copy with request for acknowledgment.
SS Lt. Col.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-I-PS
Teletype Goering to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944
TOP SECRET
CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE
Teletype Section
URGENT
Transmitted by [Initials]
Received
-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------------- Hour | Day | Month | Year | from | by 240 | 15 | 2 | 44 | E2 | [Initials] -------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------------
FS--No. 24411
t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030--QEM--GKDOL--to Reichsfuehrer-SS Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No. 72/44.-
Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7)
I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force operational staff [Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab]. At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp [K Z] convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind Concentration Camp [KZ] convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful for your support in carrying out this task.
Heil Hitler--Yours Goering, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF 391/44 GKDOS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS
TOP SECRET
The Reichsfuehrer-SS Field Command Post. Personal Staff 10 March 1944 Diary No. _Subject_: Use of Prisoners in the air craft industry-M. To the SS-Brigadefuehrer FEGELEIN _Fuehrer Headquarters_
Dear Hermann!
Enclosed I am sending you copy of a letter for your information. It was given to the Reich marshal on 9 March 1944 by the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
Heil Hitler! (initialled) DR
1 enclosure
# # # # #
9 March 1944 1879/44 secret Field-command office Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry. Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944. Top Reich Secret
Most honored Reichsmarshal
Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
This survey indicates that at the present time about _36000 prisoners_ are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated.
The production is being discussed, established and executed between the Reich ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.
We assist with all forces at our disposal.
The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is not solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of the required working speed thru constant control and supervision of the workgroups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total work, better results can definitely be expected.
We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg, which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4000 prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2000 men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109.
In Oranienburg we are employing 6000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60% of the total crew of the plant.
The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8000 prisoners.
We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2500 women are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total serial production to employ prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500 rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are increasing employment to 4000 women. The performance of the women is excellent.
In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn [Brno] we produce also for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant supplies 14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for ME 109 to the Messerschmitt corporation, Augsburg.
The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of 14 Feb 1944 are already under way.
I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on this subject.
Heil Hitler (initialed) HH
Use of Prisoners for the Aircraft Industry.
-----------------------+---------------+---------+----------------------- | Number of | | | Prisoners | Man-Hrs | +-------+-------+---------+ Camp & Plant |planned| used | January | Production -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------- _Auschwitz_: | | | | | | | | AA fortification staff,| | | | Auschwitz | 250 | 191 | 48,788 | Construction of AA | | | | positions. | | | | Ost-Maschinenbau GmbH, | | | | (Factory), | | | | Schwientochlowitz | 1,500 | 730 | 196,067 | AA gun production: | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | | 105 guns. | | | | Siemens & Schuckert, | | | | Auschwitz | 1,500 | 90 | 19,240 | at first completion | | | | of plant, later | | | | switch and control | | | | instruments for night | | | | fighters. | | | | _Buchenwald_: | | | | | | | | Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | | GmbH., Leipzig | 2,800 | 1,550 | 176,105 | air plane parts | | | | production | | | | _prod. result_ | | | | _Jan_: | | | | 360 wings for BF 109 | | | | 290 fuselages BF 109 | | | | 304 tail assemblies | | | | Junkers-Flug-& | | | | Motorenwerke AG., | | | | Schoenebeck | 2,000 | 1,310 | 362,619 | air plane parts | | | | production | | | | Polte, Arnstadt | 100 | 87 | 24,112 | finishing of AA | | | | cartridge cases; | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | | 181,000 AA | | | | cartridge cases. | | | | Leichtmetallwerke | | | | Rautenbach Wernigerode| 1,200 | 772 | 189,832 | production of cylinder | | | | blocks for airplane | | | | motors | | | | _Dachau_: | | | | | | | | High frequency research| 15 | 15 | 3,290 | high frequency | | | | development | | | | BMW, Munich-Allach |12,000 | 3,434 | 908,606 | air plane motor | | | | production-- | | | | construction & | | | | subterranean building | | | | Dornier Works GmbH., | | | | Neuaubing | 3,000 | 60 | 9,527 | at first construction | | | | of workers’ camp, | | | | later plane part | | | | production. | | | | Engineer Kimmel, Munich| 25 | 23 | 7,925 | building of radio | | | | measuring instruments | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | | 35 RC-generators. Air force research | | | | institute, Munich | 400 | 40 | -- | building of air force | | | | research institute | | | | Ottobrunn | | | | Messerschmitt AG., | | | | Augsburg-- | | | | ” Haunstetten | 3,400 | 2,695 | 740,640 | air plane production | | | | Me ” Gablingen | 600 | 352 | -- | air plane production | | | | Me ” Dachau | 600 | 192 | 35,766 | manufacture of plane | | | | parts ” Kottern | 1,000 | 341 | 57,050 | first building of | | | | factory, then plant | | | | parts production | | | | Air force planning | | | | office, Sudelfeld | 25 | 25 | 4,660 | building of | | | | experimental station | | | | for high frequency Praezifix, Dachau | 400 | 356 | 94,067 | production of standard | | | | plane parts and | | | | screws H. Sachse KG. Kempten. | 1,000 | 374 | 91,630 | first building of | | | | factory/start | | | | production of | | | | propeller control | | | | instruments. | | | | _Flossenbuerg_: | | | | | | | | Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | GmbH, Floss. | 4,000 | 1,911 | 422,158 | plane parts production | | | | for Me _prod. result | | | | Jan_: 900 noses & | | | | radiator covering; | | | | 120,000 parts. | | | | Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | | GmbH, | | | | Johanngeorgenstadt | 600 | 564 | 117,524 | air plane parts | | | | production. Milsen | 500 | 30 | -- | air plane parts | | | | production. | | | | Geramic Works Bohemia, | | | | Neurohlau | 100 | 100 | 10,764 | plane parts | | | | production. | | | | Luftfahrtgeraetewerk, | | | | Zwodau | 1,500 | 199 | 28,314 | instrument prod. for | | | | air force. | | | | _Herzogenbusch_: | | | | | | | | Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | GmbH. Herzogenbusch | 600 | 411 | 35,248 | air plane | | | | disassembling plant | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | | 12 planes | | | | disassembled | | | | 35 motors ” | | | | 120 wings ” | | | | Air force field | | | | construction office 3 | 1,000 | 265 | 64,800 | runway construction | | | | for airport. | | | | _Mauthausen_: | | | | | | | | Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | GmbH., Mauthausen | 500 | 423 | 82,632 | plane parts | | | | construction for Me | | | | _prod. results | | | | January_: | | | | 25 plane fuselages | | | | Flugmotoren GmbH., | | | | Wiener-Neudorf | 3,000 | 1,983 | 417,328 | first building, later | | | | plane parts prod. | | | | Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | Schwechat | 3,200 | 2,065 | 486,206 | air plane parts | | | | production | | | | _Natzweiler_: | | | | | | | | Dt Erd- & Steinwerke | | | | GmbH, Natzweiler | 400 | 261 | 63,221 | disassembling of Ju | | | | motors & welding of | | | | air torpedoes. | | | | _Neuengamme_: | | | | | | | | Jastram, | | | | Hamburg-Bergedorf | 80 | 80 | 21,554 | air plane parts | | | | production Messap GmbH., | | | | Hamburg-Langenhorn | 120 | 110 | 31,422 | production of fuse | | | | mechanisms | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | |16 800 balance wheels | | | | S30 | | | |53 900 balance wheels | | | | S60 | | | |15 600 time fuses S30 | | | |46 700 time fuses S60 | | | | _Ravensbrueck_: | | | | | | | | Air ministry testing | | | | ground, Peenamuende-W | 600 | 598 | 125,000 | building | | | | Geraetewerk Pommern | | | | GmbH, Stargard | 550 | 283 | 81,129 | production of aerial | | | | torpedoes | | | | Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | Barth. | 2,000 | 1,721 | 435,155 | air plane production | | | | Mechan. Werkstaetten | | | | GmbH. Neubrandenburg | 4,000 | 1,981 | 529,126 | production of bomb | | | | release mechanism and | | | | Fz.G.76; _prod. Jan._ | | | | 23,000 lock 50/X | | | | 1,500 lock 2000 | | | | 150 PVC 1006 | | | | 500 rudder | | | | machines | | | | 400 ER 4 L-“2” | | | | Siemens & Halske, | | | | Berlin, work | | | | Ravensbrueck | 2,400 | 872 | 242,867 | communication | | | | equipment | | | | product. (e.g. throat | | | | microphones) Silva-Metallwerke | | | | GmbH, Genthin | 600 | 596 | 154,224 | production of AA | | | | ammunition | | | | _prod. result Jan._: | | | | 518 200 2-cm shells | | | | 927 500 2-cm shells | | | | (various styles) | | | | 965 000 13-mm shells | | | | Veltener-Maschinenbau | | | | GmbH., Volten | 600 | 596 | 146,873 | production of plane | | | | parts. | | | | _Sachsenhausen_: | | | | | | | | Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | | Oranienburg | 6,500 | 5,939 |1,699,978| plane mass production. | | | | _Prod. result_ | | | | 15 plane bodies He 177 Luftschiffbau Zepplin | | | | GmbH, Oranienburg | 300 | 221 | 54,006 | production and repair | | | | of balloons | | | | _prod. result Jan_: | | | | 120 balloons repaired | | | | and part work for | | | | 40 new balloons. | | | | _Ostland | | | | Concentration | | | | Camp_: | | | | | | | | Air force field | | | | building direction. | | | | Spilve | 1,000 | 1,000 | 280,776 | building of airport. | | | | Field building | | | | direction 3/I, Kauen | 1,000 | 829 | 222,186 | building of airport. | | | | AA booty repair shop, | | | | Kauen | 200 | 162 | 4,920 | rebuilding of booty AA | | | | Kopperschmidt & Soehne,| | | | Riga | 20 | 20 | 6,160 | production of plane | | | | turrets. | | | | It was recently agreed | | | | to use further: | | | | | | | | _Buchenwald_: | | | | | | | | Anhydrit |10,000 | -- | -- | plane production of | | | | Ju underground | | | | Ago, Oschersleben | 1,500 | -- | -- | plane production | | | | Focke-Wulf fighters. | | | | _Gross-Rosen_: | | | | | | | | Famo, Bunzlau | 1,500 | -- | -- | servicing of FW night | | | | fighters, Ta 154. | | | | _Mauthausen_: | | | | | | | | Esche II |10,000 | -- | -- | kind of production to | | | | be decided by air | | | | Ministry. | | | | _Natzweiler_: | | | | | | | | Geraetewerk Pommern | | | | GmbH., branch | | | | Diedenhofen | 600 | -- | -- | production of aerial | | | | torpedoes. |90,785 |35,839 |8,733,495| -----------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------------
The Chief of the SS Economics Administration Main Office Berlin, 21 February 1944 (signed) Pohl I. [?] SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Armed Forces SS.
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
TAE-No. 475/44 top secret
(Signed) Pohl
[Initialled] HH
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3, 17 April 1944.
Phone: 11 00 52
Pohl
TOP SECRET
Fighter staff, attention: Field Marshal MILCH
Fighter staff, attention: Chief of office SWR
_For Information_
Reichsfuehrer-SS and chief of the German Police, Reichleader HIMMLER
Head of armament office Lt Gen Dr Ing. h. c. Waeger
Plenipotentiary-General for Construction, Director Stobbe-Dethleffsen
1. Using tables and drawings as an illustration I have in conjunction with Field Marshal Milch informed the Fuehrer on the work of the fighter staff in pointing to the extraordinarily pleasing and successful cooperation of the newly created organization with all offices and works. He is cognizant of the fact that the greatest part of the transfer has been fixed according to plan and that as the first step the decentralization above the ground can be concluded by approximately August and that the second step aiming at the total subterranean security of the most sensitive works will be concluded by the end of the year.
2. Field Marshal Milch has reported as a result of the meeting on construction of the “central planning” to the Fuehrer, that of the amount of construction demanded, because of the extraordinary aggravation of the all-over situation, only the most important part of the construction work could be accomplished. The Fuehrer demands that in spite of that both the large plants, each of at least 600,000 qm, which he demanded should be constructed with all energy. He consents that one of these works will not be built in concrete but in accordance with the proposal as an enlargement and in the immediate vicinity of the present central works as the so-called central construction and will come under the management of the Junkers works.
The Fuehrer agrees to the suggestion that the second large building project will, because of lack in labor and material, not be carried out on German territory, but on suitable ground (first of all gravel foundation and possibilities for transportation) in the immediate proximity of the border, on French, Belgian or Dutch territory, as long as the plant is constructed behind a fortified zone. The suggestion to build on French territory is favored by the fact that it will then be much easier to make the necessary labor available. In spite of that the Fuehrer asks to try, to construct this second works in an essentially secure territory, namely in the Protectorate. If the labor can not be supplied there either, the Fuehrer wants to get in touch in person with the Reichsfuehrer SS and will cause him to provide the approximately 100,000 men required, thru the securing of corresponding Jewish contingents from Hungary. The Fuehrer demands that a meeting take place with him shortly in order to discuss the details in the presence of the men concerned.
3. An immediate task for the central construction besides assuring the supply of the bottleneck products of the Junkers works which is to be executed step by step, is the planning and securing of ME 262 at the rate of 1000 a month and of an additional fighter plane at the rate of 2000 a month.
Heil Hitler
signed: SPEER
Certified: Capt. Stein
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS
[several illegible notations]
Re: Taking of hostages
OKH received: 1 Oct. 1941
5 copies--copy
OKH/Gen. Qn.
(W. Bfh. Suedost)
Military Commander, South-East
Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:
1. nationalist
2. democratic-bourgeois, and
3. communist
It is important that among them shall be well-known leading personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made public.
Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.
It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed.
[partly illegible notation]
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
(signed) Keitel.
Complied with in France and Belgium.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden
The Director. Dresden-Al, 1 June 1940.
To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
Dear Ministerialrat!
Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried.
I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 16 March 1940 to Reichsleiter Bormann, referring mainly to the _confiscated property of the convents in the Ostmark_. In accordance with the Fuehrer’s decree on Jewish property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this case, too; the Fuehrer should have the final word in the distribution to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase. This regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the assumption of power if possible.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully
H. Posse.
1 enclosure.
# # # # #
At the Fuehrer’s present HQ, 16 Jan 41 Bo/Fu
R.L.M.B.
1. Director Dr. Posse, _Dresden-Hellerau_
_Personal!_
_Registered!_
Tunnigtweg 14
Dear Dr. Posse!
Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the convent in Hohenfurth near Kruman. The convent and its entire property shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude, hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants.
It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after the latter shall be completed.
I await your decision in the matter.
Heil Hitler!
Faithfully yours, [initialed by Bormann]
Enclosures
2. Presented again: 3 May 1941.
# # # # #
Dresden-Al, 16 May 1941
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden.
The Director.
The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann,
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
_Personal!_
Dear Reichsleiter!
I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries, the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out _whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Fuehrer_.
After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian, Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that the _convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose_. There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also the “Emperor’s Stall” there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in good shape, at present the picture-gallery of the convent, not very valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired collections may be presented to the Fuehrer there.
Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area; therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists.
In case the Fuehrer should agree with the proposal to have Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, particularly against fire.
Therefore, I beg to have the Fuehrer state his intentions regarding their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting, also several other collections of paintings for which there’d hardly be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer’s library which was bought in Switzerland. Also very rich stocks, already packed and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new acquisitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated art-treasures could be distributed.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully H. Posse.
# # # # #
Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures.
It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow.
Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr. Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Goering and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, and, so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out.
Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Cracow, box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic Library in Cracow and are being set up there properly, a task which may be finished by February 1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me.
The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures in the form of a photo-Album to the Fuehrer.
I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw--works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock of “objects d’art”, such as handicraft in gold and silver of German origin to a large part, (particularly from the Church of Maria and the cathedral of Wawel) tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books, etc. Those were the principal fields of interest for Polish collectors, besides their interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the 19th century. It is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example Czartoryski, Wilano etc). However, many thousand works of art of all kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library.
As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors, glass-chandeliers, porcelains etc) be used for the interior decoration of the Pavillion of the “Zivinges” in Dresden.
A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer’s and other old German masters kept in the Ossolinemm in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian hands. Maybe at least Durer’s 27 pieces could still be salvaged for Germany.
While in Warsaw, a Polish colleague of mine whom I have known, for quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was begun already in June 1939; by the end of July the entire official museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry, collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept there also, arms and historically valuable pieces like the blood-banner of the Prophet which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands.
/s/ Hans Posse.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1602-PS
Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, 15 May 1941
Trogerstrasse 56
Dear Reichsfuehrer,
My sincere thanks for your cordial wishes and flowers on the birth of my second son. This time, too, it is a strong boy, though he has come 3 weeks too early. I may send you a picture of both children incidentally. * * *
For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII, Munich, for a medical course. During this course, where researches on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the _serious_ question: can you make available two or three professional criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made at “Bodenstaendige Pruefstelle fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe”, Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation. They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a representative of the air forces Surgeon who makes these experiments. He is also of the opinion that the problems in question could only be solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be used as test material). * * *
I hope sincerely, highly esteemed Reichsfuehrer that, in spite of the immense burden of work you carry, you are in the pink of health.
With my heartiest wishes, I am with Heil Hitler your gratefully devoted
(signature) S. RASCHER
(Z--2)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1616-PS
Dr. S. RASCHER SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
Munich, 17 February 1943
To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Mr. Heinrich Himmler
Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Str. 8
Dear Reichsfuehrer!
Enclosed I present to you in condensed form a summary of the results of the experiments made in warming up people who have been cooled off by using animal heat.
Right now I am attempting to prove through experiments on human beings that it is possible to warm up people cooled off by dry cold just as fast as people who were cooled off by remaining in cold water. The Reich physician SS, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Gravitz doubted very much that that would be possible and said that I would have to prove it first by 100 experiments. Up to now I have cooled off about 30 people stripped in the open air during 9-14 hours to 27°-29°. After a time corresponding to a transport of one hour, I put these subjects in a hot bath. _Up to now_ every single patient was completely warmed up within one hour at most, though some of them had their hands and feet frozen white. In some cases a slight fatigue with slightly rising temperature was observed on the day following the experiments. I have not observed any fatal results from this extremely fast warming up. I have not so far been able to do any warming up by “Sauna” as ordered by you, my dear Reichsfuehrer, as the weather in December and January was too warm for any experiments in the open air, and right now the camp is closed on account of typhoid and I am not allowed therefore to bring the subjects to these experiments into the SS-Sauna. (I have been vaccinated several times and continue myself to make the tests within the camp in spite of the typhoid in the camp.) It would be best if I were transferred to the Waffen-SS soon and could go together with Neff to Auschwitz and * * * the question of the warming up of persons who have frozen on land * * *.
[rest of document missing]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS
SECRET
The Reichfuehrer SS
Berlin, SW 11, B. Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8 Field Command Post
November 1942
Dear Comrade Milch!
You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave [Arzt des Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe].
These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who deserve only to die [todeswuerdig] from concentration camps for these experiments.
Unfortunately you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to report on the experiments at the Ministry for Aviation. I had put great hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the difficulties, based mainly on religious objections, which oppose Dr. Rascher’s experiments--for which _I_ assumed responsibility--could be eliminated.
The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these “Christian medical circles” the standpoint is being taken that it goes without saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life but that the life of a criminal--who is not drafted into military service--is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain oneself with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note that credit is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding the scientist who performed them.
I personally have inspected the experiments, and have--I can say this without exaggeration--participated in every phase of this scientific work in a helpful and inspiring manner.
We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out of our people. But this should not affect the research work which is necessary for our young and splendid soldiers and aviators.
I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the liaison between you and Wolff a _“non-Christian” physician should be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist and not prone to intellectual theft_ and who could be informed of the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the administrative authorities, so that the results would really obtain a hearing.
I believe that this solution--to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility and under my orders--is the best way. The experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed in the post of Dachau--who is under my command--about me in utterances delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the Waffen SS as quickly as possible.
I would be grateful to you if you would give the order to put the low pressure chamber at our disposal again, together with step-up pumps, because the experiments should be extended to include even greater altitudes.
Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1618-PS
S. RASCHER
Intermediate report on intense chilling experiments in the Dachau Camp, started on 15 August 1942
_Experimental procedure_
The experimental subjects (V P) were placed in the water, dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures varying from 2.5° to 12°. In one experimental series, Occiput and brain stem protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments the Occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water.
Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood, up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed extreme dilation of the night chamber. As soon as the temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) died invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The above discussed autopsy finding conclusively proved the importance of a warming protective device for head and Occiput when designing the planned protective clothing of the foam type.
Other important findings, common in all experiments, to be mentioned. Marked increase of the viscosity of the blood, marked increase of hemoglobin, an approximate five fold increase of the leukocytes, invariable rise of blood sugar to twice its normal value. Auricular fibrillation made its appearance regularly at 30°.
During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was shown that rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable to slow re-warming, because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal heat.
Rewarming by animal warmth--animal bodies or women’s bodies--would be too slow. As auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling, improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into consideration. The foam suit with suitable neck protector which is being prepared by the German Institution for textile research [Deutsches Textilforschungsinstitut] Muenchen-Gladbach deserves first priority in this connection. The experiments have shown that pharmaceutical measures are probably unnecessary if the flier is still alive at the time of rescue.
(signed) Dr. S. Rascher
Muenchen--Dachau, 10 September 1942.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1621-PS
SECRET!
The Reichsfuehrer SS Personal Staff File Nr. 19/9/43a/Pers/V
Command Post, 12 November 1942 [Rubber Stamp] Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS [illegible notation] Administration Secret/
SECRET!
1. To SS Major General Rauter
The Hague
Dear Major General,
The SS Captain Dr. Rascher is in need of medico-physiological appliances. He points out that there are sufficient appliances at the University of Leyden and at the University of Utrecht, which could be put to use.
The Reichsfuehrer SS asks you to attempt to obtain these appliances, which would still have to be listed in detail by SS Captain Dr. Rascher resp. by SS Colonel Sievers, through the Reich Commissar. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Rascher resp. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers will submit the list directly to you.
Heil Hitler!
(signed) Brandt
Transmitted to
2. SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers
3. SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher, with the request that the above be noted and the necessary steps taken.
[Signed illegible] SS-Lieutenant Colonel
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SECRET!
[Rubber Stamp] Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS (illegible notation) SECRET
Dr. S. Rascher, SS Captain
SECRET!
File Memorandum.
Procurement of medico-physiological appliances is so difficult in Germany that the continued conduct of experiments is seriously endangered. If the necessary appliances cannot be procured, it will be very much more difficult to build up the Institute for Functional Research in Military Science within the framework of the Ancestral Heritage Organization [Ahnenerbe].
The Institutes of the Universities of Leyden and Utrecht, however, are very plentifully equipped with the very best scientific appliances at both these universities is not feasible, however, since the University of Leyden is, and will remain, closed, notwithstanding all rumors, and since the University of Utrecht works with only half its usual enrollment.
SS Lieutenant Colonel Sievers therefore suggests that the Reichsfuehrer SS write a letter to Reich Governor Dr. Seyss-Inquart saying that it is request that the Reich Governor put the appliances of the University Institutes concerned at the disposal of the Ancestral Heritage Organization [Ahnenerbe], initially on a loan basis.
(signed) Dr. Rascher
Munich, 12 November 1942
[Handwritten notation]
Dr. Brandt to Reuter
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1637-PS
1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, i. V., PAGES 1089-1091
Acceptance of members of the Security Police into the SS of the N.S.D.A.P. of 23 June 1938.
Ministerial-Blatt of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior, Berlin, 1938
No. 28, p. 1090
_Appointments, Wages, Maintenance, Service Regulations_
Circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior for 23.6.1938--S-V 3 No. 72/38
-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- The | The | Corresponds to the -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal-assistant | Office helper | SS Sergeant aspirant in preparatory | [Amtsgehilfe | [SS service | Betenmeister] | Unterscharfuehrer] [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv. | | im Verbereitungsvienst] | | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal-Assistant | Superintendant | SS-Staff Sergeant aspirant | [Hausmeister] | [SS- [Kriminal-Assist-Aniv] | | Scharfuehrer] -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal assistant | Police office assistant.| SS-Technical [Kriminal-Assist] | [Pol-Buereassist] | Sergeant [SS- | Police-Prison-Technical | Oberscharfuehrer] | Sergeant. [Poli- | | Gefaengnisoberwachtm] | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Chief Criminal | Police-Prison-Master | SS-Master Sergeant Assistant. | Sergeant [Pol- | [SS [Krim-Oberassist] | Gefaengnis-Hauptwachtm]| Hauptscharfuehrer] -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal secretary | Police-secretary | SS-Lieutenant [Krim-Sekretar] | [Pol-Sekretar] | [SS- Criminal district | Office-Secretary | Untersturmfuehrer] secretary | [Kanzleisekretaer] | [Krim-Bez. Sekretar] | Police secretary first | | class | | [Pol-Obersekretaer] | | Technical secretary | | [Techn-Sekretaer] | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal inspector | Ministerial registrator | SS-First [Krim-Inspektor] | [Min-Registrator] | Lieutenant [SS- Criminal commissar up | Police inspector | Obersturmfuehrer] to 15 years of service | [Pol-Inspektor] | [Krim-Kommissar] | Assessor | | [Assessor] | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal commissar with | Police inspector | SS-Captain over 15 years of | [Pol-Inspektor] | [SS- service | with 300 Reichsmark | Hauptsturmfuehrer] [Krim-Kommissar] | additional salary. | Criminal counsellor | Police inspector first | [Krim-Rat] up to 15 | class | years of service. | [Pol-Oberinspektor] | | Government-Assessor | | [Reg-Assessor] | | Police counsellor up to | | 15 years of service. | | [Pol-Rat] | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Criminal counsellor with | Police counsellor with | SS-Major over 15 years of | over 15 years of | [SS- service [Krim-Rat] | service. [Pol-Rat] | Sturmbannfuehrer] Criminal director | Office-counsellor | [Krim-Direktor] | [Amtsrat] | Government and criminal | Government-counsellor | counsellor | [Reg-Rat] | [Reg. u. Krim-Rat] | | -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Government counsellor | Government counsellor | SS-Lieutenant first class and | first class | Colonel [SS- criminal counsellor. | [Oberreg-Rat] | Obersturmbann- [Oberreg.-und Krim.-Rat] | | fuehrer] -------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- Government and criminal | Government director | SS-Colonel director | [Reg-Direktor] | [SS- [Reg.-und Krim.- | Ministerial | Standartenfuehrer] Direktor] | counsellor [Min-Rat] | Reich-criminal director | | [Reichskrim-Direktor] | | ------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------- With the aim of fusing members of the German Police with the “Schutzstaffel” of the National Socialist German Workers Party into one uniformly turned out State Protective Corps [Staatsschutzkorps] of the National Socialist Reich, I decree as follows:
I. (1) Members of the Security Police can upon request be received into the Schutzstaffel of the _NSDAP_ if they
1. fulfill the general requirements of the SS and
2. _a._ Up to 30.1.1933 (inclusive) have been members of the NSDAP or of its affiliates (the Sturmabteilung, the National Socialist Motor Corps, the Hitler Youth) even if they have meanwhile honorably resigned from these affiliates.
or
_b._ for a static period [seit einem ... liegenden Zeitpunkt] before 30.1.1933 were sponsoring members of the SS [Foerderndes Mitglied]
or
_c._ Have seen service for at least three years in the Security Police under the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and have proven themselves.
(2) Permit for admission of a wider circle of persons I reserve for myself.
(3) Admission according to the general requirements is not affected by this circular.
II. 1. Upon transfer into the SS, the grade held in the police will be changed to a corresponding one in the SS. Former members of the SS, SA, NSKK (National Socialist Drivers Corps) who held a higher rank, will be incorporated with the same high rank. When promoted within the security police, an assimilation of ranks will take place in every case.
3. I myself will make decisions about incorporation of members of the security police with higher ranks.
4. The employees of the security police will be put into that SS rank which corresponds to their rank as civil servant, according to their jobs.
5. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS up to the publication of these ordinances will be promoted to the SS rank corresponding to their police rank, provided they do not already hold such, or a higher SS rank.
III. 1. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS will be assigned to the units of the security service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, according to more detailed instructions of the chief of the security police and of the security main office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
2. The chief of the security police and of the security main office regulates the SS-service relations [Dienstverhaltnisse] and obligations of the members of the security police who were incorporated into the SS.
IV. 1. The applications of members of the security police for admission to the SS are to be directed to the chief of the security police through service channels.
2. The applications are to be submitted according to the following sample:
_SAMPLE_:
(Place and date)
I herewith request admission to the security service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in conformity with the circular of the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German police in the Ministry of the Interior of June 23rd, 1938-S.V.3 number 72/38 (R M Bli V. page 1089)
First and last name: _______________________________________ ____________________________________________________________ (rank and office)
Day, month and year of birth: ______________________________
Place of birth: ____________________________________________
Party membership number, district [Ortsgruppe]: ____________
Last SS-, SA-, NSKK or HJ rank and number, last SS, SA-, respectively HJ district [Dienststelle]: ____________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________
Separated from the SS etc. on the __________________________
(with indication, whether transferred directly to the police, or, if otherwise, which service relations in the meantime)
Day of joining the NSDAP, SS, SA, HJ _______________________
Helping member [Foerderndes Mitglied] of the SS since: _____
Working in the security police since: ______________________
To The Chief of the security police through channels.
* * * * * * *
V. This circular is to be brought to the attention of all members of the security police.
To the Reichsstatthalter, the state governments, the Reichscommissioner for the Saarland, the Prussian supreme and government presidents, the office of the secret state police [Gestapo], the Reich criminal police office [Reichskrim-Pol-Amt], the federal police main offices [Staatspol-Leitstellen] and federal police office [Staatspol-Stellen], the criminal police main offices [Krim-Pol. Leitstellen] and criminal police offices [Krim-Pol Stellen], the commander of the leaderschool of the security police [Kommandeur der Fuehrerschule der Sicherheitspol].
To the SS main office, the main office for security [Sicherheitshauptamt], the security service leaders [SD-Fuehrer] of the higher levels of the SS [SS-Oberabschnitte] and the security service lower levels [SD-Unterabschnitte]. by copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1638-PS
1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, iV, PAGE 1906
Cooperation of the Agencies of the General and Interior Administration with the S.D. of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) of 11 Nov. 1938
(1) The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) has, as the intelligence organization for Party and nation--in particular for the support of the Security Police--important missions to fulfill. The SD thereby becomes active on a national mission. This necessitates a close and sympathetic cooperation between the SD and the authorities for general and internal administration. Therefore, inquiries of the SD are to be answered in the same way as inquiries of all national office are treated. Likewise, the sections of the SD are obligated to furnish information to the general and internal administration.
(2) Business between the SD and the Reich Ministry of the Interior proceeds solely through the Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt, business between the SD and the remaining authorities of general and internal administration only through the higher levels of the SD. Business between the authorities for general and internal administration of the SHA proceeds through the Reich Ministry of the Interior, business between the authorities for general and internal administration and the other SD offices in Prussia through the Regierungs-Praesident or Ober-Praesident, in the other provinces through the corresponding authorities. In doubtful cases the combined decision of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and of the Reichsfuehrer SS should be obtained.
Supplement for municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate bodies of the public law: I request, to act accordingly.
To lower authorities municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate bodies of the public law.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1639-A-PS
Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration 1939 Edition [Pages 2-18]
Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 18th Feb 1939 No. 265/39 g.Kdos. I IVa. 125 copies, 101st copy Re: Reprint of Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration.
1. Enclosed is the Reprint for 1939 of the “Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration” with the request to destroy Mobilization Books (Z), hereby made obsolete, at the beginning of the new mobilization year.
2. The Reprint takes effect on the 1st April 1939. The annexes V, XIX, and XX will be forwarded after their completion.
3. An expression of opinion on the proposals handed in here will not take place in detail any more, insofar as the expression has not already been made.
4. The necessity of cooperation between Ministers and the highest Reich agencies is not always pointed out in the column “Remarks”. It is to be understood that the cooperation needed for preparations and carrying out of the measures must be guaranteed, even without an express directive.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. Keitel.
Distribution list on the next page.
Distribution’s List: Copy
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 1
Deputy of the Fuehrer 2- 3
Attention SS Brigadier General _Knoblauch_ Prussian State-Ministry 4- 5
Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Bergbohm_ Ministry for Foreign Affairs 6- 7
Attention Counsellor of the Legation Dr. _Freiherr v.d. Heyden-Rynsch_
GBV [Plenipotentiary-General for Administration] Chief of Operational Staff
Attention State Secretary Dr. _Struckart_ for Reich Ministry of the Interior 8- 9 for Reich Ministry of Justice 11-12 for Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular Culture 13-14 for Central Reich Office for regional planning 15-16
GBW [Plenipotentiary-General for Economics] Chief of the Operational Staff
Attention Ministerial Director _Sarnow_ for GBW [Operational Staff] 17-18 for Reich Ministry of Economics 19-20 for Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 21-22 for Reich Labor Ministry 23-24 for Reich Chief Forester 25-26
Reich Ministry of Finance 27-28 Attention Counsellor of the Minister, Privy Counsellor Dr. _Bender_
Reich Ministry of Finance 29-30 Attention Finance President _von Dietz_
Reich Ministry of Communications 31-33 Attention Chief of Section of the Ministry _Baur_
Reich Ministry of Communications 34-35 Attention State Railway Director Dr. _Ebeling_
Reich Postal Ministry 36-37 Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Honold_
Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 38-39 Attention Lt Colonel _Wentscher_
Reichbank Directorate 40-41 Attention Reichsbank Director Dr. _Mueller_
Inspector General of the German Highways 42-43 Attention Government Construction Counsellor _Henne_
OKH (Army High Command) (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Army) 44-73
OKM (Navy High Command) (A.II) 74-81
Reich Ministry for Air Travel and Air Force High Command (2nd Section of the General Staff of the Air Force) 82-93
_OKW_: (Armed Forces High Command) L Ia 94 L Ia Prop. 95 L II 96 L IVa 97 L IVb 98 L IVd 99 WNV 100 W Stb 101-103
A Ausl./Abw. (Foreign Intelligence Section) 104-106 AWA (J) 107 WH 108 Being kept by L IVa 109-125
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