chapter 16 (New York: F. A. Stokes Co.).

[Image: The Boer Republics and the Surroundings.]

{493}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-November). The Boer advance. Invasion of Cape Colony and Natal. The invaders joined by Dutch farmers of the colony. The British unprepared. Investment of Kimberley and Mafeking.

In a despatch dated January 16, 1900, Sir Alfred Milner gave particulars of the first advance of the Boer forces from the Orange Free State into Cape Colony, and of the extent to which they were joined by Dutch farmers in districts south of Orange River. He wrote: "The portion of the Colony with which I propose to deal is that which lies south of the Orange River. The districts north of that river have been so completely cut off, and our accounts of what has been, and is, going on there are so scanty and imperfect, that the history of their defection cannot yet be written. I shall content myself with quoting an extract from a report upon the state of affairs in that region by a gentleman lately resident in Vryburg, which undoubtedly fairly expresses the truth so far as he has been in a position to observe it:—'All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts,' he says, 'have joined the Boers, and I do not believe that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch community in the whole of Bechuanaland.' … The districts invaded by the enemy south of the Orange River are:—Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, and Barkly East. It was on the 12th October that the enemy committed the first act of war and of invasion near Vryburg, on the western border, but it was not till more than a month later, namely, the 14th November, that they occupied Colesberg. Apparently they were waiting for reinforcements, for when they actually did cross the frontier they were 1,100 strong. Whatever the cause of their delay, it was not due to any discouragement from the people of Colesberg. The small British garrison then in the country being engaged elsewhere, and the district being entirely unguarded save by a few policemen, people from there continually visited the river to communicate with the enemy. The Chief Constable reports that when he left the town 300 Colesberg farmers had already joined the enemy, and that 400 more were expected from the adjoining district of Philipstown. … On the 16th November General Grobler, the Boer Commandant, addressed the following telegram to Bloemfontein:—'Colesberg was occupied by me without opposition. … I was very well pleased with the conduct of the Afrikanders. We were everywhere welcomed.' … Eastwards along the border the tide of insurrection ran strong. In the closing days of October a Boer force assembled at Bethulie Bridge, which was guarded only by a handful of police. As the days passed and the alarm grew, the Cape police force was withdrawn from Burghersdorp, which lies south of Bethulie, down the line to Stormberg, while, in their turn, the Imperial forces abandoned the important position of Stormberg, and retired on Queenstown, thus leaving the district clear for the invaders. That they did not immediately advance was certainly not owing to any fear of resistance at Burghersdorp, the inhabitants of which fraternised with the commando stationed on the river, continually passing to and fro. Finally, on the 14th November, the date of the occupation of Colesberg, the advance was made, and on the following morning a body of 500 Boers occupied the town. … According to the despatch of the Boer Commandant, dated 16th November, Burghersdorp was occupied 'amidst cheers from the Afrikanders,' and 'the Colonial burghers are very glad to meet us.' Commandeering at once began throughout the district of Albert, and a Burghersdorp resident estimated that about 1,000 farmers were prepared to join at the date of his leaving the place. …

"Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of Colesberg, no less than five great districts—those of Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse—had gone over without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to the enemy. Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange Free State had established their authority, and everywhere, in the expressive words of a Magistrate, British loyalists were 'being hunted out of town after town like sheep.' In the invaded districts, as will be seen from the above, the method of occupation has always been more or less the same. The procedure is as follows:-A commando enters, the Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the Court-house or market-place, and a Proclamation is read, annexing the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their country. … The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during November it was a number not less than the total of the invading commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee from the Albert district has estimated the total number of Colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the districts north of that river, to which I referred at the beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more, either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the Queen."-

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: Cd. 264, 1900, pages 1-5._

The above relates to movements from the Orange Free State into Cape Colony, where the most of reinforcement from Afrikander inhabitants of British soil was to be got. From the Transvaal, the movement of Boer forces across the frontiers, both eastward and westward, was equally prompt. Early on the morning of the 12th they were in Natal, advancing in three strong columns, under General Joubert, upon Newcastle, threatening the advance posts of the British at Dundee and Glencoe (some 40 miles northeast of Ladysmith), where valuable coal mines claimed defence. At the same time, another Boer army, under General Cronje, had passed the western border and was moving upon Mafeking, where Colonel (afterwards General) Baden-Powell, with an irregular force of about 1,200 men, was preparing for a siege. {494} The inhabitants of the town, including refugees, numbered about 2,000 whites and 7,000 blacks. A few days later Boer forces were skirmishing with the defenders of the diamond mines at Kimberley, where Colonel Kekewich commanded about 1,000 men, and where Cecil Rhodes was among the beleaguered citizens. The population of Kimberley was 33,000, more than half blacks. It is plain that the British were wholly unprepared for so vigorous an opening of hostilities on the part of the Boers. A military writer in the "London Times," discussing the "Lessons of the War," at the end of a year after its beginning, made the following statements and comment:—"There was no difficulty in obtaining the fullest information as to the resources of the Transvaal and the Free State, and we have been officially informed that 'the armed strength of the Boers, the number of their guns, with their character and calibre,' as laid down in the report of the Director of Intelligence, 'corresponds exactly with our recently-ascertained knowledge of what the enemy has put into the field.' Whether or not these reports ever travel from Queen Anne's gate to Pall-mall seems uncertain, since the Commander-in-Chief publicly stated that 'We have found that the enemy … are much more powerful and numerous than we expected.' The report of the Intelligence Department seems, therefore, to have been as valueless for practical purposes as were those transmitted to Paris by Colonel Stoffel prior to the outbreak of the Franco-German war, and Lord Wolseley was apparently as little aware of the fighting resources of the Boers as was Marshal Lebœuf of those of the Germans. When, early in September, 1899, it became a pressing necessity to reinforce the troops in South Africa, it was painfully realized that not a single unit at home was ready to take the field. One weak battalion and three field batteries, hastily compounded by wholesale drafting from others, represented the available contribution from a standing army at home whose nominal effectives considerably exceeded 100,000. The reinforcements, totally inadequate to meet the crisis, were made up by drawing upon India and the colonial garrisons."

_London Times, November 22, 1900._

Another writer in "The Times," reviewing, at nearly the same time, the previous year of the war, gave this account of its opening circumstances:—"If the organization of the British Army had permitted the despatch at short notice of 30,000 troops from Great Britain, the whole course of the war would have been different. It was a prevailing illusion that Mr. Kruger would yield to diplomatic pressure not backed by available force, and political expediency, over-riding military considerations, led to a compromise. It was tardily decided to bring the forces in South Africa up to a total of about 22,000 by drawing on India and the colonial garrisons; mobilization was deferred till October 7. Thus the first reinforcements arrived barely in time to prevent Natal from being over-run by the Boers, and the expeditionary force did not begin to reach Durban [the port of Natal] till after Ladysmith had been closely invested. … There were advisers of the Cabinet who held that the military strength of the Boers was a bubble easily pricked. Thus it was widely believed that a severe repulse in Northern Natal would suffice to break up the Boer forces, and, knowing only that a body of 4,000 British troops was assembled at Dundee and another somewhat larger at Ladysmith, we hastily assumed that these places were naturally well suited and had been specially prepared for defence. When, on the 26th, the concentration at Ladysmith was accomplished, after a painful and a hazardous march, it was imagined that our forces occupied an intrenched camp, which, if necessary, could be held with ease. Later it became clear that Ladysmith was exceedingly ill-adapted for defence, that it was practically unfortified when invested, and finally that, if the attacking force had been composed of trained troops, it must have fallen, in spite of every effort on the part of the garrison. The occupation of Dundee, it was discovered, was maintained against the military judgment of Sir G. White. …

"When at length the army corps and the cavalry division began, early in November, to arrive in South Africa, we believed that the bulk of this large force, which was apparently ready to take the field, would invade the Orange Free State and strike for Bloemfontein, clearing Cape Colony and inevitably drawing Boer forces away from the investments of Kimberley and of Ladysmith. This was another illusion. At least one-half of the expeditionary force was despatched to Durban and the rest was frittered away between three separate lines of advance. There were thus four separate groupings of British troops, spread over an immense front, and incapable of affording each other mutual support. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief being involved in a difficult campaign in Natal, there was no responsible head in Cape Colony, where partial chaos soon supervened. … Faulty as was the strategy which substituted scattered efforts with insufficient force for a primary object, that of the Boers was happily even more ill-conceived. In place of attempting to occupy our troops in Natal and throwing their main strength into Cape Colony, where a Dutch rising on a large scale would inevitably have occurred, they also preferred to fritter away their strength, devoting their main efforts against Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and contenting themselves with the occupation of Colesberg and Stormberg in small force, which, however, was quickly swelled by local rebels."

_London Times, November 5, 1900. _

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-December). The early battles. British reverses. Siege of Ladysmith.

The serious fighting of the war began in Natal, as early as the 20th of October, when three columns of the Boer forces closed in on the British advance post at Glencoe. The first of the Boer columns to arrive opened a precipitate attack, and in the hard battle which ensued (at Talana Hill) the British could claim the final advantage, though at very heavy cost. Their commander, General Sir W. Penn Symons, received a mortal wound and died three days afterwards, kindly cared for and buried by the enemy, his successor in the command, General Yule, having found it necessary to retreat from Glencoe and Dundee to Ladysmith. The Boers were already striking at the railroad between Glencoe and Ladysmith, and sharp fighting had taken place on the 21st at Elandslaagte, a station on the line only seventeen miles from the latter town. {495} The Boers, in that encounter, had been driven from the neighboring hills, but the British had again suffered greatly, and began to realize the quality of the foe with which they had to deal. A graphic account of the battle at Elandslaagte was written by the famous newspaper correspondent, G. W. Steevens, who died shortly afterwards at Ladysmith. Two days after Elandslaagte there was another engagement at Reitfontein, still nearer to Ladysmith, fought for the purpose of keeping the Boers from intercepting the retreat of General Yule. The British forces defending Natal were now concentrated at Ladysmith, which they had chosen for their main position, and in which they had been collecting large quantities of military stores. General Sir George White was there in general command. The Boers, with General Joubert in chief command, were rapidly closing in upon the town, and, on the 29th, they had a Creusot (French) six-inch gun on a neighboring hill, within range, ready to drop shells into its streets. That night General White made an attempt to break their lines which ended in sore disaster. One column, which marched far out, to a hill called Nicholson's Nek, for a flanking attack on the enemy, lost most of its ammunition and its battery, by a stampede of mules, and then was caught in so helpless a position that it had to lay down its arms. "The cursed white flag," wrote Mr. Steevens. "was up again over a British force in South Africa. The best part of a thousand British soldiers, with all their arms and equipment and four mountain guns, were captured by the enemy. The Boers had their revenge for Dundee and Elandslaagte in war; now they took it full measure in kindness. As Atkins had tended their wounded and succoured their prisoners there, so they tended and succoured him here. One commandant wished to send the wounded to Pretoria; the others, more prudent as well as more humane, decided to send them back into Ladysmith. They gave the whole men the water out of their own bottles; they gave the wounded the blankets off their own saddles and slept themselves on the naked veldt. They were short of transport, and they were mostly armed with Martinis; yet they gave captured mules for the hospital panniers and captured Lee-Metfords for splints." It is consoling to come on a bit of incident like this in the generally horrid story of war.

A few days later the communications of Ladysmith southward were cut off, and the forces commanded by General White, about 10,000 in number, were hemmed in by superior numbers of the Boers. British reinforcements were now beginning to arrive in South Africa, and great numbers were at sea, not only imperial troops, coming from England, India, Ceylon and elsewhere, but colonial troops, offered by Canada, New Zealand and the Australian colonies, and accepted by the imperial government. The first operations of the British campaign were planned with three objects, more or less distinct, namely, to rescue General White's army, at Ladysmith, to relieve Kimberley, and to expel the Boers from northern Cape Colony. They were conducted on three lines, from the Natal port of Durban, towards Ladysmith, under General Clery at the beginning; from Cape Town towards Kimberley, under General Lord Methuen; from Port Elizabeth and East London to Queenstown and the Cape districts occupied by the Boers, under General Gatacre.

In the early battles of General Methuen's campaign, fought at Belmont, November 23d, at Enslin, or Graspan, on the 25th, and at Modder River, only 25 miles from Kimberley, on the 28th, he carried his point, and kept up his advance, but at a heavy sacrifice of men. The battle with Cronje's forces at Modder River was a desperate struggle of ten hours duration, in which the British lost nearly 500 men and gained little. The Boers withdrew to an equally strong position, behind fortified lines which extended, some six miles in length, on hills between two points which bore the names of Spytfontein and Majesfontein. There General Methuen attacked them again, December 11, and met with a terrible repulse. His Highland Brigade, advancing in the darkness, before daybreak, was in the midst of the enemy's intrenchments before it knew them to be near, and was horribly cut to pieces, losing 53 officers, including its commander, General Wauchope, and 650 men. The British fell back to Modder River, leaving not less than 1,000 men behind. Just one day before this catastrophe, on the 10th, another of like nature, but little less serious, was sustained by General Gatacre's column, moving from Queenstown. He, too, attempted a night march and an early morning attack on the Boers in a fortified position at Stormberg, was misled by guides, miscalculated the distance, neglected to send scouts ahead, and so took his men to the very muzzles of waiting guns. From the storm which then opened on them there were more than 500 who did not escape. Besides the dead and wounded, many went as prisoners to Pretoria. Before the week of these defeats reached its end, another, far worse, had been added in the Natal campaign. General Sir Redvers Buller, appointed to the chief command in South Africa, had arrived at Cape Town on the last day of October, and, after some general study of the field at large, had taken personal direction of the operations in Natal, for the relief of Ladysmith. His movements were undoubtedly hurried by urgent appeals from General White. On the 15th of December he felt prepared to attempt the passage of the Tugela River, near Colenso, and did so with his full force, at two drifts, or fords, some two miles apart. Like Methuen and Gatacre, he seems to have been strangely misinformed as to the location and strength of the intrenchments of the Boers. The latter had succeeded again and again in concealing lines of deadly rifle-pits and batteries until their assailants fairly stumbled against them, within fatally close range. This happened at Colenso, as at Stormberg and Majesfontein and the ill-managed attempt to begin an advance upon Ladysmith cost 165 men and officers killed, 670 wounded, 337 prisoners and missing, besides 11 guns.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900. Fighting qualities of the Boers.

"Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who defended themselves for fifty years against all the power of Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible French Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country forever at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile, unconquerable races ever seen upon earth. {496} Take this formidable people and train them for seven generations in constant warfare against savage men and ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling could survive, place them so that they acquire exceptional skill with weapons and in horsemanship, give them a country which is eminently suited to the tactics of the huntsman, the marksman, and the rider. Then, finally, put a finer temper upon their military qualities by a dour fatalistic Old Testament religion and an ardent and consuming patriotism. Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one individual, and you have the modern Boer—the most formidable antagonist who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain."

_A. C. Doyle, The Great Boer War,