Part 133

"Napoleon waited in vain for propositions from the Czar; his own were scornfully rejected. Meanwhile the Russians were reorganizing their armies, and winter set in. On the 13th of October, the first frost gave warning that it was time to think of the retreat, which the enemy, already on the French flank, was threatening to cut off. Leaving Mortier with 10,000 men in the Kremlin, the army quitted Moscow on the 19th of October, thirty-five days after it had entered the city. It still numbered 80,000 fighting men and 600 cannons, but was encumbered with camp-followers and vehicles. At Malo-Jaroslavetz a violent struggle took place on the 24th. The town was captured and recaptured seven times. It was finally left in the hands of the French. Here, however, the route changed. {2772} The road became increasingly difficult, the cold grew intense, the ground was covered with snow, and the confusion in the quartermaster's department was terrible. When the army reached Smolensk, there were only 50,000 men in the ranks (November 9). Napoleon had taken minute precautions to provide supplies and reinforcements all along his line of retreat; but the heedlessness of his subalterns, and the difficulty of being obeyed at such distances and in such a country, rendered his foresight useless. At Smolensk, where he hoped to find provisions and supplies, everything had been squandered. Meanwhile there was not a moment to lose; Wittgenstein, with the army of the North, was coming up on the French right. Tchitchagof was occupying Minsk behind the Beresina, with the army which had just come from the banks of the Danube. Kutusof was near at hand. The three Russian armies proposed to unite and bar the Beresina, which the French were obliged to cross. The French began their march, but the cold became suddenly intense; all verdure had disappeared, and there being no food for the horses, they died by the thousand. The cavalry was forced to dismount; it became necessary to destroy or abandon a large portion of the cannon and ammunition. The enemy surrounded the French columns with a cloud of Cossacks, who captured all stragglers. On the following days the temperature moderated. Then arose another obstacle,—the mud, which prevented the advance; and the famine was constant. Moreover, the retreat was one continuous battle. Ney, 'the bravest of the brave,' accomplished prodigies of valor. At Krasnoi the Emperor himself was obliged to charge at the head of his guard. When the Beresina was reached, the army was reduced to 40,000 fighting men, of whom one-third were Poles. The Russians had burned the bridge of Borisof, and Tchitchagof, on the other shore, barred the passage. Fortunately a ford was found. The river was filled with enormous blocks of ice; General Eblé and his pontoniers, plunged in the water up to their shoulders, built and rebuilt bridges across it. Almost all the pontoniers perished of cold or were drowned. Then, while on the right of the river Ney and Oudinot held back the army of Tchitchagof, and Victor on the left that of Wittgenstein, the guard, with Napoleon, passed over. Victor, after having killed or wounded 10,000 of Wittgenstein's Russians, passed over during the night. When, in the morning, the rear-guard began to cross the bridges, a crowd of fugitives rushed upon them. They were soon filled with a confused mass of cavalry, infantry, caissons, and fugitives. The Russians came up and poured a shower of shells upon the helpless crowd. This frightful scene has ever since been famous as the passage of the Beresina. The governor of Minsk had 24,000 dead bodies picked up and burned. Napoleon conducted the retreat towards Wilna, where the French had large magazines. At Smorgoni he left the army, to repair in all haste to Paris, in order to prevent the disastrous effects of the last events, and to form another army. The army which he had left struggled on under Murat. The cold grew still more intense, and 20,000 men perished in three days. Ney held the enemy a long time in check with desperate valor; be was the last to recross the Niemen (December 20). There the retreat ended, and with it this fatal campaign. Beyond that river the French left 300,000 soldiers, either dead or in captivity."

_Victor Duruy, History of France, chapter 66._

"Thousands of horses soon lay groaning on the route, with great pieces of flesh cut off their necks and most fleshy parts by the passing soldiery for food; whilst thousands of naked wretches were wandering like spectres, who seemed to have no sight or sense, and who only kept reeling on till frost, famine, or the Cossack lance put an end to their power of motion. In that wretched state no nourishment could have saved them. There were continual instances, even amongst the Russians, of their lying down, dozing, and dying within a quarter of an hour after a little bread had been supplied. All prisoners, however, were immediately and invariably stripped stark naked and marched in columns in that state, or turned adrift to be the sport and the victims of the peasantry, who would not always let them, as they sought to do, point and hold the muzzles of the guns against their own heads or hearts to terminate their suffering in the most certain and expeditious manner; for the peasantry thought that this mitigation of torture 'would be an offence against the avenging God of Russia, and deprive them of his further protection.' A remarkable instance of this cruel spirit of retaliation was exhibited on the pursuit to Wiazma. Milaradowitch, Beningsen, Korf, and the English General, with various others, were proceeding on the high-road, about a mile from the town, where they found a crowd of peasant-women, with sticks in their hands, hopping round a felled pine-tree, on each side of which lay about sixty naked prisoners, prostrate, but with their heads on the tree, which those furies were striking in accompaniment to a national air or song which they were yelling in concert; while several hundred armed peasants were quietly looking on as guardians of the direful orgies. When the cavalcade approached, the sufferers uttered piercing shrieks, and kept incessantly crying 'La mort, la mort, la mort!' Near Dorogobouche a young and handsome Frenchwoman lay naked, writhing in the snow, which was ensanguined all around her. On hearing the sound of voices she raised her head, from which extremely long black, shining hair flowed over the whole person. Tossing her arms about with wildest expression of agony, she kept frantically crying, 'Rendez moi mon enfant'—Restore me my babe. When soothed sufficiently to explain her story, she related, 'That on sinking from weakness, a child newly born had been snatched away from her; that she had been stripped by her associates, and then stabbed to prevent her falling alive into the hands of their pursuers.' … The slaughter of the prisoners with every imaginable previous mode of torture by the peasantry still continuing, the English General sent off a despatch to the Emperor Alexander' to represent the horrors of these outrages and propose a check.' The Emperor by an express courier instantly transmitted an order 'to prohibit the parties under the severest menaces of his displeasure and punishment;' at the same time he directed 'a ducat in gold to be paid for any prisoner delivered up by peasant or soldier to any civil authority for safe custody.' The order was beneficial as well as creditable, but still the conductors were offered a higher price for their charge, and frequently were prevailed on to surrender their trust, for they doubted the justifiable validity of the order. {2773} Famine also ruthlessly decimated the enemy's ranks. Groups were frequently overtaken, gathered round the burning or burnt embers of buildings which had afforded cover for some wounded or frozen; many in these groups were employed in peeling off with their fingers and making a repast of the charred flesh of their comrades' remains. The English General having asked a grenadier of most martial expression, so occupied, 'if this food was not loathsome to him?' 'Yes,' he said, 'it was; but he did not eat it to preserve life—that he had sought in vain to lose—only to lull gnawing agonies.' On giving the grenadier a piece of food, which happened to be at command, he seized it with voracity, as if he would devour it whole; but suddenly checking himself, he appeared suffocating with emotion: looking at the bread, then at the donor, tears rolled down his cheeks; endeavouring to rise, and making an effort as if he would catch at the hand which administered to his want, he fell back and had expired before he could be reached. Innumerable dogs crouched on the bodies of their former masters, looking in their faces, and howling their hunger and their loss; whilst others were tearing the still living flesh from the feet, hands, and limbs of moaning wretches who could not defend themselves, and whose torment was still greater, as in many cases their consciousness and senses remained unimpaired. The clinging of the dogs to their masters' corpses was most remarkable and interesting. At the commencement of the retreat, at a village near Selino, a detachment of fifty of the enemy had been surprised. The peasants resolved to bury them alive in a pit: a drummer boy bravely led the devoted party and sprang into the grave. A dog belonging to one of the victims could not be secured; every day, however, the dog went to the neighbouring camp, and came back with a bit of food in his mouth to sit and moan over the newly-turned earth. It was a fortnight before he could be killed by the peasants, afraid of discovery. The peasants showed the English General the spot and related the occurrence with exultation, as if they had performed a meritorious deed. The shots of the peasantry at stragglers or prisoners rang continuously through the woods; and altogether it was a complication of misery, of cruelty, of desolation, and of disorder, that can never have been exceeded in the history of mankind. Many incidents and crimes are indeed too horrible or disgusting for relation."

_General Sir R. Wilson, Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia, pages 255-261._

_General Sir R. Wilson, Private Journal, volume 1, page 202-257._

When Napoleon abandoned the army, at Smorghoni, on the 6th of December, the King of Naples was left in command. "They marched with so much disorder and precipitation that it was only when they arrived at Wilna that the soldiers were informed of a departure as discouraging as it was unexpected. 'What!' said they among themselves, 'is it thus that he abandons those of whom he calls himself the father? Where then is that genius, who, in the height of prosperity, exhorted us to bear our sufferings patiently? He who lavished our blood, is he afraid to die with us? Will he treat us like the army of Egypt, to whom, after having served him faithfully, he became indifferent, when, by a shameful flight, he found himself free from danger?' Such was the conversation of the soldiers, which they accompanied by the most violent execrations. Never was indignation more just, for never were a class of men so worthy of pity. The presence of the emperor had kept the chiefs to their duty, but when they heard of his departure, the greater part of them followed his example, and shamefully abandoned the remains of the regiments with which they had been intrusted. … The road which we followed presented, at every step, brave officers, covered with rags, supported by branches of pine, their hair and beards stiffened by the ice. These warriors, who, a short time before, were the terror of our enemies, and the conquerors of Europe, having now lost their fine appearance, crawled slowly along, and could scarcely obtain a look of pity from the soldiers whom they had formerly commanded. Their situation became still more dreadful, because all who had not strength to march were abandoned, and every one who was abandoned by his comrades, in an hour afterwards inevitably perished. The next day every bivouac presented the image of a field of battle. … The soldiers burnt whole houses to avoid being frozen. We saw round the fires the half-consumed bodies of many unfortunate men, who, having advanced too near, in order to warm themselves, and being too weak to recede, had become a prey to the flames. Some miserable beings, blackened with smoke, and besmeared with the blood of the horses which they had devoured, wandered like ghosts round the burning houses. They gazed on the dead bodies of their companions, and, too feeble to support themselves, fell down, and died like them. … The route was covered with soldiers who no longer retained the human form, and whom the enemy disdained to make prisoners. Every day these miserable men made us witnesses of scenes too dreadful to relate. Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, by excessive cold and hunger, were reduced to a state of frantic stupidity, in which they roasted the dead bodies of their comrades for food, or even gnawed their own hands and arms. Some were so weak that, unable to lift a piece of wood, or roll a stone towards the fires which they had kindled, they sat upon the dead bodies of their comrades, and, with a haggard countenance, steadfastly gazed upon the burning coals. No sooner was the fire extinguished, than these living spectres, unable to rise, fell by the side of those on whom they had sat. We saw many who were absolutely insane. To warm their frozen feet, they plunged them naked into the middle of the fire. Some, with a convulsive laugh, threw themselves into the flames, and perished in the most horrid convulsions, and uttering the most piercing cries; while others, equally insane, immediately followed them, and experienced the same fate."

_E. Labaume, Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia, part 2, book 5._

ALSO IN: _Count P. de Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, books 9-12 (volume 2)._

_C. Joyneville, Life and Times of Alexander I., volume 2, chapter 5._

_Earl Stanhope, The French Retreat from Moscow (Historical Essays; and, also, Quarterly Review., October 1867, volume 123)._

_Baron de Marbot, Memoirs, volume 2, chapters 28-32._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812-1813. Treaty of Kalisch with Prussia. The War of Liberation in Germany. Alliance of Austria. The driving of the French beyond the Rhine.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813, to 1814.

{2774}

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814 (January-April). The Allies in France and in possession of Paris. Fall of Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH), and (MARCH-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814 (May). The Treaty of Paris. Evacuation of France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL-JUNE).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1814-1815. The Congress of Vienna. Acquisitions in Poland. Surrender of Eastern Galicia.

See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. Napoleon's return from Elba. The Quadruple Alliance. The Waterloo campaign and its results.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815, to 1815 (JUNE-AUGUST).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. The Allies again in France. Second Treaty of Paris.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1815. The Holy Alliance.

See HOLY ALLIANCE.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1817. Expulsion of Jesuits.

See JESUITS: A. D. 1769-1871.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1820-1822. The Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona.

See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1825. Accession of Nicholas.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1827-1829. Intervention on behalf of Greece. Battle of Navarino.

See GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1830-1832. Polish revolt and its suppression. Barbarous treatment of the insurgents.

See POLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1831-1846. Joint occupation of Cracow. Extinction of the republic. Its annexation to Austria.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1833-1840. The Turko-Egyptian question and its settlement.

See TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1839-1859. Subjugation of the Caucasus.

See CAUCASUS.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1849. Aid rendered to Austria against the Hungarian patriots.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1848-1849.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1853-1854. Causes of the Crimean War with Turkey, England and France.

"The immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1853 was a dispute which had arisen between France and Russia upon the custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The real cause was the intention of Russia to hasten the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Nicholas, in a memorable conversation, actually suggested to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that England should receive Egypt and Crete as her own portion of the spoil. This conversation, which took place in January 1853, was at once reported to the British Government. It undoubtedly prepared the way for future trouble. … It had the effect of rendering the British Ministry suspicious of his intentions, at a moment when a good understanding with this country was of the first importance to the Czar of Russia. There can, then, be very little doubt that Nicholas committed a grave error in suggesting a partition, which may have seemed reasonable enough to Continental statesmen, but which was regarded with horror by England. Almost at the same moment he affronted France by declining to call Napoleon 'Monsieur mon frère.' … Nicholas had the singular indiscretion to render a British ministry suspicious of him, and a French emperor angry with him, in the same month. Napoleon could easily avenge the affront. … The Greek and Latin Churches both claimed the right of protecting the Holy Places of Palestine. Both appealed to a Mahometan arrangement in support of their claim: each declined to admit the pretensions of the other. The Latin Church in Palestine was under the protection of France; the Greek Church was under the protection of Russia; and France and Russia had constantly supported, one against the other, these rival claims. In the beginning of 1853 France renewed the controversy. She even threatened to settle the question by force. The man whom Nicholas would not call 'mon frère' was stirring a controversy thick with trouble for the Czar of Russia. It happened, moreover, that the controversy was one which, from its very nature, was certain to spread. Nearly eighty years before, by the Treaty of Kainardji, the Porte had undertaken to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects, and to place a new Greek Church at Constantinople, which it undertook to erect, 'and the ministers who officiated at it under the specific protection of the Russian Empire.' The exact meaning of this famous article had always been disputed. In Western Europe it had been usually held that it applied only to the new Greek Church at Constantinople, and the ministers who officiated at it. But Russian statesmen had always contended that its meaning was much wider; and British statesmen of repute had supported the contention. The general undertaking which the Porte had given to Russia to afford a constant protection to its Christian subjects gave Russia —so they argued—the right to interfere when such protection was not afforded. In such a country as Turkey, where chronic misgovernment prevailed, opportunity was never wanting for complaining that the Christians were inadequately protected. The dispute about the Holy Places was soon superseded by a general demand of Russia for the adequate protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte; In the summer of 1853 the demand took the shape of an ultimatum; and, when the Turkish ministers declined to comply with the Russian demand, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities. In six months a miserable quarrel about the custody of the Holy Places had assumed dimensions which were clearly threatening war. At the advice of England the Porte abstained from treating the occupation of the Principalities as an act of war; and diplomacy consequently secured an interval for arranging peace. The Austrian Government framed a note, which is known as the Vienna Note, as a basis of a settlement. England and the neutral powers assented to the note; Russia accepted it; and it was then presented to the Porte. But Turkey, with the obstinacy which has always characterised its statesmen, declined to accept it. War might even then have been prevented if the British Government had boldly insisted on its acceptance, and had told Turkey that if she modified the conditions she need not count on England's assistance. One of the leading members of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry wished to do this, and declared to the last hour of his life that this course should have been taken. {2775} But the course was not taken. Turkey was permitted, or, according to Baron Stockmar, encouraged to modify the Vienna Note; the modifications were rejected by Russia; and the Porte, on the 26th of September, delivered an ultimatum, and on the 4th of October 1853 declared war. These events excited a very widespread indignation in this country. The people, indeed, were only imperfectly acquainted with the causes which had produced the quarrel; many of them were unaware that the complication had been originally introduced by the act of France; others of them failed to reflect that the refusal of the Porte to accept a note which the four Great Powers—of which England was one—had agreed upon was the immediate cause of hostilities. Those who were better informed thought that the note was a mistake, and that the Turk had exercised a wise discretion in rejecting it; while the whole nation instinctively felt that Russia, throughout the negotiations, had acted with unnecessary harshness. In October 1853, therefore, the country was almost unanimously in favour of supporting the Turk. The events of the next few weeks turned this feeling into enthusiasm. The Turkish army, under Omar Pasha, proved its mettle by winning one or two victories over the Russian troops. The Turkish fleet at Sinope was suddenly attacked and destroyed. Its destruction was, undoubtedly, an act of war: it was distorted into an act of treachery; a rupture between England and Russia became thenceforward inevitable; and in March 1854 England and France declared war."

_S. Walpole, Foreign Relations, chapter 3._

ALSO IN: _A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, volume l._

_J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, volume 2, chapter 6._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1854 (September). The Crimean War: Landing of the Allies. Battle of the Alma. Sufferings of the invading army.