Part 134

"England, then, and France entered the war as allies. Lord Raglan, formerly Lord Fitzroy Somerset, an old pupil of the Great Duke in the Peninsular War, and who had lost his right arm serving under Wellington at Waterloo, was appointed to command the English forces. Marshal St. Arnaud, a bold, brilliant soldier of fortune, was intrusted by the Emperor of the French with the leadership of the soldiers of France. The allied forces went out to the East and assembled at Varna, on the Black Sea shore, from which they were to make their descent on the Crimea. The war, meantime, had gone badly for the Emperor of Russia in his attempt to crush the Turks. The Turks had found in Omar Pasha a commander of remarkable ability and energy; and they had in one or two instances received the unexpected aid and counsel of clever and successful Englishmen. … The invasion of the Danubian provinces was already, to all intents, a failure. Mr. Kinglake and other writers have argued that but for the ambition of the Emperor of the French and the excited temper of the English people the war might well have ended then and there. The Emperor of Russia had found, it is contended, that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey; his fleet was confined to its ports in the Black Sea, and there was nothing for him but to make peace. But we confess we do not see with what propriety or wisdom the allies, having entered on the enterprise at all, could have abandoned it at such a moment, and allowed the Czar to escape thus merely scotched. … The allies went on. They sailed from Varna for the Crimea. … There is much discussion as to the original author of the project for the invasion of the Crimea. The Emperor Napoleon has had it ascribed to him; so has Lord Palmerston; so has the Duke of Newcastle; so, according to Mr. Kinglake, has the 'Times' newspaper. It does not much concern us to know in whom the idea originated, but it is of some importance to know that it was essentially a civilian's and not a soldier's idea. It took possession almost simultaneously, as far as we can observe, of the minds of several statesmen, and it had a sudden fascination for the public. The Emperor Nicholas had raised and sheltered his Black Sea fleet at Sebastopol. That fleet had sallied forth from Sebastopol to commit what was called the massacre of Sinope. Sebastopol was the great arsenal of Russia. It was the point from which Turkey was threatened; from which, it was universally believed, the embodied ambition of Russia was one day to make its most formidable effort of aggression. Within the fence of its vast sea-forts the fleet of the Black Sea lay screened. From the moment when the vessels of England and France entered the Euxine the Russian fleet had withdrawn behind the curtain of these defences, and was seen upon the open waves no more. If, therefore, Sebastopol could be taken or destroyed, it would seem as if the whole material fabric, put together at such cost and labor for the execution of the schemes of Russia, would be shattered at a blow. … The invasion of the Crimea, however, was not a soldier's project. It was not welcomed by the English or the French commander. It was undertaken by Lord Raglan out of deference to the recommendations of the Government; and by Marshal St. Arnaud out of deference to the Emperor of the French, and because Lord Raglan, too, did not see his way to decline the responsibility of it. The allied forces were, therefore, conveyed to the south-western shore of the Crimea, and effected a landing in Kalamita Bay, a short distance north of the point at which the river Alma runs into the sea. Sebastopol itself lies about 30 miles to the south; and then, more southward still, divided by the bulk of a jutting promontory from Sebastopol, is the harbor of Balaklava. The disembarkation began on the morning of September 14th, 1854. It was completed on the fifth day; and there were then some 27,000 English, 30,000 French, and 7,000 Turks landed on the shores of Catherine the Great's Crimea. The landing was effected without any opposition from the Russians. On September 19th, the allies marched out of their encampments and moved southward in the direction of Sebastopol. They had a skirmish or two with a reconnoitring force of Russian cavalry and Cossacks; but they had no business of genuine war until they reached the nearer bank of the Alma. The Russians, in great strength, had taken up a splendid position on the heights that fringed the other side of the river. The allied forces reached the Alma about noon on September 20th. They found that they had to cross the river in the face of the Russian batteries armed with heavy guns on the highest point of the hills or bluffs, of scattered artillery, and of dense masses of infantry which covered the hills. The Russians were under the command of Prince Mentschikoff. {2776} It is certain that Prince Mentschikoff believed his position unassailable, and was convinced that his enemies were delivered into his hands when he saw the allies approach and attempt to effect the crossing of the river. … The attack was made with desperate courage on the part of the allies, but without any great skill of leadership or tenacity of discipline. It was rather a pell-mell sort of fight, in which the headlong courage and the indomitable obstinacy of the English and French troops carried all before them at last. A study of the battle is of little profit to the ordinary reader. It was an heroic scramble. There was little coherence of action between the allied forces. But there was happily an almost total absence of generalship on the part of the Russians. The soldiers of the Czar fought stoutly and stubbornly, as they have always done; but they could not stand up against the blended vehemence and obstinacy of the English and French. The river was crossed, the opposite heights were mounted, Prince Mentschikoff's great redoubt was carried, the Russians were driven from the field, the allies occupied their ground; the victory was to the Western Powers. … The Russians ought to have been pursued. They themselves fully expected a pursuit. They retreated in something like utter confusion. … But there was no pursuit. Lord Raglan was eager to follow up the victory; but the French had as yet hardly any cavalry, and Marshal St. Arnaud would not agree to any further enterprise that day. Lord Raglan believed that he ought not to persist; and nothing was done. … Except for the bravery of those who fought, the battle was not much to boast of. … At this distance of time it is almost touching to read some of the heroic contemporaneous descriptions of the great scramble of the Alma. … Very soon, however, a different note came to be sounded. The campaign had been opened under conditions differing from those of most campaigns that went before it. Science had added many new discoveries to the art of war. Literature had added one remarkable contribution of her own to the conditions amidst which campaigns were to be carried on. She had added the 'special correspondent.' … When the expedition was leaving England it was accompanied by a special correspondent from each of the great daily papers of London. The 'Times' sent out a representative whose name almost immediately became celebrated—Mr. William Howard Russell, the 'preux chevalier' of war correspondents in that day, as Mr. Archibald Forbes of the 'Daily News' is in this. … Mr. Russell soon saw that there was confusion; and he had the soundness of judgment to know that the confusion was that of a breaking-down system. Therefore, while the fervor of delight in the courage and success of our army was still fresh in the minds of the public at home, while every music-hall was ringing with the cheap rewards of valor, in the shape of popular glorifications of our commanders and our soldiers, the readers of the 'Times' began to learn that things were faring badly indeed with the conquering army of the Alma. The ranks were thinned by the ravages of cholera. The men were pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, Lord Raglan himself said. … The hospitals were in a wretchedly disorganized condition. Stores of medicines and strengthening food were decaying in places where no one wanted them or could well get at them, while men were dying in hundreds among our tents in the Crimea for lack of them. The system of clothing, of transport, of feeding, of nursing—everything had broken down. Ample provisions had been got together and paid for; and when they came to be needed no one knew where to get at them. The special correspondent of the 'Times' and other correspondents continued to din these things into the ears of the public at home. Exultation began to give way to a feeling of dismay. The patriotic anger against the Russians was changed for a mood of deep indignation against our own authorities and our own war administration. It soon became apparent to everyone that the whole campaign had been planned on the assumption that it was to be like the career of the hero whom Byron laments, 'brief, brave, and glorious.' Our military authorities here at home—we do not speak of the commanders in the field—had made up their minds that Sebastopol was to fall, like another Jericho, at the sound of the war-trumpets' blast. Our commanders in the field were, on the contrary, rather disposed to overrate than to underrate the strength of the Russians. … It is very likely that if a sudden dash had been made at Sebastopol by land and sea, it might have been taken almost at the very opening of the war. But the delay gave the Russians full warning, and they did not neglect it. On the third day after the battle of the Alma the Russians sank seven vessels of their Black Sea fleet at the entrance of the harbor of Sebastopol. This was done full in the sight of the allied fleets, who at first, misunderstanding the movements going on among the enemy, thought the Russian squadron were about to come out from their shelter and try conclusions with the Western ships. But the real purpose of the Russians became soon apparent. Under the eyes of the allies the seven vessels slowly settled down and sank in the water, until at last only the tops of their masts were to be seen; and the entrance of the harbor was barred as by sunken rocks against any approach of an enemy's ship. There was an end to every dream of a sudden capture of Sebastopol."

_J. McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, chapter 27 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN: _General Sir E. Hamley, The War in the Crimea, chapters 2-3._

_W. H. Russell, The British Expedition to the Crimea, books 1-2._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (September-October). Opening of the siege of Sebastopol.

Four days after the battle of the Alma the allies reached the Belbek, so close to Sebastopol that "it became a matter of necessity to decide upon their next step. It appears to have been the wish of the English at once to take advantage of their victory and assault the north side. It is now known that such a step would almost certainly have been successful. … But again St. Arnaud offered objections." It was then determined "to undertake a flank march round the head of the harbour, and to take possession of the heights on the south. It was a difficult operation, for the country was unknown and rough, and while in the act of marching the armies were open to any assault upon their left flank. It was however carried out unmolested. … On the 26th the English arrived at the little landlocked harbour of Balaclava, at the foot of the steep hills forming the eastern edge of the plateau. The fleet, duly warned of the operation, had already arrived. … {2777} Canrobert … had now succeeded the dying St. Arnaud. … A similar question to that which had arisen on the 24th now again rose. Should Sebastopol be attacked at once or not? Again it would appear that Lord Raglan, Sir Edmund Lyons, and others, were desirous of immediate assault. Again the French, more instructed in the technical rules of war, and supported by the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who commanded the English Engineers, declined the more vigorous suggestion, and it was determined at least to wait till the siege guns from the fleet were landed, and the artillery fire of the enemy weakened, in preparation for the assault. In the light of subsequent knowledge, and perhaps even with the knowledge then obtainable if rightly used, it appears that in all the three instances mentioned the bolder less regular course would have been the true wisdom. For Menschikoff had adopted a somewhat strange measure of defence. He had given up all hopes of using his fleet to advantage. He had caused some of his vessels to be sunk at the entrance of the harbour, which was thus closed; and having drawn the crews, some 18,000 in number, from the ships, he had intrusted to them the defence of the town, and had marched away with his whole army. The garrison did not now number more than 25,000, and they were quite unfit—being sailors—for operations in the field. The defences were not those of a regular fortress, but rather of an entrenched position. … There were in Sebastopol two men who, working together, made an extraordinary use of their opportunities. Korniloff, the Admiral, forcing himself to the front by sheer nobleness of character and enthusiasm, found in Colonel von Todleben, at that time on a voluntary mission in the town, an assistant of more than common genius. … The decision of the allies to await the landing of their siege train was more far-reaching than the generals at the time conceived, although some few men appear to have understood its necessary result. It in fact changed what was intended to be a rapid coup de main into a regular siege—and a regular siege of an imperfect and inefficient character, because the allied forces were not strong enough to invest the town. … Preparation had not been made to meet the change of circumstances. The work thrown upon the administration was beyond its powers; the terrible suffering of the army during the ensuing winter was the inevitable result. … The bombardment of the suburb, including the Malakoff and the Redan, fell to the English; the French undertook to carry it out against the city itself, directing their fire principally against the Flagstaff battery. … Slowly the siege trains were landed and brought into position in the batteries marked out by the engineers. … It was not till the 16th of October that these preparations were completed. … The energy of Korniloff and the skill of Todleben had by this time roused the temper of the garrison, and had rendered the defences far more formidable; and in the beginning of October means had been taken to persuade Menschikoff to allow considerable bodies of troops to return to the town. … On the 17th the great bombardment began. The English batteries gained the mastery over those opposed to them, but the efforts of the French, much reduced by the fire of the besieged, were brought to a speedy conclusion by a great explosion within their lines. Canrobert sent word to Lord Raglan that he should be unable to resume the fire for two days. The attack by the fleet had been to little purpose. … Every day till the 25th of October the fire of the allies was continued. But under cover of this fire (always encountered by the ceaseless energy of Todleben) the change had begun, and the French were attacking the Flagstaff bastion by means of regular approaches. On that day the siege was somewhat rudely interrupted. The presence of the Russian army outside the walls and the defect in the position of the allies became evident."

_J. F. Bright, History of England, 1837-1880, pages 251-256._

ALSO IN: _A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, volumes 3-4._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (October-November). The Crimean War: Balaclava and Inkermann.

"The Russian general soon showed that he was determined not to allow the allies to carry on their operations against the town undisturbed. Large parties of Russian soldiers had for some time been reconnoitring in the direction of Balaclava, showing that an attack in that quarter was meditated. At length, on the 25th of October, an army of 30,000 Russians advanced against the English position, hoping to get possession of the harbours and to cut the allies off from their supplies, or at any rate to destroy the stores which had already been landed. The part of the works on which the Russian troops first came was occupied by redoubts, defended by a body of Turkish recruits, recently arrived from Tunis, who, after offering a very feeble resistance, fled in confusion. But when the Russians, flushed with this first success, attempted to pursue the advantage they had gained, they soon encountered a very different foe in the Highlanders, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, who bore the brunt of the Russian attack with great firmness. The British cavalry particularly distinguished themselves in this action, routing a far superior force of Russian cavalry. It was in the course of this engagement that the unfortunate blunder occurred, in consequence of which 607 men [the 'Light Brigade' immortalized by Tennyson] galloped forth against an army, and only 198 came back, the rest having been killed, wounded, or made prisoners. A long, unsatisfactory controversy was carried on some time after, having for its object to decide who was to blame for throwing away, in this foolish manner, the lives of so many gallant men. It seems that the orders were not very clearly expressed, and that the general—Lord Lucan—by whom they were received, misapprehended them more completely than a man in his position ought to have done. In the end, the Russians were forced to retire, without having effected their object: but as they retained some portion of the ground that had been occupied by the allies at the commencement of the battle, they too claimed the victory, and Te-Deums were sung all over Russia in honour of this fragmentary success. However, the Russian commander did not abandon the hope of being able to obtain possession of Balaclava. On the very day following the affair which has just been related, the Russians within the town made a sortie with a force of about 6,000 men: but near the village of Inkermann they encountered so strong a resistance from a far inferior force, that they were obliged to retreat. {2778} The Russian army at Balaclava had been prepared to coöperate with them; but the promptitude and vigour with which the allies repelled the sortie prevented the Russians from entrenching themselves at Inkermann, and thus frustrated the plan of a combined attack on the allied position which had probably been formed. The village of Inkermann, which was the scene of this skirmish, shortly after witnessed a more deadly and decisive contest. It was on the morning of Sunday, November 5th, that the approach of the Russian army was heard, while it was still concealed from view by the mists which overhung the British position. That army had been greatly increased by the arrival of large reinforcements, and every effort had been made to exalt the courage of the soldiers: they had been stimulated by religious services and exhortations, as well as by an abundant supply of ardent spirits; and they came on in the full confidence that they would be able to sweep the comparatively small British force from the position it occupied. That position was the centre of a grand attack made by the whole Russian army. The obscurity prevented the generals of the allies from discovering what was going on, or from clearly discerning, among a series of attacks on different parts of their position, which were real, and which were mere feints. There was a good deal of confusion in both armies; but the obscurity, on the whole, favoured the Russians, who had received their instructions before they set out, and were moving together in large masses. It was, in fact, a battle fought pell-mell, man against man, and regiment against regiment, with very little guidance or direction from the commanding officers, and consequently one in which the superior skill of the British gave them little advantage. The principal point of attack throughout was the plateau of Inkermann, occupied by the Guards and a few British regiments, who maintained a long and unequal struggle against the main body of the Russian army. It was, in fact, a hand-to-hand contest between superior civilization on the one hand, and superior numbers on the other, in which it is probable that the small British force would have been eventually swept off the field. Bosquet, the ablest of the French generals, with a soldier's instinct at once divined, amid all the obscurity, turmoil, and confusion, that the British position was the real point of attack; and therefore, leaving a portion of his force to defend his own position, he marched off to Inkermann, and never halted till his troops charged the Russians with such fury that they drove them down the hill, and decided the fate of the battle in favour of the allies. … Meanwhile Mr. Sidney Herbert, the minister at war, had succeeded in inducing Miss Florence Nightingale, well known in London for her skilful and self-denying benevolence, to go out and take charge of the military hospitals in which the wounded soldiers were received. Everything connected with the hospitals there was in a state of the most chaotic confusion. The medical and other stores which had been sent out were rotting in the holds of vessels, or in places where they were not wanted. Provisions had been despatched in abundance, and yet nothing could be found to support men who were simply dying from exhaustion. The system of check and counter-check, which had been devised to prevent waste and extravagance in the time of peace, proved to be the very cause of the most prodigious waste, extravagance, and inefficiency in the great war in which England was now embarked. The sort of dictatorial authority which had been conferred on Miss Nightingale, supported by her own admirable organising and administrative ability, enabled her to substitute order for confusion, and procure for the multitudes of wounded men who came under her care the comforts as well as the medical attendance they needed. She arrived at Scutari with her nurses on the very day of the battle of Inkermann. Winter was setting-in in the Crimea with unusual rigour and severity."

_W. N. Molesworth, History of England, 1830-1874, volume 3, chapter 1._

ALSO IN: _E. H. Nolan, Illustrated History of the War against Russia, chapters 40-48 (volume 1)._

_Chambers' Pictorial History of the Russian War, chapters 7-8._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854-1855. Siege and capture of Kars.