Part 51

At the time when the Confederacy of Delos was formed, "the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula … were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium. … Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the Confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out, especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without. Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias." Pausanias, whose treasonable intrigues with the Persian king began at Byzantium (See GREECE: B. C. 478-477) was convicted some nine or ten years later, and suffered a terrible fate, being shut within a temple to which he had fled, and starved. "His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistokles. … The charge [against Themistokles] of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties. … The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of cooperation against a common enemy. {156} And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiraeus: Aristeides is commander of the fleet and first organiser of the Confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact. … From henceforth the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. … The triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover, the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. … The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. 'The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,' and instruments of the new vocation at Athens as head of the Delian Confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. … Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenian constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest; no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled and eligibility extended to all the citizens; We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded when we find that it was proposed by Aristeides. … The popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian Confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendency of Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristeides. … Of these the chief were Kimon [Cimon], (son of Miltiades), and Alkmæon." In 471 B. C. Themistokles was sent into exile by a vote of ostracism, and retired to Argos. Five years later he was accused of complicity in the treasonable intrigues of Pausanias, and fled to the court of the Persian king, where he spent the remainder of his days. "Aristeides died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistokles."

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 44 (volume 5)_.

The constitutional effects of the Persian war, and the political situation of Athens immediately after the war, are represented somewhat differently from the account above, in the lately discovered work on the Constitution of Athens which is attributed to Aristotle. The following is quoted from one of the translations of the latter: "After the Median war the council of Areopagus [See AREOPAGUS] recovered strength and ruled the state, not that any law conferred the hegemony on them, but because the aristocratic party had the credit of the victory at Salamis. For when the generals had despaired of the country and proclaimed a sauve qui peut, the Areopagus raised funds, gave every man eight drachmas (6s. 6d.) and induced them to man the ships. In consequence of this public service the Ecclesia yielded the ascendency to the Areopagus, and public affairs were admirably administered during the following epoch. For they acquired the art of war, made their name honoured throughout the Hellenic world, and possessed themselves of the sovereignty of the sea with the consent of Lakedaimon. At this time the leaders of the commons were Aristeides, son of Lusimachos, and Themistokles, son of Neokles; the latter studious of the arts of war, the former reputed eminent in statesmanship and honest beyond his contemporaries; which characters made their countrymen employ the one as a general, the other as a councillor. The rebuilding of the walls of Athens was their joint work, though they were otherwise at feud. The detachment of the Ionians from Persia and the formation of an alliance with Sparta were due to the counsels of Aristeides, who seized the opportunity afforded by the discredit cast on the Lakonians by the conduct of Pausanias. He too originally apportioned, two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes (478 B. C.), the contribution to be paid by the islanders. … Subsequently, when lofty thoughts filled every bosom and wealth was accumulating, Aristeides advised them to administer the hegemony with their own hands, to leave their country occupations and fix their domicile in the city. Sustentation, he promised, would be provided for all, either as soldiers or sailors in active service, or as troops in garrison or as public servants; and then they could increase the vigour of their imperial sway. They followed his advice, and, taking the rule into their own hands, reduced their allies to the position of vassals, except the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians, whom they kept as satellites of their power, and permitted to retain their own constitutions and to rule their own dependencies: and they provided for their own sustentation by the method which Aristeides indicated; for in the end the public revenues, the taxes and the tributes of the allies gave maintenance to more than 20,000. There were 6,000 dicasts or jurors, 1,600 archers, 1,200 cavalry, 500 senators, 500 soldiers of the dockyard garrison, 50 city guards, 700 home magistrates, 700 foreign magistrates, 2,500 heavy armed soldiers (this was their number at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war), 4,000 sailors manning 20 guardships, 2,000 sailors appointed by lot, manning 20 tribute-collecting ships, and in addition to these the Prutaneion, the orphans, the gaolers; and all these persons were maintained at the expense of the national treasury. The sustentation of the commons was thus secured. {157} The 17 years which followed the Median war were about the period during which the country continued under the ascendency of the Areopagus, though its aristocratic features were gradually on the wane. When the masses had grown more and more preponderant, Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, reputed incorruptible in his loyalty to democracy, became leader of the commons, and began to attack the Areopagus. First, he put to death many of its members, by impeaching them of offences committed in their administration. Afterwards in the archonship of Konon (462 B. C.) he despoiled the council itself of all its more recently acquired attributes, which were the keystone of the existing constitution, and distributed them among the Senate of 500, the Ecclesia, and the courts of law. In this work he had the co-operation of Themistokles, who was himself an Areopagite, but expecting to be impeached for treasonable correspondence with Persia. … Ephialtes and Themistokles kept accusing the Areopagus before the Senate of 500, and again before the commons, till finally they stripped it of all its principal functions. The assassination of Ephialtes by the instrumentality of Aristodikos of Tanagra followed not long after. Such were the circumstances of the overthrow of the Areopagus. After this the degradation of the constitution proceeded without intermission from the eagerness of politicians to win popular favour; and at the same time there happened to be no organizer of the aristocratic party, whose head, Kimon, the son of Miltiades, was too young for some years to enter political life; besides which their ranks were much devastated by war. Expeditionary forces were recruited by conscription; and as the generals had no military experience and owed their appointment to the reputation of their ancestors, each expedition entailed the sacrifice of 2,000 or 3,000 lives, chiefly of the noblest sons of Athens, whether belonging to the wealthy classes or to the commons."—Aristotle, On the Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste.) chapter 23-26.—On the above, Dr. Abbott comments as follows: "So much of this account as refers to Themistocles may be at once dismissed as unhistorical. … If the evidence of Thucydides is to count for anything, it is quite certain that Themistocles finally left Greece for Persia about 466 B. C. … Plutarch says not a word about Themistocles. But the remainder of the account [of the attack on the Areopagus] is supported by all our authorities—if indeed it is not merely repeated by them."

_E. Abbott, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 11, section 5._

ALSO IN _J. P. Mahaffy, Problems in Greek History, page 96._

_Plutarch, Themistocles._

See, also, below: B. C. 466-454.

ATHENS: B. C. 470-466. Continued war against the Persians. Cimon's victories at the Eurymedon. Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.

"Under the guidance of Athens, the war against the Persians was continued. Cimon [Kimon] sailed with a fleet to the coast of Thrace, and laid siege to Eion on the Strymon [B. C. 470]. The Persian garrison made a gallant defence; and finally Boges, the governor, rather than surrender, cast all his gold and silver into the river; and, having raised a huge pile of wood, slew his wives, children and slaves, and laid their bodies on it; then setting fire to it, he flung himself into the flames: the garrison surrendered at discretion. Doriscus was attacked in vain, but all the other Persian garrisons in Europe were reduced. Cimon then, as executor of an Amphictyonic decree, turned his arms against the piratic Dolopians of the Isle of Scyros, whom he expelled, and filled the island with Athenian colonists. On this occasion he sought and found (as was supposed) the bones of the hero Theseus, who had died in this island 800 years before; and he brought them in his own trireme to Athens,—an act which gained him great favour with the people. By this time, some of the confederates were grown weary of war, and began to murmur at the toils and expense to which it put them. The people of Naxos were the first who positively refused to contribute any longer; but the Athenians, who had tasted of the sweets of command, would not now permit the exercise of free will to their allies. Cimon appeared (Ol. 78,3) [B. C. 466] with a large fleet before Naxos; the Naxians defended themselves with vigour, but were at length forced to submit; and the Athenians had the hardihood to reduce them to the condition of subjects to Athens—an example which they soon followed in other cases. … After the reduction of Naxos, Cimon sailed over to the coast of Asia, and learning that the Persian generals had assembled a large fleet and army in Pamphylia, he collected a fleet of 200 triremes at Cnidos, with which he proceeded to the coast of that country, and laid siege to the city of Phaselis, which, though Greek, obeyed the Persian monarch. Having reduced it to submission, he resolved to proceed and attack the Persian fleet and army, which he learned were lying at the river Eurymedon. On his arrival, the Persian fleet, of 350 triremes, fearing at first to fight till 80 Phoenician vessels, which they were expecting, should come up, kept in the river; but finding that the Greeks were preparing to attack, they put out to sea and engaged them. The action did not continue long: the Barbarians fled to the land; 200 ships fell into the hands of the victors, and several were destroyed. Without a moment's delay, Cimon disembarked his men, and led them against the land forces: the resistance of the Persians was obstinate for some time, but at last they turned and fled, leaving their camp a prey to the conquerors; and Cimon had thus the rare glory of having gained two important victories in the one day. Hearing then that the 80 Phoenician vessels were at Hydros, in the Isle of Cyprus, he immediately sailed thither and took or destroyed the whole of them. The victory on the Eurymedon may be regarded as the termination of the conflict between Greece and Persia. The year after it (Ol. 78,4) [B. C. 465], Xerxes was assassinated, and the usual confusion took place in the court of Susa."

_T. Keightley, History of Greece, part 1, chapter 13._

ALSO IN _W. W. Lloyd, The Age of Pericles, chapter 27 (volume 1)._

See also PERSIA: B. C. 486-405.

{158}

ATHENS: B. C. 466-454. Leadership in the Delian confederacy changed to sovereignty. Revolt and subjugation of Thasos. Help to Sparta and its ungracious requital. Fall and exile of Cimon. Rise of Pericles and the democratic anti-Spartan policy. Removal of the federal treasury from Delos. Building the Long Walls.

"It was now evident to the whole body of the allies of Athens that by joining the league they had provided themselves with a mistress rather than a leader. … Two years after the reduction of Naxos another powerful island-state broke out into rebellion against the supremacy of Athens. The people of Thasos had from very early times possessed territory on the mainland of Thrace opposite to their island. By holding this coast-slip they engrossed the trade of the Valley of the Strymon, and held the rich gold mines of Mount Pangaeus. But the Athenians, after the capture of Eïon, set themselves to develop that port as the commercial centre of Thrace. … A spot called 'The Nine Ways,' … where that great river first begins to broaden out into its estuary, but can still be spanned by a bridge, was the chosen site of a fortress to secure the hold of Athens on the land. But the native Thracian tribes banded themselves together, and fell upon the invaders with such desperation that … the Athenian armies were defeated. … It was probably the discouragement which this defeat caused at Athens that emboldened Thasos to declare her secession from the Confederacy of Delos. She wished to save her Thracian trade, before Athens could make another attempt to divert it from her. The Thasians did not rely on their own resources alone; they enlisted the Thracians and Macedonians of the mainland, and sent to Sparta to endeavour to induce the ephors to declare war on Athens." The Spartans were well disposed to take up the cause of the Thasians; but at that moment they were overwhelmed by the calamity of the frightful Earthquake of 464, instantly followed by the rising of the Helots and the third Messenian war (See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD). "The island-state was therefore left to its own resources; and these were so considerable that she held out against the force of the Athenian confederacy for two whole years. … She was obliged at last to surrender to Cimon [B. C. 463], whose army had long been lying before her walls. Like Naxos, she was punished for her defection by the loss of her war-fleet and her fortifications, and the imposition of a fine of many talents. Still more galling must have been the loss of her trade with Thrace, which now passed entirely into Athenian hands. … The Spartans were still engaged in a desperate struggle with their revolted subjects when the siege of Thasos came to an end. Cimon, who was now at the height of his reputation and power, saw with distress the troubles of the city he so much admired. He set himself to persuade the Athenians that they ought to forego old grudges, and save from destruction the state which had shared with them the glory of the Persian war. … His pleading was bitterly opposed by the anti-Spartan party at Athens, headed by two statesmen, Ephialtes and Pericles, who had already come into notice as antagonists of Cimon. But the more generous and unwise policy prevailed, and 4,000 hoplites were sent to the aid of Sparta [B. C. 462]. This army was pursued by misfortune; it was so unsuccessful in attacking Ithome that the Spartans attributed its failure to ill will rather than ill luck. They, therefore, began to treat their allies with marked discourtesy, and at last sent them home without a word of thanks, merely stating that their services could be of no further use [See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD]. This rudeness and ingratitude fully justified the anti-Spartan party at Athens. … Cimon was now no longer able to deal with the policy of the state as he chose, and the conduct of affairs began to pass into the hands of men whose foreign and domestic policy were alike opposed to all his views. Ephialtes and Pericles proceeded to form alliances abroad with all the states which were ill disposed toward Sparta, and at home to commence a revision of the constitution. They were determined to carry out to its furthest logical development the democratic tendency which Cleisthenes had introduced into the Athenian polity. Of Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, comparatively little is known. But Pericles … was the son of Xanthippus, the accuser of Miltiades in 489, B. C., and the victor of Mycale and Sestos; while, on his mother's side, he came of the blood of the Alcmaeonidae. Pericles was staid, self-contained, and haughty—a strange chief for the popular party. But his relationship to Cleisthenes, and the enmity which existed between his house and that of Cimon, urged him to espouse the cause of democracy. … While Cimon had Greece in his mind, Pericles could only think of Athens, and the temper of the times was favourable to the narrower policy. … The first aim which Pericles and Ephialtes set before themselves was the cutting down of the power of the Areopagus [See above: B. C. 477-462]. That body had since the Persian war become the stronghold of the Conservative and philo-Laconian party. … Ephialtes took the lead in the attack on the Areopagus. He chose a moment when Cimon was away at sea, bent on assisting a rebellion against the Great King which had broken out in Egypt. After a violent struggle, he succeeded in carrying a law which deprived the Areopagus of its ancient censorial power, and reduced it to a mere court to try homicides. … When Cimon came home from Egypt he was wildly enraged. … Recourse was had to the test of ostracism. It decided against Cimon, who therefore went into banishment [B. C. 459]. But this wrong against the greatest general of Athens was, not long after, avenged by an over-zealous and unscrupulous friend. Ephialtes was slain by assassins in his own house. … The immediate result of this murder was to leave Pericles in sole and undivided command of the democratic party. The foreign policy of Pericles soon began to involve Athens in troubles at home. He concluded alliances with Argos and Thessaly, both states at variance with Sparta, and thereby made a collision with the Lacedæmonian confederacy inevitable. He gave still more direct offence to Corinth, one of the most powerful members of that confederacy, by concluding a close alliance with Megara. … In Boeotia, too, he stirred up enmity, by giving an active support to the democratic party in that country. These provocations made a war inevitable. In 458 B. C. the storm burst. … At the moment of the outbreak of the first important naval war which she had to wage with a Greek enemy since the formation of her empire, Athens took two important steps. The first was destined to guard against the risk of misfortunes by sea; it consisted in the transference from Delos to Athens [dated by different authorities between 461 and 454 B. C.] of the central treasury of the confederacy. … {159} It was not long before the Athenians came to regard the treasury as their own, and to draw upon it for purely Attic needs, which had no connection with the welfare of the other confederates. … The second important event of the year 458 B. C. was the commencement of the famous 'Long Walls' of Athens [See LONG WALLS]. … When they were finished Athens, Peiræus, and Phalerum, formed the angles of a vast fortified triangle, while the space between them, a considerable expanse of open country, could be utilized as a place of refuge for the population of Attica, and even for their flocks and herds."

_C. W. C. Oman, History of Greece, chapters 23-24._

ALSO IN _E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapters 5-6._

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapter 17 (volume 3)._