Part 6

“I have always been most obedient when most taxed with disobedience. But my RIGHT hand is not the RIGHT hand of Melinda. The RIGHT I revere is not the right ordered by sycophants: the _jus vagum_, the capricious command of princes or ministers. I follow the LAW _of God_, (what is _laid down_ by him for the rule of my conduct,) when I follow the laws of human nature: which without any human testimony we know must proceed from God; and upon these are founded the RIGHTS of man, or what is _ordered_ for man. I revere the constitution and constitutional laws of England, because they are in conformity with the LAWS of _God_ and _nature_; and upon these are founded the rational rights of Englishmen. If princes, or ministers, or the corrupt sham-representatives of the people, _order_, _command_, or _lay down_ any thing contrary to that which is _ordered_, _commanded_, or _laid down_ by God, human nature, or the constitution of this government, I will still hold fast by the higher authorities. If the meaner authorities are offended, they can only destroy the body of the individual, but never can affect the RIGHT, or that which is ordered by their superiors.”[5]

[5] See his whole article on Rights.

Thus he is found to agree with Webster, that the _will of God_ is the ultimate _genus_ of the RIGHT. That is RIGHT, which conforms to the will of God as _laid down in law_--whether that law be a _written revelation_, nature, or the customs of society, (as in the case of the _right_ and _left_ hand,) as the exponent of that will--they are what is ordered in the case, and make the RIGHT. Hence he condemns as “wretched mummery” the distinction admitted by M. Portalis, between obedience to a command, and obedience to what is RIGHT and JUST in itself, and, on the same ground, pronounces it “highly improper” to say, with Mr. Locke, “God has a RIGHT to do it: we are his creatures.” For truly if his will be the ultimate _genus_ of RIGHT, then he can have no _rights_, for there is certainly no superior to whose _commands_ he conforms in the acts of his will. But precisely at this point let us take our stand. I affirm on the authority of Scripture, no less than sound philosophy, (always in harmony,) that _God has_ RIGHTS, and that the distinction of M. Portalis is in many instances correct; and that hence Tooke, Dr. Paley, (who also concurs in this view--see his article Rights, in his Moral Philosophy,) Dr. Webster, with many others of great distinction, strangely err, not in their etymology of this word, but in that hypothesis by which they make it a significate of the _will of God_. We cannot agree with them that RIGHTS and DUTIES which are reciprocal, are resolvable only into the will of God--have his will alone for their ultimate foundation. I take ground back of this. True, I say with them--and I claim full credit in the declaration--that the volitions, the acts of God, are always RIGHT; but I do not say that his will makes the essential or true distinction between _right_ and _wrong_. We dare not assume that God, could, by an act of volition, make the _right_ to be the _wrong_, and the _wrong_ to be the _right_--good evil, and evil good! It is absurd to assume that God can do things that are in themselves contradictory. Omnipotent, we know, he is; but such things are not the objects of power, any more than things which _are_ the objects of power, are, in the same sense, the objects of Omniscience. To affirm that he could make the _right_ to be the wrong, is as _false_ as it would be impious to affirm that he _would_ do it, if he could--false, because, if he can, he has not deposited the truth in that great master-work of his hand, the mind of man; for, by the power of the intuition he has given us, we are assured that the idea is in itself a gross absurdity. And if this be not decisive of the question, then neither intuition nor the deductions of intuition are of any authority. Man is the victim of a false guide within! He may “eat and drink, for to-morrow he dies!” There will be no more of him; or, what is worse, he is but a link in a chain of sentient beings who are governed by a cruel fate, which regards not the distinctions of _right_ and _wrong_; and he may be the sport of wickedness in the world to come, as he has been the victim of deception in this! I think it more than error to reason thus! I think it profane!

We may take ground back of this--ground as honorable to God as it is exalting to man and encouraging to his hopes. It is true, that both rectitude and duty, together with liberty, are resolvable into the essential good. Or, in other words, _freedom_, _rectitude_, and _duty_ are the modes of thought in which we conceive of the good as existing in the soul of man, and that they are, each of them, in their distinct nature and harmonious union, the true ideal of the good--the modes of thought, also, in which the intuition of man perceives the good in the case of every moral action which is good. And concerning the good in itself, which is thus in an humble degree perceived by us, it is certainly a reality which is immutable and eternal. God did not make it--nor was it made. It is of the essential nature of God, and eternal. He is the great impersonation of the good. His will, his volitions, in all cases, are but the expressions of this high attribute. His will, therefore, always conforming to the essential good, is a perfect rule of what is right in itself, and proper to be observed by us, as a rule of duty or conduct. Such a rule, it will be seen, is eminently adapted to the wants of humanity; but, at the same time, his will and the good are different realities. The one is an essential quality of his holy nature, and the other is, to a certain extent, an expression of this attribute in the form of volitions. That the will of God did not make the right in itself, will readily appear. Is it to be conceived that there ever was a period in eternity past, when truth was not truth, or when truth did not exist? when _the good_ was not the _good_, or when the good did not exist? But does it not accord with the clearest teachings of reason, that the truth always was the truth, and ever will be the truth? that the good always will be the good? That two and two are equal to four; that to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the same time is an absurdity and a contradiction; and that things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another, we say are all intuitive truths--we cannot be mistaken about them. So also in morals: that the truth is good; that virtue is good; that a good action is not an evil action; and that to affirm that a good action is not a good action is an absurdity, a contradiction, we say, _are all intuitions_--_we cannot be mistaken about them_. But is it not equally intuitive that these things were always so--that these truths were always truths--the good was always the good, just as certainly as that they are so now? Then the _eternity_ of these things is just as certainly an intuition, as that they exist now is an intuition. Hence the eternity of God, who is the great impersonation of this high quality, or whose attribute it is, is an intuitive truth. Hence his will did not make it, for it is absurd to say that he made himself. His will, therefore, which, in given cases, is his volition, is but the expression of this essential quality of his holy nature. Hence his will is a rule of right, because in all cases it conforms to the good, but it did not make the good.

Therefore the RIGHT, as it conforms to the essential GOOD, is of the nature of the GOOD. It is properly a significate of the good, and not a significate of the _will of God_. Things agreeing with one and the same thing agree with each other. Hence it coincides with the will of God. But such coincidence does not constitute any thing _right_ in itself; but it is because, like the will of God, it conforms to, or is of the nature of, the ESSENTIAL GOOD, _that it is right_. The RIGHT then, in itself, is the GOOD. The GOOD is the true generic idea which classifies all the different applications of this term. So far as any thing is of the nature of the GOOD, it is in itself RIGHT. So far as any thing, to which the idea of the RIGHT applies, is negative of the _good_, i. e., is evil, it is WRONG.

The GOOD, therefore, as an ultimate _genus_, is much more extensive in meaning than the RIGHT. It extends to all _physical_ as well as _moral_ good. Our subject requires us to consider it only so far as it applies to humanity. And how far is this? When Jehovah created man, he pronounced him to be “very good,” i. e., essentially good in the attributes of his nature. He was created in “his own image: in the image of God created he him.” “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and _man became a living soul_.” That is, he was created a pure spiritual intelligence. He had a clear and correct perception and judgment of pure abstract truth, and of the relations of truth; with the corresponding feelings of obligation to duty, and a power of will sufficient to control the mental states within the sphere of its operations. Now, as a pure intelligence, thus endowed, he is within the limits of his capacity a cause within himself--strictly a self-acting agent, and hence accountable. And as he was created with a feeling of obligation to observe the good as a rule in all his conduct, he was created a subject of duty--he was under obligation to do, to act; and as in each of these respects, and in all others, he was created in conformity with the essential good, he was _rectus_, _right_. All this is implied in that declaration of his essential nature, as a pure spiritual intelligence, (who was therein made in the image of God,) which defined him to be “_very good_.” Nor can we think of this good as a quality or attribute of humanity, without being conscious, if we reflect closely, of associating in our minds the idea that the being who personates it is for that reason _free_; that for that reason he is _rectus_, _straight_, conformed to the good as the rule, that is, _right_; and that for the same reason he is under obligation--it is his _duty_ to act according to that rule. Every instance of moral action that is good implies these ideas: it is _free_, it is _rectus_, _straight_, and it is done in accordance with _duty_. In the same sense in which _life_, _sense_, and _motion_ enter into and so form the comprehension of the creature, animal; so _liberty_, _rectitude_, and _duty_ form the comprehension of moral good, so far as it applies to humanity. These are distinct ideas. Still they coincide, and either implies the others as correlatives. Hence we say of a _free_ action that it is _good_, implying that it is at the same time _rectus_, and done in accordance with duty; and of an action in conformity to a proper rule, that it is _good_, implying at the same time that it is _free_, and done in accordance with _duty_; and also of an action in compliance with _duty_, that it is _good_, implying that it is also _free_, and straight, i. e., conformed to rule: thus in each case we imply the correlative ideas.

Now, whatever is in my possession by natural endowment is _mine_, in the strictest sense. Hence, _freedom_ is mine, _duty_ is mine, and _rectitude_ is mine, because the _good_ is mine, and those are the elements of the good, each one implying the others.

Hence arises the idea of _natural right_: that is, the _right_ with which I am endowed by the constitution of my nature as a rational being. But what is that RIGHT? Evidently, the _good_. The good as an attribute is in my possession. I am constituted with it and by it. Hence it is inalienable. Divest me of the good as an attribute of my nature, i. e., liberty, rectitude, and duty, and I sink at once in the scale of being: I cease altogether to be a rational or accountable being.

Let no one imagine that this position conflicts with the well-known fact that man is a fallen being. For although fallen, he is still accountable. True, his moral nature is in ruins, but still it is a moral nature. Though disordered, it is not eradicated. Hence the restoration by grace is called a conversion; but if the essential moral nature of man had been destroyed by the fall, and an attribute of essential evil had taken the place of it, his restoration could not be called, as it is, a _change_, but should be called in the strictest sense an _original_ creation. Hence, although man is fallen, depraved--and we need not object to the strong terms in which this depravity is usually expressed--still we find that the sentiment of all mankind is on the side of virtue, on the side of the good; and that men, though unchanged by sovereign grace, are still required to be honest, gentlemanly, and in all things regardful of each other’s rights. We admit of exceptions or modifications of this only in the case of those in whom humanity has not been fully developed, as before noticed, and those in civilized life who have so far abused their moral nature as, in the language of Paul, to fit themselves for destruction. Therefore, it still remains that the _good_ in the form of rectitude, _right_, is in some modification an endowment of my nature: the _right_, in itself, is mine by nature.

But the good, as an attribute, is an _active_ principle. We were endowed with it for the purpose of movement--for results. It is my duty to act _right_--straight, or in accordance with the _good_ as a rule. Hence, whatever is a necessary _condition_ of the operation of this active principle, the essential good, is in itself a good which is either in my possession, and hence is mine by possession; or it _ought_ to be in my possession, and hence is mine by just title. Hence, to breathe, under all circumstances, together with all physical motion and the sustenance of the body, which involves the right of property to a certain extent, each in given circumstances, is the natural right of every one. So also the right of the embryo-man, the idiot, the imbecile, the uncivilized, or the savage, to protection and defence, is a natural right; and for the same reason, to be protected and defended from certain helpless conditions by others, is the natural right of every one in all states of humanity. Because each of these, and of all similar things, is in itself good, being a necessary condition of the operation of the essential good, and is either in our possession or ought to be in our possession; each one is also a _natural right_, the good that is or ought to be in our possession.

But there are _acquired rights_.

It is the _duty_ of man to act, from the very fact that he is endowed with the attribute of the _good_, which envelops the idea of duty. He also has _power_ to act from the very same natural constitution. Now, if he use this _power_ as duty and rectitude indicate that he should do, all nature teaches, what the Bible confirms, that he will glorify God, i. e., exemplify his goodness, and therein promote his own happiness and the happiness of those with whom he is associated; or, in other words, he will secure for himself and confer upon his fellows eminent benefits resulting from the performance of his duty. Now, whatever results to him in this way is certainly his by possession, or by Divine grant, as much so as any natural _right_; but these _benefits_, being of the nature of the essential good, (for the reason that they are _benefits_, are in themselves _right_,) result to him in the performance of his duty, and therefore are _his rights_. But the acquisition is made to depend upon the exercise of his _arbitrary_ volition. If he use this in pursuance of duty, they follow. If he use it in violation of duty, they do not follow. Hence, if he realize them at all, either by possession or by title, they are _acquired_, and therefore are acquired _rights_ or benefits.

Therefore, _acquired rights_ may be defined, such good, in the form of benefits or privileges, as results from the performance of duty. Logically, they belong to the class of the essential good called benefits or privileges, with the “_essential difference_” that they are such as result from the performance of duty. Any other result, though in itself of the nature of the essential good, yet, as it conferred no benefit, could not be said to be _our right_. Capital punishment, for example, when in accordance with the Divine will, is in itself of the nature of the essential good; still, it would be an abuse of language to say, in any ordinary case, that it was the right of the criminal to be hung! because for no reason that we can imagine does it confer any benefit or privilege upon the criminal. To be _acquired rights_, therefore, they must not only be of the nature of the good--that is, actual benefits--but this good must result from the performance of duty, and not from the non-performance of duty, as in the example given.

The definition corresponds with the language of common sense. All men, in speaking of cases which are supposed to involve the question of _rights_, employ the term in this sense. You say, of a farmer in a given case, that he had no _right_ to an abundant harvest: why? because he neglected his farm: his lands were not properly prepared, and the growing crop was left open to depredations from stock: that is, he neglected his duty; he had no _right_ to the benefit of an abundant harvest. And again, you say to a neighbor, You should have paid a certain sum of money to A., in a given case. He had a _right_ to the money, because he complied with the conditions on which the money was to be paid. _He did his duty_, and therefore had a _right_ to the money. Thus, the neglect of duty negatives _right_ in the one case, and the performance affirms it in the other, according to the common usage of language.

Another idea which clearly enters into the common and correct use of this term is that it is reciprocal with _obligation_: that is, wherever there is a right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation, _duty_, upon others. If one man has a _right_ to an estate, others are under obligation, that is, it is their _duty_, to abstain from it. If the letting of it alone be the result of duty on the part of others, the enjoyment of it by him must also result from duty on his part, or the ideas do not coincide: that which was duty in one set of men would not be duty in another, in regard to the same thing, and in correlative circumstances. This would be absurd: therefore, the duty of one set of men to let another alone in the enjoyment of a certain benefit, implies the correlative idea that they enjoy the benefit in virtue of doing their duty. Hence, those benefits which are our rights result to us from the performance of our duty.

The points established in this discussion are:

1. That conformity to what is _ordered_ or commanded is not the true generic idea of _the right_ in itself. What is ordered or commanded can only interpret _the right_, when the command itself conforms to the essential good, as in the case of the Divine will. This is always _right_, because it so conforms, or is always an expression of the essential good.

Hence, the _good_ is the true generic idea of _the right_. This alone can interpret _the right_ in any case. Therefore, although man, in virtue of his constitution as a pure intelligence, has the _power_ to do _wrong_, he has not, and never can have, _the right_ to do wrong. For wrong is the negative of right; and any thing, whether attribute, quality, opinion, doctrine, or act--every thing, whether moral or physical--to be _right_, must be of the nature of the _good_: all else is _wrong, not right_. And it further follows, that the only true subjective _right_ which any man has to exercise his power of self-control, is in doing that which is good, and not in doing that which is evil.

2. The _natural rights_ of man are,

First--The essential good in his possession by natural endowment, and which is therefore inalienable. And, Second--The necessary conditions, whatever they may be, of the operation of the inherent good as an active principle. Some of these are inalienable, and others are alienable. To this view of natural rights the common usage of language conforms.

3. The _acquired rights_ of man are, such good, in the form of benefits or privileges, as results to him from the performance of duty.

LECTURE V.

THE DOCTRINES OF RIGHTS APPLIED TO GOVERNMENT.

Government, human as well as Divine, is a necessity of man’s fallen condition--All men concur in this--Man did not originate government: he has only modified the form--The legitimate objects of government, and the means which it employs to effect these objects--The logical inferences: 1. Although he has the power, he has no right to do wrong; 2. As a fallen being, he is, without a government over him, liable to lose the power of self-control--What are the rights of man: 1. In a state of infancy; 2. In a state of maturity; and, 3. In a savage or uncivilized state--Civil government is not founded on a concession of rights.