Part 50

"The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found one. Soon after his victory, Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request that a squadron of 70 ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded 100 talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades, himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at once attacked him for misconduct in the enterprise. … Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him, but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of 50 talents. So large a sum was more than even Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound. … His condemnation was one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors of judgment. … We have very little information about the state of Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Ægina. … Meanwhile, a man was rising to power, who may be said to have created the history of Athens for the rest of the century,—Themistocles, the son of Neocles. … On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep them away, so long as they were masters of the Ægean? … With an insight almost incredible he perceived that the Athenians could become a maritime nation; that Athens possesses harbours large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta. But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus … and Aristides. … They were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating. This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes; he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs. … He had been second in command at Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles could only expect the most resolute opposition. Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He had to make his party … conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their unmannerly and uncultivated leader. And they might, perhaps, have maintained their position if it had not been for the Æginetan war. That unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an unprovoked attack of the Æginetans on the coast of Attica (506 B. C.), [Ægina being allied with Thebes in the war mentioned above—B.C. 509-506]. {153} It was renewed when the Æginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon afterwards. The Æginetans had the stronger fleet, and defeated the Athenian ships. "Such experiences naturally caused a change in the minds of the Athenians. … It was clear that the old arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals." Themistocles now "came forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides. … It was clear that nothing decisive could be done in the Æginetan war unless the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in this manner, by 483 B. C., Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the city. He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium. … By the summer of 480, the Athenians … were able to launch 180 vessels, besides providing 20 for the use of the Chalcideans of Eubœa. … At the same time Themistocles set about the fortification of the Peiræus. … Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would have made the Peiræus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not prepared."

_E. Abbott, Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens, chapter 2._

ALSO IN: Plutarch, _Aristides. Themistocles._

ATHENS: B. C. 481-479. Congress at Corinth. Organized Hellenic Union, under the headship of Sparta.

See GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

ATHENS: B. C. 480-479. The second Persian invasion. Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa. Abandonment of the City.

"The last days of Darius were clouded by the disaster of Marathon; 'that battle formed the turning point of his good fortune,' and it would seem that the news of it led to several insurrections, particularly that of Egypt; but they were soon put down. Darius died (Olymp. 73, 3), and Xerxes, who succeeded him, was prevented from taking revenge on the Athenians by the revolt of Egypt, which engaged his attention during the first years of his reign. But he completely conquered the insurgents after they had maintained themselves about four or five years; and he then made preparations for that vengeance on Athens for which his barbarian pride was longing. The account of the three years' preparations of Xerxes, how he assembled his army in Asia Minor, how he made a bridge across the Hellespont, how he cut a canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos to prevent his fleet being destroyed by storms—all this is known to everyone who has read Herodotus. History is here so much interwoven with poetry, that they can no longer be separated. … The Greeks awaited the attack (Olymp. 75, 1), 'but they were not agreed among themselves. The Argives from hatred of Sparta joined the Persians, and the miserable Boeotians likewise supported them. The others kept together only from necessity; and without the noble spirit of the Athenians Greece would have been lost, and that from the most paltry circumstances. A dispute arose as to who was to be honoured with the supreme command; the Athenians gave way to all, for their only desire was to save Greece. Had the Persians moved on rapidly, they would have met with no resistance, but they proceeded slowly, and matters turned out differently.' A Greek army was encamped at Tempe, at the entrance of Thessaly, and at first determined on defending Thessaly. But they must have seen that they could be entirely surrounded from Upper Thessaly; and when they thus discovered the impossibility of stopping the Persians, they retreated. The narrative now contains one inconceivable circumstance after another. … It is inconceivable that, as the Greeks did make a stand at Thermopylae, no one else took his position there except King Leonidas and his Spartans, not including even the Lacedaemonians, for they remained at home! Only 1,000 Phocians occupied the heights, though that people might surely have furnished 10,000 men; 400 of the Boeotians were posted in the rear, as a sort of hostages, as Herodotus remarks, and 700 Thespians. Where were all the rest of the Greeks? … Countless hosts are invading Greece; the Greeks want to defend themselves, and are making active preparations at sea; but on land hundreds of thousands are met by a small band of Peloponnesians. 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans as hostages, and 1,000 Phocians, stationed on the heights! A pass is occupied, but only that one, and the others are left unguarded. … All this is quite unintelligible; it would almost appear as if there had been an intention to sacrifice Leonidas and his men; but we cannot suppose this. These circumstances alone suggest to us, that the numbers of the Persian army cannot have been as great as they are described; but even if we reduce them to an immense extent, it still remains inconceivable why they were not opposed by greater numbers of the Greeks, for as afterwards they ventured to attack the Persians in the open field, it was certainly much more natural to oppose them while marching across the hills. But however this may be, it is an undoubted fact, that Leonidas and his Spartans fell in the contest, of which we may form a conception from the description of Herodotus, when after a resistance of three days they were surrounded by the Persians. A few of the Spartans escaped on very excusable grounds, but they were so generally despised, that their life became unendurable, and they made away with themselves. This is certainly historical. … After the victory of Thermopylae all Hellas lay open before the Persians, and they now advanced towards Athens, a distance which they could march in a few days. Thebes opened her gates, and joyfully admitted them from hatred of Athens. Meantime a portion of the army appeared before Delphi. It is almost inconceivable that the Persians did not succeed in taking the temple. … The miracles by which the temple is said to have been saved, are repeated in the same manner during the attack of the Gauls. {154} But the temple of Delphi was certainly not plundered.' … The city of Athens had in the meantime been abandoned by all the people; the defenceless had taken refuge in the small island of Salamis, or of Troezen, 'and all the Athenians capable of bearing arms embarked in the fleet.' … The Persians thus took Athens without any resistance. … During the same days on which the battle of Thermopylae was fought, the Greek fleet was engaged in two indecisive but glorious battles near the promontory of Artemisium. 'In a third the Persians gained the upper hand, and when the Greeks at the same time heard of the defeat at Thermopylae, they withdrew, and doubling Cape Sunium sailed towards Salamis.' God sent them a storm whereby the Persians in their pursuit suffered shipwreck. … While the Greek fleet was stationed in the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, towards Piraeeus, discord broke out among the Greeks. The Peloponnesians thought only of themselves; they had fortified the Isthmus; there they were assembled, and there they wanted to offer resistance to the Persians. In their folly they forgot, that if the enemy with his superior fleet, should turn against Peloponnesus, they might land wherever they liked. … But Themistocles now declared, that all the hopes of the Athenians were directed towards the recovery of their own city; that, if the Peloponnesians should sacrifice them, and, thinking of themselves only, should abandon Attica to the barbarians, the Athenians would not be so childish as to sacrifice themselves for them, but would take their women and children on board their ships, and sail far away from the Persians to the island of Sardinia, or some other place where Greek colonies were established; that there they would settle as a free people, and abandon Peloponnesus to its fate; and that then the peninsula would soon be in the hands of the enemy. This frightened the Peloponnesians, and they resolved to stand by Athens. It is evident that, throughout that time, Themistocles had to struggle with the most intolerable difficulties, which the allies placed in his way, as well as with their jealousy, meanness, and insolence. 'The rudeness of the Spartans and Corinthians is nowhere more strongly contrasted with the refinement of the Athenians, than on that occasion.' But after he had tried everything, and overcome by every possible means a hundred different difficulties, he yet saw, that he could not rely on the perseverance of the Peloponnesians, and that they would turn to the Isthmus as soon as Xerxes should proceed in that direction. He accordingly induced the Persian king, by a false message, to surround the Greek fleet, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Peloponnesians. He declared himself ready to deliver the whole of the Greek fleet into his hands. This device was quite to the mind of the Persians; Xerxes believed him, and followed his advice. When Themistocles was thus sure of the Peloponnesians, the ever-memorable battle of Salamis commenced, which is as certainly historical as that of Cannae, or any modern battle, 'whatever the numbers may be.' The battle proceeded somewhat in the manner of the battle of Leipzig: when the issue was decided, a portion of those who ought to have joined their countrymen before, made common cause with the Greeks. … Their accession increased the victory of the Greeks. … Certain as the battle of Salamis is, all the accounts of what took place after it, are very doubtful. This much is certain, that Xerxes returned, 'leaving a portion of his army under Mardonius in Greece;' … Winter was now approaching, and Mardonius withdrew from ravaged Attica, taking up his winter-quarters partly in Thessaly and partly in Boeotia. … The probability is, that the Athenians remained the winter in Salamis in sheds, or under the open sky. Mardonius offered to restore to them Attica uninjured, so far as it had not already been devastated, if they would conclude peace with him. They might at that time have obtained any terms they pleased, if they had abandoned the common cause of the Greeks; and the Persians would have kept the peace; for when they concluded treaties they observed them: they were not faithless barbarians. But on this occasion again, we see the Athenian people in all its greatness and excellence; it scorned such a peace, and preferred the good of the Peloponnesians. … Mardonius now again advanced towards Athens; the Spartans, who ought to have proceeded towards Cithaeron, had not arrived, and thus he again took possession of Attica and ravaged it completely. At length, however (Olymp. 75, 2), the Athenians prevailed upon the Peloponnesians to leave the Isthmus, and they gradually advanced towards Boeotia. There the battle of Plataeae was fought. … In regard to the accounts of this battle, it is historically certain that it was completely won by the Greeks, and that the remnants of the Persian army retreated without being vigorously pursued. It must have reached Asia, but it then disappears. It is also historically certain, that Pausanias was the commander of the allied army of the Greeks. … After their victory, the Greeks advanced towards Thebes. In accordance with a vow which they had made before the war, Thebes ought to have been destroyed by the Greeks. But their opinions were divided. … On the same day on which the battle of Plataeae was fought, the allied Greeks gained as complete a victory at sea. … After this victory of Mycale, the Ionian cities revolted against the Persians."

_B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, volume 1, lectures 37 and 38._

ALSO IN: _Herodotus, History; translated and edited by H. Rawlinson, book 7 (volume 4)_.

_Plutarch, Themistocles._

_G. W. Cox, The Greeks and Persians._

ATHENS: B. C. 479-478. Protection of Ionia assumed. Siege and capture of Sestus. Rebuilding and enlargement of the city and its walls. Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

"The advantages obtained by the Hellenes [in their war with Persia] came upon them so unexpectedly as to find them totally unprepared, and accordingly embarrassed by their own victories. What was to be done with Ionia? Was the whole country to be admitted into the Hellenic confederation? Too great a responsibility would, in the opinion of the Peloponnesians, be incurred by such a step. … It would be better to sacrifice the country, and establish the Ionians in settlements in other parts, at the expense of those who had favoured the Medes, i. e., of the Argives, Bœotians, Locrians, and Thessalians. … The Athenians, on the other hand, espoused the cause of the cities. … Ionia ought to be a bulwark against the Barbarians, and to belong to the Hellenes. {155} … The Athenians found a support in the feeling prevalent among the Ionians, who were naturally opposed to any forced settlement. Accordingly, in the first instance, Samos, Lesbos, Chios, and a number of other island-towns, were admitted into the confederation … and a new Hellas was formed, a Greek empire comprehending both sides of the sea. Considerations of caution made it necessary, above all, to secure the passage from Asia to Europe; for it was universally believed that the bridge over the Hellespont was either still in existence or had been restored. When it was found to have been destroyed, the Peloponnesians urged the termination of the campaign. … The Athenians, on the other hand, declared themselves resolved … not to leave unfinished what they had begun. Sestus, the strongest fortress on the Hellespont, ought not to be left in the hands of the enemy; an attack on it ought to be risked without delay, before the city had prepared for a siege. They allowed the Peloponnesians to take their departure, and under the command of Xanthippus united with the ships of the Ionians and Hellespontians for the purpose of new undertakings." The Persians in Sestus resisted obstinately, enduring a long siege, but were forced to surrender at last. "Meanwhile, the main point consisted in the Athenians having remained alone in the field, in their having fraternized with the Ionians as one naval power, and having after such successes attained to a confidence in victory, to which no enterprise any longer seemed either too distant or too difficult. Already they regarded their city as the centre of the coast-lands of Greece. But what was the condition of this city of Athens itself? A few fragments of the ancient city wall, a few scattered houses, which had served the Persian commanders as their quarters, were yet standing; the rest was ashes and ruins. After the battle of Platææ the inhabitants had returned from Salamis, Trœzene, and Ægina; not even the fleet and its crews were at hand to afford them assistance. They endeavoured to make shift as best they could, to pass through the trials of the winter. As soon as the spring arrived, the restoration of the city was commenced with all possible activity. … But even now it was not the comforts of domesticity which occupied their thoughts, but, above all, the city as a whole and its security. To Themistocles, the founder of the port-town, public confidence was in this matter properly accorded." It was not possible "to carry out a new and regular plan for the city; but it was resolved to extend its circumference beyond the circle of the ancient walls, … so as to be able, in case of a future siege, to offer a retreat to the country-population within the capital itself. … But the Athenians were not even to be permitted to build their walls undisturbed; for, as soon as their grand plan of operations became known, the envy and insidious jealousy of their neighbours broke out afresh. … The Peloponnesian states, above all Ægina and Corinth, hastened to direct the attention of Sparta to the situation of affairs. … As at Sparta city walls were objected to on principle, and as no doubts prevailed with regard to the fact that z well-fortified town was impregnable to the military art of the Peloponnesians, it was actually resolved at any price to prevent the building of the walls in Attica." But, for shame's sake, the interference undertaken by Sparta was put upon the ground that in the event of a future invasion of the country, only the peninsula could be successfully defended; that central Greece would necessarily be abandoned to the enemy; and that every fortified city in it would furnish him a dangerous base. "At such a crisis craft alone could be of avail. When the Spartans made their imperious demand at Athens, Themistocles ordered the immediate cessation of building operations, and with assumed submissiveness, promised to present himself at Sparta, in order to pursue further negotiations in person. On his arrival there, he allowed one day after the other to go by, pretending to be waiting for his fellow envoys." In the meantime, all Athens was toiling night and day at the walls, and time enough was gained by the audacious duplicity of Themistocles to build them to a safe height for defence. "The enemies of Athens saw that their design had been foiled, and were forced to put the best face upon their discomfiture. They now gave out that they had intended nothing beyond good advice."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN _G. W. Cox, History of Greece, book 2, chapter 7-8 (volume 1-2)._

ATHENS: B. C. 478-477. Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta. Formation of the Confederacy of Delos. The founding of Athenian Empire.

See GREECE: B. C. 478-477.

ATHENS: B. C. 477-462. Constitutional gains for the democracy. Ascendency of Aristeides. Declining popularity and ostracism of Themistokles. The sustentation of the commons. The stripping of power from the Areopagus.