chapter 3

(with permission of D. Appleton & Co., copyright, 1899)._

As the influx of newcomers increased and advanced, "the Boers realized that the world and civilisation were once more upon them. In spite of all the opposition that patriarchal prejudice could muster, railways usurped the place of the slow moving ox-waggon, and in the heart of their solitude a city had arisen; while to the north and to the east between them and the sea were drawn the thin red lines of British boundary. … A primitive pastoral people, they found themselves isolated, surrounded—'shut in a kraal for ever,' as Kruger is reported to have said,—while the stranger was growing in wealth and numbers within their gates. Expansion of territory, once the dream of the Transvaal Boers, as their incursions into Bechuanaland, into Zululand, and the attempted trek into Rhodesia, all testify, was becoming daily less practicable. One thing remained,—to accept their isolation and strengthen it. Wealth, population, a position among the new States of the world had been brought to them, almost in spite of themselves, by the newcomer, the stranger, the Uitlander. What was to be the attitude towards him politically? Materially he had made the State—he developed its resources, paid nine-tenths of its revenue. Would he be a strength or a weakness as a citizen—as a member of the body politic? Let us consider this new element in a new State—how was it constituted, what were its component parts? Was it the right material for a new State to assimilate? {460} Cosmopolitan to a degree—recruited from all the corners of the earth—there was in it a strong South African element, consisting of young colonists from the Cape Colony and Natal—members of families well known in South Africa—and many of them old schoolfellows or in some other way known to each other. Then the British contingent, self-reliant, full of enterprise and energy—Americans, for the most part skilled engineers, miners and mechanics—French, Germans, and Hollanders. A band of emigrants, of adventurers, and constituted, as I think all emigrants are, of two great classes—the one who, lacking neither ability nor courage, are filled with an ambition, characteristic particularly of the British race, to raise their status in the world, who find the conditions of their native environment too arduous, the competition too keen, to offer them much prospect, and who seek a new and more rapidly developing country elsewhere; and another, a smaller class who sometimes through misfortune, sometimes through their own fault, or perhaps through both, have failed elsewhere.

"Adventurers all, one must admit; but it is the adventurers of the world who have founded States and Kingdoms. Such a class as this has been assimilated by the United States and absorbed into their huge fabric, of which to-day they form a huge and substantial portion. What should the Transvaal Boers have done with this new element so full of enterprise and vigour? This had been for the last ten years the great question for them to solve. … Enfranchisement, participation in the political life of the State by the Uitlander,—this means, they said, a transference of all political power from our hands to those of men whom we do not trust. 'I have taken a man into my coach,' said President Kruger, 'and as a passenger he is welcome; but now he says, Give me the reins; and that I cannot do, for I know not where he will drive me.' To the Boer it is all or nothing; he knows no mean, no compromise. Yet in that very mean lies the vital spirit of republicanism. What is the position of the Boers in the Cape Colony? Are they without their share, their influence, their Africander bond in the political affairs of the country? And so it is throughout the world today,—in the United States, in England, in France, in the British Colonies, wherever the individual thrives and the State is prosperous—the compromise of divided political power among all classes, all factions, is the great guarantee of their well being. … That the enfranchisement of the Uitlander would mean a complete transference of political power into his hands involves two assumptions: the first is that the Uitlanders would form a united body in politics; the second is that their representatives would dominate the Volksraad. The most superficial acquaintance with the action of the inhabitants of the Witwatersrand district on any public matter will serve to refute the first of these. … The second of these assumptions—though it is continually put forward—almost answers itself. The number of representatives from the Uitlander districts under any scheme of redistribution of seats which the Boer could reasonably be expected to make would fall considerably short of those returned from the Boer constituencies. Such was the attitude of the Boers on this vital question which led to the Reform Movement of 1895; and I have stated what I believe to be the injustice of it as regards the Uitlanders and the unwisdom of it in the true interests of the Boers."

_A. P. Hillier, Raid and Reform, pages 24-29 (London: Macmillan & Co.)._

SOUTH AFRICA: Portuguese Possessions: A. D. 1891. Delagoa Bay Railway question.

See (in this volume) DELAGOA BAY ARBITRATION.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1894. Estimated population.

In October, 1894, the British agent at Pretoria, J. A. de Wet, estimated the population of the Transvaal (on the basis of a census taken in 1890) as follows: "Transvaalers and Orange Free Staters, 70,861: British subjects, 62,509: other foreigners, 15,558;" total, 148,928.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1894. The "Commandeering" question. Visit of the British High Commissioner to Pretoria. Demonstration of British residents.

The first question which came to a sharp issue between the government of the South African Republic and the British subjects resident in the gold fields related to the claim which the former made on the latter for military service in the wars of the Republic with neighboring native tribes. The demand for such service was made, in each case, by what was called a "commando," the commando being defined in the military law of the Boers as follows: "By commando is understood a number of armed burghers and subjects of the state called together to suppress rebellion amongst the natives, or disturbances amongst the white population." British residents protested against the requirement of this service from them; and the British Government, in 1894, opened negotiations with that of the Boer Republic to obtain their exemption from it. It was acknowledged that there is "nothing contrary to international comity in the application of such a law as the commando law to a foreigner"; but, said the British Colonial Secretary, in a despatch (June 8, 1894) giving instructions to the British High Commissioner in South Africa, "Her Majesty's Government consider that a special reason for now claiming exemption for our people is afforded by the fact that treaties have been concluded by the South African Republic under which, as they understand, the subjects of no less than seven Powers—Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland—are now exempt from this liability; and they consider that they can hardly be expected to acquiesce in a state of things under which Her Majesty's subjects, whose interests in the South African Republic are greater and more intimate than those of any other Power, should remain in a position of such marked disadvantage. I have therefore to instruct you to address, in moderate and courteous terms, a friendly representation to the Government of the South African Republic on the subject."

Negotiations on the subject were then opened, which led to a visit to the Boer capital by the British High Commissioner, Sir H. B. Loch, on invitation from President Kruger. His arrival at Pretoria (June 25) gave occasion for a demonstration on the part of British residents which showed the state of feeling existing more plainly, no doubt, than it had appeared before. The circumstances were reported a few days later by the High Commissioner, as follows: "When I entered the carriage with President Kruger, two men got on to the box with a Union Jack, and the crowd, notwithstanding the President's remonstrances, took the horses out and dragged the carriage to the hotel, a distance of nearly a mile, singing all the way 'God save the Queen,' and 'Rule Britannia.' {461} On arrival at the hotel, the address was presented, to which I briefly replied, and then called for three cheers for the President, which were heartily given. He was then dragged in his carriage to the Government Office. I am satisfied that no personal insult was intended, by this demonstration, to the President, and any annoyance with which he viewed the occurrence seemed to be caused from the fact of the arrangements for keeping order having been so defective. The political atmosphere, however, was charged with such an amount of electricity that every moment an explosion was imminent. The Legislative and Executive enactments which press heavily on the great industry which contributes upwards of £1,000,000 annually out of a total revenue of little more than a million and a quarter, without the population that produces this wealth possessing any franchise rights, or voice in the government of the country, has created a deep-seated feeling of dissatisfaction, shared alike by the English, American, German, and other foreign residents in the country. The compulsory commandeering was the last straw that broke down the patience they had hitherto exhibited. … The Transvaal Government were, before my arrival, seriously alarmed at the state of feeling at Johannesburg, but when they came to consider the real meaning of the demonstration on my arrival at Pretoria, which showed to them how general the dissatisfaction was amongst all classes of British subjects, who formed the majority of the whole population of the Republic, they, for the first time, realised the imminent danger of the situation, and told me of their dread of a collision that at any moment might occur between the Boer burghers, who were in considerable numbers in the town, and the English and foreign residents."

To avoid any further excitement of feeling, the Commissioner declined to visit Johannesburg, which he had intended to do. During his stay at Pretoria, he submitted to President Kruger the draft of a Convention stipulating that "the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen whilst residing within the limits of the South African Republic, and the citizens of the South African Republic whilst residing within the dominions of Her Majesty the Queen, shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as the subjects of the most favoured nation with regard to military service and all obligations of a like nature"; and he received from President Kruger a counter proposition, for the negotiation of a new agreement, to take the place of the London Convention of 1884, embodying the desired provision concerning military service, along with other amendments of the old Convention. To this proposal, President Kruger added: "In order, however, to meet the request of Her Majesty's Government, the Government will, in the meantime, provisionally, no more commandeer British subjects for personal military service." Practically, this assurance disposed of the commandeering grievance; but no Convention on the subject was attained.

_Great Britain, Parliamentary Publication. (Papers by Command, C. 8159)._

"A great mass meeting was held at Johannesburg (July 14) for the purpose of demanding that the franchise should be extended to all aliens, and insisting that the Constitution should be amended and made more genuinely democratic. In consequence of this meeting the Volksraad passed at one sitting two readings of a bill restricting severely the right of public meeting. No outdoor meetings or addresses were to be allowed, and an assemblage of six persons would be considered a public meeting. The police were given power by this bill to order those present to disperse, and everyone attending was made liable to imprisonment for two years, while the callers of any meeting that the police might consider to be against the public peace might be fined £500 or sentenced to two years hard labour. … On the return of the 'commandeered' men from the war [with the rebellious chief Malaboch] President Kruger welcomed them, and said that no doubt the Volksraad would bestow on them the rights of full citizenship. The effect of the Franchise Act passed in June, however, was in general to prevent any citizen from obtaining the franchise unless his father was born in the State or had been naturalized. The formation of committees by aliens for the support of political candidates was rendered penal. … The Volksraad postponed for one year the consideration of the Government proposal to grant the franchise to the foreign residents who had recently served in the various 'commandos' against the Kaffir rebels."

_Annual Register, 1894, page 369._

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1894-1895. Extended charter and enlarged powers of the Company. Its master spirit, Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes. Attitude towards the South African Republic.

The British South Africa Company, royally chartered in 1889 for the promotion of "trade, commerce, civilization and good government" in "the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions," was now in full possession, both politically and commercially, not only of the great domain of the Matabeles and the Mashonas, stretching to the Zambesi River, but likewise of a vast territory beyond that stream. Its charter had been extended in 1891, to cover the whole sphere of British influence north of the Zambesi, except the strip of country called Nyassaland, which borders the western shore of Nyassa Lake. It had subjugated the Matabeles, extinguished their kingdom, driven its native sovereign, Lo Bengula, to exile and death.

See in volume 4, SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1885-1893.

By a new agreement with the British Government, signed on the 23d of May, 1894, it had received political authority over this imperial domain, in addition to the powers and privileges which its broad charter gave.

The administration of the government of the region was to be conducted by the Company, under an Administrator and a Council of four members composed of a Judge and three other members. The Administrator to be appointed by the Company, with the approval of the Colonial Secretary, and to be removed either by the Secretary or by the Company, with the approval of the Secretary. The Judge, appointed by the Company, with the approval of the Colonial Secretary, and removable only by the Secretary, was to be a member of the Council ex officio. {462} The members of the Council, other than the Judge, to be appointed by the Company, with the approval of the Secretary, and to be removable by the Company. … The Administrator should, as representative of the Company, administer the government, but must take the advice of his Council on all questions of importance. In cases of emergency, when he found it impracticable to assemble a quorum, the Administrator might take action alone, but must report such action to the Council at its next meeting. Moreover, he might overrule the Council, but must, in that case, report the matter forthwith to the Company, with the reasons for his action; and the Company might rescind the decision of the Administrator, whether made with, or without, or against, the advice of the Council. With the concurrence of at least two members of the Council, and with the approval of the British High Commissioner for South Africa, the Administrator was empowered to frame and issue regulations, which should have the force of law; but the Colonial Secretary or the Company could veto any such regulation at any time within twelve months of the date of approval by the High Commissioner. This power of making ordinances included the power to impose such taxes as might be necessary, and the right to impose and to collect customs duties. The armed forces of the Company were expressly forbidden to act outside the defined limits of its territory without the permission of Her Majesty's Government.

The master spirit of the Company which exercised these imperial powers of government over so great a dominion in Africa was Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes, Premier of Cape Colony, organizer and chief of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Co. in the diamond fields,—millionaire projector and manager of everything stupendous in the enterprises of the African world. He seemed, in fact, to be more than a master spirit in the Company. Apparently he had created it as an instrument of his ambitions, and it moved in his shadow throughout. Its Administrator, Dr. Leander S. Jameson, was his closely confidential friend. Presently it stamped his name on the broad empire which bore already the stamp of his personality and will, by proclaiming (May 1, 1895): "The territories now or hereafter placed under the control of the British South Africa Company shall be named collectively Rhodesia. The provinces at the present time included in the territory of Rhodesia are Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Northern Zambesia." Great ambitions—imperial ambitions—had thus come to be powerfully embodied in a corporation which practically served the will of one remarkably able man. They were ambitions which had been in conflict from the beginning with the interests as well as the ambitions of the Boers of the South African Republic, and the conflict was not to be ended by the triumph which the Rhodesians had won. Naturally the Boer was jealous and distrustful of the energetic men who had seized lands which he desired and hemmed his republic in. Naturally, too, the bold adventurers of Rhodesia, arrogant in their success and as little scrupulous as "empire-builders" are apt to be, looked with contempt and impatience at the plodding Boer, as an obstacle to their booming development in Africa of a civilization "up to date." Between the two incongruous neighbors rose the cry of the angry Uitlanders at Johannesburg, threatening the one and appealing to the sympathy of the other. The consequences soon appeared.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (July). Opening of Delagoa Bay Railway.-

The opening of the railway to Delagoa Bay was celebrated with much ceremony at Pretoria on the 8th of July.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (September-December). Closing of Vaal River "drifts" (fords) as ports of entry. Anger in Cape Colony. A threatening situation.

In September, the government of the South African Republic adopted a measure, for the benefit of its new railway, connecting Delagoa Bay with Pretoria, and for the development of foreign trade via Delagoa Bay rather than through Cape Colony, which raised a storm of indignation at the Cape, giving birth to a grievance there which became for a time more threatening than the grievances of the Uitlanders of the Rand. The measure in question was one that closed the "drifts" or fords of the Vaal River, between Cape Colony and the Transvaal, as ports of entry for the importation of over-sea goods. As stated by the British High Commissioner, in a despatch (October 7) to Mr. Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, the history of the case is as follows:

"In the year 1891 the Cape Government came to an agreement with the Transvaal Government and the Netherlands Railway Company to advance the latter £600,000 towards the construction of the railway from the Vaal river to Johannesburg, receiving in exchange for such advance Netherlands Railway Company 4 per cent. bonds at £93, guaranteed by the Transvaal Government. It was stipulated in the agreement that the Cape Government might fix the traffic rates on the Transvaal extension until the close of 1894, or until the completion of the railway from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria, if such completion should take place before that date. The railway extension from the Vaal river so provided for was opened in September, 1892, and the Cape Government secured thereby, during the continuance of the agreement, practically the monopoly of the Johannesburg traffic. The agreement terminated on the 31st December, 1894, the Delagoa Bay to Pretoria Railway having shortly before been completed and commenced working. Up to the close of the agreement the through-traffic rates from the coast to Johannesburg had been fixed by the Cape at the average rate of about 2.4d. per ton per mile. After the close of the agreement the Netherlands Railway Company raised the rates on its 52 miles of railway, from the Vaal river to Johannesburg, to an average of nearly 8d. per ton per mile. Upon this importers began to remove a portion of their goods from the railway at the Vaal river, and to send them on by road and bullock-waggon to their destination in the Transvaal, instead of by the Netherlands Railway to Johannesburg and elsewhere as before. This move has recently been met by the Transvaal Government issuing a Proclamation closing the drifts on the Vaal river alongside the railway as ports of entry for over-sea goods, leaving them open for other goods, the produce of South Africa. Importers of over-sea goods have thus only the choice between making use of the Netherlands line from the Vaal to Johannesburg at the enhanced traffic rates imposed on that line, or of importing via Delagoa Bay or Durban." {463} Vigorous remonstrances against this measure were made instantly by the government of Cape Colony, not only on the ground of its unfriendliness to the Colony, but also as being an infraction of the 13th article of the London Convention of 1884 (see above: A. D. 1884-1894), and the British government was appealed to for its interference. To this appeal the British Colonial Secretary replied with much caution, on the 1st of November, in a communication cabled to the High Commissioner, as follows: "Subject to the conditions stated further on, I am prepared to authorize you to send to the Government of the South African Republic a message to the following effect.:—'I am advised by the Law Officers of the Crown (who, it is hardly necessary to state, have examined the question from a purely legal standpoint) that the recent action of the South African Republic is a breach of Article XIII. of the London Convention. I am further advised that the Government of the South African Republic cannot now set itself right by making general the prohibition of entry by the drifts, so as to include Colonial goods, if and when they reissue their Proclamation, which, I am surprised to observe, they appear to have some intention of doing. Her Majesty's Government accept the legal advice which they have received; but independently of their Conventional rights they are of opinion that the closing of the drifts, and especially the extension of that measure to Colonial goods, is so unfriendly an action as to call for the gravest remonstrance on their part. While anxious for an amicable settlement of the question, they must therefore protest against what they regard as an attempt to force the hand of the Cape Government in Conference by a proceeding which almost partakes of the nature of an act of hostility.' You will communicate this message confidentially to your Ministers in writing, pointing out that when once it is sent Her Majesty's Government cannot allow the matter to drop until they have obtained a compliance with their demands, even if it should be necessary to undertake an expedition for that purpose. Her Majesty's Government do not intend that such au expedition should, like most previous Colonial wars, be conducted at the entire cost of this country; and you should explain to your Ministers that you are therefore instructed to require from them a most explicit undertaking in writing that, if it becomes necessary to send an expedition, the Cape Parliament will bear half the gross expense, and that the Local Government will furnish a fair contingent of the fighting force, so far as its resources in men may suffice, besides giving the full and free use of its railways and rolling stock for military purposes. If your Ministers cannot give you such assurances you will report fully by telegraph, and defer action pending further instructions from me; but if you obtain these assurances in writing, explicitly and without qualification, you may send the above message to the Government of the South African Republic."

This was followed by a further cautionary message, November 3, in these words: "Referring to my telegrams of the 1st November, although willing to support your Ministers on the conditions already stated, I should think it would be well, in their own interests, and those of South African commerce generally, if they will be as moderate as they can find it consistent with their duty to be in their demands as to their share of railway business. I have no doubt that you have availed yourself of any chances you may have had of impressing such a view on them and if you think it expedient you may tell them, confidentially, that such is my view." On the 4th, Sir Hercules Robinson replied: "My Ministers, including Schreiner and Faure, the two Dutch Members, were unanimous in their decision to accept your conditions. I am assured by Mr. Rhodes that he can count on the support of the majority in the Cape Parliament, and there are no facts before me which would lead me to a different view; but I do not think that the question will arise, as the Government of the South African Republic will not hold out against the united action of the Cape and Her Majesty's Government." On the same day he transmitted to President Kruger the message contained (as above) in Secretary Chamberlain's despatch of November 1. On the 21st of November the reply of the Transvaal Government was given, as follows:

"This Government most deeply regrets that the Cape Colony has by its own acts created a condition of things, in consequence of which it afterwards found itself compelled to invoke the intervention of the British Government, and it still more deeply regrets that Her Majesty's Government, on the 'ex parte' representations of the Cape Colony, felt itself constrained to telegraph to this Government in the terms of the communication of the 3rd instant. From the reply of this Government, it will be evident to your Excellency that it wishes to contribute in every possible way to preserve the good understanding in South Africa, and it therefore considers a passage such as occurs in your Excellency's telegram of the 3rd instant, 'An attempt to force the hand of the Cape Government at the Conference by a measure which almost resembles the nature of a hostile act,' not justified as regards this Republic. This Government adheres to its opinion and view that it has an undoubted right to regulate the ports of entrance on the borders of the Republic, and if Her Majesty's Government calls this an unfriendly act, this Government can only say that it was the consequence of an unfriendly act of the Cape Colony. In order not to be the cause of disturbance in South Africa, this Government is prepared to submit the regulating of the ports of entrance on the borders to arbitration, it being convinced of the justice of its assertion that the regulating of the ports of entrance on its borders by it is no infringement of Article 13 of the Convention of London."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8474, pages 11-21. _

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (November). The state of discontent among the Uitlanders, and its causes. The franchise question. Growth of British Imperialistic designs.

The suspension of commandeering went a very little way towards removing the grievances of the British residents in the Transvaal. Underlying that and all other causes of discontent was the evident determination of the Boer inhabitants of the Republic to keep in their own hands the whole power of government, both state and municipal, and to deal with the increasing multitude of incomers from the outside world (whom they called Uitlanders, or Outlanders) permanently as aliens, excluded from citizenship by as many bars as a jealous legislature could raise. {464} Until 1882, a foreigner, settling in the Transvaal, could become a citizen and a voter after a residence of two years. The required residence was then raised to five years, and in 1887 it was carried up to fifteen. By this time the immigrant population was growing numerous, and its complaints of disfranchisement and non representation in the Volksraad, or Legislature, soon took on angry tones. In 1890 a nominal concession was made to the discontented Uitlanders, by the creation of a Second Volksraad (see, in this volume, CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC—the bracketed amendments or added articles following Article 29), to which they could elect representatives. The suffrage in elections to this new chamber was given after two years residence, on the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic, and qualification for sitting in it was acquired after a residence of four years. But the Second Volksraad had no independent power. It could act only on certain specified subjects, taxation not included, and all that it did was subject to overruling by the First Volksraad, while the enactments of the latter were entirely valid without its consent. The Second Volksraad, in fact, was no actual branch of the national legislature, but a powerless appendage to it, where an appearance of representation in the government could be given to the Uitlander population without the reality.

Naturally, this aggravated rather than pacified the discontent of the new comers. They were a rapidly increasing multitude, congregated, for the most part, in one district, where it was easy for them to feel and act in combination. By 1895 there was said to be 100,000 of them in the 'Witwatersrand, and some 60,000 natives were working in their mines. They were being heavily taxed, and they complained that they could get nothing adequate in return for the taxation,—neither an efficient police, nor decent sanitary regulations, nor a proper water supply, nor a safe restraint upon the sale of liquors to their native work people. At the same time it was charged that corruption prevailed in the omnipotent First Volksraad, and among public officials, and that, on the whole, the Republic was in bad as well as in ignorant hands. This was not alone the view of the complaining foreign residents, but was shared more or less by unprejudiced visitors to the country, including Mr. James Bryce, who travelled in the Transvaal in 1895, and who wrote of the grievances of the Uitlanders in quite a sympathetic vein.

Until the gold-seekers came into it, the Republic had been poor and its revenues small. Their coming gave it a full treasury. They were the principal consumers of the imported goods on which its tariff was laid. Their large use of dynamite and other explosives in mining gave the government an opportunity to make a highly profitable monopoly of the manufacture, afterwards exchanged for an equally profitable concession to a monopolistic company. Their mines were the proper subject of a tax which yielded large returns. In fact, the Republic was taking much to itself from the Uitlanders,—no more, perhaps, than it had a fair right to take,—but, according to what seems to be trustworthy testimony, it was giving them far less in return for it than they had a just right to demand, and it was offering them no prospect of anything better in time to come.

It seems to be certain that responsibility for whatever was hostile and unjust in the treatment of the foreign population rested largely upon the President of the Republic, Mr. Paul Kruger, who had been at the head of the government for many years. He exercised an influence and authority that had scarcely any limit. The Volksraad was obedient to his will, and most of its legislation was understood to emanate from him and from those whose council he took. There can be little doubt that he practically shaped the whole policy of the Boer Republic in its dealing with the Uitlanders, and that it expressed the attitude of his mind toward foreigners in general and Englishmen in particular. He distrusted even the Dutch of Cape Colony, and sought Hollanders for the public service when he needed qualifications which his own people did not possess.

"While within the Transvaal there was growing discontent, matters were so shaping themselves without as to still further complicate the situation. The idea of a Confederation of British South Africa and the extension of the British sphere to the Zambesi, had long been the dream of imperialists, and the ruling classes at the Cape had persistently urged this upon the home government. … After the consolidation of the diamond companies. Mr. Cecil Rhodes became the imperialist leader in South Africa and marshaled behind him all the corporate interests and combined influence of his many associates. The Boer Republics stood in the way of the success of imperialistic enterprise. Then too the 'scramble for Africa,' which began with the efforts of the King of Belgium to consolidate the native tribes of central Africa under Belgian rule and which resulted in the carving out of the Congo Free State, the assertion of German protection over Damaraland and Namaqueland, and the joint effort of European powers to check the British sphere, all lent zest to ambition and brought the English popular mind into temper for concerted action. Under such circumstances the 'little England' party lost its standing and an imperial policy gained fullest support. With such an atmosphere surrounding the Transvaal the grievances of the 'aliens' within could not long be disregarded without serious trouble."

_F. A. Cleveland, The South African Conflict (The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Number 265), pages 19-22._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895-1896. Revolutionary conspiracy of disaffected Uitlanders at Johannesburg with Rhodesians. The Jameson Raid and its results.

In the fall of 1895, certain of the disaffected Uitlanders at Johannesburg, leaders of an organization called the Transvaal National Union, abandoned attempts to obtain what they sought from the President and the Volksraad by petition and agitation, and either invited or accepted proposals of assistance from the armed forces of the British South Africa Company, with a view to some kind of a revolutionary undertaking. The story of the plot has been told with great frankness by one of the actors in it, Mr. Alfred P. Hillier, who writes:

{465}

"Mr. Cecil Rhodes, … accustomed as he was to success, quick movement and rapid developments, in his great career, had … watched with impatient eyes the setting back of the clock within the South African Republic. His chief lieutenant, Dr. Jameson, who had shared with him the labour of reclaiming from barbarism and developing Rhodesia, and whose ambition was no less than his superior's, discussed with him the desirability of some active outside pressure; and between them was evolved what is known as the Jameson plan. Mr. Beit, the capitalist most largely interested in the mines of the Rand, an old financial colleague of Mr. Rhodes, both in the De Beers amalgamation and in the establishment of the Chartered Company, promised both his influence and his purse in support of the plan. Overtures were then made to Mr. Lionel Phillips, who was at the head of the Chamber of Mines, and Mr. Charles Leonard, the Chairman of the National Union. … The plan at this early stage was presented in a very attractive form. A force under Dr. Jameson was to be quietly gathered on the border. The Johannesburg agitation, reinforced with capitalist support, was to be steadily pushed forward. Rifles and ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. Both the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office might be counted on, it was said, to support a vigorous forward movement for reform. Mr. Phillips and Mr. Leonard, sick and weary of the hopelessness of unsupported constitutional action, and of the continual set back in Boer politics, already casting round in their minds for some new departure, accepted and from that time forth co-operated with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson in the development of the Jameson plan.

"In October, 1895, a meeting took place at Groote Schuur, Mr. Rhodes' residence near Cape Town, at which were present, in addition to Mr. Cecil Rhodes, Mr. Lionel Phillips, Mr. Hammond, Mr. Charles Leonard, and Colonel Frank Rhodes. At this meeting the plan was more fully discussed and matured; and in November, 1895, when Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg, the details were finally settled. The letter of invitation was written, signed and handed to Dr.Jameson, and the date of combined action provisionally fixed for the end of December. Dr. Jameson's force was to be about 1,000 strong, and the start to be made when finally summoned by the signatories of the letter. In the meantime the Johannesburg leaders were to have sent in to them 4,500 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and were, if possible, to arrange for an attack on the Pretoria Arsenal simultaneously with the move from outside. With regard to the letter of invitation which was subsequently used by Dr. Jameson as a justification for his start, … Mr. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, and Mr. Phillips have all distinctly stated that this letter was never intended as an authority to Dr. Jameson to enter the Transvaal, unless and until he received a further summons from them. Such was in brief the history of the Jameson plan as far as concerned Johannesburg. And it is necessary here to refer to the position with regard to it of the bulk of the men who subsequently constituted the Reform Committee. They at this time, with the exception of a few of their number, of which I personally was one, were entirely ignorant of what was going on. … The Johannesburg leaders, relying on the general sentiment of the community, assumed the responsibility of arranging a basis of operations. So that the plan when it was gradually revealed to various men had either to be accepted by them in its entirety or rejected. … Men demanded and received assurance that the movement was to be a republican one, and in no way to be an attempt on the independence of the country. A sufficient number of rifles were also to be forthcoming, and the High Commissioner was to be on the spot to expedite the adjustment of matters immediately disturbances arose."

_A. P. Hillier, Raid and Reform, pages 47-53._

The practical working of the conspiracy proved less easy than the planning of it. Arms and ammunition were smuggled into Johannesburg, but not in sufficient quantities. The time of action had been fixed for the 28th of December. When it came near there were found to be only 2,500 rifles at hand, instead of the 10,000 that were wanted. A scheme for the surprising of the Boer arsenal at Pretoria was pronounced at the last moment impracticable. Still more disconcerting to many was a report which came from Cape Town, that Jameson would require the rising to be made under and in favor of the British flag. "The movement within the Transvaal," says Mr. Hillier, "had from its outset been one in favour, not of a British Colony, but of a sound Republic. … Many Americans and South Africans had accorded their support only on this understanding." Until a clearer arrangement with the Rhodesians on this point could be reached, the leaders in Johannesburg determined not to act. Accordingly, on the 26th of December, two days before the appointed date of insurrection, they telegraphed to Jameson, in covert language which he understood, that it was "absolutely necessary to postpone the flotation." On the following day they issued a lengthy manifesto, setting forth all their grievances, and deferring until the 6th of January a general meeting of the National Union which had been called for the 27th of December—the eve of the intended rising. The manifesto concluded as follows:

"We have now only two questions to consider: (a) What do we want? (b) how shall we get it?

I have stated plainly what our grievances are, and I shall answer with equal directness the question, 'What do we want?' We want:

(1) the establishment of this Republic as a true republic:

(2) a Grondwet or Constitution which shall be framed by competent persons selected by representatives of the whole people and framed on lines laid down by them—a constitution which shall be safeguarded against hasty alteration;

(3) an equitable franchise law, and fair representation;

(4) equality of the Dutch and English languages;

(5) responsibility of the Legislature to the heads of the great departments;

(6) removal of religious disabilities;

(7) independence of the courts of justice, with adequate and secured remuneration of the judges;

(8) liberal and comprehensive education;

(9) efficient civil service, with adequate provision for pay and pension;

(10) free trade in South African products.

That is what we want. There now remains the question which is to be put before you at the meeting of the 6th January. viz., How shall we get it?"

_Great Britain: Papers by Command, 1896, C.—7933._

{466}

Acting, as appears, on his own responsibility, Dr. Jameson refused to be stopped by the postponement at Johannesburg, and, on the evening of December 29, he entered the Transvaal territory, from Pitsani-Pitlogo, in Bechuanaland, with a force of about 500 men. His movement created consternation in all the circles of the conspiracy, and received no effectual support. It was promptly disavowed and condemned by the British authorities, and by the home officials of the British South Africa Company. Cecil Rhodes could do nothing but tacitly acknowledge his responsibility for what his lieutenant had done (though the precipitation of the raid was evidently a surprise and a trouble to him) by resigning the premiership of Cape Colony. Meantime, the invaders had learned that the Boers were not to be ridden over in the easy fashion they supposed. Hasty levies had intercepted their march, had repulsed them at Krugersdorp, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, surrounded them at Doornkop, and forced them to surrender on New Year's day. A few days later, the Uitlanders at Johannesburg, some of whom had made a confused and ineffectual attempt to take arms, proclaiming a provisional government, and around whose town the excited Boers had gathered in large force, were persuaded by the British High Commissioner to submit to the Transvaal authorities, and more than fifty of the leaders were placed under arrest.

"With great difficulty, President Kruger overcame the desire of his people that Jameson and his officers should be brought to trial and punished in the country they had outraged by their invasion, and they were handed over to the British government for removal to England and trial by an English court. The trial took place in July (20-28), before the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Russell of Killowen), Baron Pollock, and Justice Hawkins, with a special jury. The charge on which the prisoners were tried was that of having fitted out a warlike expedition against a friendly state, in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The charge of the Lord Chief Justice gave the following questions to the jury: Were preparations for a raid made by the defendants? Did they aid, abet, counsel, or procure such preparation? Were they employed in the actual expedition? Did the Queen exercise dominion and sovereignty in Pitsani-Pitlogo? The jury returned affirmative answers, which were held to constitute a verdict of "guilty," and sentence was pronounced,—fifteen months of imprisonment for Dr. Jameson, and terms varying from five to ten months for his four subordinate officers. During the trial and after there were many demonstrations of popular sympathy with the prisoners. Meantime, in April, the Transvaal authorities had brought the imprisoned leaders of the Johannesburg "reform committee" to trial at Pretoria on charges of treason and had convicted them all. Four, namely, Colonel Rhodes (brother of Cecil), Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, and John Hays Hammond (an American), were sentenced to death; the remainder to a payment of heavy fines. The death sentences were soon commuted, first to imprisonment for fifteen years, and subsequently to fines of $125,000 on each of four prisoners.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January). Message of the German Emperor to President Kruger, relative to the Jameson Raid.

The critical situation of affairs produced by the Jameson raid was dangerously complicated at the beginning by the publication of the following telegram, sent to President Kruger, on the 3d of January, by the German Emperor: "I express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people and without appealing for help to friendly powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace, and safeguard the independence of your country against attacks from without." President Kruger replied: "I testify to Your Majesty my very deep and heartfelt thanks for Your Majesty's sincere congratulations. With God's help we hope to do everything further that is possible for the holding of our dearly bought independence and the stability of our beloved republic." This kindled a white heat of indignation in England. It was supposed to signify a disposition on the part of the German Emperor to recognize the absolute independence which the South African Republic claimed, and to threaten interference as between Great Britain and the Boers. A powerful "flying squadron" was instantly put in commission, and several ships were ordered to Delagoa Bay. For some time the relations between Great Britain and Germany were seriously strained; but various influences gradually cooled the excited feeling in England, though not a little distrust of German intentions has remained.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January-April). Urgency of the British Colonial Secretary for redress of Uitlander grievances. Invitation to President Kruger to visit England. His requirement that Article IV. of the London Convention shall be discussed. Deadlock of the parties.

The complaints of the Uitlanders, effectually silenced for the time being at Johannesburg by the vigorous action of the Boers, were now taken up by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Chamberlain, and pressed in strenuous despatches to the High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Hercules Robinson. On the 4th of January, 1896, four days after the surrender of Jameson and four days before the insurgent Uitlanders at Johannesburg had laid down their arms, a long despatch was cabled by Mr. Chamberlain to the High Commissioner, instructing him to make "friendly representations" to President Kruger on the subject of those complaints. "I am aware," wrote the Colonial Secretary, "that victory of Transvaal Government over Administrator of Mashonaland may possibly find them not willing to make any concessions. If this is the attitude they adopt, they will, in my opinion, make a great mistake; for danger from which they have just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led up to it are not removed, may recur, although in a different form. I have done everything in my power to undo and to minimise the evil caused by late unwarrantable raid by British subjects into the territory of the South African Republic, and it is not likely that such action will be ever repeated; but the state of things of which complaint has been made cannot continue forever. If those who are now a majority of inhabitants of the Transvaal, but are excluded from all participation in its government, were, of their own initiative, and without any interference from without, to attempt to reverse that state of things, they would, without doubt, attract much sympathy from all civilised communities who themselves live under a free Government, and I cannot regard the present state of things in the South African Republic as free from danger to the stability of its institutions. {467} The Government of the South African Republic cannot be indifferent to these considerations, and President of South African Republic himself has on more than one occasion, expressed his willingness to inquire into and to deal with just reasons for discontent; and the Volksraad have now the opportunity to show magnanimity in the hour of their success and to settle all differences by moderate concessions. They must fully admit the entire loyalty of yourself and of Her Majesty's Government to the terms of London Convention, as shown by their recent intervention, and they must recognise that their authority in crisis through which they have passed could not have been so promptly and effectively asserted without that intervention. If they will recognise this by making concessions in accordance with our friendly advice, no one will be able to suggest that they are acting under pressure, and their voluntary moderation will produce best effect among all who are interested in well-being of the Transvaal and in future of South Africa."

On the 13th of January the Colonial Secretary pursued the subject in another despatch to Sir Hercules Robinson, as follows: "Now that Her Majesty's Government have fulfilled their obligations to the South African Republic, and have engaged to bring the leaders in the recent invasion to trial, they are anxious that the negotiations which are being conducted by you should result in a permanent settlement by which the possibility of further internal troubles will be prevented. The majority of the population is composed of Uitlanders, and their complete exclusion from any share in the government of the country is an admitted grievance which is publicly recognised as such by the friends of the Republic as well as by the opinion of civilised Europe. There will always be a danger of internal disturbance so long as this grievance exists, and I desire that you will earnestly impress on President Kruger the wisdom of making concessions in the interests alike of the South African Republic and of South Africa as a whole. There is a possibility that the President might be induced to rely on the support of some foreign Power in resisting the grant of reforms or in making demands upon Her Majesty's Government; and in view of this I think it well to inform you that Great Britain will resist at all costs the interference of any foreign Power in the affairs of the South African Republic. The suggestion that such interference was contemplated by Germany was met in this country by an unprecedented and unanimous outburst of public feeling. In order to be prepared for all eventualities, it has been thought desirable by Her Majesty's Government to commission a Flying Squadron of powerful men-of-war, with twelve torpedo-ships; and many other vessels are held in reserve. Her Majesty's Government have no reason, at the present moment, to anticipate any conflict of interest with foreign Powers; but I think it right for you to know that Great Britain will not tolerate any change in her relations with the Republic, and that, while loyally respecting its internal independence, subject to the Conventions, she will maintain her position as the Paramount Power in South Africa, and especially the provisions of Article IV. of the Convention of 1884. It is my sincere hope that President Kruger, who has hitherto shown so much wisdom in dealing with the situation, will now take the opportunity afforded to him of making of his own free will such reasonable concessions to the Uitlanders as will remove the last excuse for disloyalty, and will establish the free institutions of the Republic on a firm and lasting basis."

To this Sir Hercules replied with a remonstrance, saying: "Your telegram 13 January No.1 only reached me last night after I had left Pretoria. I could, if you consider it desirable, communicate purport to President of South African Republic by letter, but I myself think such action would be inopportune. … Nearly all leading Johannesburg men are now in gaol, charged with treason against the State, and it is rumoured that Government has written evidence of a long-standing and wide-spread conspiracy to seize Government of country on the plea of denial of political privileges, and to incorporate the country with that of British South Africa Company. The truth of these reports will be tested in the trials to take place shortly in the High Court, and meanwhile to urge claim for extended political privileges for the very men so charged would be ineffectual and impolitic. President of South African Republic has already promised municipal government to Johannesburg, and has stated in a Proclamation that all grievances advanced in a constitutional manner will be carefully considered and brought before the Volksraad without loss of time; but until result of trials is known nothing, of course, will now be done." Mr. Chamberlain saw force in the High Commissioner's objections, and assented to a momentary suspension of pressure on the Transvaal President, but not for long. "I recognise," he telegraphed on the 15th, "that the actual moment is not opportune for a settlement of the Uitlanders' grievances, and that the position of the President of the South African Republic may be an embarrassing one, but I do not consider that the arrest of a few score individuals out of a population of 70,000 or more, or the supposed existence of a plot among that small minority, is a reason for denying to the overwhelming majority of innocent persons reforms which are just in themselves and expedient in the interests of the Republic. Whatever may be said about the conduct of a few individuals, nothing can be plainer than that the sober and industrious majority refused to countenance any resort to violence, and proved their readiness to obey the law and your authority. I hope, therefore, to hear at an early date that you propose to resume the discussion with President of South African Republic on lines laid down in my previous telegrams. I do not see that the matter need wait until the conclusion of the trial of the supposed plotters."

On the 28th of January the High Commissioner, under instructions from London, addressed to President Kruger the following invitation: "I am directed by Her Majesty's Government to tender to your Honour a cordial invitation to visit England, with a view to discussing with them all those questions which relate to the security of the South African Republic and the general welfare of South Africa. I am to add that, although Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to modify Article 4 of the London Convention [see above; A. D. 1884-1894], other matters are open to friendly discussion. {468} Her Majesty's Government hope that your Honour will come as the guest of the British Government." While this invitation was being considered, and before a reply to it had been made, the British Colonial Secretary reopened his own discussion of the questions at issue, February 4, in a despatch of great length, reviewing the whole history of the relations of the Uitlanders to the government of the South African Republic, and of the recent occurrences which had been consequent upon their discontent. It praised "the spirit of wisdom and moderation" shown by President Kruger, who "kept within bounds the natural exasperation of his burghers," and it gave especial attention to a proclamation which President Kruger had addressed to the inhabitants of Johannesburg, on the 10th of January, in which he had said: "It is my intention to submit a draft Law at the first ordinary session of the Volksraad, whereby a Municipality with a Mayor at its head will be appointed for Johannesburg, to whom the whole municipal government of this town will be entrusted."

On this the Secretary made the following suggestions: "Basing myself upon the expressed desire of President Kruger to grant municipal government to Johannesburg, I suggest, for his consideration, as one way of meeting the difficulty, that the whole of the Rand district, from end to end, should be erected into something more than a municipality as that word is ordinarily understood; that, in fact, it should have a modified local autonomy, with powers of legislation on purely local questions, and subject to the veto of the President and Executive Council; and that this power of legislation should include the power of assessing and levying its own taxation, subject to the payment to the Republican Government of an annual tribute of an amount to be fixed at once and revised at intervals, so as to meet the case of a diminution or increase in the mining industry. As regards judicial matters in such a scheme, the Rand, like the Eastern Provinces and the Kimberley District of the Cape Colony, might have a superior court of its own. It would, of course, be a feature of this scheme that the autonomous body should have the control of its civil police, its public education, its mine management, and all other matters affecting its internal economy and well-being. The central Government would be entitled to maintain all reasonable safeguards against the fomenting of a revolutionary movement, or the storage of arms for treasonable purposes within the district. Those living in, and there enjoying a share in the government of, the autonomous district, would not, in my view, be entitled to a voice in the general Legislature or the Central Executive, or the presidential election. The burghers would thus be relieved of what is evidently a haunting fear to many of them—although I believe an unfounded one—that the first use which the enfranchised newcomers would make of their privileges would be to upset the republican form of government. Relieved of this apprehension, I should suppose that there would not be many of them who would refuse to deal with the grievances of the comparatively few Uitlanders outside the Rand on those liberal principles which characterized the earlier legislation of the Republic. The President may rest assured that in making the above suggestions I am only actuated by friendly feeling towards himself and the South African Republic. They are not offered in derogation of his authority, but as the sincere and friendly contribution of Her Majesty's Government towards the settlement of a question which continues to threaten the tranquillity of the Republic and the welfare and progress of the whole of South Africa. A proper settlement of the questions at issue involves so many matters of detail which could be more easily and satisfactorily settled by personal conference, that I should be glad to have the opportunity of discussing the subject with the President, if it suited his convenience, and were agreeable to him, to come to this country for the purpose. Should this be impracticable, I rely upon you to make my views known to him and to carry on the negotiations."

This despatch, as soon as it had been forwarded from the Colonial Office, was published in the "London Gazette," so that a telegraphed summary of its contents reached President Kruger before it came to him officially,—which naturally added something to the irritations existing at Pretoria. However, the President, on the 8th of February, by telegram to the High Commissioner, and more fully on the 25th by letter, responded to the invitation to visit England. In his telegram he said: "In order to give me the liberty to let the Honourable Volksraad judge whether permission and power to act will be given me to go out of the country, an understanding must, of course, first be come to as to what points will he discussed or not, so that I may lay those points before the Volksraad for deliberation and resolution." In his letter he wrote:

"At the commencement, I wish to observe that the object of this letter is to pave the way for a friendly discussion of the matters herein mentioned, in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution, and further that, although as yet I desire no positive and direct assent to the desires expressed herein, I would, nevertheless, to prevent a misunderstanding, desire to have an assurance that they will be taken into the most mature consideration with the earnest endeavour and the sincere desire to comply with my wishes. The desire to receive this assurance will be respected by your Excellency and Her Majesty's Government as reasonable, when I say that, considering especially my advanced age and the unavoidable delay, owing to my absence, in the transaction of matters affecting the highest State interests, I would, with difficulty, be able to make the sacrifice in going only to discuss matters without arriving at the desired result, and it is evident that if the assurance referred to by me cannot be given by Her Majesty's Government, in all probability the Honourable Volksraad would not grant its consent and commission. … Although, as already said, the Government could tolerate no interference in its internal relations and the official discussion of affairs with the object of requiring changes therein will have to be avoided, on the other hand I wish it to be understood that private hints given by statesmen of experience in the true interest of the country and its independence will always be warmly appreciated by me, from whatever side they may come.

{469}

"Going over to a summing up of the points which, in my opinion, should be brought under discussion, I wish to mention in the first place:—

1. The superseding of the Convention of London with the eye, amongst others, on the violation of the territory of the South African Republic: because in several respects it has already virtually ceased to exist; because in other respects it has no more cause for existence; because it is injurious to the dignity of an independent Republic; because the very name and the continual arguments on the question of suzerainty, which since the conclusion of this Convention no longer exists, are used as a pretext, especially by a libellous press, for wilfully inciting both white and coloured people against the lawful authority of the Republic; for intentionally bringing about misunderstanding and false relations between England and the Republic, whereby in this manner the interests of both countries and of their citizens and subjects are prejudiced and the peaceful development of the Republic is opposed. In the discussion of the withdrawal of the Convention as a whole, Article IV. should naturally not be kept back. I have reason to believe that the British Government has come to the decision to make no alteration in this on account of false representations made to it and lying reports spread by the press and otherwise with a certain object, to the effect that the Government of the Republic has called in, or sought, the protection of other Powers. While I thankfully acknowledge and will ever acknowledge the sympathy of other Powers or their subjects, and the conduct of the last named has, in the light of the trials recently passed through, on the whole offered a favourable contrast to that of British subjects, there is nevertheless nothing further from my thoughts than to strive for the protection of a foreign power, which I will never even seek. Neither I nor the people of the Republic will tolerate an interference with the internal relations from any power whatever, and I am prepared, if the course proposed by me be adopted, to give the necessary assurances for this, in order that Her British Majesty's Government need have no fear that Her interests in South Africa should be injured.

2. Further should be discussed the superseding of the Convention by a treaty of peace, commerce and friendship, by which the existing privileges of England in the dominion of commerce and intercourse and the interests of British subjects in the Republic will be satisfactorily guaranteed on the footing of the most-favoured nation, and herein I would be prepared to go to the utmost of what can reasonably be asked.

3. Then the necessary guarantees will have to be given against a repetition of the violation of territory out of the territory of the Chartered Company or the Cape Colony, and of disturbing military operations and unlawful military or police or even private movements on the borders of the Republic.

4. Further should be discussed the compensation for direct and indirect injury to be given or caused to be given by England for and by reason of the incursion that recently took place. The reasons for this are evident and need no argument. The amount to be demanded it is impossible as yet to determine, but, if required, it can still be given before my departure to England.

5. I would, although in the following respects I would not insist beforehand on an assurance such as that intended with regard to the above-mentioned points, nevertheless wish to request the earnest consideration of a final settlement of the Swaziland question, in this sense, that that country shall henceforth become a part of the Republic. …

6. Further, I would very much like to have discussed the revocation of the charter of the Chartered Company, which, if this does not take place, will continue to be a threatening danger to the quiet and peace of the Republic and thereby also to the whole South Africa. I am of opinion that all the above desires are fair and just. … I will be pleased to receive the views of Her Majesty's Government on the points herein brought forward, in order that I may be enabled to bring the matter for decision before the Honourable Volksraad."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this communication was, in part, as follows: "Her Majesty's Government regret that President has given no definite reply to invitation to visit England which was sent to him on 28th January. This invitation was the result of private information conveyed to Her Majesty's Government that the President was desirous of arranging with them a settlement of all differences, and of placing on a permanent and friendly basis the relations between the United Kingdom and the South African Republic. Before forwarding the invitation, Her Majesty's Government knew that his Honour was in full possession of their opinion, that no arrangement can be satisfactory or complete which does not include a fair settlement of those grievances of the Uitlander population which have been recognized by the general public opinion of South Africa, and which have been the cause of discontent and agitation in the past, and are likely—unless remedied—to lead to further disturbances in future, Her Majesty's Government also took care to satisfy themselves that the President had been made aware that they were not prepared to modify in any way the provisions of Article IV. of the Convention of 1884, and this was again made clear in the formal invitation to visit England. Under these circumstances, it was with great surprise that Her Majesty's Government learnt from the Despatch of the President of 25th February that his Honour objected to discuss the question of the reforms asked for by the Uitlanders, and that he desired to propose withdrawal of Article IV. of the Convention, and Her Majesty's Government regret that they were not informed of his Honour's views on the subject at an earlier date, as they would not have felt justified in inviting the President to encounter the fatigue of a journey to this country if they had not been led to believe that he was in agreement with them as to the general object of such a visit.

"In their view, Her Majesty's Government were able to offer a complete guarantee in the future to the South African Republic against any attack upon its independence, either from within any part of Her Majesty's dominions or from the territory of a foreign Power. In return, they assumed that the President would make known to them the measures which he proposed to take to remedy the acknowledged grievances of the Uitlanders, and to consider any suggestions which Her Majesty's Government might wish to offer as to the adequacy of these measures for the removal of all cause of internal disturbances. … Such a discussion as they contemplate would not involve any acknowledgment on the part of the President of a right of interference in the internal concerns of the Republic, but would only at the most amount to a recognition of the friendly interest of Her Majesty's Government in its security, and in the general welfare of South Africa. {470} The President would be, of course, at liberty to accept or to reject any advice that might be tendered to him by Her Majesty's Government, but in the latter case the responsibility for the result would naturally rest wholly with him. Her Majesty's Government have already expressed a willingness to give full consideration to any representations which his Honour may wish to make on the other points named in his letter, although some of them are matters wholly in jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government. But unless the President is satisfied with the explanations I have now given, Her Majesty's Government are reluctantly obliged to come to the conclusion that no good purpose can be served by the proposed visit."

In return to this despatch, President Kruger, on 17th of March, expressed his "deep disappointment" at its contents, by reason of which, he said, "it is not possible for me to proceed to convene a special session of the Volksraad at once" for the purpose of action upon the invitation of the British Government. Thereupon (April 27), the Colonial Secretary cabled to the High Commissioner in South Africa: "Her Majesty's Government have no alternative but to withdraw the invitation, which it appears from the President's message was given under a misapprehension of the facts." Thus the two parties were at a deadlock.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1896, C. 7933, pages 19-91; and C. 8063, pages 11-17._

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia: A. D. 1896 (March-September). Matabele revolt.

Taking advantage of the confusion in affairs which followed the Jameson raid, and its removal of part of the police force from the country, the Matabele rose in revolt. The main provocation of the rising appears to have been from severe measures that were adopted for stamping out rinderpest in the country. Many whites were killed in the regions of scattered settlement, and Buluwayo and Gwelo, where considerable numbers had taken refuge, were in much danger for a time. But prompt and vigorous measures were taken by the colonial and imperial authorities, as well as by the officers of the South Africa Company. Troops were sent from Cape Colony, Natal, and England, and Major-General Sir Frederick Carrington was ordered from Gibraltar to take command. Cecil Rhodes hastened to Salisbury on the first news of the outbreak and organized a force of volunteers for the relief of the beleaguered towns. The Transvaal government offered help. By June, when General Carrington arrived, and Lord Grey had succeeded Dr. Jameson as Administrator, the insurgent natives had been put on the defensive and had nearly ceased their attacks. They were driven into the Matoppo hills, where their position was formidably strong. At length, in August, Mr. Rhodes opened negotiations with some of the chiefs, and went, with three companions, unarmed, into their stronghold. He there made an agreement with them, which the British military authorities and many of the Matabele warriors refused to be bound by. But the revolt had been practically broken and soon came to an end.

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1896 (June). Resignation of Mr. Rhodes.

On the 26th of June the resignations of Cecil J. Rhodes and Mr. Beit from the Board of Directors of the British South Africa Company, and of Mr. Rutherford Harris as its Secretary, were accepted by the Board.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1896 (July). Investigation of the Jameson Raid. Responsibility of Cecil J. Rhodes.

On the 17th of July a Select Committee of the Cape Colony House of Assembly, appointed in the previous May "to inquire into the circumstances, as affecting this colony, in connexion with the preparations for and carrying out of the recent armed inroad into the territory of the South African Republic," made its report, rehearsing at length the facts ascertained, with evidence in full, and submitting a number of "conclusions," among them the following: "Your Committee are of opinion that no member of the then Colonial Government with the exception of the then Prime Minister [Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes], had any knowledge whatever or suspicion of the intention to send an armed force across the border of the South African Republic. … Your Committee is convinced that the stores and workshops of the De Beers Consolidated Mines were for some time previous to the inroad used for the storage and for the unlawful exportation of arms destined for the South African Republic, in connexion with this inroad, and also that 11 men were sent from De Beers to Johannesburg, who were afterwards allowed to resume their positions. The evidence is clear, and leaves no room for doubt on this point. The local directors give an emphatic denial to any guilty knowledge on their part, and your Committee must acquit them of anything beyond negligence, which, looking to the magnitude of the transactions and the length of time over which they extended, must have been very marked. It is not conceivable that such proceedings could have been permitted without the knowledge and approval of the Chairman and Life Governor, Mr. C. J. Rhodes. With regard to the Chartered Company, your Committee find that the principal officials in Cape Town either knew, or were in a position to have known, the existence of this plot. Two at least of the directors, Mr. Beit and the Right Honorable C. J. Rhodes, were, together with the Administrator, Dr. Jameson, and Dr. Harris, the South African Secretary of the Company, active as promoters and moving spirits throughout, and they were from time to time kept informed of the preparations. … The whole movement was largely financed and engineered from outside, and in both cases certain directors and officials of the Chartered Company of British South Africa were active throughout. As regards the Right Honorable C. J. Rhodes, your Committee can come to no other conclusion than that he was thoroughly acquainted with the preparations that led to the inroad. That in his capacity as controller of the three great joint-stock companies, the British South Africa Company, the De Beers Consolidated Mines, and the Gold Fields of South Africa, he directed and controlled the combination which rendered such a proceeding as the Jameson raid possible. … It would appear that Mr. Rhodes did not direct or approve of Dr. Jameson's entering the territory of the South African Republic at the precise time when he did do so, but your Committee cannot find that that fact relieves Mr. Rhodes from responsibility for the unfortunate occurrences which took place. Even if Dr. Jameson be primarily responsible for the last fatal step, Mr. Rhodes cannot escape the responsibility of a movement which had been arranged, with his concurrence, to take place at the precise time it did, if circumstances had been favourable at Johannesburg."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8380, pages 7-9._

{471}

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1896 (July). Parliamentary movement to investigate its administration.

In the British House of Commons, on the 30th of July, Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, made a motion for the appointment of a select committee of fifteen to conduct an inquiry into the administration of the British South Africa Company, and the motion was adopted.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896-1897 (May-April). Continued controversies between the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, and the Government of the South African Republic. Complaints and counter complaints. Aliens Immigration Law, etc.

For a time after the abandonment of the proposed visit of President Kruger to England, the older questions at issue between Great Britain and the Transvaal fell into the background; but new ones were constantly rising. Each party watched the other with suspicious and critical eyes, sharply questioning things that would hardly have been noticed in ordinary times. The Boer authorities, on their side, were naturally disturbed and made inquisitive by every movement of troops or arms in the surrounding British territory, both of which movements were being somewhat increased by the revolt of the Matabeles. They were impatient, too, for some action on the part of the British government against the chief authors of the recent invasion,—the officials of the British South Africa Company,—and against the Company itself. On the 11th of May, 1896, the State Secretary of the Transvaal government telegraphed to the British High Commissioner as follows: "The newspapers of the last few days state that Her Majesty's Government still continue to take the part of the Directors of British South Africa Company, especially Mr. Rhodes. This Government will not believe the accuracy of these reports, but it is of opinion that the Chartered Company as administering the Government up to now is a source of danger to whole of South Africa. The inroad into this Republic was made by officers, troops, and arms of that Chartered Company, and even the explicit prohibition of Her Majesty's Government was unable to restrain them, notwithstanding the Chartered Company had taken upon itself the international obligations of Great Britain. The behaviour of the persons who knew of the scheme of the inroad beforehand and supported it is, as we see, defended by saying that they acted thus in the interests of and for the extension of Imperialism in South Africa. This Government does not believe that the end justifies the means, and is convinced that Her Majesty's Government does not wish to be served by misdeed."

When this had been communicated to the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, he replied (May 13) that the President of the South African Republic "has been misinformed if he supposes that Her Majesty's Government have taken the part of any of British South Africa Company Directors, including Mr. Rhodes, with regard to any connexion which they may be hereafter proved to have had with the recent raid. … On the contrary, while appreciating Mr. Rhodes's services in the past, Her Majesty's Government have condemned the raid, and the conduct of all the parties implicated by the telegrams recently published. Her Majesty's Government have promised a full Parliamentary inquiry, as soon as legal proceedings against Dr. Jameson and his officers have been concluded, to examine the Charter granted to British South Africa Company and the operation of its provisions, and to consider whether any improvements in it are desirable. Such an inquiry will go into the whole subject, not only of recent events, but of the whole administration. Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to announce any decision as to the future of the Company until the Parliamentary Committee has made its recommendations."

On the 15th President Kruger replied: "This Government is very pleased at receiving the assurance that a searching inquiry is being instituted against British South Africa Company and its Directors, and will follow its course with interest." But the following month found the authorities at Pretoria still unsatisfied as to the intention of the British government to bring Mr. Rhodes and the South Africa Company to account for what they had done. On the 19th of June, the then Acting High Commissioner (Sir Hercules Robinson having gone to England on leave) transmitted to Mr. Chamberlain two telegrams just received by him from the government of the South African Republic. The first was as follows: "Acting under instructions, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that, with a view to the welfare and peace of South Africa, this Government is convinced that the proofs in the possession and at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government now completely justify and compel the bringing to trial of Messrs. Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Beit, and Doctor Rutherford Harris, as has already been done with Doctor Jameson and his accomplices. In the interests of all South Africa, this Government feels itself obliged to press the taking of this step upon Her Majesty's Government. I have also the honour to request your Excellency to communicate this despatch by cable to Her Majesty's Government in London."

The second was in this language: "This Government regards with great regret the delay in the matter of the inquiry with respect to the complicity and responsibility of British South Africa Company in connexion with the raid of Doctor Jameson and his band within the territory of this Republic. This Government considers it its right and duty to press for the speedy holding of the inquiry, not merely because it is the injured party but also because of its interest and share in the well-being of South Africa, whose interests, as repeatedly intimated, are also dear to Her Majesty the Queen. This Government is also convinced that it is urgently necessary that the entire control and administration, as well civil as military, be taken out of hands of British South Africa Company and transferred to Her Majesty's Government, and I am instructed to press this point on behalf of this Government. I have further the honour to request your Excellency to cable this despatch to Her Majesty's Government in London."

{472}

To these communications Mr. Chamberlain made a somewhat haughty response. "Inform the Government of the South African Republic," he cabled on the 25th of June, "that Her Majesty's Government have received their telegrams of the 19th June, which were published in London almost simultaneously with their receipt by me. Her Majesty's Government do not require to be reminded of their duty in regard to the recent invasion of the South African Republic, and they cannot admit the claim of the Government of the Republic to dictate the time and manner in which they shall fulfil their obligations. I am unable to understand the reasons which have suddenly influenced the Government of the South African Republic to make representations which are inconsistent with their previous statements. On 18th April and on 15th May the Government of the Republic appeared to be satisfied with the assurances given them by Her Majesty's Government, from which there has never been any intention of departing. It would not be in accordance with English ideas of justice to condemn the British South Africa Company and deal with its powers as proposed in the telegrams before an enquiry had been made, and before the Company had been heard in its own defence. With regard to the demand of the Government of the South African Republic that the three gentlemen specifically named shall now be placed on their trial, you will remind them that Her Majesty's Government can only act in this matter upon the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown, and in accordance with the principles of English law."

But Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, on his side, was equally—perhaps more than equally—watchful and critical of the doings and omissions of the government of the South African Republic. He kept an eye upon them that was especially alert for the detection of infractions of the London Convention of 1884 (see above: A. D. 1884-1894), with its provisions very strictly construed. He found treaties negotiated with foreign powers in contravention of Article IV. of that Convention, and laws passed which he deemed an infringement of its Article XIV. He arraigned the government of the Republic upon each as it came to his knowledge, and then, on the 6th of March, 1897, went back over the record of his complaints and summed them up, as follows: "It will be convenient if I recapitulate briefly the occasions for such complaint, beginning with the cases relating to Article IV. of the Convention. …

"1.—Netherlands Treaty. On the 9th November 1895, an Extradition Treaty between the South African Republic and the Netherlands was signed at the Hague, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 19th June last, without the Treaty being submitted for the approval of Her Majesty. The case was therefore one of a clear infraction of the Convention, inasmuch as the Treaty had not been submitted to Her Majesty's Government on its completion, and had been concluded by the exchange of ratifications without obtaining the previous approval of the Queen. The Government of the South African Republic, on their attention being called to the infraction, did not deny that there had been a departure from the general practice, but urged that they had made no publication of the Treaty in anticipation of the approval of Her Majesty. The Treaty had, however, been published in the 'Netherlands Gazette' of the 3rd July, and I observed that when the Treaty was published in the 'Staats Courant' of the South African Republic after Her Majesty's approval had been given, the official notice merely stated that the Treaty was signed and ratified on certain dates, no reference being made to that approval.

"2.-The Accession of the South African Republic to the Geneva Convention. After Dr. Jameson's raid, owing to a report made by the St. John's Ambulance Association, Her Majesty's Government determined to invite the South African Republic to accede to the Geneva Convention, and the necessary instructions were sent to Sir J. de Wet, who, however, omitted to carry them out. The South African Republic, on the 30th September, formally communicated to the Swiss Government, through their Representative at the Hague, their act of accession to the Geneva Convention. Her Majesty's Government, in the circumstances, did not hesitate to convey the Queen's approval, but the action of the Government of the Republic none the less constituted a breach of the London Convention.

"3.—Portuguese Treaty. An Extradition Treaty between the South African Republic and Portugal was signed on the 3rd November 1893, but, contrary to the usual practice, has not yet been submitted for the Queen's approval, although two years have elapsed since Lord Ripon, in his Despatch of the 25th February 1895, requested your predecessor to call the attention of the President to the omission to communicate this Convention to Her Majesty's Government under the provisions of Article IV. of the London Convention. … I now pass to the consideration of some of the recent legislation of the Volksraad in its relation to Article XIV. It will be found that it involves in more than one case actual or possible breaches of the Convention. Article XIV. runs as follows:—'All persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic.'

"4.—The Aliens Immigration Law. This law imposes upon aliens conditions of a new and burthensome character in excess of the simple requirement that they must conform themselves to the laws of the Republic. … 2. The Aliens Expulsion Law. This law empowers the President, with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, after consulting the State Attorney, to expel, without an appeal to the Court, any foreigner who, by word or writing, excites to disobedience or transgression of the law, or takes any steps dangerous to public peace and order. … Her Majesty's Government … do not admit that the Government of the Republic have a right to expel foreigners who are not shown to have failed to conform to the laws of the Republic, and they reserve the right to object to proceedings under the Act which may amount to a breach of the Convention. {473} 3. The Press Law. This law empowers the State President, on the advice and with the consent of the Executive, to prohibit entirely or for a time the circulation of printed or published matter the contents of which are, in his judgment, contrary to good morals or a danger to the peace and order in the Republic. The suppression of the 'Critic' newspaper, the property of a British subject, under this law, is a matter which may raise a serious question as to whether the action of the Government of the Republic has been consistent with the Convention, but as Her Majesty's Government have not yet received the explanation of the Government of the Republic in that case, it is only necessary for me to make a passing allusion to it in this Despatch.

"In several of the cases above cited, the strict letter of the Convention could apparently have been observed without any difficulty, while in others the objects which the Government of the South African Republic had in view could have been attained without any infringement of the Convention by a previous understanding with Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government therefore cannot conceal from themselves that the Government of the South African Republic have in these cases failed to give effect in practice to the intention, so frequently expressed in public and official utterances, of upholding the Convention on the part of the Republic, and of maintaining that good understanding with Her Majesty's Government which is so necessary in the interests of South Africa."

Of the laws complained of by Mr. Chamberlain, that relating to immigrant aliens had raised the most protest, because of its requirement that all such aliens who were permitted to enter and remain in the country must carry "travelling and residential passes," to be shown on demand. The Transvaal Government had met Mr. Chamberlain's first remonstrance on this subject, in January, by saying: "It is an evident fact that, especially during the last time, the immigration of aliens of the lowest class and without any means of subsistence has been increasing in a disquieting manner. These persons are dangerous to the peace of the inhabitants and of the State itself, and, in the opinion of this Government, no country whatever can be obliged to admit such undesirable persons. The regulation of unrestricted entry, as it at present takes place, is thus, from the point of view of police requirement, not only necessary but also entirely justified and constitutes no infringement of Article 14 of the Convention. This Government does not desire as yet to express any opinion on the suggestion that under the circumstances mentioned it should have approached Her Britannic Majesty's Government with a view to arriving at an understanding. In case, however, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has another practical measure to propose whereby its above-mentioned subjects, whose presence here is not desired for the reasons stated, can be prevented from seeking an outlet on the soil of the South African Republic, and that measure can be found to be applicable to the subjects of other Powers as well (since the law makes no distinction in that respect) it will be ready, with gratitude, to give its full consideration to such measure."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8423._

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony and Natal: A. D. 1897. Conference of colonial premiers with the British Colonial] Secretary.

See (in this volume) ENGLAND: A. D. 1897 (JUNE-JULY).

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1897 (January). Compulsory labor in Rhodesia.

In January, 1897, the Deputy Commissioner of the British government in Rhodesia made a report to the High Commissioner on several subjects pertaining to the native administration of the British South Africa Company which he had been instructed to investigate. One question to be answered was "whether there exists a law or practice whereby compulsory labor is exacted from natives, either by the government of the British South Africa Company, or by private persons with consent of the government, or by both?" From his lengthy report on this subject the High Commissioner deduced the following summary of conclusions, which he communicated to the colonial secretary:

"(1.) That compulsory labour did undoubtedly exist in Matabeleland, if not in Mashonaland.

(2.) That labour was procured by the various Native Commissioners for the various requirements of the Government, mining companies, and private persons.

(3.) That the Native Commissioners, in the first instance, endeavoured to obtain labour through the indunas, but, failing in this, they procured it by force."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C.—8547._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (January-March). Conflict of the Judiciary with the Executive and the Volksraad. The case of R. E. Brown.

In January, 1897, a decision was rendered by the High Court of the Republic which brought it into conflict with President Kruger and the Volksraad. This decision was given in connection with a suit brought against the government of the South African Republic by an American engineer, Mr. R. E. Brown, and the claim of Mr. Brown had arisen out of circumstances which were subsequently related by a speaker in the United States Senate, as follows: Mr. R. E. Brown, a young American mining engineer, living and operating in the Cœur d'Alene district, in the State of Idaho, about eight years ago, at the invitation of English capitalists, left this country to go to the South African Republic for the purpose of assisting in the development of the gold mines of that country. It was about that time that Hammond, Clements, and other American engineers went there, and it is not too much to say that the genius and the energy of those young Americans more than anything else made that country a great gold producer and its mines the most valuable of any in the world. At that time most of the mines were held by English companies or Germans. The laws were very simple, but in some respects appear to have been drawn in the interest of the wealthy syndicates. Upon the discovery of new mines the President of the Republic by proclamation opened them to mining locations, fixing a day and hour at which they would be opened to such location. Thereafter persons desiring to stake out mines had to go to the office of the responsible clerk of the district in which the mines were located to make application for licenses to locate the mines, and thereafter they were authorized, either in person or by deputy, to go on the ground and make mining locations. {474} Under this system most of the valuable mines of the country had been absorbed, as I said, by English and German syndicates. The mode in which they operated to absorb the mines was to place their men upon the newly opened ground and at the earliest possible moment apply for licenses to locate the mines, and then by means of couriers with swift horses, or by signals from mountain to mountain where that was possible, to convey information to their men and cause the mines to be located before their rivals could get on the ground. Mr. Brown had not been in the country very long before he learned of this antiquated system, and he determined on the next opening of mines to apply to their location some of the snap and go of American methods.

"In June, 1895, President Kruger by proclamation opened the mines on the Witfontein farm, district of Potchefstroom, the responsible clerk for which resided at Doornkop, in that district. Mr. Brown determined that he would acquire some of these mines, at least, and as large a number of them as possible. Witfontein was only 30 miles from Doornkop. The mines were known to be very valuable, because they had been prospected on each side and it was found that valuable gold-bearing reefs ran through them from end to end. Accordingly he purchased heliographic instruments and employed expert heliographic operators, and without the knowledge of his rivals established heliographic communication between Doornkop and Witfontein. Then he placed his men upon the ground, and on the 19th day of July, 1895, the earliest period at which he was permitted to do so, he appeared at the office of the responsible clerk and sought licenses to locate 1,200 mines upon this ground. However, on the day before the opening of the mines his rivals had found out about the heliographic communication, but they were beaten in the race. In that extremity they communicated with President Kruger by wire and induced him on the night of the 18th to issue a second proclamation, withdrawing the mines of Witfontein from the privilege of mining locations, and when Mr. Brown appeared at the office of the responsible clerk and tendered his money he was met with the information of this action on the part of the President of the South African Republic, and his application was refused. But nothing daunted he caused his agents on the ground to locate the mines the same as if the licenses had been granted to him, and then he brought suit before the high court of justice of the South African Republic against the Republic, alleging the facts substantially as I have stated them and praying that the authorities be compelled to issue to him licenses for the mines located, or in lieu thereof that compensation be made to him in the sum of £372,400, amounting to about $1,850,000. While this suit was pending it was sought to re-enforce the action of the President in withdrawing these lands, and the Volksraad [passed a resolution approving the withdrawal and declaring that no person should be entitled to compensation on account of it]."

_United States Congressional Record, January 21, 1901, page 1370._

On Mr. Brown's suit, the High Court of the Republic decided that the claimant's right to the land was good, and could not be set aside by ex post facto measures of the Executive or the Legislature. The President and the Volksraad refused to submit to this decision, and passed a law to overrule it, on the ground that, under the Grondwet (constitution), the Volksraad is the highest power in the state. In a subsequent public statement of the matter, Justice Kotze, the Chief Justice, explained the issue that was thus raised between his court and the President, and also related the circumstances of a compromise by which it was settled temporarily, as follows:

"This so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 seeks to deprive the judges of the testing right, authorizes the President to put a certain question to the members of the bench that they would not arrogate to themselves the so-called testing power, and empowers him to instantly dismiss the judge or judges from whom he receives no answer, or, in his opinion, an unsatisfactory answer. The judges for the future are also subjected to a humiliating form of oath. This measure, it seems almost superfluous to observe, is no law. It alters the constitution of the country without any previous reference to the people, and for the reasons given in the Brown case it is devoid of all legal validity. The five judges, on March 1, 1897, unanimously issued a declaration, stating that by this so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 a vital violation of the independence of the bench had taken place, and that the judges were exposed in future to the suspicion of bribery. In fact, the nature and tendency of this measure are so immoral that one of the judges openly said that no honorable man can occupy a seat on the bench while Law Number 1 of 1897 remains on the statute book.

"The question above referred to was duly put by the President to the judges, who had unanimously signed a letter to the effect that they did not feel themselves at liberty to give any answer, when the chief justice of the Cape Colony arrived in Pretoria, and through his mediation a written understanding was proposed by the judges on March 19, and accepted without any qualification by the President on March 22, 1897. By the terms of this compact the judges undertook not to test laws and resolutions of the Volksraad on the distinct understanding that the President would as soon as possible submit a draft Grondwet to the Volksraad providing how alone the Grondwet can be altered by special legislation in a manner analogous to the provisions contained in the constitution of the Orange Free State on the subject, and incorporating the guaranties for the independence of the judiciary. By these means the judges intended to protect both the constitution and the bench against sudden surprises and attacks, such as, for instance, the oft-quoted measure known as Law Number 1, of 1897. They did this to avert a crisis, and, in order to help the Government and Volksraad out of a difficulty of their own creation, placed themselves under a temporary obligation upon the faith of the President as speedily as possible complying with his portion of the understanding."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session, House Document Number 618._

The promised amendment of the Grondwet was not made, and the issue concerning it was brought to a crisis in the next year.

See below: A. D. 1898 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).

SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (February): Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner.

In February, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, to succeed Sir Hercules Robinson, retired, and raised to the peerage as Lord Rosmead.

{475}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February). The franchise.

The government of the Transvaal extended the full franchise to 862 Uitlanders who supported it at the time of the Jameson raid.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February.) Indemnity claimed by the South African Republic for the Jameson Raid.

On the 16th of February, 1877, the State Secretary of the South African Republic, Dr. W. J. Leyds, presented to the British High Commissioner the following "specification of the compensation to which the Government of the South African Republic lays claim for and in connexion with the incursion into the Territory of the South African Republic by Dr. Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered Company at the end of December 1895 and the beginning of January 1896.

1. Expenditure for military and commando services In connexion with the incursion, the sum of. £136,733 s.4 d.3

2. Compensation to the Netherlands South African Railway Company for making use, in accordance with the concession granted to that Company, of the railway worked by it during the commando on account of the incursion of Dr. Jameson. £9,500 s.0 d.0

3. Disbursements to surviving relatives of slain and wounded. £234 s.19 d.6

4. For annuities, pensions, and disbursements to widows and children of slain burghers and to relatives of unmarried slain burghers, as also to wounded burghers, a total sum of. £28,243 s.0 d.0

5. Expenses of the telegraph department, for more overtime, more telegrams on service in South African communication, more cablegrams, &c. £4,692 s.11 d.9

6. Hospital expenses for the care of the wounded and sick men, &c. of Dr. Jameson. £225 s.0 d.0

7. For support of members of the families of commandeered burghers during the commando. £177 s.8 d.8

8. Compensation to be paid to the and the commandeered burghers for their services troubles and cares brought upon them. £62,120 s.0 d.0

9. Account of expenses of the Orange Free State. £36,011 s.19 d.1

Total £677,936 s.3 d.3

"Moral or intellectual compensation to which the Government of the South African Republic lays claim for and in connexion with the incursion into the Territory of the South African Republic by Dr. Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered Company at the end of December 1895 and the beginning of January 1896. One million pounds sterling (£1,000,000)."

To this claim the British colonial secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, replied on the 10th of April, saying, with reference to the specification under the second head, "for moral or intellectual damage," that "Her Majesty's Government … regret that they do not feel justified in presenting it to the British South Africa Company"; and adding: "Her Majesty's Government fear that they may be compelled to take similar exception to certain of the items composing the first head, especially in view of the very short period which elapsed between the crossing of the frontier by Dr. Jameson's force and its surrender; but as it is apparent from the nature of the figures that the Government of the South African Republic have proceeded on very precise data in arriving at the various sums to which they lay claim, Her Majesty's Government, before offering any observations on this part of the claim, would ask his Honour to be so good as to furnish them with full particulars of the way in which the different items comprised in the first head have been arrived at."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: C.—8404, 1897; and C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February-July). British parliamentary investigation of the Jameson Raid.

A Committee of the British House of Commons, appointed "to inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into the administration of the British South Africa Company," began its sittings on the 16th of February, 1897. Among the members of the Committee were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Attorney-General, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir William Harcourt, Sir John Lubbock, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. John Ellis, Mr. Buxton, Mr. Blake, and others. Mr. Rhodes, who was first examined by the Committee, read a statement of the circumstances leading up to the raid, in which he said that, as one largely interested in the Transvaal, he felt that the unfriendly attitude of the Boer Government was the great obstacle to common action among the various states in South Africa, and that, therefore, he had assisted the movement in Johannesburg with his purse and influence. "Further," he said, "acting within my rights, in the autumn of 1895 I placed a body of troops under Dr. Jameson, prepared to act in the Transvaal in certain eventualities." Subsequently Mr. Rhodes declared: "With reference to the Jameson raid, I may state that Dr. Jameson went in without my authority." He concluded his statement by declaring that in what he did he was greatly influenced by his belief that the policy of the Boer Government was to "introduce the influence of another foreign Power into the already complicated system of South Africa." Mr. Rhodes was kept under examination before the Committee for four days, and then "almost the next thing heard of him was that he had started for South Africa on his way back to Rhodesia." Another witness examined was Sir Graham Bower, Secretary to the High Commissioner at the Cape. "His evidence was certainly most startling, and at the same time of great importance. He stated that late in October, 1895, Mr. Rhodes came into his office and said: 'I want you to give me your word of honour that you will not say a word to anyone about what I am going to tell you.' Sir Graham Bower—who, as he said, had a great many Cape secrets in his possession—pledged his word, and soon found he was in possession of a secret which it was his official duty to disclose to the High Commissioner and his private duty not to disclose. Mr. Rhodes then said that he was negotiating about the Protectorate, that there was going to be a rising in Johannesburg, and that he wished to have a police force on the border. He added in substance: 'If trouble comes I am not going to sit still. You fellows are infernally slow.' It further transpired that on the fateful Sunday (December 28) Mr. Rhodes had told him that Jameson had gone in, but that he hoped that the message he had sent would stop him." {476} When Dr. Jameson was examined he fully acknowledged his conspiracy with the Johannesburg revolutionists, and stated that he had given information of it to Mr. Rhodes, adding; "He agreed, and we arranged that when the rising took place he should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal Government and the Uitlanders. With these matters settled, I left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town."

In the course of the inquiry, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, desired to give testimony, and related that Dr. Harris, the Secretary in South Africa to the British South Africa Company, said to him, "I could tell you something in confidence," or "I could give you some confidential information"; but that he (Chamberlain) stopped him at once, saying, "I do not want to hear any confidential information. I am here in an official capacity, and I can only hear information of which I can make official use"; and adding: "I have Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa. I have entire confidence in him, and I am quite convinced he will keep me informed of everything I ought to know." In concluding his testimony, Mr. Chamberlain said: "I desire to say, in the most explicit manner, that I did not then have, and that I never had, any knowledge or—until, I think it was, the day before the raid took place—the slightest suspicion of anything in the nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the Transvaal." The Committee having called upon Mr. Rhodes' solicitor, a Mr. Hawksley, to produce telegrams which had passed between Mr. Rhodes and himself, refused to do so.

"The proceedings which ensued were not to the credit of the Committee, for instead of reporting the matter to the House at once in a special report, they decided to refer to it in the interim report on the raid. Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake alone opposed this course, which was either a confession of unwillingness to reach the bottom of the business, or the suggestion that somebody was to be shielded. … Having devoted two days to hearing counsel on behalf of Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit and Dr. Harris, the Committee adjourned to consider its report. The general feeling was that the proceedings had been conducted with singular laxity or want of skill. Those interested in keeping secret the true history of the raid were entirely successful, and it was generally by the merest chance that any fact of importance was elicited from the witnesses. The representatives of the Opposition, Sir William Harcourt, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Buxton, were, after Mr. Rhodes had been unaccountably permitted to quit England, willing to allow the breakdown of the proceedings; and what was even more surprising in so strict a parliamentarian as Sir William Harcourt, a witness was allowed to treat the Committee with defiance, and to pass unchecked. To a very great extent the inquiry had been obviously factitious, but in whose interest concealment was considered necessary remained undivulged. It was surmised that reasons of State had been found which outweighed party considerations, and that the leaders of the Opposition had been privately convinced that the alleged grounds were sufficient for the course adopted."

The report of the majority of the Committee, signed by all of its members except Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake (the former of whom submitted a minority report), was made public on the 13th of July. The results of its inquiry were summed up under the following heads:

I. "Great discontent had, for some time previous to the incursion, existed in Johannesburg, arising from the grievances of the Uitlanders.

II. Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and, beyond all other persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a course of action as that which he adopted. As managing director of the British South Africa Company, as director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of interests; he used his position and those interests to promote and assist his policy. Whatever justification there might have been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed insurrection against the Government of the South African Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a State which was in friendly relations with her Majesty, in breach of the obligation to respect the right to self-government of the South African Republic under the conventions between her Majesty and that State. Although Dr. Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always part of the plan that these forces should be used in the Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

III. Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr. Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his colleagues in the Colonial Ministry and from the board of the British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

IV. Your committee have heard the evidence of all the directors of the British South Africa Company, with the exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined, Mr. Beit and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr. Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the Reform Union; he contributed large sums of money to the revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for the consequences.

V. There is not the slightest evidence that the late High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all information on the subject from him. The committee must, however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in not communicating to the High Commissioner the information which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty in a like manner.

VI. Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor any of the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which made them, or should have made them or any of them, aware of the plot during its development.

{477}

VII. Finally, your committee desire to put on record an absolute and unqualified condemnation of the raid and of the plans which made it possible."

"The result caused for the time being grave injury to British influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with neighbouring States. The course of action subsequently taken by the Government increased the suspicions which were aroused by such an emasculated report. Two days after its publication (July 15), Mr. Balfour was asked to set apart a day for the formal discussion of so important a matter. To this request Mr. Balfour, with the tacit concurrence of the front Opposition bench, replied that he saw no useful purpose to be served by such a debate."

Those who were known as the "Forward Radicals," or "Forwards," in the House, were not to be silenced in this manner, and debate was forced upon a motion expressing regret at "the inconclusive action and report of the select committee on British South Africa," and summoning Mr. Hawksley to the bar of the House, to produce "then and there," the telegrams which he had refused to the committee. In the course of the discussion which followed, Mr.Chamberlain expressed his conviction that, "while the fault of Mr. Rhodes was about as great a fault as a politician or statesman could commit, there existed nothing which affected his personal character as a man of honour." When Sir Elliott Lees, a supporter of the government, rose to protest against such a doctrine, he was met by cries which silenced his speech. The House then divided, and the resolution was defeated by 304 to 77. "It was an open secret that throughout the debate one member, unconnected with either front bench, sat with the famous telegrams in his pocket, and with them certain correspondence relating thereto which he had been instructed to read in the event of Mr. Rhodes' character being aspersed."

_Annual Register, 1897._

"The position … stands thus. The Colonial Office conceals its own documents. From none of its officials have we had any detailed or frank statement as to their relations to South African affairs during the critical period. The High Commissioner himself has not been examined. Mr. Rhodes has been allowed to go without any serious inquiry into this branch of the case. The most important cables are refused by Mr. Rhodes's order, and the Committee decline to exercise their power to compel the production of them. The story, in fact, so far as it concerns this question of the truth or falsity of the allegation that Mr. Chamberlain was 'in it,' is being smothered up, with an audacious disregard of the principles which guide all ordinary tribunals. The last steps in this proceeding have been taken with the direct assent of the leader of the Opposition. Everybody, therefore, is inquiring what reason can have induced Sir William Harcourt to execute this startling change of front. There is only one reason that can, with any probability, be assigned-that is, that some member of the Government has made a 'Front Bench communication' to the leader of the Opposition, indicating to him explicitly that there are 'reasons of State' for stopping the disclosures. There can be little doubt that this is what has happened, and conjecture, not only in this country but elsewhere, will naturally be keen to know what the nature of this momentous disclosure was.

"If Mr. Chamberlain was as absolutely free from knowledge of the Jameson plan as he has professed to be, it is hard to see how full disclosure could do any damage to the Empire, or could do anything but good to the Colonial Secretary himself. Mr. Chamberlain, of course, professes in words his private desire that everything should come out. He has not, however, assisted in the attainment of that result. The consequence is that a national and international question of very grave importance has arisen. It is said in circles usually well informed, that when the Raid occurred, it became necessary to give assurances to foreign Governments, and in particular to Germany, that the Queen's Government was in no way compromised. These assurances, it is said, were given. It is even said that they were given expressly in the name of the Queen. Something of this kind may well have happened; but it is hard to see how, if it did happen, and if the Colonial Office was as innocent as it claims to be, the disclosure of the facts can do anything but confirm the Queen's word. That documents exist which are supposed to be compromising, and which the very authors of them allege to be compromising, is a fact past hiding. It casts, unless it is cleared up, a damning doubt. Therefore it would appear to be the duty of all honest men, and, above all, of the Parliament of Great Britain, to see that an immediate end is put to a policy which may be aptly described as 'thimble-rigging,' and that the truth, whether it suits Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Chamberlain, or neither of them, must be told at fist."

_Contemporary Review, July, 1897._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State and Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April). Treaty of alliance.

In April, the two republics entered into a treaty for mutual support and defense against attacks on the independence of either, each opening its political franchises to the citizens of the other on the taking of an oath of allegiance.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April). Military expenditure by British and Boer Governments.

The budget of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, submitted to the House of Commons in April, contained an item of '£200,000 for increased military expenditure in South Africa. This was promptly attacked by the opposition, who accused the government of pursuing a war policy in its dealings with the Transvaal. Sir William Harcourt declared that Mr. Chamberlain had, "in every utterance of his during the last few months, been endeavouring to exasperate sentiment in South Africa, and to produce what, thank God! he had failed in producing—a racial war." Mr. Chamberlain retorted that Sir William Harcourt's attitude was unpatriotic and injurious to the cause of peace. He denied aggressiveness in the policy of the government, asserting that the South African Republic had been spending millions on armaments imported from abroad, in view of which the strengthening of the British garrison at the Cape by an additional regiment and three batteries was no unreasonable measure. Mr. Balfour, also, begged the House and the country to believe that the troops were sent only as a measure of precaution, to maintain admitted rights.

{478}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (May-October). The British assertion of suzerainty and declination of proposal to arbitrate disagreements.

On the 7th of May, 1897, the Acting State Secretary of the South African Republic addressed to the British Agent at Pretoria a communication of great length, reviewing the positions taken by Mr. Chamberlain in his several arraignments of the government of the Republic for alleged violation of the London Convention of 1884, and proposing an arbitration of the questions involved. "The complaint," he wrote, "which Her British Majesty's Government has advanced in an unmistakably pronounced manner over an actual or possible breach of the Convention has deeply grieved this Government, as it thinks that it has fulfilled its obligations. It sees in the fulfilment of the mutual obligations under the Convention one of the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual good understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence. To this good understanding and that confidence, however, severe shocks have been given by events which cannot be lightly forgotten. And if it were not that this Government wishes to guard itself against adopting a recriminating tone, it might put the question whether, for example, the incursion of Dr. Jameson, whether considered as a breach of the Convention or a grievance, is not of immeasurably greater importance than the various matters adduced by Her British Majesty's Government would be, even if the contention that they constitute breaches of the Convention could be accepted. There should, in the view of this Government, be a strong mutual endeavour to restore the shocked confidence and to calm the excited spirit which this Government with sincere regret sees reigning throughout almost the whole of South Africa. This Government is anxious to co-operate for this end, for the desire of the Republic, with the maintenance of its independence and rights, is for peace, and where for the reasons given it has been unable to entertain the proposal of Her British Majesty's Government in the matter of the Aliens Law,—and it appears very difficult to arrive at a solution of the question by means of correspondence,—it wishes to come to a permanent good understanding along a peaceful course, not only with respect to its undisturbed right to make an alien law, but also with regard to all points touching the Convention which are referred to in the two Despatches under reply by Her British Majesty's Government. While it respects the opinion of Her British Majesty's Government, it takes the liberty, with full confidence in the correctness of its own views, to propose to Her British Majesty's Government the principle of arbitration with which the honourable the First Volksraad agrees, in the hope that it will be taken in the conciliatory spirit in which it is made. …

"Although this Government is firmly convinced that a just and impartial decision might be obtained even better in South Africa than anywhere else, it wishes, in view of the conflicting elements, interests, and aspirations, which are now apparent in South Africa, and in order to avoid even the appearance that it would be able or desire to exercise influence in order to obtain a decision favourable to it, to propose that the President of the Swiss Bondstate, who may be reckoned upon as standing altogether outside the question, and to feel sympathy or antipathy neither for the one party nor for the other, be requested to point out a competent jurist, as has already oftener been done in respect of international disputes. The Government would have no objection that the arbitrator be subject to a limitation of time, and gives the assurance now already that it will willingly subject itself to any decision if such should, contrary to its expectation, be given against it. The Government repeats the well-meant wish that this proposal may find favour with Her British Majesty's Government, and inasmuch as the allegations of breaches of the Convention find entrance now even in South Africa, and bring and keep the feelings more and more in a state of suspense, this Government will be pleased if it can learn the decision of Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this proposal was not written until the 16th of the following October, when he, in turn, reviewed, point by point, the matters dealt with, in the despatch of Mr. Van Boeschoten. With reference to the Jameson raid he said: "Her Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the Government of the South African Republic see in the fulfilment of the mutual obligations under the London Convention one of the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence. Her Majesty's Government have uniformly fulfilled these obligations on their part, and they must strongly protest against what appears to be an implication in the Note under consideration that the incursion of Dr. Jameson can be considered as either a breach of the Convention by Her Majesty's Government or a grievance against them. That incursion was the act of private individuals unauthorised by Her Majesty's Government, and was repudiated by them immediately it became known. The immense importance to the Government of the South African Republic of that repudiation, and of the proclamation issued by the High Commissioner under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, is recognised throughout South Africa. Her Majesty's Government maintain strongly that since the Convention of 1881 there has never been any breach or even any allegation of a breach on their part of that or the subsequent Convention, and, as the subject has been raised by the implied accusation contained in the Note under consideration, Her Majesty's Government feel constrained to contrast their loyal action in the case of the Jameson raid with the cases in which they have had cause to complain that the Government of the South African Republic failed to interfere with, if they did not countenance, invasions of the adjacent territories by its burghers in violation of the Convention, and they feel bound to remind the Government of the Republic that in one of these cases Her Majesty's Government were compelled to maintain their rights by an armed expedition at the cost of about one million sterling, for which no compensation has ever been received by them."

Concerning the proposal of arbitration, the reply of the British colonial secretary was as follows: "In making this proposal the Government of the South African Republic appears to have overlooked the distinction between the Conventions of 1881 and 1884 and an ordinary treaty between two independent Powers, questions arising upon which may properly be the subject of arbitration. {479} By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign of the Transvaal Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of that territory complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, upon certain terms and conditions and subject to certain reservations and limitations set forth in 33 articles, and by the London Convention of 1884 Her Majesty, while maintaining the preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared that certain other articles embodied therein should be substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of 1881. The articles of the Convention of 1881 were accepted by the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of the Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African Republic. Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty holds towards the South African Republic the relation of a suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic self-government upon certain conditions, and it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which she accorded self-government to the Republic. One of the main objects which Her Majesty's Government had in view was the prevention of the interference of any foreign Power between Her Majesty and the South African Republic, a matter which they then held, and which Her Majesty's present Government hold, to be essential to British interests, and this object would be defeated by the course now proposed. The clear intention of Her Majesty's Government at the time of the London Convention, that questions in relation to it should not be submitted to arbitration, is shown by the fact that when the delegates of the South African Republic, in the negotiations which preceded that Convention, submitted to Her Majesty's Government in the first instance (in a letter of the 26th of November, 1883, which will be found on page 9 of the Parliamentary Paper C. 3947 of 1884) the draft of a treaty or convention containing an arbitration clause, they were informed by the Earl of Derby that it was neither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty's Government could adopt."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command. C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: Natal: A. D. 1897 (December). Annexation of Zululand.

See (in this volume) AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (ZULULAND).

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898. The position of political parties. The Progressives and the Afrikander Bund.

"The present position of parties at the Cape is as unfortunate and as unwarranted as any that the severest critic of Parliamentary institutions could have conjured up. … The Cape has always had the curse of race prejudice to contend with. Time might have done much to soften, if not to expunge it, if home-made stupidities had not always been forthcoming to goad to fresh rancour. The facts are too well known to need repetition. It is true not only of the Transvaalers that 'the trek has eaten into their souls,' and up to the time of emancipation and since, every conceivable mistake has been committed by those in authority. Thus, when the breach was, to all appearances, partly healed, the fatal winter of 1895 put back the hands of the clock to the old point of departure. As Englishmen, our sympathies are naturally with the party that is prevalently English, and against the party that is prevalently Dutch; but to find a real line of political difference between them other than national sentiment requires fine drawing. … According to our lines of cleavage both Bondsmen [Afrikander Bund] and Progressives are Conservatives of a decided type. Practically they are agreed in advocating protective duties on sea-borne trade, although in degree they differ, for whilst the Bond would have imposts as they are, the Progressives wish to reduce the duties on food stuffs to meet the grievance of the urban constituencies, and might be induced to accord preferential treatment to British goods. On the native question neither party adopts what would in England be considered an 'advanced' programme, for education is not made a cardinal point, and they would equally like, if possible, to extend the application of the Glen Grey Act, which, by levying a tax on the young Kaffirs who have not a labour certificate, forces them to do some service to the community before exercising their right of 'putting the spoon,' as the phrase is, 'into the family pot.' Neither party wishes to interfere with the rights of property or the absolute tenure of land under the Roman-Dutch law. A tax on the output of diamonds at Kimberley has been advocated by some members of the Bond as a financial expedient, but it is understood to have been put forward rather as a threat against Mr. Rhodes personally than as a measure of practical politics. Questions of franchise are tacitly left as they are, for no responsible politicians wish to go back upon the enactment which restricted the Kaffir vote to safe and inconsiderable limits. The redistribution of seats was the subject of a Bill upon which the last House was dissolved, after the rebuff that the Ministry received upon a crucial division, but it has been dealt with rather for practical than theoretical reasons. Two schemes of redistribution have been formulated, and each has been proposed and opposed with arguments directed to show the party advantage to be derived. For political reform, in the abstract, with or without an extension of the suffrage, there is no sort of enthusiasm in any quarter. Railway administration furnishes, no doubt, an occasional battle-field for the two sides of the House. Roughly, the Progressives favour the northern extension, and are willing to make concessions in rates and charges to help on the new trade with Rhodesia; whilst the Bond declare themselves against special treatment of the new interests, and would spend all the money that could be devoted to railway construction in the farming districts of the colony itself. Mr. Rhodes, however, has warned the Cape that any hostile action will be counteracted by a diversion of traffic to the East, and it is unlikely that any line of policy will be pursued that is likely to injure the carrying trade of the southern ports. Between the followers of Mr. Rhodes and the followers of Mr. Hofmeyr there is no wide divergence of principle on public affairs of the near future, so far as they have been or are to be the subject of legislation; where the difference comes in is in the attitude they severally assume towards the two republics and the territories of the north, but when talk has to yield to action it is improbable that there will be much in their disagreement."

_N. L. W. Lawson, Cape Politics and Colonial Policy (Fortnightly Review, November 1898)._

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SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898 (January-February).

Re-election of President Kruger. Renewed conflict of the Executive with the Judiciary. Dismissal of Chief-Justice Kotze.

The Presidential election in the South African Republic was held in January and February, the polls being open from the 3d of the former month until the 4th of the latter. President Kruger was re-elected for a fourth term of five years, by nearly 13,000 votes against less than 6,000 divided between Mr. Schalk Burger and General Joubert, who were opposing candidates. Soon afterwards, the conflict of 1897 between the Judiciary and the Executive (see above: A. D. 1897, JANUARY-MARCH), was reopened by a communication in which Chief-Justice Kotze, of the High Court, called the attention of the President to the fact that nothing had been done in fulfilment of the agreement that the independence of the Court and the stability of the Grondwet should both be protected by law against arbitrary interference, and giving notice that he considered the compromise then arranged to be ended. Thereupon (February 16) President Kruger removed the judge from his office and placed the State Attorney in his seat. Justice Kotze denied the legality of the removal, and adjourned his court sine die. In a speech at Johannesburg, some weeks afterwards, he denounced the action of President Kruger with great severity, saying: "I charge the President, as head of the State, with having violated both the constitution and the ordinary laws of the land; with having interfered with the independence of the High Court; and invaded and imperilled the rights and liberties of everyone in the country. The guarantees provided by the constitution for the protection of real and personal rights have disappeared, and these are now dependent on the 'arbitrium' of President Kruger."

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia and the British South Africa Company: A. D. 1898 (February). Reorganization.

In February, the British government announced the adoption of plans for a reorganization of the British South Africa Company and of the administration of its territories. The Company, already deprived of military powers, was to give up, in great part, but not wholly, its political functions. It was still to appoint an Administrator for Rhodesia south of the Zambesi, and to name the majority of members in a council assisting him, so long as it remained responsible for the expenses of administration; but, by the side of the Administrator was to be placed a Resident Commissioner, appointed by the Crown, and over both was the authority of the High Commissioner for South Africa, to whom the Resident Commissioner made reports. At home the status of the Board of Directors was to be considerably altered. The life directorships were to be abolished, and the whole Board of Directors in future to be elected by the shareholders,—any official or director removed by the Secretary of State not being eligible without his consent. The Board of Directors was to communicate all minutes, etc., to the Secretary of State, and he to have the power of veto or suspension. Finally, the Secretary of State was to have full powers to inspect and examine all documents; Colonial Office officials named by him were, in effect, to exercise powers like those of the old Indian Board of Control.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898 (March-October).

Election in favor of the Afrikander Bund. Change in the government.

Elections to the Upper House of the Cape Parliament, in March, gave the party called the Progressives, headed by Mr. Rhodes, a small majority over the Afrikander Bund—more commonly called the Bond. The Parliament opened in May, and the Progressive Ministry, under Sir Gordon Sprigg, was defeated in the Lower House in the following month, on a bill to create new electoral divisions. The Ministry dissolved Parliament and appealed to the constituencies, with the result of a defeat on that appeal. The Bond party won in the elections by a majority of two, which barely enabled it to carry a resolution of want of confidence in the government when Parliament was reassembled, in October. The Ministry of Sir Gordon Sprigg resigned, and a new one was formed with Mr. Schreiner at its head.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898-1899. Continued dispute with the British Government concerning Suzerainty.

During 1898 and half of 1899, a new dispute, raised by Mr. Chamberlain's emphatic assertion of the suzerainty of Great Britain over the South African Republic, went on between the British Colonial Office and the government at Pretoria. Essentially, the question at issue seemed to lie between a word and a fact and the difference between the disputants was the difference between the meanings they had severally drawn from the omission of the word "suzerainty" from the London Convention of 1884. On one side could be quoted the report which the Transvaal deputation to London, in 1884, had made to their Volksraad, when they brought the treaty back, and recommended that it be approved. The treaty, they reported, "is entirely bilateral [meaning that there were two sides in the making of it] whereby your representatives were not placed in the humiliating position of merely having to accept from a Suzerain Government a one-sided document as rule and regulation, but whereby they were recognized as a free contracting party. It makes, then, also an end of the British suzerainty, and, with the official recognition of her name, also restores her full self-government to the South African Republic, excepting one single limitation regarding the conclusion of treaties with foreign powers (Article 4). With the suzerainty the various provisions and limitations of the Pretoria Convention which Her Majesty's Government as suzerain had retained have also, of course, lapsed."

On the other side, Mr. Chamberlain could quote with effect from a speech which Lord Derby, then the British Colonial Secretary, who negotiated the Convention of 1884 with the Boer envoys, made on the 17th of March, that year, in the House of Lords. As reported in Hansard, Lord Derby had then dealt with the very question of suzerainty, as involved in the new convention, and had set forth his own understanding of the effect of the latter in the following words: "Then the noble Earl (Earl Cadogan) said that the object of the Convention had been to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. The word 'suzerainty' is a very vague word, and I do not think it is capable of any precise legal definition. {481} Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very easy to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a protectorate, or a suzerainty, or the recognition of England as a paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling power is retained when the State which exercises this suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the dependent State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the condition of things which it implied still remains; although the word is not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have abstained from using the word because it was not capable of legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: C. 9507, 1899, pages 24 and 34._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (March). Petition of British subjects to the Queen.

A fresh excitement of discontent in the Rand, due especially to the shooting of an Englishman by a Boer policeman, whom the Boer authorities seemed disposed to punish lightly or not at all, led to the preparation of a petition to the British Queen, from her subjects in the South African Republic, purporting to be signed in the first instance by 21,684, and finally by 23,000. The genuineness of many of the signatures was disputed by the Boers, but strenuously affirmed by those who conducted the circulation of the petition. It set forth the grievances of the memorialists at length, and prayed Her Majesty to cause them to be investigated, and to direct her representative in South Africa to take measures for securing from the South African Republic a recognition of their rights. The petition was forwarded to the Colonial Office on the 28th of March.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9345._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (May-June). The Bloemfontein Conference between President Kruger and the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner.

There seems to be no mode in which the questions at issue between the British and the Boers, and the attitude of the two parties, respectively, in their contention with each other, can be represented more accurately than by quoting essential parts of the official report of a formal conference between President Kruger and the British High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, which was held at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, during five days, May 31-June 5, 1899. The meeting was arranged by President Steyn, of the Orange Free State, with a view to bringing about an adjustment of differences by a free and full discussion of them, face to face. In the official report of the conversations that occurred, from which we shall quote, the remarks of President Kruger are given as being made by the "President," and those of the High Commissioner as by "His Excellency." The latter, invited by the President to speak first, said:

"There are a considerable number of open questions between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic on which there is at present no sign of agreement. On the contrary, disagreements seem to increase as time goes on. … In my personal opinion the cause of many of the points of difference, and the most serious ones, arises out of the policy pursued by the Government of the South African Republic towards the Uitlander population of that Republic among whom many thousands are British subjects. This policy, the bitter feeling it engenders between the Government and a section of Uitlanders, and the effect of the resulting tension in South Africa, and the feeling of sympathy in Great Britain, and even throughout the British Empire generally, with the Uitlander population, creates an irritated state of public opinion on both sides, which renders it much more difficult for the two Governments to settle their differences amicably. It is my strong conviction that if the Government of the South African Republic could now, before things get worse, of its own motion change its policy towards the Uitlanders, and take measures calculated to content the reasonable people among them, who, after all, are a great majority, such a course would not only strengthen the independence of the Republic but it would make such a better state of feeling all round that it would become far easier to settle outstanding questions between the two Governments. … The President, in coming here, has made a reservation as to the independence of the Republic. I cannot see that it is in any way impairing the independence of the Republic for Her Majesty's Government to support the cause of the Uitlanders as far as it is reasonable. A vast number of them are British subjects. If we had an equal number of British subjects and equally large interests in any part of the world, even in a country which was not under any conventional obligations to Her Majesty's Government we should be bound to make representations to the Government in the interests of Her Majesty's subjects, and to point out that the intense discontent of those subjects stood in the way of the cordial relations which we desire to exist between us. I know that the citizens of the South African Republic are intensely jealous of British interference in their internal affairs. What I want to impress upon the President is that if the Government of the South African Republic of its own accord, from its own sense of policy and justice, would afford a more liberal treatment to the Uitlander population, this would not increase British interference, but enormously diminish it. If the Uitlanders were in a position to help themselves they would not always be appealing to us under the Convention. …

"President.—I shall be brief. I have come with my commission, in the trust that Your Excellency is a man capable of conviction, to go into all points of difference. … I should like His Excellency to go point by point in this discussion, so that we can discuss each point that he thinks requires attention, not with a view to at once coming to a decision, but to hear each side, and we can go back on any point if necessary, and see if we can arrive at an understanding. I would like to give concessions as far as is possible and practicable, but I want to speak openly, so that His Excellency may be able to understand. I should like to say that the memorials placed before Her Majesty's Government came from those who do not speak the truth. I mean to convey that we do give concessions wherever we think it practicable to do so, and after we have discussed it in a friendly way Your Excellency will be able to judge whether I or the memorialists are right. I have said that if there are any mistakes on our side, we are willing to discuss them. Even in any matter concerning internal affairs I would be willing to listen to his advice if he said it could be removed in this way or that way. But when I show him that by the point we may be discussing our independence may be touched, I trust he will be open to conviction on that subject. …

{482}

"His Excellency.—I think the point which it would be best to take first, if the President agrees, … would be the Franchise. … There are a number of questions more or less resting upon that. … I should like to know a little more about the President's views. I want to know more because if I were to begin and say I want this, that, and the other, I know I should be told this was dictation. I do not want to formulate a scheme of my own, but I can, if necessary.

"President.—As long as I understand that it is meant in a friendly manner, and you mean to give hints, I won't take it that they are commands. It has already been arranged that you give me friendly hints and advice, and I will not take it as dictation, even though it should be on points on which I should consider you have no right to interfere. … I would like you to bear one point in view, namely, that all kinds of nations and languages, of nearly all powers, have rushed in at the point where the gold is to be found. In other countries … there are millions of old burghers, and the few that come in cannot out-vote the old burghers, but with us, those who rushed in to the gold fields are in large numbers and of all kinds, and the number of old burghers is still insignificant; therefore we are compelled to make the franchise so that they cannot all rush into it at once, and as soon as we can assure ourselves by a gradual increase of our burghers that we can safely do it, our plan was to reduce the time for anyone there to take up the franchise, and that is also my plan. … As His Excellency doubtless knows, I have proposed to the Volksraad that the time should be reduced by five years, and gradually as more trusted burghers join our numbers, we can, perhaps, go further. There are a number who really do not want the franchise, but they use it as pretext to egg on people with Her Majesty. … You must remember, also, on this subject, that the burghers in our Republic are our soldiers, who must protect the land, and that we have told these men to come and fight when we have had difficulties with the Kaffirs. They wanted the vote, but they would not come and fight. Those who were willing to help obtained the franchise, but it appears that many do not want to have it.

"His Excellency.—They did not want to take the obligations without the rights of citizenship, and in that I sympathize with them. If they should obtain that right, then naturally they would have to take those burdens upon them.

"President.—Those who want the franchise should bear the burdens.

"His Excellency.—Yes. Immediately they get the franchise they take upon themselves the obligations connected therewith."

[From this the talk wandered to the subject of commandeering, until the High Commissioner brought it back to the franchise question.]

"His Excellency.—If I made a proposal to admit strangers under such conditions as to swamp the old burghers it would be unreasonable. But the newcomers have, at present, no influence on the legislation of the Republic, which makes an enormous difference. They haven't got a single representative. The First Volksraad consists of 28 members, and not one member represents the feelings of the large Uitlander population.

"President.—Men from any country could after two years vote for the Second Volksraad, and after two years more sit in the Second Raad. There are Englishmen who have obtained the full franchise in that way, and are eligible for the Volksraad. And now I have proposed to shorten the last ten years of the period required for the full franchise and make it five years.

"His Excellency.—There are a great many objections of the gravest kind to the process by which men may now obtain burgher rights. First of all, before he can begin the process of gradually securing burgher rights—which will be completed in 14 years at present, and in 9 years according to the President—he has to forswear his own allegiance. Take the case of a British subject, which interests me most. He takes the oath, and ceases to be a British subject by the mere fact of taking that oath; he loses all the rights of a British subject, and he would still have to wait for 12 years, and under the new plan 7 years, before he can become a full citizen of the Republic. British subjects are discouraged by such a law from attempting to get the franchise. Even if they wanted to become citizens, they would not give up their British citizenship on the chance of becoming in 12 years citizens of the Republic.

"President.—The people are the cause of that themselves. In 1870 anyone being in the land for one year had the full franchise.

"His Excellency.—That was very liberal.

"President.—In 1881, after the war of independence, some of our officials and even members of our Raad then said that they were still British subjects, although they had taken the oath of allegiance, and I had to pay back, out of the £250,000, what I had commandeered from them. That was the reason the oath had to be altered. …

"His Excellency.—In 1882, after all this had happened, there was a franchise law in the Transvaal, which demanded five years' residence, but it did not require the oath that is now taken. It required a simple declaration of allegiance to the State, though all this that the President refers to happened before. Why was not it necessary to introduce this alteration then?

"President.—The people who, before the annexation, had taken that oath, but had not forsworn their nationality, 1887, sent a lying memorial, as they are sending lying memorials now, to say that everybody was satisfied, as they now say that everybody is dissatisfied.

"His Excellency.—I think I must just explain a little more clearly my views on the point we are now discussing. … I think it is unreasonable to ask a man to forswear one citizenship unless in the very act of giving up one he gets another, and I think it is also unnecessary to ask him to do more than take an oath of fealty to the new State, of willingness to obey its laws and to defend its independence, when it is known and certain that the taking of that oath deprives him of his existing citizenship. I think the oath should be a simple oath of allegiance, and that it should not be required of a man until the moment he can get full rights in a new State. Now that was the position under the law of 1882, and all these reasons which the President has been giving are based on what happened before that. {483} Why were they not considered and acted upon when the law of 1882 was made? … As for the period required to qualify for the full franchise, I do not see why the length of time should be longer in the South African Republic than in any other South African State. They are all new countries. In the new country which is springing up in the north, and which is getting a new Constitution this year, the period is one year. The people who have conquered that country for the white race may find that the newcomers are more numerous than they are. But I do not expect that anything like that will be done in the South African Republic; something far short of that would be reasonable. What I do think and desire, and that is the object of my suggestion, is this: that the numerous foreign population engaged in commerce and industry—to which the country, after all, owes its present great position in wealth and influence— should have a real share in the government of the Republic, not to over-rule the old burghers—not at all—but to share the work of Government with them, to give them the benefit of their knowledge and experience, which is in many cases greater than that of the old burghers, so that through their gradual co-operation a time may come when, instead of being divided into two separate communities they will all be burghers of the same State. It is not enough that a few people should be let in. It is obvious, however, that you could not let in the whole crowd, without character or anything—I do not ask it—but you want such a substantial measure that in elections of members of the Volksraad the desires of the new industrial population should have reasonable consideration. They have not got it now, and when the questions that interest them come before the Volksraad it is too evident that they are discussed from an outside point of view. The industrial population are regarded as strangers. … I do not want to swamp the old population, but it is perfectly possible to give the new population an immediate voice in the legislation, and yet to leave the old burghers in such a position that they cannot possibly be swamped.

"President.—I hope you will be open to conviction on that point. I would like to convince you on the subject, and to show you that it would be virtually to give up the independence of my burghers. In the Republic the majority of the enfranchised burghers consider they are the masters. Our enfranchised burghers are probably about 30,000, and the newcomers may be from 60,000 to 70,000, and if we give them the franchise to-morrow we may as well give up the Republic. I hope you will clearly see that I shall not get it through with my people. We can still consult about the form of oath, but we cannot make the time too short, because we would never get it through with the people—they have had bitter experience. I hope His Excellency will think about what I have said, and weigh it well.

"His Excellency.—I see your point, and want to meet it.

"President.—I will think over what has been said, and will try and meet every difficulty.

At the opening of the Conference on the second day the President spoke of reports of an increase of British forces in South Africa, which the High Commissioner assured him were untrue. The latter in turn referred to accounts that had appeared of an extensive purchase of arms in the Transvaal; and was assured by the President that the armament of the burghers was only for their proper preparation to deal with the surrounding natives. The President then produced a memorial purporting to be signed by 21,000 Uitlanders, contradictory of the representations contained in the memorial sent to the Queen in March (see above). After discussion upon this, the conversation returned to the question of the franchise.

"His Excellency.—What makes this whole discussion so difficult is the intense prejudice on the side of the present burghers, and their intense suspicion of us. They think Her Majesty's Government wants to get their country back in one way or another. Her Majesty's Government does not; but what it does desire is that it should have such a state of rest in the country as will remove causes of friction and difficulty between the Republic and Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa, and the whole of the British Empire, and my suggestions here are directed to that end. I do not want to say it over and over again, I say it once for all. …

"President.—I should like to make a slight explanation to His Excellency. His Excellency yesterday mentioned that in some States those going in from outside speedily got burgher rights, but he must not forget, as I said before, they are glad of the people who come in. But, here we have all nations and all kinds, and if they were to get burgher rights quickly then that would be the end of our independence, and then they could send us away where they liked. I would like His Excellency to bear that in mind.

"His Excellency.—I do not see how the old burghers can have it both ways. They cannot have a very large population streaming in to develop the resources of the country, and giving it a much higher position in the world than it would otherwise have, and at the same time exclude these people from participation in the Government of the country.

"President.—Your Excellency must bear this in mind. There is no Gold Law in the world that is so liberal as that of the Republic."

The President then recurred to the right which the Uitlanders might obtain, of voting for the Second Volksraad after two years, and becoming eligible to seats in it after four years, and said that it was in the Second Volksraad that their own interests were dealt with—not in the First. The High Commissioner asked if the Second Raad could act without consent of the First. The President acknowledged that the latter could alter any law which "appears to be against the general welfare," but contended that it had no wish to go into gold field matters, though it has the power, and that it had interfered with action of the Second Rand in but three or four instances. The High Commissioner remarked that Uitlanders who abandoned their own nationality to wait years for full citizenship in the Republic might have the latter prospect taken away from them at any moment by a single resolution of the First Raad. The President replied: "They haven't done it yet. The legislatures of all the world have the same power." To which the High Commissioner made answer: "This power existing, the new comers cannot be expected—I should not recommend one of them—to give up his present citizenship for the mere chance of becoming a citizen of the new country."

{484}

"His Excellency.—If the President thinks we are asking too much … I must report to Her Majesty's Government that the President rejects our friendly suggestions.

"The President.—I would be misleading you if I should tell you that I can give all the strangers the franchise in a very short time. I would consider that our independence was sacrificed thereby: but I say this, let His Excellency keep impartially in view my points of difficulty, and let him make his proposals and submit them to us, so that we can consider them and judge about them. … I have already said that perhaps means may be found to alter the form of oath. … I would now like His Excellency to propose a scheme.

"His Excellency.— … What I suggest is this: That every foreigner who can prove satisfactorily that he has been resident in the country for five years, and that he desires to make it his permanent place of residence, that he is prepared to take the oath to obey the laws, to undertake all the obligations of citizenship, and to defend the independence of the country, should be allowed to become a citizen on taking that oath. This should be confined to persons possessing a certain amount of property, or a certain amount of yearly wages, and who have good characters. In order to make that proposal of any real use for the new citizens who mostly live in one district in the Republic, and a district which only returns one member in 28 to the First Raad, and one in 28 to the Second Raad, I propose that there should be a certain number of new constituencies created, the number of which is a detail upon the discussion of which I will not now enter. But what is vital from my point of view is that the number of these districts should not be so small as to leave the representatives of the new population in a contemptible minority.

"President.—With us the majority of the enfranchised burghers constitutes the ruling voice, and must be listened to in the Volksraad. If the 60,000 came in immediately, they would swamp the 30,000. … I mean this: that if they are all enfranchised then they would at once form the majority of the whole population, and the majority of enfranchised burghers, according to our law, must be listened to by the Volksraad; since in a Republic we cannot leave the sovereign voice out of account.

"His Excellency.—This is pure theory, that the Volksraad have to do what the majority of the people desire. The Volksraad does what it considers right in its own eyes; it is elected by the people, and does what it thinks right, and the President has made it quite clear during the last year or two that anything the Volksraad does is law."

At an afternoon meeting on the same day, there was a long discussion of the dynamite grievance of the Uitlanders, and the President wished to bring up other points; but the High Commissioner objected:

"His Excellency.—I think the discussion will be of interminable length if we are to proceed in this way, and if we cannot approach one another on the point on which I have made my suggestions, and which lies outside all the pending questions between the two Governments, these other controversies may as well be allowed to go on in the usual course. If the President to-morrow will give me an answer on the first subject I raised, and then wishes to bring forward his grievances, I will consider them to-morrow. I do not want to go on with a long list of my own until I understand what is the basis on which I stand in regard to what I consider the most important question of all.

"President.—I think it would be as well if we returned in a little while to discuss our points, but I would like to give His Excellency some things to think over. The first point I would like to mention is my wish that Swaziland should now be handed over to me as a portion of my land. … Secondly, the demand made with regard to the damages for the Jameson Raid, Mr. Chamberlain said he was against paying the million, but he is not against paying the expenses incurred. Thirdly, that differences such as those now existing between us, should be settled by arbitration, and then no war or quarrel could arise between us. … These are some of the questions I wish His Excellency to think about."

At the opening of the Conference on the third day, the President sought to commit the High Commissioner to an "understanding," that "if we came," he said, "to some agreement on the franchise Her Majesty's Government then would engage not in any way to concern itself with internal affairs in the Republic any longer, and that in future questions that then may arise, whether out of the Convention or otherwise, Her Majesty would agree to have such questions referred to arbitration." The High Commissioner declined to deal with the subject of the franchise as a matter of "bargain." It was a subject of grievances and discontent, dangerous to the Republic and dangerous to the relations between the Republic and Great Britain, which ought to be dealt with on its merits alone. Nevertheless, after some controversy, he said:

"His Excellency.— … As far as the Jameson Indemnity is concerned I know that a despatch is on the way to me at this present moment, which forwards a statement from the British South Africa Company examining the details of the claim which has been sent in, and asking that the question of the amount payable in respect of the Raid may be submitted to arbitration. I have received a telegram that that despatch is coming. The position is this—the British Government have admitted in principle that the Company must pay what is fairly due on account of that raid; but the question of the amount is still under discussion, and I hope that this proposal will lead to a settlement. As to the question of arbitration, which I think is the matter that interests the President most, I am in so far entirely with him that I want if possible to have in future as few questions to discuss with the Government of the South African Republic, as I now have with the Government of the Orange Free State. I feel that the President will need, if he accepts my scheme of franchise, or any other similar proposal, to have some assurance that there shall not be perpetual controversies between him and England, and that if there are controversies, some regular way of dealing with them should be devised. {485} The President once proposed that some question, or a number of questions, should be submitted to the President of the Swiss Republic. The British Government refused that on the general principle—from which I am sure they will not depart—that they will not have any foreign Government, or any foreign interference at all, between them and the South African Republic. But if some other method can be devised of submitting to an impartial tribunal questions that may in future arise between us, and perhaps even some questions which exist at present—but in any case to provide for the future—if such a plan can be devised and suggested to me, I will lay it before Her Majesty's Government and do what I can personally to assist in a satisfactory solution of the matter. The President must understand that I cannot pledge Her Majesty's Government in any way on this subject. The question has taken me by surprise; I didn't come here contemplating a discussion on it, but I must say if it could be satisfactorily arranged while excluding the interference of the foreigner, it would seem to me to open a way out of many difficulties. But all the same, I adhere firmly to my proposal that we should first try and settle on the scheme which the President would accept as regards the matter which I put forward."

At the close of the morning interview, both parties expressed hopelessness of agreement. On meeting again in the afternoon, the President submitted in writing the following proposals concerning the franchise: "As the purpose I had in view at this Conference principally consists in the removal of existing grounds of disagreement and further to provide for the friendly regulation of the way of settling future disputes by means of arbitration, the following proposals with regard to the franchise must be considered as conditional and dependent on the satisfactory settlement of the first mentioned points, and on the request that my request to incorporate Swaziland in the South African Republic shall be submitted by the High Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government. Subject to the foregoing I undertake to submit without delay to the approval of the Volksraad and the people the following proposals about the franchise:

"I. Every person who fixes his residence in the South African Republic has to get himself registered on the Field-cornets' books within fourteen days after his arrival according to the existing law; will be able after complying with the conditions mentioned under 'A.,' and after the lapse of two years to get himself naturalised; and will five years after naturalisation, on complying with the conditions mentioned under 'B.,' obtain the full franchise.

"A.— 1. Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation; 2. Two years' continued registration; 3. Residence in the South African Republic during that period; 4. No dishonouring sentence; 5. Proof of obedience to the laws; no act against Government or independence; 6. Proof of full State citizenship and franchise or title thereto in former country; 7. Possession of unmortgaged fixed property to the value of £150 approximately, or occupation of house to the rental of £50 per annum, or yearly income of at least £200. Nothing, however, shall prevent the Government from granting naturalisation to persons who have not satisfied this condition; 8. Taking of an oath similar to that of the Orange Free State.

"B.— 1. Continuous registration five years after naturalisation; 2. Continuous residence during that period; 3. No dishonouring sentence; 4. Proof of obedience to the laws, &c.; 5. Proof that applicant still complies with the condition A(7).

"II. Furthermore, the full franchise shall be obtained in the following manner:— (a.) Those who have fixed their residence in the South African Republic before the taking effect of Act 4, 1890, and who get themselves naturalised within six months after the taking effect of this Act on complying with the conditions under 1A, shall obtain the full franchise two years after such naturalisation on proof of compliance with the conditions mentioned under 1B (altering the five into two years). Those who do not get themselves naturalised within six months under Article 1, (b.) Those who have been resident in the South African Republic for two years or more can get themselves immediately naturalised on compliance with the conditions under 1A., and shall five years after naturalisation obtain the full franchise on compliance with the conditions under 1B. (c.) Those who have been already naturalised shall five years after naturalisation obtain the full franchise on compliance with the conditions under 1B."

At the meeting next day, the High Commissioner presented to the President a written memorandum in reply to the proposals of the latter. He admitted that "the scheme proposed is a considerable advance upon the existing provisions as to franchise," but said that he could not recommend its acceptance as adequate to the needs of the case. "Under this plan," he continued, "no man who is not already naturalised, even if he has been in the country 13 or 14 years, will get a vote for the First Volksraad in less than 2½ years from the passing of the new law. There will be no considerable number of people obtaining that vote in less than five years, that is if they come in and naturalise. But I fear the majority of them will not come in, because the scheme retains that unfortunate provision, first introduced in 1890, by which, owing to the two stages—first, naturalisation with a partial franchise, and then, after five years, full franchise—a man has to abandon his old citizenship before he becomes a full-fledged citizen of his new country. My plan avoided this. My doctrine is that, however long a period of residence you fix before a man becomes a citizen of your State, you should admit him, once for all, to full rights on taking the oath of allegiance. And this is especially important in the South African Republic, because, owing to the facility and frequency with which laws—even fundamental laws—are altered, the man who takes the oath and thereby loses his old country will never feel quite sure that something may not happen in the interval, when he is only half a citizen, to prevent his becoming a whole one. The vote for the First Volksraad is the essential point. According to the present constitution of the Transvaal, the First Volksraad and the President really are the State. But under this scheme it will be a considerable time before any number of Uitlanders worth mentioning can vote for the First Volksraad, and even then they will only command one or two seats. My point was to give them at once a few representatives. They might be a minority, even a small minority. {486} I have said over and over again I do not want to swamp the old burghers. But as long as the representatives of the new comers are entirely excluded from the supreme legislative council, they will, as a body, remain an inferior caste. The co-operation and gradual blending of the two sections of the population will not take place. The old separation and hostility will continue. I see no prospect here of that concord to which I had looked both to bring about a more progressive system of government, and to remove causes of friction between the Government of the South African Republic and Great Britain. For these reasons I regret to say the scheme seems to me so inadequate that I think it would be wasting the time of the Conference to discuss its details."

The President rejoined in another memorandum, which added one more to his former proposals, namely this: "I am ready to propose and to recommend to the First Volksraad to increase the number of members of the First Volksraad, whereby the Gold Fields will be represented by five, instead of as now by two, members."

The response to this by the High Commissioner was a review, at length, of all that had been proposed, leading to the conclusion which he expressed as follows:

"If I am asked whether I think they will satisfy the Uitlander community, and are calculated to relieve the British Government from further solicitude on the score of its Uitlander subjects, I cannot answer in the affirmative. Still less can I encourage the idea that the British Government can be asked to give something in exchange for such legislation as the President proposes. My own proposal was put forward in no bargaining spirit. I asked myself, in advancing it, what is the smallest measure of reform that will really be of any use, that is to say, which will allay the present unrest and enable the Uitlanders to exercise within a reasonable time an appreciable influence on the Government of the country. It was in that spirit that I suggested the outline of a scheme, intentionally not working it out in detail (for I was ready to listen as to details), but indicating a certain minimum from which I am not prepared to depart. … When I came here I came in the hope that I might be able to report to Her Majesty's Government that measures were about to be adopted which would lead to such an improvement in the situation as to relieve Her Majesty's Government from pressing for the redress of particular grievances on the ground that the most serious causes of complaint would now gradually be removed from within. I do not feel that what His Honour has seen his way to propose in the matter of franchise or what he indicates as the extreme length to which he might, at some future time, be willing to go in the extension of local government is sufficient to justify me in reporting in that sense."

The Conference was ended by a last memorandum from the President, in which he said: "As it is my earnest wish that this Conference should not be fruitless, I wish to make the following proposal to His Excellency, viz.:—As according to his own admission my proposal about franchise is an important step in the right direction, I shall be prepared to lay my proposal before the Volksraad and to recommend it, even though His Excellency does not fully agree with it. From his side I shall then expect that His Excellency will lay before and recommend to Her Majesty's Government my request about arbitration on future matters of difference under the Convention. His Excellency will, however, readily understand that if Her Majesty's Government should not meet me so far, so as to grant my acknowledged fair request for arbitration, it could be with difficulty expected that the people of the South African Republic would approve of my comprehensive proposal with regard to franchise."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9404._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (May-August). Advice to President Kruger from Cape Afrikanders, and from Holland and Germany.

Several private letters written at the time of these occurrences by Sir J. E. De Villiers, a leading Afrikander, Chief Justice of Cape Colony, and one of the Commissioners who negotiated the Convention of 1881, addressed to persons who might have influence with President Kruger, were made public a year later. In the first of these letters, written to President Steyn of the Orange Free State, on the 21st of May, 1899, Justice De Villiers used strong expressions, as follows: "On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President as I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on him, but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, would be amenable to argument, but I fear that either my advice had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with the President. I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms. It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily from the Government instead of being gradually forced from them. In the former case they would rally the greater number of the malcontents around them, in the latter case no gratitude will be felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, there can be no doubt that as the alien population increases, as it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made by the President seems to be simply ridiculous. I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my fellow Commissioners that the President would adopt his retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other words, to recommence the war. … If I had any influence with the President I would advise him no longer to sit on the boiler to prevent it from bursting. Some safety-valves are required for the activities of the new population. In their irritation they abuse the Government, often unjustly, in the press, and send petitions to the Queen; but that was only to be expected. Let the Transvaal Legislature give them a liberal franchise and allow them local self-government for their towns, and some portion of the discontent will be allayed. The enemies of the Transvaal will not be satisfied; on the contrary, the worst service that can be done to them is the redress of the grievance, but it is the friends of the country who should be considered."

{487}

On the 31st of July, the Justice wrote still more urgently and impatiently to a Mr. Fischer, who was in close relations with the Transvaal President: "I do not think that President Kruger and his friends realize the gravity of the situation. Even now the State Secretary is doing things which would be almost farcical if the times were not so serious. Some time ago I begged of him to drop the censorship of telegrams because it serves no useful purpose and only delays the publication of lies by a few days. His answer was that the Government should not disseminate lies by its own wires. He might as well have said Government should not disseminate lies by its own post-office. To crown all, I see that he has now gone so far as to stop a private telegram (which had been paid for) because it contained a lie. I really do not know where he is going to stop or whether he intends to guarantee that all telegrams allowed to pass contain the truth and nothing but the truth. Could you not induce him to stop such childish nonsense? The Transvaal will soon not have a single friend left among the cultivated classes. Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so obscure that the State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to remove the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough to speak for itself, and no Government or Court of Law will be bound by the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what those explanations are, but the very fact that they are required condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Herholdt. The time really has come when the friends of the Transvaal must induce President Kruger to become perfectly frank and take the newcomers into his confidence. It may be a bitter pill to have to swallow in yielding to further demands, but it is quite clear to the world that he would not have done as much as he has done if pressure had not been applied. What one fears is that he will do things in such a way as to take away all grace from his concessions. Try to induce him to meet Mr. Chamberlain in a friendly manner and at once remove all the causes of unrest which have disturbed this unhappy country for so many years. As one who signed the Convention in 1881, I can assure you that my fellow Commissioners would not have signed it if they had not been led to believe that President Kruger's policy towards the Uitlanders would have been very different from what it has been."

Three confidential despatches sent to President Kruger, in the same period, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands government were laid before the States General at The Hague, October 25, 1900, and made public through Reuter's press agency, as follows:

"In the first despatch, which is dated May 13, 1899, the Minister states that news received from different capitals leads him to believe in the imminence of the danger of a violent solution of the problem in South Africa. As a faithful friend he counsels Mr. Kruger in the true interests of the Republic to show himself as conciliatory and moderate as possible, and adds that he learns from a trustworthy source that the German Government fully shares that opinion. Mr. Kruger replied that he had always been conciliatory and did not desire war, but that he could not sacrifice the independence of the Republic. He was willing enough to grant the suffrage, but he could not tolerate Englishmen remaining subjects of the Queen while receiving at the same time the right to vote in the Republic. In the second despatch, dated August 4, 1899, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs advised President Kruger, in the interests of the country, not to refuse peremptorily the British proposal for an international commission. Mr. Kruger replied that the commission would not be international, but an Anglo-Transvaal commission. He intended to ask for further information from Great Britain as to the scope and composition of the commission, and did not mean to give a decided refusal. Finally, the Netherlands Minister, in a telegram dated August 15, 1899, stated that the German Government entirely shared his opinion as to the inadvisability of declining the English proposal, adding that the German Government, like himself, was convinced that any request to one of the Great Powers at such a critical moment would be barren of result and highly dangerous to the Republic. To this Mr. Kruger replied that the British proposal would result in very direct interference by the English in the internal affairs of the Republic. He added that he had no intention of appealing to a Great Power."

Speaking in the German Reichsrath, on the 10th of December, 1900, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Bülow, referred to the above publications by the Dutch government, and confirmed them, saying that it was in accordance with the views of the German Government that the Dutch Foreign Minister "strongly advised Mr. Kruger to maintain a moderate attitude. In June, 1899, Mr. Kruger was advised by Germany through the Dutch Government to invite mediation, but Dr. Leyds informed the Dutch Minister in Paris that Mr. Kruger did not consider 'that the moment had yet come for applying for the mediation of America.' Some time afterwards Mr. Kruger made the attempt to obtain arbitration, but 'feeling had become too heated,' and in August Mr. Kruger complained to the Dutch Government that arbitration could not be arranged. The answer to this complaint is given in the Dutch Yellow-book under the date of August 15, 1899, and points out that the German Government would at that date have regarded any appeal to a Great Power as hopeless and as very dangerous for the Republics. The German Government also shared the Dutch view that Mr. Kruger ought not to reject the English proposal then before him."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (July-September) Amendment of the Franchise Law.

After much discussion and many changes, an amended Franchise Law was adopted by the First Volksraad of the Republic and published on the 26th of July. It conceded to foreigners who had already been resident in the Republic for seven years a possibility of obtaining full burgher rights simultaneously with the taking of the oath of allegiance, but subjected the proceeding to conditions which would make it, in Uitlander opinion, of service to very few. The judgment of Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, as expressed to Secretary Chamberlain, was to the effect that "the bill, as it stands, leaves it practically in the hands of the Government of the South African Republic to enfranchise or not enfranchise the Uitlanders as it chooses. If worked in a liberal spirit, its clumsy and unreasonable provisions may be got over. {488} But if it is to be enforced rigidly, there will be practically unlimited opportunities of excluding persons whom the Government may consider undesirable, nor does the tone of the debate in the Raad leave much doubt as to the spirit in which some at least of the authors of the Bill would like to see it worked." His criticism applied especially to the certificate required from every applicant. "The certificate," he said, "which every applicant must obtain from three different officials, as to (a) continuous registration and domicile, (b) obedience to the laws, (c) committing no crime against the independence of the country, is one which these officials, even if well disposed, would be able in hardly any case to give. None of them can have any such knowledge of the Uitlander population as would enable them to give this comprehensive certificate; it is acknowledged that some of the Johannesburg lists have been lost; and the Field-cornet has, I believe, held his present office for less than four years." Moreover, a requirement of "continuous" registration "may mean," said the High Commissioner, "(and I cannot understand what else it could mean) registration for seven years in one ward and district; so that a person having resided and been registered in one district and subsequently removed to another would forfeit the benefit of his first period of residence. Even if this were not so, he would doubtless have to get a double set of certificates."

Simultaneously with the publication of the new Franchise Law it was announced that the Executive Council had decided to give the Witwatersrand Gold Fields a representation of five members (out of 31) in the First Volksraad, as well as representation by the same number in the Second Volksraad. To the British Agent at Pretoria, Mr. Conyngham Greene, this seemed to be "so wholly inadequate as not to be worthy of serious consideration."

In view of the complexities and uncertainties involved in the new Franchise Law, the High Commissioner addressed the following communication to the government of the South African Republic, August 1:

"Her Majesty's Government authorize me to invite President South African Republic to appoint delegates to discuss with delegates to be appointed by me on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, whether Uitlander population will be given immediate and substantial representation by franchise law recently passed by Volksraad, together with other measures connected with it, such as increase of seats, and, if not, what additions or alterations may be necessary to secure that result. In this discussion it should be understood that the delegates of Her Majesty's Government would be free to make any suggestions calculated to improve measures in question and secure their attaining the end desired."

The reply to this proposal was given by the Boer government to the British Agent at Pretoria in two notes, the first, dated August 19, as follows: "With reference to your proposal for a joint enquiry contained in your despatches of the 2nd and 3rd August, Government of South African Republic have the honour to suggest the following alternative proposal for consideration of Her Majesty's Government, which this Government trusts may lead to a final settlement.

(1.) The Government are willing to recommend to the Volksraad and the people a 5 years' retrospective franchise, as proposed by His Excellency the High Commissioner on the 1st June, 1899.

(2.) The Government are further willing to recommend to the Volksraad that 8 new seats in the First Volksraad, and, if necessary, also in the Second Volksraad, be given to the population of the Witwatersrand, thus with the 2 sitting members for the Goldfields giving to the population thereof 10 representatives in a Raad of 36, and in future the representation of the Goldfields of this Republic shall not fall below the proportion of one-fourth of the total.

(3.) The new Burghers shall equally with the old Burghers be entitled to vote at the election for State President and Commandant-General.

(4.) This Government will always be prepared to take into consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details of the Franchise Law as Her Majesty's Government, through the British Agent, may wish to convey to it.

(5.) In putting forward the above proposals Government of South African Republic assumes:

(a) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place.

(b) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being allowed tacitly to drop.

(c) That arbitration (from which foreign element other than Orange Free State is to be excluded) will be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become law.

(6.) Immediately on Her Majesty's Government accepting this proposal for a settlement, the Government will ask the Volksraad to adjourn for the purpose of consulting the people about it, and the whole scheme might become law say within a few weeks.

(7.) In the meantime the form and scope of the proposed Tribunal are also to be discussed and provisionally agreed upon, while the franchise scheme is being referred to the people, so that no time may be lost in putting an end to the present state of affairs. The Government trust that Her Majesty's Government will clearly understand that in the opinion of this Government the existing Franchise Law of this Republic is both fair and liberal to the new population, and that the consideration that induces them to go further, as they do in the above proposals, is their strong desire to get the controversies between the two Governments settled, and further to put an end to present strained relations between the two Governments and the incalculable harm and loss it has already occasioned in South Africa, and to prevent a racial war from the effects of which South Africa may not recover for many generations, perhaps never at all, and therefore this Government, having regard to all these circumstances would highly appreciate it if Her Majesty's Government, seeing the necessity of preventing the present crisis from developing still further and the urgency of an early termination of the present state of affairs, would expedite the acceptance or refusal of the settlement here offered. (Signed) F. W. REITZ."

The second note, which followed on the 21st of August, was in these terms:

{489}

"In continuation of my despatch of the 19th instant and with reference to the communication to you of the State Attorney this morning, I wish to forward to you the following in explanation thereof, with the request that the same may be telegraphed to His Excellency the High Commissioner for South Africa, as forming part of the proposals of this Government embodied in the above-named despatch.

(1.) The proposals of this Government regarding question of franchise and representation contained in that despatch must be regarded as expressly conditional on Her Majesty's Government consenting to the points set forth in paragraph 5 of the despatch, viz.: (a) In future not to interfere in internal affairs of the South African Republic. (b) Not to insist further on its assertion of existence of suzerainty. (c) To agree to arbitration.

(2.) Referring to paragraph 6 of the despatch, this Government trusts that it is clear to Her Majesty's Government that this Government has not consulted the Volksraad as to this question and will only do so when an affirmative reply to its proposals has been received from Her Majesty's Government. (Signed) F. W. REITZ."

The above notes were repeated by cable, in full, to the Colonial Secretary, at London, and, on the 28th of August, he returned by the same medium his reply, as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government have considered the proposals which the South African Republic Government in their notes to the British Agent of 19th and 21st August have put forward as an alternative to those contained in my telegram of 31st July. Her Majesty's Government assume that the adoption in principle of the franchise proposals made by you at Bloemfontein will not be hampered by any conditions which would impair their effect, and that by proposed increase of seats for the Goldfields and by other provisions the South African Republic Government intend to grant immediate and substantial representation of the Uitlanders. That being so, Her Majesty's Government are unable to appreciate the objections entertained by the Government of the South African Republic to a Joint Commission of Inquiry into the complicated details and technical questions upon which the practical effect of the proposals depends. Her Majesty's Government, however, will be ready to agree that the British Agent, assisted by such other persons as you may appoint, shall make the investigation necessary to satisfy them that the result desired will be achieved and, failing this, to enable them to make those suggestions which the Government of the South African Republic state that they will be prepared to take into consideration. Her Majesty's Government assume that every facility will be given to the British Agent by the Government of the South African Republic, and they would point out that the inquiry will be both easier and shorter if the Government of the South African Republic will omit in any future Law the complicated conditions of registration, qualification and behaviour which accompanied previous proposals, and would have entirely nullified their beneficial effect. Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of the South African Republic will wait to receive their suggestions founded on the report of the British Agent's investigation before submitting a new Franchise Law to the Volksraad and the Burghers. With regard to the conditions of the Government of the South African Republic: First, as regards intervention; Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention on their behalf, but Her Majesty's Government cannot of course debar themselves from their rights under the Conventions nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilized Power to protect its subjects in a foreign country from injustice. Secondly, with regard to suzerainty Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of the South African Republic to the second paragraph of my despatch of 13th July. Thirdly, Her Majesty's Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a Tribunal of Arbitration from which foreigners and foreign influence are excluded. Such a discussion, which will be of the highest importance to the future relations of the two countries, should be carried on between the President and yourself, and for this purpose it appears to be necessary that a further Conference, which Her Majesty's Government suggest should be held at Cape Town, should be at once arranged. Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two Governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration. It is necessary that these should be settled concurrently with the questions now under discussion, and they will form, with the question of arbitration, proper subjects for consideration at the proposed Conference."

On the 2d of September the Boer government replied to this at length, stating that it considered the proposal made in its note of August 19 to have lapsed; again objecting to a joint inquiry relative to the practical working of the Franchise Law, but adding: "If they [the Government] can be of assistance to Her Majesty's Government with any information or explanation they are always ready to furnish this; though it appears to it that the findings of a unilateral Commission, especially when arrived at before the working of the law has been duly tested, would be premature and thus probably of little value."

Meantime, on the 31st of August, Sir Alfred Milner had telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: "I am receiving representations from many quarters to urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense. Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in various reliable quarters that the distress is now really serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. Business there is at a standstill; many traders have become insolvent; and others are only kept on their legs by the leniency of their creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected hitherto, are now suffering owing to the withdrawal of workmen, both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action; not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the vindication of British authority. It is prolongation of the negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded."

{490}

On the 8th of September, the High Commissioner was instructed by Mr. Chamberlain to communicate the following to the government of the Transvaal:

"Her Majesty's Government are still prepared to accept the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of the 19th August taken by themselves, provided that the inquiry which Her Majesty's Government have proposed, whether joint—as Her Majesty's Government originally suggested—or unilateral, shows that the new scheme of representation will not be encumbered by conditions which will nullify the intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the Uitlanders. In this connection Her Majesty's Government assume that, as stated to the British Agent, the new members of the Raad will be permitted to use their own language. The acceptance of these terms by the Government of the South African Republic would at once remove the tension between the two Governments, and would in all probability render unnecessary any further intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to secure the redress of grievances which the Uitlanders would themselves be able to bring to the notice of the Executive and the Raad."

In a lengthy response to this by State Secretary Reitz, September 16, the following are the essential paragraphs: "However earnestly this Government also desires to find an immediate and satisfactory course by which existing tension should be brought to an end, it feels itself quite unable, as desired, to recommend or propose to South African Republic Volksraad and people the part of its proposal contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of its note 19th August, omitting the conditions on the acceptance of which alone the offer was based, but declares itself always still prepared to abide by its acceptance of the invitation [of] Her Majesty's Government to get a Joint Commission composed as intimated in its note of 2nd September. It considers that if conditions are contained in the existing franchise law which has been passed, and in the scheme of representation, which might tend to frustrate object contemplated, that it will attract the attention of the Commission, and thus be brought to the knowledge of this Government. This Government has noticed with surprise the assertion that it had intimated to British Agent that the new members to be chosen for South African Republic Volksraad should be allowed to use their own language. If it is thereby intended that this Government would have agreed that any other than the language of the country would have been used in the deliberations of the Volksraad, it wishes to deny same in the strongest manner."

Practically the discussion was ended by a despatch from the British Colonial Secretary, September 22d, in which he said; "Her Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion repeated their assurances that they have no desire to interfere in any way with independence of South African Republic, provided that the conditions on which it was granted are honourably observed in the spirit and in the letter, and they have offered as part of a general settlement to give a complete guarantee against any attack upon that independence, either from within any part of the British dominions or from the territory of a foreign State. They have not asserted any rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic other than those which are derived from the Conventions between the two countries or which belong to every neighbouring Government (and especially to one which has a largely predominant interest in the adjacent territories) for the protection of its subjects and of its adjoining possessions." Referring to his despatch of September 8, the Secretary concluded: "The refusal of the Government of the South African Republic to entertain the offer thus made, coming as it does at the end of nearly four months of protracted negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending over a period of more than five years, makes it useless to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and Her Majesty's Government are now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement of the issues which have been created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for many years by the Government of the South African Republic. They will communicate to you the result of their deliberations in a later despatch."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9518, 9521, 9530._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1899 (September-October). The Free State makes common cause with the South African Republic.

On the 27th of September, President Steyn communicated to the British High Commissioner a resolution adopted that day by the Orange Free State Volksraad, instructing the government to continue efforts for peaceful settlement of differences between the South African Republic and Great Britain, but concluding with the declaration that "if a war is now begun or occasioned by Her Majesty's Government against South African Republic, this would morally be a war against the whole of white population of South Africa and would in its results be calamitous and criminal, and further, that Orange Free State will honestly and faithfully observe its obligations towards South African Republic arising out of the political alliance between the two Republics whatever may happen."

On the 11th of October, the High Commissioner communicated to President Steyn the ultimatum that he received from the South African Republic, and asked: "In view of Resolution of Volksraad of Orange Free State communicated to me in Your Honour's telegram of 27th September I have the honour to request that I may be informed at Your Honour's earliest possible convenience whether this action on the part of the South African Republic has Your Honour's concurrence and support." The reply of the Orange Free State President was as follows:

"The high handed and unjustifiable policy and conduct of Her Majesty's Government in interfering in and dictating in the purely internal affairs of South African Republic, constituting a flagrant breach of the Convention of London, 1884, accompanied at first by preparations, and latterly followed by active commencement of hostilities against that Republic, which no friendly and well-intentioned efforts on our part could induce Her Majesty's Government to abandon, constitute such an undoubted and unjust attack on the independence of the South African Republic that no other course is left to this State than honourably to abide by its Conventional Agreements entered into with that Republic. On behalf of this Government, therefore, I beg to notify that, compelled thereto by the action of Her Majesty's Government, they intend to carry out the instructions of the Volksraad as set forth in the last part of the Resolution referred to by Your Excellency."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C.—9530, pages 38 and 67._

{491}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal and Orange Free State: A. D. 1899 (September-October). Preparations for war. Troops massed on both sides of the frontiers. Remonstrances of Orange Free State. The Boer Ultimatum.

Before the controversy between Boer and Briton had reached the stage represented above, both sides were facing the prospect of war, both were bringing forces to the frontier, and each was declaring that the other had been first to take that threatening step. Which of them did first begin movements that bore a look of menace seems difficult to learn from official reports. On the 19th of September, the British High Commissioner gave notice to the President of the Orange Free State that "it has been deemed advisable by the Imperial military authorities to send detachments of the troops ordinarily stationed at Cape Town to assist in securing the line of communication between the Colony and the British territories lying to the north of it"; and "as this force, or a portion of it, may be stationed near the borders of the Orange Free State," he wished the burghers of that State to understand that the movement was in no way directed against them. Eight days later, President Steyn, of the Orange Free State, addressed a long despatch to the High Commissioner, remonstrating against the whole procedure of the British government in its dealing with the South African Republic, and alluding to the "enormous and ever increasing military preparations of the British government." On the 2d of October he announced to the Commissioner that he had "deemed it advisable, in order to allay the intense excitement and unrest amongst our burghers, arising from the totally undefended state of our border, in the presence of a continued increase and movement of troops on two sides of this State, to call up our burghers, to satisfy them that due precaution had been taken." The High Commissioner replied on the 3d: "Your Honour must be perfectly well aware that all the movements of British troops which have taken place in this country since the beginning of present troubles, which have been necessitated by the natural alarm of the inhabitants in exposed districts, are not comparable in magnitude with the massing of armed forces by government of South African Republic on the borders of Natal." Some days previous to this, on the 29th of September, Secretary Chamberlain had cabled from London to Sir Alfred Milner: "Inform President of Orange Free State that what he describes as the enormous and ever-increasing military preparations of Great Britain have been forced upon Her Majesty's Government by the policy of the South African Republic, which has transformed the Transvaal into a permanent armed camp, threatening the peace of the whole of South Africa and the position of Great Britain as the paramount State."

On the 9th of October the High Commissioner received another telegram from the President of the Orange Free State, of which he cabled the substance to London as follows: "He demurs to statement that military preparations of Her Majesty's Government have been necessitated by conversion of South African Republic into an armed camp. Her Majesty's Government must be entirely misinformed and it would be regrettable if, through such misunderstanding, present state of extreme tension were allowed to continue. Though Her Majesty's Government may regard precautions taken by South African Republic after Jameson Raid as excessive, Government of South African Republic cannot be blamed for adopting them, in view of large Uitlander population constantly being stirred up, through hostile press, to treason and rebellion by persons and organizations financially or politically interested in overthrowing the Government. Arming of Burghers not intended for any purpose of aggression against Her Majesty's dominions. People of South African Republic have, since shortly after Jameson Raid, been practically as fully armed as now, yet have never committed any act of aggression. It was not till Her Majesty's Government, with evident intention of enforcing their views on South African Republic in purely internal matters, had greatly augmented their forces and moved them nearer to borders that a single Burgher was called up for the purpose, as be firmly believed, of defending country and independence. If this natural assumption erroneous, not too late to rectify misunderstanding by mutual agreement to withdraw forces on both sides and undertaking by Her Majesty's Government to stop further increase of troops."

But, in reality, it was already too late; for, on the same day on which the above message was telegraphed from Bloemfontein, the government of the South African Republic had presented to the British Agent at Pretoria a note which ended the possibility of peace. After reviewing the issue between the two governments, the note concluded with a peremptory ultimatum, as follows: "Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic but also [?] of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assurance (a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government. (b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn. (c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed Burghers of this Republic from the borders. {492} (d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any port of South Africa. This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval [it] will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war."

To this ultimatum the British government gave its reply, in a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir Alfred Milner, October 10, as follows: "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, Number 3. You will inform the Government of the South African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C.—9530._

Efforts which were being made at the time in Holland to assist the Boer Republic in pacific negotiations with Great Britain were suddenly frustrated by this action. A year later (in November, 1900) it was stated in the States General at The Hague that "in the autumn of 1899 the Netherlands Government offered in London its good offices for the resumption of negotiations with the Transvaal, but these efforts had no result in consequence of the sudden ultimatum of the Transvaal and the commencement of hostilities by the armies of the Republics, actions which surprised the Netherlands Government. When once the war had broken out any effort in the direction of intervention would have been useless, as was shown by the peremptory refusal given by Great Britain to the offer of the United States."

An Englishman who was in the country at the time gives the following account of the Boer preparation for war: "In the towns the feeling was strongly against war; in the country districts war was popular, as the farmers had not the slightest doubt they would be able to carry out their threat of 'driving the English into the sea.' … Skilled artillerymen were finding their way into the country towards the end of August last [1899]. The Boers themselves did not put much faith in their artillery, but they were reassured by the officers who told them that they would yet learn to respect its usefulness and efficiency—a prophecy which to our cost has been more than fulfilled. … General Joubert was always ready and willing, at any time, to inspect and test new guns or military necessaries, and no expense was spared to make the Transvaal burgher army a first-class fighting-machine. … Surprise has been expressed at the inaccurate statements made by colonials as to the fighting strength of the Boers. They had not allowed for the enormous increase of population. From an absolutely reliable source the writer ascertained in September last that they could put in the field between 50 and 60 thousand men, made up as follows: Transvaal burghers, 22,000; resident foreigners, etc., 10,000; Free Staters, 16,000; colonists who would cross the border and join, 6,000; total, 54,000. … As soon as war seemed likely, no time was lost in perfecting the military arrangements. Before Great Britain had thought of mobilizing a soldier, the Boer emissaries were again scouring the colonies of Natal and the Cape, sounding the farmers as to what part they were prepared to take in the coming conflict. … While people at home were wondering what the next move would be, the Boers were ready to answer the question. Towards the middle of September all preparations were completed, the Government had laid in large quantities of supplies (mainly of flour, Boer meal, and tinned foods), which they anticipated would tide them over twelve to eighteen months, and by that time, if they had not beaten the British, they relied on foreign intervention. They had also received large sums of money from Europe, and some additional supplies of arms and ammunition. Ammunition was distributed in large quantities throughout the country, each burgher receiving a sealed packet in addition to his ordinary supply. The last batch of the Mauser rides was distributed, and the mobilization scheme finally arranged, by which, on a given word being telegraphed to the different centres, the first Republican army corps would be mobilized within twenty-four hours. This actually took place. … The British Government could hardly fail to be aware of the fact that the Transvaal was in earnest this time. A visit to the country districts towards the end of August, about the time when the Boer Executive themselves sounded the country through their private agencies, would have revealed the fact that the people were not only perfectly willing to go to war, but that they absolutely wished for it. As one Boer put it to the writer: 'We look on fighting the English as a picnic. In some of the Kaffir wars we had a little trouble, but in the Vryheids Oorlog (the Boer War of 1881) we simply potted the Rooineks as they streamed across the veld in their red jackets, without the slightest danger to ourselves.' They had the utmost contempt for Tommy Atkins and his leaders, many of them bragging that the only thing that deterred them from advocating war instanter was the thought that they would have to kill so many of the soldiers, with whom individually they said there was no quarrel. With such a state of things, which should have been perfectly clear to the Intelligence Department (and through it to the War Office) in London—because no resident with eyes to see could be deceived in the matter—we allowed the present war to find us unprepared!"

_J. Scoble and H. H. Abercrombie, The Rise and Fall of Krugerism,