volume 2, pages 157-159.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Army administration). Red-tape and politics. Their working in the campaign.

"The Cuban campaign had been foreseen by intelligent officers for more than a year, but the department which clothes the army had taken no steps toward providing a suitable uniform for campaigning in the tropics until war was declared. The Fifth Army Corps, a comparatively small body of 17,000 men, was concentrated at Tampa on the railroad within reach of all the appliances for expediting business. Between April 26, when war was declared, and, June 6, when the corps embarked for Cuba, sufficient time elapsed to have clothed 1,000,000 men if the matter had been handled in the same manner a wholesale clothing firm would handle similar business. Yet the corps went to Cuba wearing the winter clothing it had brought on its backs from Montana, Wyoming, and Michigan. It endured the heat of the tropics clad in this, and was furnished with light summer clothing by the department to wear for its return to Montauk, where the breezes were so bracing that the teeth chattered even when the men were clad in winter clothing. The only reason for this absolute failure to properly clothe the army was that the methods of the department are too slow and antiquated for the proper performance of business. There was no lack of money. It was a simple case of red-tape delays. There can be no doubt that the intention was that the summer clothing should be worn in Cuba and that there should be warm clothing issued at Montauk. It was issued after the troops had shivered for days in their light clothes. The delays unavoidably connected with an obsolete method caused great suffering that should not have been inflicted upon men expected to do arduous duty. A sensible man would not put a heavy blanket on a horse to do draught work on a hot day; but the red tape of an antiquated way of doing business caused our soldiers to wear heavy woolen clothes in torrid heat, when every nerve was to be strained to the breaking point in athletic exertion. This is not pointed out in a fault-finding spirit. The men are proud to have been in the Fifth Corps and to have endured these things for the country and the flag; but these unnecessary sufferings impaired the fighting strength of the army, caused much of the sickness that visited the Fifth Corps, and might have caused the failure of the whole expedition. …

"The difficulty here depicted was one which beset the department at every turn in the whole campaign. It is a typical case. Transports, tentage, transportation—it was the same in everything. With the most heroic exertions the department was able to meet emergencies only after they had passed. This was caused partly by lack of ready material, but mainly by an inelastic system of doing business which broke down in emergencies. This, in turn, was caused mainly by the illiberal treatment accorded to this, as well as to every other department of the army by Congress. It uniformly cuts mercilessly all estimates of this, as of every other department, and leaves no margin of expenditure or chance of improvement. It dabbles in matters which are purely technical and require the handling of expert executive talent. …

"Plans for war should be prepared in advance. This was especially true of the last war, which had been foreseen for years and considered a probability for several months. All details should have been previously worked out, all contingencies foreseen before hostilities began. Such plans would require some modifications, of course, but would form a working basis. {613} Neither Santiago nor Manila Bay would have been foreseen; but any plans for war would have involved the consideration and solution of the following problems: How to raise, arm, equip, organize, mobilize, clothe, feed, shelter, and transport large bodies of soldiers. The point where the battle might occur would be a mere tactical detail to be worked out at the proper time. The above problems could all be solved in time of peace and should have been solved. The general staff performs this function in foreign armies, but we had no such body in our service and nothing to imperfectly take its place. …

"The most urgently needed reform is the absolute divorcement of the army in all of its departments from politics. … No department of the army should be more exempt from political influence than the staff. This points at once to the most urgent reform, viz., make the commanding general the real working head of the army, instead of the Secretary of War. No good results have come to the service by the extension of the Secretary's powers in Grant's first administration. Most of the evils of the service can be traced to the fact that the general commanding has since that time been practically deprived of his proper functions, and the real head of the army has been a politician."

_Lieutenant J. H. Parker, Our Army Supply Department and the need of a General Staff (Review of Reviews, December, 1898)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Cuba). The War with Spain. Sickness in the American army at Santiago. Its alarming state. Hurried removal of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island.

"After the surrender of General Toral's army General Shafter urged the War Department from time to time to hasten the shipment of the Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order that the American Army, whose condition was now deplorable, might be transported to the United States. At this time about half the command had been attacked by malarial fever, with a few cases of yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever. The yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the troops at Siboney, and the few cases found among the troops at the front were at once transferred to that place. … There was great fear, and excellent grounds for it, that the yellow fever, now sporadic throughout the command, would become epidemic. With the command weakened by malarial fevers, and its general tone and vitality much reduced by all the circumstances incident to the campaign, the effects of such an epidemic would practically mean its annihilation. The first step taken to check the spread of disease was the removal of all the troops to new camping grounds. … It was directed that the command be moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a short time the yellow fever would be stamped out. … But the effect produced on the command by the work necessary to set up the tents and in the removal of the camps increased the number on the sick report to an alarming degree. Convalescents from malarial fever were taken again with the fever, and yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid increased. It was useless now to attempt to confine the yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and isolation hospitals were established around Santiago. It was apparent that to keep moving the command every few days simply weakened the troops and increased the fever cases. Any exertion in this heat caused a return of the fever, and it must be remembered that the convalescents now included about 75 per cent. of the command. The Commanding General was now directed to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the yellow fever limit; but this was a physical impossibility. …

"The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these conditions staring them in the face, that the officers commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation. As a result of this conference the General sent the following telegram giving his views [and those of the General Officers and Medical Officers]. … 'In reply to telegram of this date [August 3], stating that it is deemed best that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men a day, at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says it is not a good camping ground. … In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came with it, and were sent immediately after it, with the least delay possible, to the United States. If this is not done I believe the death-rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the General Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you their views.' …

"On August 4th instructions were received from the War Department to begin the removal of the command to Montauk Point, Long Island. Some of the immune regiments were on the way to Santiago, and other regiments were at once ordered there to garrison the district as General Shafter's command was withdrawn. The first of the fleet of vessels to return the Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and leave August 9th, and by the end of the month nearly all were transported.

"After the surrender the relations between the American and Spanish troops were very cordial. There could be little or no conversation between individuals, but in many ways the respect each had for the other was shown, and there seemed to be no hatred on either side. Most of the Spanish officers remained in their quarters in town, and they shared in the feeling displayed by their men. Salutations were generally exchanged between the officers, and American ways and manners became very popular among the Spaniards. … {614} "By the 25th of the month General Shafter's entire command, with the exception of a few organizations just ready to embark, had departed, and, turning over the command to General Lawton, he sailed that day with his staff on the 'Mexico,' one of the captured transports, and at noon September 1st went ashore at Montauk Point, Long Island."

_J. D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter,