chapter 12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Philippines). Correspondence between the General commanding United States forces at Cavite and Manila, and Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.

On the 4th of July, General Thomas M. Anderson, then commanding the "United States Expeditionary Forces" at Cavite Arsenal, addressed the following communication to "Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces":

"General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without permission."

On the following day Aguinaldo replied:

"General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments with which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency. I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction whenever occasion represents. I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." …

To this communication General Anderson returned the following on the 6th: "General: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy. But for a short time we must organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precaution. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?" …

On the 9th of July General Anderson reported to the War Department at Washington: "General Aguinaldo tells me he has about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns, which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have in all 4,000 prisoners. When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government."

On the 17th the American commander caused another communication to be addressed to "General Emilio Aguinaldo" as follows: "Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that, the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner. I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible."

To this communication there seems to have been no written reply until the 24th; and, on the 20th, the Chief Quartermaster reported to General Anderson "that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor Aguinaldo's order, in this section, who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them." On the 23d General Anderson repeated his request, as follows:

{615}

"General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response. As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience."

The next day Aguinaldo replied: "I have the honor to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (premising) that you afford me a previous advice of four days in anticipation."

Meantime, General Anderson had written to the War Department, on the 18th: "Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain. The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it. We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us. I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila. The city is strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season. If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering ability here." And, again on the 21st, he had written: "Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."

On the 24th General Anderson received from the Philippine leader a very clear and definite statement of his attitude towards the "Expeditionary Forces of the United States," and the intentions with which he and the people whom he represented were acting. "I came," he wrote, "from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude.

"Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being] more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship. {616} I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed for the North American people, in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty."

In the same strain, on the 1st of August, Aguinaldo wrote to United States Consul Williams, as to a "distinguished friend:"

"I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots. These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship?

"It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the American forces have shown not an active, only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, and for that reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly, as also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power with my people that the United States shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed people.

"Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot and history are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to our unfortunate country; that we know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands pre-eminent the immortal General Washington."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document Number 208._

In an article published in the "North American Review," February, 1900, General Anderson discussed his relations with Aguinaldo very frankly, in part as follows: "On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether 'the United States of the North' either had recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was 'had' or 'would.' In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had had no reason to surmise.

"But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo. I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. … A few days thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. {617} With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.' It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel and forage. …

"The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can … be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us. About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They, therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country. … At seven o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the Filipinos from the city. … I therefore took the responsibility of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below, requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely on the honor of the American people. The General then read to them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino people. …

"There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence."

_T. M. Anderson, Our Rule in the Philippines (North American Review, volume 170, page 275)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Porto Rico). Occupation of Porto Rico.

"With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Porto Rico became the next strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose. Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived on the 11th of July with reinforcements for General Shafter's army. With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and artillery, 2 companies of engineers and 1 company of the signal corps, General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st, having 9 transports, convoyed by the fleet, under Captain Higginson, with the 'Massachusetts' (flagship), 'Dixie,', Gloucester,' 'Columbia' and 'Yale,' the two latter carrying troops. The expedition landed at on July 25th, which port was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the 'Annapolis' and the 'Wasp,' while the 'Puritan' and 'Amphitrite' went to San Juan and joined the 'New Orleans,' which was engaged in blockading that port. The major general commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwan's brigade of the Third Army Corps, by General Wilson with a part of his division and also by General Brooke with a part of his corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27th he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the capture of the island. With the exception of encounters with the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros [the Rio Prieto], Coamo, and Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor and by the 12th of August much of the island was in our possession and the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed. Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage."

_Message of the President of the United States to Congress, December 5, 1898._

"During the nineteen days of active campaign on the island of Puerto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by the United States forces and brought under our control. Our forces were in such a position as to make the positions of the Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San Juan, utterly untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated or captured in the six different engagements which took place, and in every position they had occupied up to that time. The volunteers had deserted their colors, and many of them had surrendered to our forces and taken the oath of allegiance. This had a demoralizing effect upon the regular Spanish troops. … The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded."

_General Miles, Report (Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,